//
archives

NZR UD class

This tag is associated with 20 posts

changing his date of birth = whereby the Division Bench has overturned the judgment and order dated 14.6.2004 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 5700(W) of 2001 whereunder he had given the stamp of approval to decision dated 26.2.2004 by the General Manager of the appellant-company, who had rejected the objection of the respondent for changing his date of birth as recorded in his service excerpts and Form ‘B’ Register, the appellants have preferred their appeal by special leave.- “Implementation Instruction No. 76” has tried to support the order passed by the Division Bench. Para (A)(i) deals with Matriculation certificate. It reads as follows: – “(i) Matriculates. In the case of appointees who have passed Matriculation or equivalent examinations, the date of birth recorded in the said certificate shall be treated as correct date of birth and the same will not be altered under any circumstances.” Para (A)(v) deals with revision of determination of date of birth in respect of existing employees. Paras (A)(v)(i)(a) and (b) are as follows: – “v) Review determination of date of birth in respect of existing employees. i) (a) In the case of the existing employees Matriculation Certificate or Higher Secondary Certificate issued by the recognized Universities or Board or Middle pass Certificate issued by the Board of Education and/or Department of Public Instruction and admit cards issued by the aforesaid Bodies should be treated as correct provided they were issued by the said Universities/Boards/Institutions prior to the date of employment. (b) Similarly, Mining Sirdarhip, Winding Engine or similar other statutory certificates where the Manager had to certify the date of birth will be treated as authentic. Provided that where both documents mentioned in (i)(a) and (i)(b) above are available, the date of birth recorded in (i)(a) will be treated as authentic.”- It is a well-known principle that one of the ends of equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If a person has taken an undue advantage the court in its extraordinary jurisdiction would be within its domain to deny the discretionary relief. In fact, Mr. Singh, learned senior counsel for the appellants, has basically rested his submission on this axis. In our considered opinion, the Division Bench has erred in extending the benefit to the respondent who had taken undue advantage by not producing the Matriculation Certificate solely on the motive to get an entry into service. In view of our aforesaid premised reasons we are unable to concur with the view taken by the High Court in F.M.A. No. 169 of 2006 and, accordingly, the Judgment dated 17.8.2007 passed by the Division Bench is set aside. 19. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.

published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40832 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8634 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 22813 of 2007) Eastern Coalfields Ltd. and others … Appellants Versus Bajrangi Rabidas …Respondent         J U D G M E N T   Dipak Misra, J. … Continue reading

M.V. Act – COMPENSATION TO A CHILD = What is the just and fair compensation to be awarded to a child, who suffered disability in a motor accident, is the main point arising for consideration in this case.= In Kum. Michael vs. Regional Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Another[4], this Court considered the case of an eight year old child suffering a fracture on both legs with total disability only to the tune of 16%. It was held that the child should be entitled to an amount of Rs.3,80,000/- on these counts. 12. Though it is difficult to have an accurate assessment of the compensation in the case of children suffering disability on account of a motor vehicle accident, having regard to the relevant factors, precedents and the approach of various High Courts, we are of the view that the appropriate compensation on all other heads in addition to the actual expenditure for treatment, attendant, etc., should be, if the disability is above 10% and upto 30% to the whole body, Rs.3 lakhs; upto 60%, Rs.4 lakhs; upto 90%, Rs.5 lakhs and above 90%, it should be Rs.6 lakhs. For permanent disability upto 10%, it should be Re.1 lakh, unless there are exceptional circumstances to take different yardstick. In the instant case, the disability is to the tune of 18%. Appellant had a longer period of hospitalization for about two months causing also inconvenience and loss of earning to the parents. The appellant, hence, would be entitled to get the compensation as follows: – | HEAD |COMPENSATION AMOUNT | |Pain and suffering already |Rs.3,00,000/- | |undergone and to be suffered in | | |future, mental and physical shock, | | |hardship, inconvenience, and | | |discomforts, etc., and loss of | | |amenities in life on account of | | |permanent disability. | | |Discomfort, inconvenience and loss |Rs.25,000/- | |of earnings to the parents during | | |the period of hospitalization. | | |Medical and incidental expenses |Rs.25,000/- | |during the period of | | |hospitalization for 58 days. | | |Future medical expenses for |Rs.25,000/- | |correction of the mal union of | | |fracture and incidental expenses | | |for such treatment. | | |TOTAL:- |Rs.3,75,000/- | 13. The impugned judgment of the High Court in M.F.A. No. 1146 of 2008 is accordingly modified. The claimant will be entitled to a total compensation of Rs.3,75,000/- along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of the petition. First respondent – Insurance Company is directed to deposit the enhanced compensation with interest as above within two months from today. On such deposit, it will be open to the appellant to approach the Tribunal for appropriate orders on withdrawal. The appeal is allowed as above.

