North India

This tag is associated with 3 posts

Land Acquisition Act – enhancement of Market value – by applying principle of 12% increase per year on the market value as the 12% per annum increase which courts have often found to be adequate in compensation matters hardly does justice to those land owners whose land have been acquired as judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the increase is not 10 or 12 or 15% per year but is often upto 100% a year for land which has the potential of being urbanized and commercialized such as in the present case.” – Apex court enhanced the compensation = Kashmir Singh …Appellant(s) Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. …Respondent(s) = published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41088

Land Acquisition Act – enhancement of Market value – by applying principle of 12% increase per year  on the market value as the  12%  per  annum increase  which  courts  have  often  found  to  be  adequate  in compensation matters hardly does justice  to  those  land  owners whose land have been acquired as judicial notice can be taken  of the fact that … Continue reading

Change report in respect of six churches amalgamation of person and property = was set aside and the same was confirmed by Apex court- Change Reports were filed by First District Church of the Brethren (hereinafter referred to as ‘the FDCB’) a registered religious society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the SR Act’) bearing Registration No. 1202/44 and later registered as public trust in Gujarat bearing No.E- 643/Bharuch, after the enactment of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the BPTA’) property of which is vested with its ‘Property Committee’ and the Church of North India (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CNI’), Gujarat Diocese. The CNI is a public trust registered by an application accepted on May 12, 1970 with effect of registration being given from 1971 and the trust being formed on November 29, 1970 with Registration No. D-17/Ahmedabad. 3. These Change Reports were filed to give effect to the unification of six churches which included the FDCB, an offshoot of the ‘Brethren Church’ of USA (other Churches being The Council of the Baptist Churches in North India, The Church of India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon, The Methodist Church (British and Australian Conference), The Methodist Church in Southern Asia and The United Church of Northern India) into a single entity, ‘The Church of North India’ (with the Gujarat Chapter being managed by the Church of North India, Gujarat, Diocese).= scope of inquiry of the Charity Commissioner under Section 22 of the Act, this Court in Church of North India (supra) very aptly provided a bird’s eye view of Section 22 which is provided as under : “….Section 22 provides for the change which may occur in any of the entries recorded in the register kept under Section 17 to make an appropriate application within 90 days from the date of the occurrence of such change. Sub-section (1A) of Section 22 reads thus: “(1A) Where the change to be reported under sub- section (1) relates to any immovable property, the trustee shall, alongwith the report, furnish a memorandum in the prescribed form containing the particulars (including the name and description of the public trust) relating to any change in the immovable property of such public trust, for forwarding it to the sub-registrar referred to in sub- section (7) of section 18.” 31. Sub-section (2) of Section 22 empowers a Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner to hold an inquiry for the purpose of verifying the correctness of the entries in the register kept under Section 17 or ascertaining whether any change has occurred in any of the particulars recorded therein. In the event, a change is found to have occurred in any of the entries recorded in the register kept under Section 17, the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner is required to record a finding with the reasons therefore to that effect. Such an order is appealable to the Charity Commissioner. By reason of changes which have been found to have occurred, the entries in the register are required to be amended. Such amendment on the occurrence of change is final and conclusive.” = it is the duty of the society to take steps in accordance with Section 13 of the SR Act for its dissolution. We have further noted that unless the properties vested in the Trust are divested in accordance with the provisions of the SR Act and in accordance with the BPTA, merely by filing the Change Report/s, CNI cannot claim a merger of churches and thereby claim that the properties vested in the Trust would vest in them. In our opinion, it would only be evident from the steps taken that the passing of resolutions is nothing but an indication to show the intention to merge and nothing else. In fact, the City Civil Court has correctly held, in our opinion, which has been affirmed by the High Court, that there was no dissolution of the society and further merger was not carried out in accordance with the provisions of law. In these circumstances, we hold that the society and the Trust being creatures of statute, have to resort to the modes provided by the statute for its amalgamation and the so-called merger cannot be treated or can give effect to the dissolution of the Trust. In the matrix of the facts, we hold that without taking any steps in accordance with the provisions of law, the effect of the resolutions or deliberations is not acceptable in the domain of law. The question of estoppel also cannot stand in the way as the High Court has correctly pointed out that the freedom guaranteed under the Constitution with regard to the faith and religion, cannot take away the right in changing the faith and religion after giving a fresh look and thinking at any time and thereby cannot be bound by any rules of estoppel. Therefore, the resolution only resolved to accept the recommendation of joint unification but does not refer to dissolution. 26. Having analysed the facts and the law in the matter, we are of the opinion that the High Court and the City Civil Court have rightly adjudicated on the matter in question and correctly set aside the order passed by the Charity Commissioner. 27. Accordingly, we affirm the order passed by the High Court. 28. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in the present appeals and the same are dismissed accordingly.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40842     Reportable   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8800-8801 /2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 16575-16576 of 2012)       Vinodkumar M. Malavia etc. … Appellants   Vs.   Maganlal Mangaldas Gameti & Ors. … Respondents       J … Continue reading

