This tag is associated with 13 posts

set aside the death sentence and award life imprisonment.There is no reason to disbelieve the above evidence and circumstances nor there is any reason to doubt the commission of offence by the appellant and the recovery of incriminating material on his disclosure statement. The incriminating circumstances taken into consideration by the courts below can reasonably be inferred. However, so far as the sentence part is concerned, in view of the law referred to hereinabove, we are of the considered opinion that the case does not fall within the rarest of rare cases. However, considering the nature of offence, age and relationship of the victim with the appellant and gravity of injuries caused to her, appellant cannot be awarded a lenient punishment. 25. A three Judge Bench of this Court in Swami Shraddananda @ Murali Manohar Mishra v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2008 SC 3040, considering the facts of the case, set aside the sentence of death penalty and awarded the life imprisonment but further explained that in order to serve the ends of justice, the appellant therein would not be released from prison till the end of his life. 26. Similarly, in Ramraj v. State of Chattisgarh, AIR 2010 SC 420, this Court while setting aside the death sentence made a direction that the appellant therein would serve minimum period of 1Page 18 20 years including remissions earned and would not be released on completion of 14 years imprisonment. 27. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we set aside the death sentence and award life imprisonment. The appellant must serve a minimum of 30 years in jail without remissions, before consideration of his case for pre-mature release. 28. The appeal stands disposed of.

Page 1   REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 523 OF 2010Neel Kumar @ Anil Kumar ….Appellant VersusThe State of Haryana ….RespondentJ U D G M E N T Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J . 1. This criminal appeal has been preferred against the judgmentand order dated 17.7.2009 passed by the High … Continue reading

murder case arosed out of heat of passion, no advantage took, no cruelty, no scope for private defence except as there is no premeditation, offence cums under sec.300 fourth exception= We are of the view that in the instant case, as rightly held by the High Court and Trial Court, there is nothing to show that the deceased, his wife (PW 8), his son (PW 1) or others had attacked the appellant, nor the surrounding circumstances would indicate that there was a reasonable apprehension that the death or grievous hurt was likely to be caused to the appellant by them or others. The plea of private defence is, therefore, has no basis and the same is rejected. 17. Considering the background facts as well as the fact that there was no premeditation and the act was committed in a heat of passion and that the appellant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner and that there was a fight between the parties, we are of the view that this case falls under the fourth exception to Section 300 IPC and hence it is just and proper to alter the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part 1 IPC and we do so. 18. We are informed that the appellant is in custody since 30.07.2003. In our view, custodial sentence of 10 years to the accused-appellant would meet the ends of justice and it is ordered accordingly. The appeal is accordingly disposed of, altering the sentence awarded.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 356 OF 2007 Arjun … Appellant (s) versus State of Maharashtra … Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T K.S. Radhakrishnan, J. 1. The appellant, herein, was convicted by the 2nd Ad-hoc AdditionalSessions Judge for the offence punishable under Section … Continue reading

SO MANY PARENTS ENTERTAINING DOUBT TO SAY THAT THEY HAVE FORCED TO GIVE DOWRY SEC.7(3) OF THE D.P.ACT PROTECTS THE PARENTS WHO GAVE DOWRY.“The petitioner has sought prosecution on the basis of the statement of giving dowry by the father of the complainant. From perusal of the statement made in the complaint, I find no such incriminating statement of voluntarily giving dowry for marriage. The statement regarding giving presents ‘UPHAR’ does not come within the ambit of definition of dowry. Moreover, the father of the complainant is an aggrieved person from whom dowry was being demanded. Such aggrieved person is protected under Section 7 (3) from prosecution under the Act.”

