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negotiable instruments act

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Sec.138 of N.I.Act – Territorial Jurisdiction -where the cheque was dishonored – Bhaskaran judgment was overruled – 3 bench judges held that Once the cause of action accrues to the complainant, the jurisdiction of the Court to try the case will be determined by reference to the place where the cheque is dishonoured. – The general rule stipulated under Section 177 of Cr.P.C applies to cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Prosecution in such cases can, therefore, be launched against the drawer of the cheque only before the Court within whose jurisdiction the dishonour takes place except in situations where the offence of dishonour of the cheque punishable under Section 138 is committed along with other offences in a single transaction within the meaning of Section 220(1) read with Section 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or is covered by the provisions of Section 182(1) read with Sections 184 and 220 thereof. and further held that – 1. this judgment will have only prospective pertinence, i.e. applicability to Complaints that may be filed after this pronouncement.- 2.where, post the summoning and appearance of the alleged Accused, the recording of evidence has commenced as envisaged in Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, will proceeding continue at that place.- 3.whether evidence has been led before the Magistrate at the pre-summoning stage, either by affidavit or by oral statement, the Complaint will be maintainable only at the place where the cheque stands dishonoured. – 4.the category of Complaint cases where proceedings have gone to the stage of Section 145(2) or beyond shall be deemed to have been transferred by us from the Court ordinarily possessing territorial jurisdiction, as now clarified, to the Court where it is presently pending. – 5.All other Complaints (obviously including those where the accused/respondent has not been properly served) shall be returned to the Complainant for filing in the proper Court, in consonance with our exposition of the law. – 6. If such Complaints are filed/refiled within thirty days of their return, they shall be deemed to have been filed within the time prescribed by law, unless the initial or prior filing was itself time barred.= CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2287 OF 2009 Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod …..Appellant Versus State of Maharashtra & Anr. …..Respondents = 2014 – Aug – Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41801

Sec.138 of N.I.Act – Territorial Jurisdiction –where the cheque was dishonored – Bhaskaran judgment was overruled – 3 bench judges held that Once the cause of action accrues to the complainant, the  jurisdiction of the Court to try the case will be determined by reference  to  the  place where the cheque is dishonoured.- The general rule stipulated under Section 177 of … Continue reading

Sec.138 of N.I.Act – Sec.27 of General clauses Act and Sec.114 of Evidence Act – Presumption of service of Statutory Notice under sec.138 – when it was given to correct address – then there is no need to plead specifically that the accused managed and got return the notice un served in the pleadings of complaint – High court erred in quashing the complaint basing on Shakti Travel & Tours which does not hold the field any more. – Apex court held that It is not necessary to aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. and set aside the High court order= CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1523 OF 2014 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.)No.8783 of 2013] M/s. Ajeet Seeds Ltd. … Appellant Vs. K. Gopala Krishnaiah … Respondent = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41790

  Sec.138 of N.I.Act – Sec.27 of General clauses Act and Sec.114 of Evidence Act – Presumption of service of Statutory Notice under sec.138 – when it was given to correct address – then there is no need to plead specifically that the accused managed and got return the notice un served in the pleadings … Continue reading

Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – failure of complainant to plead – Directors, Manager, Secretary or other officers of the company for arraying as accused there must be specific pleadings that the accused were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company – High court rightly quashed the complaint = Mannalal Chamaria & Anr. ….Appellants Versus State of West Bengal and Anr. …Respondents = 2014 (March.Part) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41331

   Sections  138  and  141 of    the    Negotiable    Instruments    Act,    1881  – failure of complainant to plead  – Directors,  Manager, Secretary or other officers of the company for arraying as accused there must be specific pleadings that the accused were in charge of and  responsible for the conduct of the business of the company – … Continue reading