 published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40696 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.7139 OF 2013 [Arising out of S.L.P.(Civil) No. 1676 of 2012] Master Mallikarjun … Appellant (s) Versus Divisional Manager, the National Insurance Company Limited & Anr. … Respondent (s) J U D G M E N T KURIAN, J.: Leave granted. 2. … Continue reading

Interpretation of clause in the agreement of sale – Excise duty notice calling upon erst while owner is quashed =Excise dues are not the statutory liabilities which arise out of the land and building or the plant and machinery. = “all these statutory liabilities arising out of the land shall be borne by purchaser in the sale deed” and “all these statutory liabilities arising out of the said properties shall be borne by the vendee and vendor shall not be held responsible in the Agreement of Sale.” As per the High Court, these statutory liabilities would include excise dues. We find that the High Court has missed the true intent and purport of this clause. The expressions in the Sale Deed as well as in the Agreement for purchase of plant and machinery talks of statutory liabilities “arising out of the land” or statutory liabilities “arising out of the said properties” (i.e. the machinery). Thus, it is only that statutory liability which arises out of the land and building or out of plant and machinery which is to be discharged by the purchaser. Excise dues are not the statutory liabilities which arise out of the land and building or the plant and machinery. Statutory liabilities arising out of the land and building could be in the form of the property tax or other types of cess relating to property etc. Likewise, statutory liability arising out of the plant and machinery could be the sales tax etc. payable on the said machinery. As far as dues of the Central Excise are concerned, they were not related to the said plant and machinery or the land and building and thus did not arise out of those properties. Dues of the Excise Department became payable on the manufacturing of excisable items by the erstwhile owner, therefore, these statutory dues are in respect of those items produced and not the plant and machinery which was used for the purposes of manufacture. This fine distinction is not taken note at all by the High Court.= We thus conclude that the judgment of the High Court is unsustainable in law. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. As a consequence the notice of the Excise Department calling upon the appellant to pay the dues of the erstwhile owner of the unit in question also stands quashed. The appellant shall also be entitled to cost of this appeal.

published in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40655   [REPORTABLE]   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.6802/2013 (arising out of SLP(civil) No. 15278 of 2012)   M/s. Rana Girders Ltd. …..Appellant   Vs. Union of India & Ors. ….Respondents   J U D G M E N T A.K.SIKRI,J. 1. Leave granted. 2. One … Continue reading

