advocatemmmohan
Patna High Court
Appointment of dealers for superior kerosene oil and light diesel oil (SKO-LDO) – whether, on the cancellation of the allotment of a dealership or distributorship for petroleum products in favour of the first ranked or first empanelled candidate, there is an automatic allotment in favour of the second ranked or second empanelled candidate, subject to fulfillment of the conditions of allotment. Apex court held that In our opinion, in view of the decisions of this Court, if the allotment is tainted due to political connections or patronage or other extraneous considerations, the entire selection process is vitiated and, therefore the second ranked or second empanelled candidate is not entitled to an automatic allotment of a dealership or distributorship in his or her favour.= CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8980 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 313 of 2012) Chairman cum Managing Director Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Ors. ….Appellants Vs. Sunita Kumari & Anr. ….Respondents =2014- sept, month- http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41934
Appointment of dealers for superior kerosene oil and light diesel oil (SKO-LDO) – whether, on the cancellation of the allotment of a dealership or distributorship for petroleum products in favour of the first ranked or first empanelled candidate, there is an automatic allotment in favour of the second ranked or second empanelled candidate, subject to fulfillment of the conditions … Continue reading
Arbitration proceedings -Court can appoint any arbitrator other than the prescribed arbitrator as per the terms of agreement – disputes between contractors and Railways – as per the terms of agreement a railway Officer was to be appointed as arbitrator – decades lapsed no award was passed – High court appointed former Chief Justice of the Sikkim High Court – challenged as invalid and beyond conditions of arbitration agreement – Apex court held thatA period of nearly two decades has elapsed since the contractor had raised his claims for alleged wrongful termination of the two contracts. The situation is distressing and to say the least disturbing. The power of the Court under the Act has to be exercised to effectuate the remedy provided thereunder and to facilitate the mechanism contemplated therein. In a situation where the procedure and process under the Act has been rendered futile, the power of the Court to depart from the agreed terms of appointment of arbitrators must be acknowledged in the light of the several decisions noticed by us. We are, therefore, of the view that no infirmity muchless any illegality or failure of justice can be said to be occasioned by the order passed by the High Court so as to warrant any interference. We, therefore, unhesitatingly dismiss this appeal filed by the appellant-railways. = CIVIL APPEAL NO.6275 OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 20427 OF 2013) NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY & ORS. … APPELLANT (S) VERSUS TRIPPLE ENGINEERING WORKS … RESPONDENT (S) = 2014- Aug. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41824
Arbitration proceedings -Court can appoint any arbitrator other than the prescribed arbitrator as per the terms of agreement – disputes between contractors and Railways – as per the terms of agreement a railway Officer was to be appointed as arbitrator – decades lapsed no award was passed – High court appointed former Chief Justice of the … Continue reading
Whether a Magistrate after accepting a negative final report submitted by the Police can take action on the basis of the protest petition filed by the complainant/first informant?= Apex court held YES = CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1412 OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP(CRL.) No.3308 of 2013) RAKESH & ANR … APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE OF U.P. & ANR. .. RESPONDENTS = 2014 – Aug.Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41823
Whether a Magistrate after accepting a negative final report submitted by the Police can take action on the basis of the protest petition filed by the complainant/first informant?= Apex court held YES Respondent No.2 herein lodged an FIR which was registered as Crime Case No.480 of 2000 under Section 364 of the Indian Penal Code at … Continue reading
In the absence of any specific overt acts no person should be convicted under sec.147, 148 and 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC – except for his role = PUTCHALAPALLI NARESH REDDY …. APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF A.P. & ETC. …. RESPONDENTS judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40884
In the absence of any specific overt acts no person should be convicted under sec.147, 148 and 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC – except for his role = Apex court confirmed the high court orders except modified the sentence from life to simple injury for one of the accused who had … Continue reading
Service matter – appointment of trained teachers in the vacancies in the post of primary teachers in the state of Bihar = several trained teachers for a direction upon the State of Bihar to appoint them in the vacancies in the post of primary teachers in the State of Bihar. = Be that as it may, in the event, some discrepancies had crept in the final select list, the individual grievances contained various anomalies, which it is difficult for us to unravel. Accordingly, we modify our order dated 13th October, 2011, and allow the applicants to approach the High Court for redressal of their grievances. We also direct that the applications, special leave petitions and writ petitions filed before us be treated as withdrawn, with liberty to the parties to approach the High Court individually or otherwise, for relief, if any, but without, in any way, affecting the appointments of those teachers who have already been appointed against the vacant 34,540 posts and are working. We have been informed during the hearing that about 2413 posts out of the 34,540 posts were still left to be filled up. All the applications, Special Leave Petitions and Writ Petitions are, therefore, disposed of in the light of the aforesaid observations. We make it clear that none of the persons appointed out of the 34,540 vacancies should be disturbed in any way, but the question of filling up the balance vacancies may be taken into consideration, while disposing of the applications in question.