whether an authorised signatory of a company would be liable for prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for brevity ‘the Act’) without the company being arraigned as an accused. -apex court held No = “141. Offences by companies. – (1) If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly; Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence: Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a Company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act, has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.” 16. On a reading of the said provision, it is plain as day that if a person who commits offence under Section 138 of the Act is a company, the company as well as every person in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of business of the company at the time of commission of offence is deemed to be guilty of the offence. The first proviso carves out under what circumstances the criminal liability would not be fastened. Sub-section (2) enlarges the criminal liability by incorporating the concepts of connivance, negligence and consent that engulfs many categories of officers. It is worth noting that in both the provisions, there is a ‘deemed’ concept of criminal liability.- Resultantly, the Criminal Appeal Nos. 838 of 2008 and 842 of 2008 are allowed and the proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the Act are quashed. 46. Presently, we shall advert to the other two appeals, i.e., Criminal Appeal Nos. 1483 of 2009 and 1484 of 2009 wherein the offence is under Section 67 read with Section 85 of the 2000 Act. In Criminal Appeal No. 1483 of 2009, the director of the company is the appellant and in Criminal Appeal No. 1484 of 2009, the company. Both of them have called in question the legal substantiality of the same order passed by the High Court. In the said case, the High Court followed the decision in Sheoratan Agarwal (supra) and, while dealing with the application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the instance of Avnish Bajaj, the Managing Director of the company, quashed the charges under Sections 292 and 294 of the Indian Penal Code and directed the offences under Section 67 read with Section 85 of the 2000 Act to continue. It is apt to note that the learned single Judge has observed that a prima facie case for the offence under Sections 292(2)(a) and 292(2)(b) of the Indian Penal Code is also made out against the company. 47. Section 85 of the 2000 Act is as under: – “85. Offences by companies – (1) Where a person committing a contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder is a company, every person who, at the time the contravention was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of business of the company as well as the company, shall be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to punishment if he proves that the contravention took place without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where a contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule, direction or order made there under has been committed by a company and it is proved that the contravention has taken place with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.” 48. Keeping in view the anatomy of the aforesaid provision, our analysis pertaining to Section 141 of the Act would squarely apply to the 2000 enactment. Thus adjudged, the director could not have been held liable for the offence under Section 85 of the 2000 Act. Resultantly, the Criminal Appeal No. 1483 of 2009 is allowed and the proceeding against the appellant is quashed. As far as the company is concerned, it was not arraigned as an accused. Ergo, the proceeding as initiated in the existing incarnation is not maintainable either against the company or against the director. As a logical sequeter, the appeals are allowed and the proceedings initiated against Avnish Bajaj as well as the company in the present form are quashed. 49. Before we part with the case, we must record our uninhibited and unreserved appreciation for the able assistance rendered by the learned counsel for the parties and the learned amicus curiae. 50. In the ultimate analysis, all the appeals are allowed.

   published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=39265 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 838 OF 2008   Aneeta Hada …..……..Appellant Versus M/s. Godfather Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd. ………Respondent WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 842 OF 2008 Anil Hada …………Appellant Versus M/s. Godfather Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd. ………Respondent WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. … Continue reading

whether the Court, where a cheque is deposited for collection, would have territorial jurisdiction to try the accused for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short “the N.I.Act”) or would it be only the Court exercising territorial jurisdiction over the drawee bank or the bank on which the cheque is drawn? = whether the sending of notice from Delhi itself would give rise to a cause of action in taking cognizance under the N.I. Act. In such circumstances, we are of the view that Harman Electronics (supra) is only an authority on the question where a court will have jurisdiction because only notice is issued from the place which falls within its jurisdiction and it does not deviate from the other principles laid down in K. Bhaskaran (supra). This Court has accepted that the place where the cheque was presented and dishonoured has jurisdiction to try the complaint. In this way, this Court concluded that issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action but communication of the notice would. In other words, the court clarified only on the service in such notice and failure on the part of the accused to pay the demanded amount within a period of 15 days, thereafter, the commission of an offence completes. We are of the view that this Court in Harman Electronics (supra) affirmed what it had said in K. Bhaskaran (supra) that court within whose jurisdiction the cheque is presented and in whose jurisdiction there is failure to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of notice can have jurisdiction to try the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. It is also relevant to point out that while holding that the Chandigarh Court has jurisdiction, this Court in Harman Electronics (supra) observed that in the case before it, the complaint was silent as to whether the said cheque was presented at Delhi. In the case on hand, it is categorically stated that the cheque was presented at Bhiwani whereas in Harman Electronics (supra) the dishonour had taken place at Chandigarh and this fact was taken into account while holding that Chandigarh court has jurisdiction. In the complaint in question, it is specifically stated that the dishonour took place at Bhiwani. We are also satisfied that nothing said in Harman Electronics (supra) had adverse impact on the complainant’s case in the present case. we must note that in K. Bhaskaran (supra), this Court has held that Section 178 of the Code has widened the scope of jurisdiction of a criminal court and Section 179 of the Code has stretched it to still a wider horizon. Further, for the sake of repetition, we reiterate that the judgment in Ishar Alloy (supra) does not affect the ratio in K. Bhaskaran (supra) which provides jurisdiction at the place of residence of the payer and the payee. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances and even on merits, the High Court rightly refused to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code and dismissed the petition filed by the appellantaccused. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the ratio laid down in K.Bhaskaran (supra) squarely applies to the case on hand. The said principle was correctly applied by the learned Sessions Judge as well as the High Court. Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. In view of the dismissal of the appeal, the interim order granted by this Court on 09.12.2011 shall stand vacated.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40477 Page 1 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 808 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 9434 of 2011) Nishant Aggarwal …. Appellant(s) Versus Kailash Kumar Sharma …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam,J. 1) Leave granted. 2) The question … Continue reading