A contract for sale of shares is not valid as per sec.13, and 16 of Securities Contracts ( Regulation) Act and as such transfer and registration of shares in the name of purchaser is prohibited and can not be enforced = Armed with the decree, Bhagwati on 12th December, 1994 lodged the transfer deeds in respect of 14120 shares with Peerless for their transfer. Peerless, however, did not accede to the prayer of Bhagwati and by its letter dated 8th February, 1995 refused to register the said shares, inter alia, on the ground that the said transfer of shares by Tuhin in favour of Bhagwati was in violation of the provisions of Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956; hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Regulation Act’. According to Peerless, the contract for sale of shares was not a spot delivery contract, signatures of Tuhin differed from the signatures on the record of Peerless and further the stamps affixed on the instruments of transfer had not been cancelled. Bhagwati re-lodged the shares for transfer on 14th February, 1995 with Peerless but again Peerless did not register those shares in the name of Bhagwati.- Bhagwati, aggrieved by that, approached the Company Law Board, Eastern Region by filing an application under Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956 hereinafter to be referred to as ’the Act’ and the Company Law Board by its judgment and order dated 25th November, 1998 dismissed the said application inter alia holding that transfer of shares in favour of Bhagwati was against the provisions of Sections 13 and 16 of the Regulation Act and as such, illegal. In the opinion of the Company Law Board Peerless rightly refused registration of transfer. While doing so, the Company Law Board further observed that the shares of a public limited company which are not registered in the Stock Exchange also come under the purview of Regulation Act.= the appellant pleaded that the contract in question is a spot delivery contract and, therefore, does not come within the mischief of Section 16 of the Regulation Act.= “16. Power to prohibit contracts in certain cases.- (1) If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary to prevent undesirable speculation in specified securities in any State or area, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that no person in the State or area specified in the notification shall, save with the permission of the Central Government, enter into any contract for the sale or purchase of any security specified in the notification except to the extent and in the manner, if any, specified therein. (2) All contracts in contravention of the provisions of sub- section (1) entered into after the date of the notification issued thereunder shall be illegal.” – According to the definition, a contract providing for actual delivery of securities and the payment of price thereof either on the same day as the date of contract or on the next day means a spot delivery contract. When we consider the facts of the present case bearing in mind the definition aforesaid, we find that the contract in question is not a spot delivery contract. True it is that by letter dated 30th of October, 1987 written by Tuhin to Bhagwati, he had stated that the formal agreement had been executed between them on 10th November, 1986 and as per the agreement he is transferring the entire 3530 shares of Peerless purchased from the loan amount and the transfer is in its repayment. However, the agreement dated 21st November, 1994 between Bhagwati and Tuhin which formed part of the compromise decree provides that the sale of shares took place on 30th October, 1987 and in consideration thereof Bhagwati paid a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs on 21st November, 1994 and further the dividend on the entire shares up to the accounting year 1989-90 amounting to Rs.8,64,850 to be retained by Tuhin. In the face of it, the plea of Bhagwati that the payment of Rs. 10 lakh was made to buy peace, is not fit to be accepted and, in fact, that forms part of the consideration for the sale of shares. Once we take this view, the plea of the appellant that it is a spot delivery contract is fit to be rejected. We agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the Company Law Board and the High Court on this issue. Both the contentions of the appellant having no substance, we do not find any merit in this appeal and it is dismissed accordingly but without any order as to costs.

 published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40558      REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.7445 OF 2004 BHAGWATI DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. APPELLANT VERSUS PEERLESS GENERAL FINANCE & INVESTMENT COMPANY LTD AND ANR. RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD,J. Appellant aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 30th July, 2003 passed in ACO No.76 … Continue reading

Service matter = revised merit list drawn after the selective re-evaluation of the answer scripts of all the candidates who had appeared in the Main Examination for the posts of Subedars, Platoon Commanders and Sub-Inspectors in the respondent-State of Chhattisgarh.- the High Court has dismissed the Writ Petitions filed by the appellants herein and confirmed the revised merit list drawn after the selective re-evaluation of the answer scripts of all the candidates who had appeared in the Main Examination for the posts of Subedars, Platoon Commanders and Sub-Inspectors in the respondent-State of Chhattisgarh.= Admittedly, in the instant case the error committed by the respondent-Board in the matter of evaluation of the answer scripts could not be attributed to the appellants as they have neither been found to have committed any fraud or misrepresentation in being appointed qua the first merit list nor has the preparation of the erroneous model answer key or the specious result contributed to them. Had the contrary been the case, it would have justified their ouster upon re-evaluation and deprived them of any sympathy from this Court irrespective of their length of service. In our considered view, the appellants have successfully undergone training and are efficiently serving the respondent-State for more than three years and undoubtedly their termination would not only impinge upon the economic security of the appellants and their dependants but also adversely affect their careers. This would be highly unjust and grossly unfair to the appellants who are innocent appointees of an erroneous evaluation of the answer scripts. However, their continuation in service should neither give any unfair advantage to the appellants nor cause undue prejudice to the candidates selected qua the revised merit list. 27. Accordingly, we direct the respondent-State to appoint the appellants in the revised merit list placing them at the bottom of the said list. The candidates who have crossed the minimum statutory age for appointment shall be accommodated with suitable age relaxation. 28. We clarify that their appointment shall for all intents and purpose be fresh appointment which would not entitle the appellants to any back wages, seniority or any other benefit based on their earlier appointment. 29. The order passed by the High Court shall stand modified to the above extent. Appeals disposed of.