whether the competing goods are different and whether the Registrar was right in refusing the appellant’s opposition. In deciding on this point the well settled law is to consider the nature of goods; its characteristic; its origin; the purpose; whether it is produced usually by one and the same manufacturer or distributed by the same wholesale houses; whether they are sold in the same shop over the same counter; during the same season and to the same class or classes of customers; whether they are regarded as belonging to the same trade etc. The Act uses the expression ”Similarity of goods or services” [S.11(a)]. The essential requirement is that there should be such similarity resulting in the likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. The question whether or not two sets of goods are of the same description is a question of fact and in deciding that question “one has to look at the trade” and must look at it from a practical business and commercial point of view. It is recognized that classification of goods and services is only an enabling tool for seeking registration and we can find many goods of same description in different classes as also goods of different description in the same class. In the instant case the competing marks are identical i.e. SONA. The rival goods are used by the common man. The perception of the mark in the mind of average consumer plays a decisive role. Here the appellant coined, adopted and started using SONA from 1975. The respondent was born some ten years later. Here it is layperson – illiterate, semi-literate, housewives, servants who will be buying both goods. Confusion as to the trade source is therefore inevitable. When the rival goods are used through the same trade channel and sold in the same shop over the same counter, many customers will wonder whether it might not be the case that the two products come from the same source. There is a real tangible danger if the impugned trade mark is put on the Register. The respondent started the use of the impugned trade mark in 1985 with an annual turnover of Rs.36,000/-. Upto 1995 their annual turnover was always less than one lakh rupees. On the other hand even before the respondent’s trade mark was born in 1985, the appellant annual turnover had reached Rs.36.0 lakhs. No wonder the appellant are greatly exercised. He is expanding and diversifying his business. The appellant have thus established by evidence filed before the Registrar and beyond any reasonable doubt, the civil standard of proof required to show that potential customers for the appellant’s goods will be misled into purchasing the respondent’s goods. In determining the likelihood of confusion because of similarity of goods, we are concerned with ordinary practical business probabilities having regard to all the circumstances. There is great affinity between the competing goods here. Since the practice of Registry is not to permit registration for a broad range of goods in a class, it then becomes its duty to ensure correct application of law in respect of subsequent identical mark for cognate class of goods. The Deputy Registrar had erred in applying the wrong test and permitted the registration of the impugned trade mark. His ruling that the rival goods are totally dim-similar is misconceived as the class of customers has been ignored. Similarity and confusion as to origin both largely are matters of fact and impression. The appellant have built a reasonable reputation for their trade mark SONA ten years before the respondent. In deciding such cases one has to think like a common man. That is the only correct test that can be sustained. The supreme test is the likely public confusion bench marking the level of education, class of customers at ground zero. 7. Accordingly, we set aside the order of the Deputy Registrar permitting registration of the impugned trade mark. OA/54/2005/TM/KOL is consequently allowed and the impugned trade mark “SONA” in class 30 is refused registration. There is no order as to costs.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD Guna Complex Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443 Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai-600018   (Circuit Bench Sitting at Kolkata)   OA/54/2005/TM/KOL FRIDAY, THIS THE 8th DAY OF JUNE, 2012     HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE PRABHA SRIDEVAN          … CHAIRMAN HON’BLE SHRI V. RAVI                                                   … TECHNICAL MEMBER   M/s Sona Spices Pvt. Ltd., 746, Industrial Area, Phase-11, … Continue reading

Blog Stats

  • 2,859,662 hits



Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 1,903 other followers

Follow advocatemmmohan on WordPress.com