in cheque bounce case – High court confirmed the order of conviction and sentence of three months simple imprisonment and to pay compensation of Rs.5 lakhs, however, the High Court was of opinion that no separate sentence could be awarded in default of payment of compensation when substantive sentence of imprisonment is independently awarded. The High Court, therefore, set aside the sentence in default of payment of compensation. Being aggrieved by the said order of conviction and sentence, the accused has approached this court by way of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.2299 of 2012. The complainant has filed Special Leave Petition No.3327 of 2012 being aggrieved by the order of the High Court to the extent it sets aside the order of sentence in default of payment of compensation. The idea behind directing the accused to pay compensation to the complainant is to give him immediate relief so as to alleviate his grievance. In terms of Section 357(3) compensation is awarded for the loss or injury suffered by the person due to the act of the accused for which he is sentenced. If merely an order, directing compensation, is passed, it would be totally ineffective. It could be an order without any deterrence or apprehension of immediate adverse consequences in case of its non- observance. The whole purpose of giving relief to the complainant under Section 357(3) of the Code would be frustrated if he is driven to take recourse to Section 421 of the Code. Order under Section 357 (3) must have potentiality to secure its observance. Deterrence can only be infused into the order by providing for a default sentence. If Section 421 of the Code puts compensation ordered to be paid by the court on par with fine so far as mode of recovery is concerned, then there is no reason why the court cannot impose a sentence in default of payment of compensation as it can be done in case of default in payment of fine under Section 64 of the IPC. It is obvious that in view of this, in Vijayan, this court stated that the above mentioned provisions enabled the court to impose a sentence in default of payment of compensation and rejected the submission that the recourse can only be had to Section 421 of the Code for enforcing the order of compensation. Pertinently, it was made clear that observations made by this Court in Hari Singh are as important today as they were when they were made. The conclusion, therefore, is that the order to pay compensation may be enforced by awarding sentence in default. 19. In view of the above, we find no illegality in the order passed by the learned Magistrate and confirmed by the Sessions Court in awarding sentence in default of payment of compensation. The High Court was in error in setting aside the sentence imposed in default of payment of compensation. We set aside the impugned order of the High Court to the extent it quashes the sentence in default of payment of compensation. We restore the order passed by learned Magistrate dated 16/4/2004 awarding two months simple imprisonment in default of payment of compensation of Rs.5 lakhs under Section 357(3) of the Code. We grant two months’ time to the accused to pay the said amount of compensation to the complainant from the date of receipt of this order.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.883 OF 2012 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.2299 of 2012] R. MOHAN … APPELLANT Vs. A.K. VIJAYA KUMAR … RESPONDENT AND CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.884 OF 2012 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.3327 of 2012] A.K. VIJAYA KUMAR … … Continue reading

