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2G Spectrum case.=whether two orders passed by this Court on 11.04.2011 and 09.11.2012 in Civil Appeal No.10660 of 2010, in exercise of powers conferred on this Court under Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution of India, while monitoring the investigation of 2G related cases, are liable to be recalled, de hors the rights guaranteed to the Petitioners to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution of India, if aggrieved by the orders passed by the Special Court dealing with 2G Spectrum case.= No Court, other than the Court seized with the trial, has the power to monitor the proceedings pending before it. Order dated 11.4.2011 only facilitates the progress of the trial by ordering that the trial must proceed on a day-to-day basis. Large backlog of cases in the Courts is often an incentive to the litigants to misuse of Court’s system by indulging in unnecessary and fraudulent litigation, thereby delaying the entire trial process. Criminal justice system’s procedure guarantees and elaborateness sometimes give, create openings for abusive, dilatory tactics and confer unfair advantage on better heeled litigants to cause delay to their advantage. Longer the trial, witnesses will be unavailable, memories will fade and evidence will be stale. Taking into consideration all those aspects, this Court felt that it is in the larger public interest that the trial of 2G Scam be not hampered. Further, when larger public interest is involved, it is the bounden duty of all, including the accused persons, who are presumed to be innocent, until proven guilty, to co-operate with the progress of the trial. Early disposal of the trial is also to their advantage, so that their innocence could be proved, rather than remain enmeshed in criminal trial for years and unable to get on with their lives and business. 29. We fail to see how the principle laid down by this Court in A.R. Antulay’s case (supra) would apply to the facts of these cases. We have found no error in the orders passed by this Court on 11.04.2011 or on 09.04.2012. Therefore, the question of rectifying any error does not arise. On the other hand, as we have already indicated, the purpose and object of passing those orders was for a larger public interest and for speedy trial, that too on day-to-day basis which has been reflected not only in the various provisions of the PC Act, 1988 but also falls within the realm of judicial accountability. 30. We also find no reason to lay down any guidelines as prayed for by the petitioners in a Court monitored investigation. In a Court monitored investigation, as already pointed out the Court is not expected to interfere with the trial proceedings. The conduct of the trial is the business of the trial judge and not the court monitoring the investigation. A superior court exercising the appellate power or constitutional power, if gives a direction to conduct the trial on day-to-day basis or complete the trial in a specific time by giving direction is not interfering with the trial proceedings but only facilitating the speedy trial, which is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. That being the factual situation in these cases, the principle laid down by this Court in Rajiv Ranjan Singh “Lalan” VI and another v. Union of India and others (2006) 1 SCC 356, Brij Narain Singh v. Adya Prasad (2008) 11 SCC 558 and Ankul Chandra Pradhan (supra), are not applicable. 31. We, therefore, find no good reason either to frame guidelines to be followed by a constitutional court in relation to monitoring of criminal investigation or any legal infirmity in the orders passed by this Court on 11.04.2011 or 09.04.2012. Writ Petitions lack merits and they are accordingly dismissed, so also IA Nos.59, 61, 63 and 68 in Civil Appeal No.10660 of 2010.

published in         http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40716     REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (C) NO.548 OF 2012 Shahid Balwa …Petitioner Versus Union of India and others …Respondents With WRIT PETITION (C) NO.550, 551, 552 OF 2012, 17 of 2013, and I.A. Nos.59, 61, 63 and 68 IN CIVIL APPEAL … Continue reading