Reported in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40581 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.26824 OF 2012 YASHWANT SINGH & ORS. … PETITIONERS VS. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. … RESPONDENTS WITH I.A.Nos. 668, 669, 671, 674, 675, 676, 677, 679, 680, … Continue reading
Right to Vote & Right to Contest When arise = “A right to vote is a statutory right, the Law gives it, the Law takes it away. Persons convicted of crime are kept away from elections to the Legislature, whether to State Legislature or Parliament, and all other public elections. The Court has no hesitation in interpreting the Constitution and the Laws framed under it, read together, that persons in the lawful custody of the Police also will not be voters, in which case, they will neither be electors. The Law temporarily takes away the power of such persons to go anywhere near the election scene. To vote is a statutory right. It is privilege to vote, which privilege may be taken away. In that case, the elector would not be qualified, even if his name is on the electoral rolls. The name is not struck off, but the qualification to be an elector and the privilege to vote when in the lawful custody of the police is taken away.” – a person who has no right to vote by virtue of the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 62 of the 1951 Act is not an elector and is therefore not qualified to contest the election to the House of the People or the Legislative Assembly of a State.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40561 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3040-3041 OF 2004 The Chief Election Commissioner Etc. … Petitioners Versus Jan Chaukidar (Peoples Watch) & Ors. … Respondents ORDER These are appeals by way of Special Leave under Article 136 of the Constitution against the common order dated … Continue reading
Ara Municipal Corporation, the Bihar Municipal Officers and Servants Pension Rules, 1987 (for short ‘the Rules’) = While they were working in the Ara Municipal Corporation, the Bihar Municipal Officers and Servants Pension Rules, 1987 (for short ‘the Rules’) came into effect. = The Ara Municipal Corporation, however, did not give effect to the Rules until 19th June, 2004 on which date it adopted resolution to give pensionary benefits to its employees who had retired from service from the year 2000 onwards in accordance with the Rules.- the Division Bench of the High Court upheld the finding of the learned Single Judge that the Rules came into effect on 13-11-1987 but held that as the two writ petitioners had not exercised their option for the pension as required by Rule 4 of the Rules and as their right to pension under the Rules was dependent upon the exercise of their option for pension, they were not entitled for the pension under the Rules. = In the facts of the present case, the Ara Municipal Corporation itself had taken a view that the Rules were not applicable until a resolution is adopted by the Corporation and adopted the resolution only on 19th June, 2004 saying that the pensionary benefits of the Rules will be given to those employees who had retired from service from the year 2000 onwards. The resolution was clearly in contravention of the Rule 1 as well as Rule 4(ii) of the Rules. If the Corporation had taken the correct view that the rules would be effective from 13th November, 1987, the two employees Ramashish Prasad and Vishwanath Ram who were employees of the Ara Municipal Corporation on that date, could have exercised their respective options to switchover to pension scheme under the Rules. This is a case where the Ara Municipal Corporation by taking the view that the Rules were not applicable until adopted by the Corporation had disabled the aforesaid two employees from exercising their option and cannot take advantage of such a disability caused by the Municipal Corporation itself and deny their statutory right to pension under the Rules. Moreover, the two employees have also not received part or whole of provident fund contribution although they have retired in 1996 and 1997 and hence they could not have been deemed to have exercised their option to retain existing provident fund. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench and direct that the appellants will be given the pensionary benefits including pension and family pension, as the case may be, in accordance with the Rules within three months from today. We make it clear that this judgment has been delivered in the facts of the present case and will not be treated as a precedent applicable to all other cases the facts of which are not before this Court.