  published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40543 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.5318-5319 OF 2013 (@ S.L.P.(C) Nos.26341-26342 of 2011) |Vikas Pratap Singh and Ors. | Appellants | Versus |State of Chhattisgarh and Ors. | Respondents | WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5320 OF 2013 (@ S.L.P.(C) No. 26349 OF 2011) Rajendra Singh … Continue reading

Land Acquisition Act = Advance possession payment of compensation like rents as fixed by LAO – enhanced by District court under sec.18 reference = pending appeal interim orders to deposit half of the compensation is legal = whether the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench was justified in directing the State to deposit the rental compensation with the Appellate Court at the rate of 8% per annum on the award value passed by the Reference Court for the period of occupation before formal acquisition, allowing the appellant to withdraw only 50% of such rental compensation during the pendency of the appeal. = It is not in dispute that in most of the cases the rental compensation has not been paid. If that factual position continues, it clearly is a case where the amount to which a person is entitled is withheld without any legitimate excuse. The learned counsel for the appellants strenuously urged that in most of the cases the proceedings have not yet attained finality and are pending either before the Reference Court or in appeal. That does not provide a legitimate excuse to the appellants to withhold payment of the rental compensation. The amount calculated on the basis of award by the Land Acquisition Officer cannot be below than the amount to be ultimately fixed. If in appeal or the reference proceeding, there is any variation, the same can be duly taken note of as provided in law. There is no difficulty and we find none as to why the compensation on the basis of value determined by the Land Acquisition Officer cannot be paid. If there is upward revision of the amount, the consequences will follow and if necessary, redetermination of the rental compensation can be made and after adjustment of the amount paid, if any, balance can be paid. If, however, the Land Acquisition Officer’s award is maintained then nothing further may be required to be done. In either event, payment of the rental compensation expeditiously would be an appropriate step. Looking at the problem from another perspective, one thing is clear that authorities have clearly ignored the sense of urgency highlighted in the various resolutions.”- For the reason aforesaid, if the High Court recalled the order dated 5th October, 2010 and directed the State Government to deposit rental compensation at the rate of 8% of the amount awarded by the Reference Court with the appellate Court, allowing the appellant to withdraw the half of the amount, no interference is called for. However, this order will not stand in the way of appellant to claim proportionate higher rental compensation, if the order of the Reference Court is upheld or further enhancement of compensation is made by the Appellate Court. 20. We find no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed with observations as made above. No costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40514 Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.    5084              OF 2013 (arising out of SLP(C)No.31318  of 2011) KAZI AKILODDIN SUJAODDIN           … APPELLANT Versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.          … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Leave granted.  The appellant is aggrieved by impugned order   dated   15th  September,   2011   passed   by   the   Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in a   Review   Application,   MCA   No.774/2011.   By   the   impugned order the Division Bench reviewed and recalled the judgment and order dated 5th  October, 2010  passed in Writ Petition No.3883/2010(D)   … Continue reading