contempt of court = Warns=Advocate on record – refused to attend before the court when pressed his presence = An application for restoration of the said appeal was filed by Shri Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Advocate-on-Record (hereinafter referred to as AOR). The said application was listed in the Court on 8.7.2013. The Court was of the view that the facts contained in the application were not correct and the counsel appearing for the applicant was not able to clarify the same. The Court passed over the matter and asked the counsel appearing therein to call the AOR who would be able to explain the factual controversy. When the matter was taken up in the second round, the Court was informed that Shri Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, AOR refused to come to the Court. It has also been pointed out that the said AOR has filed extremely large number of cases in this Court but never appears in the Court. In view of the refusal of the AOR to come to the Court, this Court had no other option but to dismiss the application. However, the Court issued a show cause notice to the said AOR as to why his name should not be removed from the register of AsOR, as his conduct was ‘unbecoming’ of an AOR. Prima facie, his conduct would tantamount to interfering with the administration of justice. Being an AOR, he ought to have appreciated that the institution of AsOR has been created under the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’) and no one can appear in this Court except by the authority of an AOR; or unless instructed by an AOR. Considering the gravity of the issue involved herein, this Court also requested the Association of AsOR, through its President and Secretary, to assist the Court in dealing with this situation as our experience has been that some AsOR, who have filed a large number of cases have been lending their signatures for consideration and take no responsibility for the matter and never appear in the Court. 2. In response to the same, Shri Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, AOR has filed his reply tendering an absolute and unconditional apology and has given an undertaking that he would not repeat such a mistake again in future. = At the time of hearing, Shri Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, AOR, not only tendered absolute and unconditional apology and promised not to repeat the misconduct in future but also assured the court that he would remain present in the court in all the cases where he had entered appearance for either of the parties. Some senior advocates and a large number of members of the Bar have also asked the Court to pardon him as he would abide by the undertaking given by him.- In view of above, though the conduct of Shri Goyal, AOR, has been reprehensible and not worth pardoning but considering the fact and circumstances involved herein, his conduct is censured and we warn him not to behave in future in such manner and to appear in court in all the cases wherever he has entered appearance. The court shall examine his conduct for one year from now and if no improvement is found, may initiate the proceedings again. With these observations, the matter stands closed for the time being.

 published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40678    REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION SUO MOTU CONTEMPT PETITION NO. 312 of 2013   In Re: Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Advocate     J U D G M E N T   Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J. 1. Civil Appeal No. 1398 of 2005, Mohamed Israfil v. … Continue reading

Service Matter – Whether the petitioners, whose names were included in the select list prepared for recruitment to Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) are entitled to be appointed against the posts which became available due to the resignation of two of the appointees and the unfilled posts of reserved categories is the question which arises for consideration in these petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution.= once the appointments are made against the advertised posts, the select list gets exhausted and those who are placed below the last appointee cannot claim appointment against the posts which subsequently become available. = “At the outset it should be noticed that the select list prepared by APSC could be used to fill the notified vacancies and not future vacancies. If the requisition and advertisement was only for 27 posts, the State cannot appoint more than the number of posts advertised, even though APSC had prepared a select list of 64 candidates. The select list got exhausted when all the 27 posts were filled. Thereafter, the candidates below the 27 appointed candidates have no right to claim appointment to any vacancy in regard to which selection was not held. The fact that evidently and admittedly the names of the appellants appeared in the select list dated 17-7-2000 below the persons who have been appointed on merit against the said 27 vacancies, and as such they could not have been appointed in excess of the number of posts advertised as the currency of select list had expired as soon as the number of posts advertised are filled up, therefore, appointments beyond the number of posts advertised would amount to filling up future vacancies meant for direct candidates in violation of quota rules. Therefore, the appellants are not entitled to claim any relief for themselves. The question that remains for consideration is whether there is any ground for challenging the regularisation of the private respondents.” In view of the above noted legal position, the decision taken by the High Court not to enter the petitioners name in the register to facilitate their appointment against the de-reserved posts or the posts vacated by the general category candidates cannot be faulted, more so because the State Government had already approved fresh recruitment and the Commission issued advertisement for 71 posts including 6 reserved category posts. In the result, the writ petitions are dismissed.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40643 Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 73 OF 2013 Raj Rishi Mehra and others …Petitioners versus State of Punjab and another …Respondents WITH WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 77 OF 2013 O R D E R Whether the petitioners, whose names were included in the select … Continue reading

Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 = question the constitutional validity of number of provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti- Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Act 7 of 1986) (for short “the Act”) being violative of Articles 14, 21, 22(4) and 300A of the Constitution of India and further prayed for issue of a writ of certiorari for quashment of the First Information Report dated 2.5.2010 giving rise to Crime No. 100 of 2010 registered at Police Station Ramala, District Baghpat.= Thus, the accused under the Act is in a distinct category and the differentiation between the two, namely, a person arrayed as an accused in respect of offences under other Acts and an accused under the Act is a rational one. It cannot be said to be arbitrary. It does not defeat the concept of permissible classification. The majority in Kartar Singh (supra) has expressed thus: – “218. The principle of legislative classification is an accepted principle whereunder persons may be classified into groups and such groups may differently be treated if there is a reasonable basis for such difference or distinction. The rule of differentiation is that in enacting laws differentiating between different persons or things in different circumstances which govern one set of persons or objects such laws may not necessarily be the same as those governing another set of persons or objects so that the question of unequal treatment does not really arise between persons governed by different conditions and different set of circumstances.”= Tested on the touchstone of the abovestated principles, the irresistible conclusion is that the classification is in the permissible realm of Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, the submission that Section 12 invites the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution is sans substratum and, accordingly, we have no hesitation in repelling the same and we so do. 47. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we uphold the constitutional validity of Section 12 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 as it does not infringe any of the facets of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Ex- consequenti, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.

 published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40619  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO. 100 OF 2010 Dharmendra Kirthal … Petitioner Versus State of U.P. and another … Respondents J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J.   In this writ petition preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution of … Continue reading

The Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 = question the constitutional validity of number of provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti- Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Act 7 of 1986) (for short “the Act”) being violative of Articles 14, 21, 22(4) and 300A of the Constitution of India and further prayed for issue of a writ of certiorari for quashment of the First Information Report dated 2.5.2010 giving rise to Crime No. 100 of 2010 registered at Police Station Ramala, District Baghpat.= Thus, the accused under the Act is in a distinct category and the differentiation between the two, namely, a person arrayed as an accused in respect of offences under other Acts and an accused under the Act is a rational one. It cannot be said to be arbitrary. It does not defeat the concept of permissible classification. The majority in Kartar Singh (supra) has expressed thus: – “218. The principle of legislative classification is an accepted principle whereunder persons may be classified into groups and such groups may differently be treated if there is a reasonable basis for such difference or distinction. The rule of differentiation is that in enacting laws differentiating between different persons or things in different circumstances which govern one set of persons or objects such laws may not necessarily be the same as those governing another set of persons or objects so that the question of unequal treatment does not really arise between persons governed by different conditions and different set of circumstances.”= Tested on the touchstone of the abovestated principles, the irresistible conclusion is that the classification is in the permissible realm of Article 14 of the Constitution. Therefore, the submission that Section 12 invites the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution is sans substratum and, accordingly, we have no hesitation in repelling the same and we so do. 47. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we uphold the constitutional validity of Section 12 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 as it does not infringe any of the facets of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Ex- consequenti, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.

 published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40619  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO. 100 OF 2010 Dharmendra Kirthal … Petitioner Versus State of U.P. and another … Respondents   J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J.   In this writ petition preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution … Continue reading

The Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 = constitutional validity of number of provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Act 7 of 1986) (for short “the Act”) being violative of Articles 14, 21, 22(4) and 300A of the Constitution of India and further prayed for issue of a writ of certiorari for quashment of the First Information Report dated 2.5.2010 giving rise to Crime No. 100 of 2010 registered at Police Station Ramala, District Baghpat .= In view of the aforesaid analysis, we uphold the constitutional validity of Section 12 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 as it does not infringe any of the facets of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Ex- consequenti, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.