Whether the Doctrine of Double Jeopardy is applicable for prosecuting the accused under sec.406 and 420 I.P.C. when the accused was already prosecuted under sec.138 of N.I. ACT on the same set of facts.? APEX COURT HELD NO = Admittedly, the appellant had been tried earlier for the offences punishable under the provisions of Section 138 N.I. Act and the case is sub judice before the High Court. In the instant case, he is involved under Sections 406/420 read with Section 114 IPC. In the prosecution under Section 138 N.I. Act, the mens rea i.e. fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of issuance of cheque is not required to be proved. However, in the case under IPC involved herein, the issue of mens rea may be relevant. The offence punishable under Section 420 IPC is a serious one as the sentence of 7 years can be imposed. In the case under N.I. Act, there is a legal presumption that the cheque had been issued for discharging the antecedent liability and that presumption can be rebutted only by the person who draws the cheque. Such a requirement is not there in the offences under IPC. In the case under N.I. Act, if a fine is imposed, it is to be adjusted to meet the legally enforceable liability. There cannot be such a requirement in the offences under IPC. The case under N.I. Act can only be initiated by filing a complaint. However, in a case under the IPC such a condition is not necessary. 28. There may be some overlapping of facts in both the cases but ingredients of offences are entirely different. Thus, the subsequent case is not barred by any of the aforesaid statutory provisions. The appeal is devoid of any merit and accordingly dismissed.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 645 of 2012 Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel …Appellant Versus State of Gujarat & Anr. …Respondents J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated 18.8.2011 passed by … Continue reading

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881: ss. 139 and 138 – Presumption in favour of holder – Manner of rebuttal of statutory presumption – Held: Presumption mandated by s. 139 includes existence of legally enforceable debt or liability – It is in nature of rebuttable presumption – Accused can raise a defence wherein existence of legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested – However, initial presumption favours the complainant – Reverse onus clause is included and the same is guided by the test of proportionality – Accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof – Standard of proof for rebutting presumption is of `preponderance of probabilities’ – If accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability, prosecution can fail – On facts, dishonour of cheque on account of `stop payment’ instructions sent by accused – Complaint u/s. 138 – Acquittal by trial court in view of discrepancies in the complainant’s version – Conviction by High Court since accused did not raise a probable defence to rebut the statutory presumption, does not call for interference – Complaint disclosed prima facie existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability – Accused failed to reply to the statutory notice u/s.138. s. 138 – Applicability of – Held: s. 138 is applicable when cheque is dishonoured on account of `stop payment’ instructions sent by accused to his bank in respect of post-dated cheque, irrespective of insufficiency of funds. The appellant engaged the services of the respondent-engineer for supervising the construction of his house. The appellant requested the respondent for a hand loan to meet the construction expenses. In view of the acquaintance, the respondent paid the same by way of cash. The appellant issued a cheque for repayment of the said amount. The respondent presented the cheque for encashment. The bank issued a return memo stating that the payment had been stopped by the drawer. Thereafter, the appellant did not honour the cheque within the statutorily prescribed period and also did not reply to the notice u/s. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The respondent filed a complaint against the appellant for offence punishable u/s.138 of the Act. The trial court acquitted the appellant u/s.138 in view of some discrepancies in the complainant’s version. The High Court holding that the appellant did not raise a probable defence to rebut the statutory presumption, convicted the appellant for commission of offence u/s. 138 of the Act and directed to pay fine of Rs. 75,000/-. Hence the present appeal. Disposing of the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. Ordinarily in cheque bouncing cases, what the courts have to consider is whether the ingredients of the offence enumerated in s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 have been met and if so, whether the accused was able to rebut the statutory presumption contemplated by s.139 of the Act. With respect to the facts of the instant case, it must be clarified that contrary to the trial court’s finding, s.138 of the Act can indeed be attracted when a cheque is dishonoured on account of `stop payment’ instructions sent by the accused to his bank in respect of a post- dated cheque, irrespective of insufficiency of funds in the account. [Para 9] [518-D-F] Goa Plast (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula D’Souza (2003) 3 SCC 232, referred to. 2.1. The presumption mandated by s.139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. This is in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While s.138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption u/s. 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by s.138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. When an accused has to rebut the presumption under s.139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of `preponderance of probabilities’. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own. [Para 14] [525-G; 526-A-G] 2.2. The High Court’s view that the accused did not raise a probable defence is accepted. The defence of the loss of a blank cheque was taken up belatedly and the accused had mentioned a different date in the `stop payment’ instructions to his bank. The instructions to `stop payment’ had not even mentioned that the cheque had been lost. A perusal of the trial record also shows that the accused appeared to be aware of the fact that the cheque was with the complainant. Furthermore, the very fact that the accused had failed to reply to the statutory notice u/s.138 of the Act leads to the inference that there was merit in the complainant’s version. Apart from not raising a probable defence, the appellant-accused was not able to contest the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. The fact that the accused had made regular payments to the complainant in relation to the construction of his house does not preclude the possibility of the complainant having spent his own money for the same purpose. As per the record of the case, there was a slight discrepancy in the complainant’s version, in so far as it was not clear whether the accused had asked for a hand loan to meet the construction-related expenses or whether the complainant had incurred the said expenditure over a period of time. Either way, the complaint discloses the prima facie existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability since the complainant has maintained that his money was used for the construction-expenses. Since the accused did admit that the signature on the cheque was his, the statutory presumption comes into play and the same has not been rebutted even with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. Thus, there is no reason to interfere with the final order of the High Court which recorded a finding of conviction against the appellant. [Paras 15 and 16] [526-H; 257-A-G] Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde (2008) 4 SCC 54; Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee (2001) 6 SCC 16; Mallavarapu Kasivisweswara Rao v. Thadikonda Ramulu Firm and Ors. 2008 (8) SCALE 680; Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Company v. Amin Chand Pyarelal (1993) 3 SCC 35; M.M.T.C. Ltd. and Anr. v. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. (2002) 1 SCC 234, referred to. Case Law Reference: 2003 (3) SCC 232 Referred to. Para 9 (2008) 4 SCC 54 Referred to. Para 10 (2001) 6 SCC 16 Referred to. Para 11 2008 (8) SCALE 680 Referred to. Para 12 1993 (3) SCC 35 Referred to. Para 12 (2002) 1 SCC 234 Referred to. Para 13 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1020 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 26.10.2005 of the High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No. 1367 of 2005. Girish Ananthamurthy, P.P. Singh for the Appellant. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, B. Subrahmanya Prasad, V.N. Raghupathy for the Respondent.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1020 OF 2010 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 407 of 2006] Rangappa … Appellant Versus Sri Mohan … Respondent   JUDGMENT K.G. Balakrishnan, C.J.I. 1. Leave granted. 2. In the present case, the trial court had acquitted the appellant-accused in a … Continue reading