A.P.HIGH COURT   THE HON‘BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU                         CRIMINAL PETITION NO.7352  OF 2010 ORDER: This petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings in Cr. No.115 of 2010 on the file of Kanchanbagh Police Station, Hyderabad, which was registered for the offence punishable under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short ‘the … Continue reading

Specific performance of sale agreement= The question as to whether the grant of relief for specific performance will cause hardship to the defendant within the meaning of Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, being a question of fact, the first appellate court without framing such an issue ought not to have reversed the finding of the trial court while concurring with it on all other issues with regard to the appellant’s entitlement to relief for specific performance of contract.


INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD This Appeal arises out of the order dated 30.09.2006 refusing the application for registration and the opposition under No. 172888 in Class 9. The appellants herein filed an application for registration of the Trade Mark CAP CAB on 03.11.2000 in Class 9 under No. 967948 claiming user since 01.04.1986 in respect of various kinds of electrical wires and cables. The said application was advertised before acceptance in the Trade Mark Journal MEGA – 6 dated 25.11.2003 at page 3580 under the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The respondent herein filed their notice of opposition opposing the registration on the ground that they are the Registered Proprietors of the Trade Mark CAP CAB under No. 750328 in Class 17 as of 03.01.1997. The respondent had also filed an application under No. 750328 in Class 17 which is under opposition. The respondent’s main contention was that they had adopted the Trade mark as early as 1981 and had been using the same continuously and extensively since then. =23. On perusal of the records, it is seen that both the appellants and the respondents are carrying on a business of similar goods with identical marks. In the case of deciding the issue of deceptive similarity, the class of customers are to be considered. The class of customers here would belong to all categories. In such circumstances, we will have to consider the priority in use. Though the respondents claim user since 1981, their documents are only of the year 1990 whereas the appellants documents are from the year 1986. The public who are aware of the appellants goods since 1986 are likely to associate the goods only with that of the appellants goods. There is no doubt the onus is always on the appellant / applicant to prove that there has been no instance of confusion in the market. The appellant being prior in use, if at all there is confusion it will only be because of the respondent’s goods. The onus, therefore now shifts on the respondent to prove confusion, which has not been satisfied. We, therefore, do not think there is any valid reason to refuse the application for registration. 24. For the above mentioned reasons, the appeal is allowed and the application for registration of the trade mark CAP CAB under No. 967948 in Class 9 is allowed to proceed for registration. No order as to costs. In view of the fact that the appeal has been disposed off, nothing survives in the Miscellaneous Petition.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATEBOARD Guna Complex Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443 Anna Salai,  Teynampet, Chennai-600018                                             ***** (CIRCUIT BENCH SITTING AT DELHI)   M.P.No.280/2007 IN  OA/08/2007/ TM/DEL AND OA/08/2007/TM/DEL   WEDNESDAY THIS THE 28th DAY OF DECEMBER,  2011   HON’BLE SMT.JUSTICE PRABHA SRIDEVAN                …  CHAIRMAN HON’BLE MS. S. USHA                                                      …  VICE CHAIRMAN   Shri Rajnish Kohli, S/o Shri … Continue reading