 published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40619 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO. 100 OF 2010 Dharmendra Kirthal … Petitioner Versus State of U.P. and another … Respondents J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. In this writ petition preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the … Continue reading

Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act,=Chapter VIII-A, which was introduced into the the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as “the 1976 Act”, in 1986, pertains to the acquisition of “cessed properties” for co-operative societies of occupiers. In view of the questions raised in the writ petitions, the matter was initially referred to a Bench of 7-Judges, but, thereafter, by order dated 20.02.2002, the matters have been referred to a Bench of Nine-Judges and are still pending decision. Since no final decision seems to be in the offing, the writ petitioners have filed IA No. 3 of 2012, for interim reliefs.= Whether MHADA has any obligation to provide similar accommodation to others in respect of the 30% surplus land, is a controversy which we need not go into and will surely be decided, whenever the Nine-Judge Bench sits to take up these matters. But for the purposes of this case, we regret that in spite of the inordinate delay in the working of the provisions of Chapter VIII-A of the 1976 Act, which was intended for the benefit of a certain section of tenants and occupants of cessed buildings, we are unable to grant the relief prayed for, as the same goes against the very grain of the provisions of Chapter VIII-A of the 1976 Act.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40501 Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION I.A. NO. 3 OF 2012 IN WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 342 OF 1999 KAMLESH C. SHAH & ORS. …PETITIONERS Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. …RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI. 1. Chapter VIII-A, which … Continue reading

Declaring sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 as ultra vires the Constitution.=The result of our aforesaid discussion is that the affirmative words used in Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e) confer power on Parliament to make one law laying down the same disqualifications for a person who is to be chosen as member of either House of Parliament or as a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State and for a person who is a sitting member of a House of Parliament or a House of the State Legislature and the words in Articles 101(3)(a) and 190(3)(a) of the Constitution put express limitations on such powers of the Parliament to defer the date on which the disqualifications would have effect. Accordingly, sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act which carves out a saving in the case of sitting members of Parliament or State Legislature from the disqualifications under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act or which defers the date on which the disqualification will take effect in the case of a sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature is beyond the powers conferred on Parliament by the Constitution. Looking at the affirmative terms of Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e) of the Constitution, we hold that Parliament has been vested with the powers to make law laying down the same disqualifications for person to be chosen as a member of Parliament or a State Legislature and for a sitting member of a House of Parliament or a House of a State Legislature. We also hold that the provisions of Article 101(3)(a) and 190(3)(a) of the Constitution expressly prohibit Parliament to defer the date from which the disqualification will come into effect in case of a sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature. Parliament, therefore, has exceeded its powers conferred by the Constitution in enacting sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act and accordingly subsection (4) of Section 8 of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution.;Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the conviction continues to operate. But where the conviction itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay. An order of stay, of course, does not render the conviction non-existent, but only nonoperative. Be that as it may. Insofar as the present case is concerned, an application was filed specifically seeking stay of the order of conviction specifying the consequences if conviction was not stayed, that is, the appellant would incur disqualification to contest the election. The High Court after considering the special reason, granted the order staying the conviction. As the conviction itself is stayed in contrast to a stay of execution of the sentence, it is not possible to accept the contention of the respondent that the disqualification arising out of conviction continues to operate even after stay of conviction. In the aforesaid case, a contention was raised by the respondents that the appellant was disqualified from contesting the election to the Legislative Assembly under sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act as he had been convicted for an offence punishable under Sections 366 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code and it was held by the three-Judge Bench that as the High Court for special reasons had passed an order staying the conviction, the disqualification arising out of the conviction ceased to operate after the stay of conviction. Therefore, the disqualification under sub-section (1), (2) or (3) of Section 8 of the Act will not operate from the date of order of stay of conviction passed by the Appellate Court under Section 389 of the Code or the High Court under Section 482 of the Code.;whether our declaration in this judgment that sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution should affect disqualifications already incurred under subsections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act by sitting members of Parliament and State Legislatures who have filed appeals or revisions against their conviction within a period of three months and their appeals and revisions are still pending before the concerned court. =However, if any sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature is convicted of any of the offences mentioned in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act and by virtue of such conviction and/or sentence suffers the disqualifications mentioned in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act after the pronouncement of this judgment, his membership of Parliament or the State Legislature, as the case may be, will not be saved by subsection (4) of Section 8 of the Act which we have by this judgment declared as ultra vires the Constitution notwithstanding that he files the appeal or revision against the conviction and /or sentence.; whether a person, who is confined in prison, whether under a sentence of imprisonment or transportation or otherwise, or is in the lawful custody of the police is not entitled to vote by virtue of sub-section (5) of Section 62 of the 1951 Act and accordingly is not an “elector” and is, therefore, not qualified to contest elections to the House of People or the Legislative Assembly of a State because of the provisions in Sections 4 and 5 of the 1951 Act. By the impugned common order, the Patna High Court accepted this contention in the writ petitions and held: “A right to vote is a statutory right, the Law gives it, the Law takes it away. Persons convicted of crime are kept away from elections to the Legislature, whether to State Legislature or Parliament, and all other public elections. The Court has no hesitation in interpreting the Constitution and the Laws framed under it, read together, that persons in the lawful custody of the Police also will not be voters, in which case, they will neither be electors. The Law temporarily takes away the power of such persons to go anywhere near the election scene. To vote is a statutory right. It is privilege to vote, which privilege may be taken away. In that case, the elector would not be qualified, even if his name is on the electoral rolls. The name is not struck off, but the qualification to be an elector and the privilege to vote when in the lawful custody of the police is taken away.” – a person who has no right to vote by virtue of the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 62 of the 1951 Act is not an elector and is therefore not qualified to contest the election to the House of the People or the Legislative Assembly of a State.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40545 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 490 OF 2005 Lily Thomas … Petitioner Versus Union of India & Ors. … Respondents WITH WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 231 OF 2005 Lok Prahari, through its General Secretary S.N. Shukla … Petitioner Versus Union of India & … Continue reading