The Persons with disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 = High court instead of dismissing the writ petition on withdrawal of writ, ought to have consider the same under this act = “47 ­ Non ­discrimination in Government employments. ­ (1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service: Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits: Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. (2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability: Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.”= The inquiry was proceeded for about 11 years, when the finding was given that the appellant is insane and the order of compulsory retirement was passed on 15th October, 2007.= The appellant was appointed in the service of respondents as an IAS officer and joined in the year 1977. He served for 30 years till the order of his compulsory retirement was issued on 15th October, 2007. It is not the case of the respondents that the appellant was insane and in spite of that he was appointed as an IAS Officer in 1977. Therefore, even it is presumed that the appellant became insane, as held by the Inquiry Officer, mentally illness being one of the disabilities under Section 2(i) of the Act, 1995, under Section 47 it was not open to the respondents to dispense with, or reduce in rank of the appellant, who acquired a disability during his service. If the appellant, after acquiring disability was not suitable for the post he was holding, should have been shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits. Further, if it was not possible to adjust the appellant against any post, the respondents ought to have kept the appellant on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or, until the appellant attained the age of superannuation whichever was earlier.= The High Court also failed to notice the relevant fact and without going into the merit allowed the counsel to withdraw the writ petition merely on the basis of the finding of Inquiry Officer. In fact the High Court ought to have referred the matter to a Medical Board to find out whether the appellant was insane and if so found, in that case instead of dismissing the case as withdrawn, the matter should have been decided on merit by appointing an Advocate as amicus curiae. ; It is informed at the bar that in normal course the appellant would have superannuated from service on 31st July, 2012. we have no other option but to set aside the order of compulsory retirement of the appellant dated 15th October, 2007 passed by the respondents; the order dated 22nd December, 2008 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in O.A.No.2784/2008 and the impugned order dated 20th April, 2010 passed by the High Court of Delhi in W.P.(C)No.2622/2010 and the case is remitted to the respondents with a direction to treat the appellant continued in the service till the date of his superannuation. The appellant shall be paid full salary minus the subsistence allowance already received for the period from the date of initiation of departmental proceeding on the ground that he was suffering from mental illness till the date of compulsory retirement. The appellant shall also be provided with full salary from the date of compulsory retirement till the date of superannuation in view of the first and second proviso to Section 47 of the Act, 1995. If the appellant has already been superannuated, he will also be entitled to full retiral benefits counting the total period in service. The benefits shall be paid to the appellant within three months, else the respondents will be liable to pay interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date the amount was due, till the actual payment. 21. The appeal is allowed with the aforesaid observations and directions but there shall be no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40495 Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4944  OF 2013 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO.26400 OF 2010) ANIL KUMAR MAHAJAN  …APPELLANT VERUS UNION OF INDIA THROUGH SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF PERSONNEL, PUBLIC GRIEVANCES AND PENSIONS, DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL AND TRAINING, NEW DELHI. AND OTHERS           … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Leave granted. 2. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi dated 20th April, 2010 in W.P.(C)No.2622 of 2010. The   relevant   portion   of   the   said   judgment   reads   as follows: “O R D E R 20.04.2010 After   some   arguments,   learned   counsel for  the  … Continue reading

The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, etc.) Act, 1995 = a teacher with mental illness failed to attend her duties and as such she was removed from service due to lack of reply from her. after 3 she filed a complaint before commissioner for reinstatement as she was dismissed when she was under mental distress = For about three years, no action was taken by appellant. In the year 2007 she filed an application before the Commissioner under Section 62 of the Act. The said application was registered as Case No. 253/2007. In the said application, the appellant took plea that the order of dismissal passed by the authorities while she was suffering from mental illness was in violation of Section 47(1) of the Act. The appellant requested for her reinstatement with full back­wages.= whether the Commissioner under Section 62 of the Act can look into the legality of the order of dismissal from service of a disabled person, if it comes to his notice that the said person with disabilities has been deprived of his rights. whether the appellant was entitled for benefits under Section 47(1) of the Act. 13. The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act was enacted in 1995 pursuant to meet the following object and reasons: (i) to spell out the responsibility of the State towards the prevention of disabilities, protection of rights, provision of medical care, education, training, employment and rehabilitation of persons with disabilities; (ii) to create barrier free environment for persons with disabilities; (iii)to remove any discrimination against persons with disabilities in the sharing of development benefits, vis­à­vis non­ disabled persons; (iv)to counteract any situation of the abuse and the exploitation of persons with disabilities; (v)to lay down a strategy for comprehensive development of programmes and services and equalization of opportunities for persons with disabilities; and (vi)to make special provision of the integration of persons with disabilities into the social mainstream. “47 ­ Non ­discrimination in Government employments ­ (1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service: Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits: Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. (2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability: Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.”= Learned Single Judge by interim order dated 11th January, 2008 directed the respondent to reinstate the appellant and to pay her regular salary w.e.f 1.2.2008 on the following terms: “8. RULE (a)By interim order, there shall be stay against the impugned order of the Commissioner to the extent that the petitioner shall not be required to pay any backwages to the respondent, but the petitioner shall reinstate the respondent in service by paying regular salary to her from 1.2.2008. (b)It is further observed that directed that the petitioner shall get respondent examined through a Government Doctor of their choice and if it is so opined by the doctor, such duty may be assigned to the respondent at a place or a nearby place, where she can comfortably and conveniently, in a safe atmosphere, discharge duty.”- Inspite of the same, the respondent authority have neither reinstated the appellant nor paid salary w.e.f. 1.2.2008. So, they cannot take advantage of their own wrong and, thereby, cannot deny the benefit of wages to which the appellant was entitled pursuant to the order passed by the High Court on 11th January, 2008. -There is nothing on the record to suggest that the respondent authority got the appellant examined by a Government Doctor to determine the duty to be assigned to her. In view of her reinstatement, now the respondent authority may get opinion of the doctor for assigning her duty. In case the appellant is not in a position to perform the normal duty because of her mental condition, the competent authority will apply Proviso to Section 47(1) of the said Act. Having regard to the fact that we have upheld the order passed by the Commissioner, we direct the authorities to reinstate the appellant in service immediately and to pay her regular salary every month. The appellant shall be entitled to arrears of salary w.e.f. 1.2.2008 which the respondent shall pay within three months, else the appellant shall become entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum with effect from 1.2.2008 till the actual payment. The appeal is allowed in the manner indicated above and the orders passed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court are set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40492 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9324 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP(C)No.7647 of 2011) GEETABEN  RATILAL PATEL          … APPELLANT VERSUS DISTRICT PRIMARY EDUCATION OFFICER          … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. This appeal is directed against the order dated 4th November, 2009 passed by the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in L.P.A.No. 1988 of 2009 whereby the Division Bench dismissed the said Letters Patent Appeal   preferred   by  the  appellant  and  affirmed   the order   dated   10th  December,   2008   passed   by   learned Single   Judge   in   Writ   Petition­Special   … Continue reading