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 482 – FIR u/ss. 498A, 494 and 506/34 IPC – By relative of first wife against the husband and his family members – Alleging second marriage and demand of dowry – Petition u/s. 482 – Plea of husband that second marriage performed after obtaining divorce from his first wife from a foreign court – High Court quashing the FIR as regards family members – FIR against husband not quashed – On appeal, held: FIR against husband liable to be quashed – FIR is attended with malafides and actuated with ulterior motive – Allegations under the provisions of IPC not made out – Prosecution was abuse of process of law – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 498A, 494 and 506/34. Penal Code, 1860 – s. 494 – Offence under – Ingredients of – Discussed. Appellant married ‘K’ and went to Canada. He took a judgment of divorce from ‘K’, from the court in Canada. Coming back to India, he remarried. Brother of ‘K’ lodged FIR against the appellant and his family members u/ss. 494, 498A and 506/34. Appellant and his family members filed two separate petitions u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. High Court allowed the petition quashing the FIR as regards the family members. Petition of the appellant was not allowed. Hence the present appeal. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The FIR is manifestly attended with malafides and actuated with ulterior motive. The prosecution of the appellant is not at all legitimate, rather it is frivolous, vexatious, unwarranted and abuse of process. The appellant has made out a case for quashing the first information report and all subsequent proceedings pursuant thereto. [Para 11] [932-D-E] 2. The observation of the High Court, that the appellant married second time, although his marriage has not been dissolved, is ex-facie contrary to record. The certificate of divorce issued by the New Westminster Registry, Supreme Court of British Columbia shows that the marriage of the appellant and ‘K’ stood dissolved on February 8, 2001. This fact is noticed in the order dated April 29, 2004 whereby the High Court quashed the F.I.R. and the subsequent criminal proceedings against the family members of the appellant. In the affidavit filed by Deputy Superintendent of Police in response to the petition filed by the appellant under Section 482 Cr.P.C., before the High Court, it has been admitted that during investigation on March 14, 2002, photocopy of divorce certificate purporting to have been issued by the Supreme Court of British Columbia was produced. [Para 7] [931-A-D] 3. Section 494 IPC, inter-alia, requires the following ingredients to be satisfied, namely, (i) the accused must have contracted first marriage; (ii) he must have married again; (iii) the first marriage must be subsisting and (iv) the spouse must be living. In the present case, the appellant’s first marriage was not subsisting when he is said to have married second time. Affidavit filed by the first wife of appellant states that she was not aware of the divorce proceedings. However, from this affidavit, it is apparent that her husband has obtained a divorce judgment. There is nothing in the affidavit that divorce judgment has been stayed or set aside. On the face of the allegations made in the FIR therefore, ingredients of the offence under Section 494 IPC are not satisfied. [Para 8] [931-D-G] 4. Insofar as offence under Section 498-A IPC is concerned, the High Court in its earlier order in the petition filed by the family members, observed that no demand of dowry has been made by the petitioners in the FIR nor was there any specific entrustment, as alleged in the FIR of dowry articles to the petitioners. Moreover, in the affidavit filed by the first wife, there is not a word about demand of dowry or harassment on account of dowry by the appellant. [Para 9] [931-H; 932-A-D] CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 2122 of 2009. From the Judgment & Order dated 24.05.2006 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Misc. No. 8526 of 2005. Sushil Kumar Jain, Puneet Jain, Eshila Barua, Ms. Pratibha Jain, for the Appellant. Vivek K. Goyal, A.A.Genl., Kuldip Singh for the Respondents.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2122 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 5910/2006) Pashaura Singh …Appellant Versus State of Punjab & Anr. …Respondents JUDGEMENT R.M. Lodha, J. Leave granted. 2. In this appeal by special leave, the appellant has challenged the order dated May 24, 2006 passed … Continue reading

Whether taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is same as summoning an accused to appear? (b) Whether the Magistrate, while considering the question of summoning an accused, is required to assign reasons for the same?

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 612 OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 9953 of 2010) Bhushan Kumar & Anr. …. Appellant(s) Versus State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. …. Respondent(s) WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 613 OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 9958 … Continue reading

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA -On 26th March 2001 the appellant, her husband Bagaya Wilber (PW2) , her co-wife and their children went early in the morning to dig in their garden. At about 7:30 a.m. PW2 told the children who included the deceased to go back home and prepare to go to school. The appellant followed them. The deceased did not want to go to school that day and pretended he was ill but soon forgot and started playing. This angered the appellant, who had previously received a report that the deceased had stolen shs. 300/= from the neighbourhood. -In 1970 the Penal Code was amended and “grievous harm” was taken out of the definition of malice aforethought. We think that if the appellant had been charged before that law was amended, she would have safely been convicted of murder because there is enough evidence to show that she deliberately burnt the deceased and therefore intended to do grievous harm to him or had knowledge that her action would probably cause grievous harm. However, on the basis of the evidence presented a reasonable doubt remains that her conduct, strange, cruel and outrageous as it was, was actuated by an intention to “exterminate” the deceased, to use the word of the learned trial judge. The evidence that was accepted by court that she herself cooled off the fire, allowed the deceased to get away from the scene, carried the deceased on a bicycle to the hospital and stayed with him until he died must be considered in her favour and consequently create doubt about her intention to cause the death of the deceased. -In the result her appeal succeeds. We quash the conviction for murder and set aside the sentence of death. Instead we convict her of manslaughter contrary to section 187 and 190 of the Penal Code Act. We shall hear submissions in mitigation before passing sentence.

    THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA (CORAM: ODOKI, CJ; TSEKOOKO; KATUREEBE; TUMWESIGYE; KISAAKYE; JJSC.) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 15 OF 2009 BETWEEN       NAKISIGE KYAZIKE::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: APPELLANT     AND   UGANDA:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: RESPONDENT (An appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal at Kampala (Before Engwau, Twinomujuni and Nshimye, … Continue reading

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA =On the night of 21 July 2001, PW3 left her home at night to attend to her daughter who lived nearby and was in labour pains. She left the appellant and the victim Sharon (PW2) sleeping in her house. After she had left, the appellant removed the victim, took her to his bed and defiled her. She felt a lot of pain and made a loud cry. Her grandmother returned and knocked on the door but the appellant refused to open the door. PW3 made a lot of loud noise and the appellant opened the door. She found the appellant in the house and noticed that the victim did not have her knickers on. She asked the victim why she did not have knickers. The victim told her, in the presence of the appellant, that it was the appellant who removed her knickers and had sexual intercourse with her. At that point, the appellant was seated in the house. PW3 could clearly see him with the help of a candle which had been left in the house and a lantern with which she had returned to the house. When asked why he had removed PW2’s knickers, the appellant replied that he had done nothing wrong. PW3 then examined the victim’s private parts =In the present case, the trial Judge imposed a sentence of imprisonment for life yet she qualified the sentence by limiting it to twenty years. In our view, the sentence was vague. The Court of Appeal confirmed the sentence of life imprisonment without clearing the vagueness. However, we think that this error did not make the sentence illegal. We are satisfied that the trial Judge intended to impose a sentence of imprisonment for twenty years. We therefore, find that the error made by the Court of Appeal did not occasion any miscarriage of justice. We uphold the sentence of twenty years imprisonment.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDAAT KAMPALA           (CORAM:          ODOKI C.J; TSEKOOKO, KATUREEBE, TUMWESIGYE AND KISAAKYE JJ.SC) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 08 OF 2009                                    BETWEEN TIGO STEPHEN:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::APPELLANT AND UGANDA::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::;:::::RESPONDENT [Appeal from Decision of the Court of Appeal sitting at Kampala (Twinomujuni, Kitumba, and Byamugisha JJ.A.) dated 23 March 2009 in Criminal Appeal No.170 of 2003]       JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Introduction This … Continue reading

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD =11. We have heard and considered the arguments of both the Counsel and have gone through the pleadings and arguments. The marks namely PLAX and CLAX are not similar in our opinion. The goods for which the trade marks are used are different. The appellant’s goods are chewing gum and lozenges for medical purposes, dental preparations (medical), Denture cleaners, Denture (additives). The respondent’s goods are antibiotics for curing dental infections and tooth extraction.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATEBOARD Guna Complex Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443, Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai-600018   CIRCUIT BENCH SITTING AT AHMEDABAD   OA/28/2007/TM/AMD                                                                                FRIDAY, THIS THE 20th DAY OF JANUARY, 2012     Hon’ble Smt. Justice Prabha Sridevan                    …  Chairman Hon’ble Ms.S. Usha                                                       …  Vice-Chairman   Colgate-Palmolive Company, a Company Incorporated and existing … Continue reading

Blog Stats

  • 2,897,031 hits



Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 1,907 other followers
Follow advocatemmmohan on WordPress.com