‘ ‘ PUBLISHED IN http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 4802-4803 OF 2013 ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) Nos. 14922-14923 OF 2009 SANCHARI DEVI & ORS Appellant(s) VERSUS ARA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS Respondent(s) JUDGMENT Leave granted. 2. These appeals are against the judgment dated 4th March, 2009 … Continue reading
Section 9-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (Maharashtra Amendment).= The correct principle, therefore, is the one recognised and reiterated in Section 9-A – to wit, where an objection to jurisdiction of a civil court is raised to entertain a suit and to pass any interim orders therein, the Court should decide the question of jurisdiction in the first instance but that does not mean that pending the decision on the question of jurisdiction, the Court has no jurisdiction to pass interim orders as may be called for in the facts and circumstances of the case. A mere objection to jurisdiction does not instantly disable the court from passing any interim orders. It can yet pass appropriate orders. At the same time, it should also decide the question of jurisdiction at the earliest possible time. The interim orders so passed are orders within jurisdiction when passed and effective till the court decides that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. These interim orders undoubtedly come to an end with the decision that this Court had no jurisdiction. It is open to the court to modify these orders while holding that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Indeed, in certain situations, it would be its duty to modify such orders or make appropriate directions. For example, take a case, where a party has been dispossessed from the suit property by appointing a receiver or otherwise; in such a case, the Court should, while holding that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, put back the party in the position he was on the date of suit. But this power or obligation has nothing to do with the proposition that while in force, these orders have to be obeyed and their violation can be punished even after the question of jurisdiction is decided against the plaintiff provided the violation is committed before the decision of the Court on the question of jurisdiction.” (emphasis supplied); We may also notice Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which lays down that the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful,unless it is forbidden by law; or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or is fraudulent; or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is unlawful and every agreement executed with such an object or consideration which is unlawful is void. Since the sale deed was executed in favour of respondent No.1 in the teeth of the order of injunction passed by the trial Court, the same appears to be unlawful.
‘ NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.3937 OF 2013(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8987 of 2008) Jehal Tanti and others …Appellants versus Nageshwar Singh (dead) through L.Rs.…Respondents J U D G M E N TG.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. This is an appeal for setting aside order dated 16.05.2007 passed … Continue reading
Sale Deed- purchased pending suit and against injunction orders = Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which lays down that the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless it is forbidden by law; or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or is fraudulent; or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is unlawful and every agreement executed with such an object or consideration which is unlawful is void. Since the sale deed was executed in favour of respondent No.1 in the teeth of the order of injunction passed by the trial Court, the same appears to be unlawful. Respondent 1 had filed suit for specific performance of agreement dated 13.9.1988 executed by Respondent 2. The appellants and Bhagwati Developers are total strangers to that agreement. They came into the picture only when Respondent 2 entered into a clandestine transaction with the appellants for sale of the suit property and executed the agreements for sale, which were followed by registered sale deeds and the appellants executed agreement for sale in favour of Bhagwati Developers. These transactions were in clear violation of the order of injunction passed by the Delhi High Court which had restrained Respondent 2 from alienating the suit property or creating third-party interest. To put it differently, the agreements for sale and the sale deeds executed by Respondent 2 in favour of the appellants did not have any legal sanctity.”
Page 1 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.3937 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8987 of 2008) Jehal Tanti and others …Appellants versus Nageshwar Singh (dead) through L.Rs. …Respondents J U D G M E N T G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. This is an appeal for setting … Continue reading
death penalty converted in to life sentence -“Brutality of the manner in which a murder was perpetrated may be a ground but not the sole criterion for judging whether the case is one of the “rarest of rare cases” as indicated in, Bachan Singh’s case, (AIR 1980 SC 898), in a way every murder is brutal, and the difference between one from the other may be on account of mitigating or aggravating features surrounding the murder.” – Thus, Section 31(1) of the Cr. P.C. empowers the Court to inflict sentences of imprisonment for more than one offence to run either consecutively or concurrently. In Kamalanantha & Ors. vs. State of T.N. [(2005) 5 SCC 194], this Court has held that the term “imprisonment” in Section 31 of the Cr. P.C. includes the sentence for imprisonment for life. Considering the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that the appellant is liable under Section 302, IPC for imprisonment for life for each of three offences of murder under Section 300, IPC and the imprisonments for life should not run concurrently but consecutively and such punishment of consecutive sentence of imprisonment for the triple murder committed by the appellant will serve the interest of justice. – but convert the sentence from death to sentence for rigorous imprisonment for life for each of the three offences of murder and direct that the sentences of imprisonment for life for the three offences will run consecutively and not concurrently.
Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 94-95 of 2011 Sanaullah Khan …… Appellant Versus State of Bihar ….. Respondent J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. This is an appeal against the judgment dated 16.12.2009 of the Patna High Court in Death … Continue reading