M.V. ACT – INSURANCE CLAIMS = THE POSITION OF VEHICLES AT THE SCENE OF ACCIDENT AND THE CONTENT OF viscera WITH ALCOHOL ALONG WITH FOOD ON DECEASED STOMACH AT THE TIME OF ACCIDENT NEVER SUGGEST CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, WHEN CHARGE SHEET WAS FILED AGAINST THE ACCUSED DUE TO RASH AND NEGLIGENCE ACCIDENT WAS OCCURRED = the police submitted a charge­ sheet (Ext.­A4) against the bus driver under Section 279, 337 and 304A IPC with specific allegation that the bus driver caused the death of Joy Kuruvila due to rash and negligent driving of the bus on 16th April, 1990 at 4.50P.M.- The mere position of the vehicles after accident, as shown in a Scene Mahazar, cannot give a substantial proof as to the rash and negligent driving on the part of one or the other. When two vehicles coming from opposite directions collide, the position of the vehicles and its direction etc. depends on number of factors like speed of vehicles, intensity of collision, reason for collision, place at which one vehicle hit the other, etc. From the scene of the accident, one may suggest or presume the manner in which the accident caused, but in absence of any direct or corroborative evidence, no conclusion can be drawn as to whether there was negligence on the part of the driver. In absence of such direct or corroborative evidence, the Court cannot give any specific finding about negligence on the part of any individual. 25. Post Mortem report, Ext.­A5 shows the condition of the deceased at the time of death. The said report reflects that the deceased had already taken meal as his stomach was half full and contained rice, vegetables and meat pieces in a fluid with strong smell of spirit. 26. The aforesaid evidence, Ext.­A5 clearly suggests that the deceased had taken liquor but on the basis of the same, no definite finding can be given that the deceased was driving the car rashly and negligently at the time of accident. The mere suspicion based on Ext.­B2, ‘Scene Mahazar’ and the Ext.­A5, post mortem report cannot take the place of evidence, particularly, when the direct evidence like PW.3, independent eye­witness, , Ext.­A1(FIR), Ext.­A4(charge­sheet) and Ext.­B1( F.I. statement) are on record. In view of the aforesaid, we, therefore, hold that the Tribunal and the High Court erred in concluding that the said accident occurred due to the negligence on the part of the deceased as well, as the said conclusion was not based on evidence but based on mere presumption and surmises. ; The deceased was 45 years of age, therefore, as per decision in Sarla Verma & Ors. V. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr., (2009) 6 SCC 121, multiplier of 14 shall be applicable. But the High Court and the Tribunal wrongly held that the multiplier of 15 will be applicable. Thus, by applying the multiplier of 14, the amount of compensation will be Rs.5,19,000 x 14 = Rs.72,66,000/­. The family of the deceased consisted of 5 persons i.e. deceased himself, wife, two children and his mother. As per the decision of this Court in Sarla Verma (supra) there being four dependents at the time of death, 1/4th of the total income to be deducted towards personal and living expenses of the deceased. The High Court has also noticed that out of 2,500 US Dollars, the deceased used to spend 500 US Dollars i.e. 1/5th of his income. Therefore, if 1/4th of the total income i.e. Rs. 18,16,500/­ is deducted towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, the contribution to the family will be (Rs. 72,66,000 – Rs. 18,16,500/­ =) Rs.54,49,500/­. Besides the aforesaid compensation, the claimants are entitled to get Rs.1,00,000/­ each towards love and affection of the two children i.e. Rs.2,00,000/­and a sum of Rs.1,00,000/­ towards loss of consortium to wife which seems to be reasonable. Therefore, the total amount comes to Rs.57,49,500/­. The claimants are entitled to get the said amount of compensation alongwith interest @ 12% from the date of filing of the petition till the date of realisation, leaving rest of the conditions as mentioned in the award intact. We, accordingly, allow the appeals filed by the claimants and partly allow the appeals preferred by the Insurance Company, so far as it relates to the application of the multiplier is concerned. The impugned judgment dated 12th April, 2007 passed by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in M.F.A. Nos.1162 and 1298 of 2001 and the award passed by the Tribunal are modified to the extent above.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40491 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 4945­4946 OF 2013 (arising out of SLP(C)Nos.20557­20558 of 2007) JIJU KURUVILA & ORS. … APPELLANTS Versus KUNJUJAMMA MOHAN & ORS.     … RESPONDENTS WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4947    OF 2013 (arising out of SLP(C)No.16078 of 2008) THE ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. … APPELLANT Versus SMT. CHINNAMMA JOY AND ORS.     … RESPONDENTS CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4948  OF 2013 (arising out of SLP(C)No.15992 of 2008) ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. … APPELLANT Versus SMT. CHINNAMMA JOY AND ORS.     … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Delay condoned. Leave granted. 1Page 2 2. These   appeals   are   directed   against   the judgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court  dated 12th  April, 2007 in M.F.A. Nos. 1162 and 1298 of 2001(D)  whereby compensation awarded to   the   claimants   by … Continue reading