whether the consent of the complainant is required for compounding an offence like that off under sec.320 of Cr.P.C. due to non-abstante clause of sec.147 of N.I.ACT ?=this Court is unable to accept the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant(s) that as a result of sanction of a scheme under Section 391 of the Companies Act there is an automatic compounding of offences under Section 138 of the N.I. Act even without the consent of the complainant.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO_263_ OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.4445/2009) JIK Industries Limited & Ors. ….Appellant(s) – Versus – Amarlal V. Jumani and Another ….Respondent(s) WITH Crl.A. No…264/2012 @ SLP(Crl) No.4446/2009, Crl.A. No 265/2012 @ SLP(Crl) No.4447/2009, Crl.A. No.266/2012 @ SLP(Crl) No.4448/2009, Crl.A. No.267/2012 … Continue reading

cheque bouns case =As of today, the appellant has undergone the sentence for a period of about 2= months before she was released on bail. Considering the fact that the appellant has deposited the amount of compensation i.e. Rs.2,20,000/- and the fact 5 that the appellant is a widow and is the only earning member in the family and considering the fact that though served with notice the respondent has not cared to appear in this Court, we are of the opinion that sentence already undergone by her should be treated as a sentence for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Order accordingly. The appellant is on bail. Her bail bond stands discharged. Needless to say that this order is passed in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 8. Appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 181 OF 2012 [ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 10537 OF 2010]     B. CHANDRAMATHI … APPELLANT Versus N. PRAKASH … RESPONDENT   O R D E R   1. Leave granted.   2. This appeal, by grant of special leave, … Continue reading

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