Non- official as co – accused can be prosecuted along with other official accused by Special court = Admittedly, 2G Scam case is triable by the Special Judge against the persons accused of offences punishable under the PC Act in view of sub­Section (1) of Section 4. The Special Judge alone can take the cognizance of the offence specified in sub­ Section (1) of Section 3 and conspiracy in relation to them. While trying any case, the Special Judge may also try an offence other than the offence specified in sub­Section (1) of Section 3, in view of sub­Section (3) of Section 4. A magistrate cannot take cognizance of offence as specified in Section 3(1) of the PC Act. In this background, as the petitioners have been shown as co­accused in second­ supplementary chargesheet filed in 2G Scam case, it is open to the Special Judge to take cognizance of the offence under Section 120­B and Section 420 IPC.- the Special Judge while trying the co­ accused of an offence punishable under the provisions of the Act as also an offence punishable under Section 120­B read with Section 420 IPC has the jurisdiction to try the appellant also for the offence punishable under Section 120­B read with Section 420 IPC applying the principles incorporated in Section 223 of the Code.; In the present case there is nothing on the record to suggest that the petitioners will not get fair trial and may face miscarriage of justice. In absence of any such threat & miscarriage of justice, no interference is called for against the impugned order taking cognizance of the offence against the petitioners. On 11th April, 2001, when the 2G Scam Case was taken up by this Court, this Court, inter alia, observed as follows: “Acting on such basis, this Court has given directions for establishing a separate Special Court to try this case and pursuant to such direction, a Special Court has been constituted after following the due procedure. We also make it clear that any objection about appointment of Special Public Prosecutor or his assistant advocates or any prayer for staying or impeding the progress of the Trial can be made only before this Court and no other court shall entertain the same. The trial must proceed on a day­to­ day basis. All these directions are given by this Court in exercise of its power under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution and in the interest of holding a fair prosecution of the case.” From the aforesaid order it is clear that this Court passed the order under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution, in the interest of holding a fair prosecution of the case. – In Rupa Asbhok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and another, (2002) 4 SCC 388, this Court held that a final judgment or order passed by this Court cannot be assailed in an application under Article 32 of the Constitution by an aggrieved person, whether he was a party to the case or not. For the said reason also, it is not open to the petitioner to indirectly assail the order passed by this Court in 2G Scam case. 30. We find no merit in these writ petitions, they are accordingly dismissed. The Special Court is expected to proceed with the trial on day­to­day basis to ensure early disposal of the trial. There shall be no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40469 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (C) No. 57 OF 2012 ESSAR TELEHOLDINGS LTD. … PETITIONER Versus REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT  & ORS.  … RESPONDENTS With WRIT PETITION (C) No. 59 OF 2012 LOOP TELECOM LTD.  … PETITIONER Versus REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT  & ORS.      … RESPONDENTS With WRIT PETITION (C) No. 96 OF 2012 VIKASH SARAF … PETITIONER Versus REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT  & ORS.  … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Feeling   aggrieved   by   the   order   dated   21st December, 2011 passed by the Special Judge, Central 1Page 2 Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi taking cognizance against   the   petitioners,   they   … Continue reading