claimants are entitled to same compensation fixed already on relied judgement in the absence of negative grounds= in Balbir Singh’s case the value of the land was fixed to a sum of Rs.50,000/- per bigha. We are, therefore, of the view that while every other reasoning of the Division Bench in adopting the value, which was fixed in Balbir Singh’s case was justified, there is no need to deduct any amount from the said value, in as much as the exemplar relied upon by the Division Bench in Balbir Singh’s case, were all sale deeds pertaining to the period 18.01.1982 to 22.07.1983 i.e., prior to the very first notification issued in respect of the present acquisition of all the four villages viz., 01.08.1983, which notification pertains to the lands belonging to the appellants which were situated in Sahibabad Daulatpur village. = The appeals stand partly allowed by enhancing the compensation from Rs.42,000/- per bigha as determined by the Division Bench of the High Court to a sum of Rs.50,000/- per bigha, in respect of both categories of land. With the above modification in the rate of land value, the appeals stand partly allowed. Needless to add that appellants would be entitled for consequential benefits as per the law, if any.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40474 Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.949 OF 2005 Premwati …. Appellant VERSUS Union of India & Ors. ….Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL NO.2443 OF 2005 Rajinder Singh (D) by Lrs. …. Appellants VERSUS Delhi College of Engineering ….Respondent J U D G M E N T … Continue reading

Blog Stats

  • 2,897,926 hits

ADVOCATE MMMOHAN

archieves

Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 1,907 other subscribers
Follow advocatemmmohan on WordPress.com