guilty of killing the former Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi Although, the parties have made diametrically opposite assertions about the atmosphere which prevailed in the State after rejection by the President of India of the mercy petitions filed by V. Sriharan @ Murugan and two others, we do not consider it necessary to decide whether the support extended by the political outfits and others to those who were found guilty of killing the former Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi may impede fair adjudication of the writ petitions filed by them warrants transfer of the three writ petitions from the Madras High Court to this Court. However, keeping in view the fact that an identical question is pending consideration before this Court in Writ Petition (Criminal) D. No. 16039 of 2011 titled Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. State of NCT of Delhi, we deem it proper to exercise power under Article 139A(1) of the Constitution. 2. L. K. Venkat and Javid Iqbal and others have filed these petitions for transfer of Writ Petition No. 20287 of 2011 titled V. Sriharan @ Murugan v. Union of India and others, Writ Petition No. 20288 of 2011 titled T. Suthendraraja @ Santhan v. Union of India and others and Writ Petition No. 20289 of 2011 titled A.G. Perarivalan @ Arivu v. Union of India and others which are pending before the Madras High Court to this Court. In the result, the transfer petitions are allowed and Writ Petition No. 20287 of 2011 titled V. Sriharan @ Murugan v. Union of India and others, Writ Petition No. 20288 of 2011 titled T. Suthendraraja @ Santhan v. Union of India and others and Writ Petition No. 20289 of 2011 titled A.G. Perarivalan @ Arivu v. Union of India and others pending before the Madras High Court are transferred to this Court. 12. The Registrar General of the Madras High Court is directed to ensure that the records of the three writ petitions are sent to this Court per messenger within two weeks of the receipt of communication from the Registry of this Court. 13. The transferred cases shall be listed before the Court on 10.7.2012 for final disposal. Notice be issued to the writ petitioners that their case will be taken up for hearing by this Court on 10.7.2012. One set of the notices be also sent to the Superintendent, Central Jail, Vellore, Tamil Nadu, who shall ensure that the same are served upon the writ petitioners well before 10.7.2012. 14. The Registry is directed to send copies of this order to the Registrar General of Madras High Court and Superintendent, Central Jail, Vellore, Tamil Nadu by fax.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TRANSFER PETITION (CRIMINAL) NOS. 383-385 OF 2011 L.K. Venkat … Petitioner Versus Union of India and others … Respondents WITH TRANSFER PETITION (CRIMINAL) NOS. 462-464 OF 2011 Javid Iqbal & others … Petitioners Versus V. Sriharan @ Murugan and others … Respondents J U D … Continue reading

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