perimeter wall

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Elections – Right of voter to vote none Candidates contested in Elections = None of the Above” (NOTA) may be provided in EVMs so that the voters= challenging the constitutional validity of Rules 41(2) & (3) and 49-O of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 (in short ‘the Rules’) to the extent that these provisions violate the secrecy of voting which is fundamental to the free and fair elections and is required to be maintained as per Section 128 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (in short ‘the RP Act’) and Rules 39 and 49-M of the Rules.- In the above backdrop, the petitioners herein prayed for declaring Rules 41(2) & (3) and 49-O of the Rules ultra vires and unconstitutional and also prayed for a direction to the Election Commission of India- Respondent No. 2 herein, to provide necessary provision in the ballot papers as well as in the electronic voting machines for the protection of the right of not to vote in order to keep the exercise of such right a secret under the existing RP Act/the Rules or under Article 324 of the Constitution.= we hold that Rules 41(2) & (3) and 49-O of the Rules are ultra vires Section 128 of the RP Act and Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution to the extent they violate secrecy of voting. In view of our conclusion, we direct the Election Commission to provide necessary provision in the ballot papers/EVMs and another button called “None of the Above” (NOTA) may be provided in EVMs so that the voters, who come to the polling booth and decide not to vote for any of the candidates in the fray, are able to exercise their right not to vote while maintaining their right of secrecy. Inasmuch as the Election Commission itself is in favour of the provision for NOTA in EVMs, we direct the Election Commission to implement the same either in a phased manner or at a time with the assistance of the Government of India. We also direct the Government of India to provide necessary help for implementation of the above direction. Besides, we also direct the Election Commission to undertake awareness programmes to educate the masses. 62) The writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid directions.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40835         REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 1 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 161 OF 2004   People’s Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. …. Petitioner (s)   Versus   Union of India & Anr. …. Respondent(s)   2   J U D G M E … Continue reading

Workmen compensation Act – whether the employee’s ischemic heart condition developed as a consequence of any stress or strain of his employment with the Appellant-company. – remanded = The Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation (1st Court), West Bengal held on 24.6.2010 that the Applicant/Respondent had met with an accident on 27.12.1999 while in the employment of the Appellant and that considering his age, wages and injury he was entitled to compensation computed at Rs.12,00,000/- (Rupees Twelve Lac) which is the maximum awardable, together with simple interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum till the date of realization. = His argument is that this health malady has not arisen as a consequence of the Respondent’s services with the Appellant, and hence no compensation was payable under Section 3 of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 which comes into operation only in the event of an employee suffering personal injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.= whether the employee’s ischemic heart condition developed as a consequence of any stress or strain of his employment with the Appellant-company. There can be no gainsaying that the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 is a beneficial legislation requiring some play at the joints so far as considering a disabled employee’s claim is concerned. In these circumstances, parties shall appear before the Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation (1st Court) West Bengal or its successor Court, as the case may be, on 11.11.2013. 4. The Appeal stands allowed accordingly.= A perusal of the impugned order makes it palpably clear that the Appellant-company’s Appeal was dismissed following the decision in FMAT No.1327 of 2010 (Dredging Corporation of India Ltd. v. P.K. Bhattacherjee). In these circumstances, this matter also requires to be remanded to the High Court of Calcutta for a fresh hearing in F.M.A. No.869 of 2010. Parties to appear before the High Court on 18.11.2013. 6. The Appeal stands allowed accordingly.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40779     NON-REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8278 OF 2013 [Arising out of S.L.P.(C)No.26414 of 2011]       Dredging Corporation of India Ltd. …..Appellant   Versus   P.K. Bhattacherjee …..Respondent   W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8279 OF 2013 … Continue reading

Insurance claim for the patient is medically described as in a “vegitiative state” and patient is called as “spastic quadric paresys = the appellants had in fact proved that they had spent Rs.3,49,128/- towards medical expenses for treating their son. They had to purchase certain instruments worth Rs.58,642/- for making life of their son comfortable and Rs.31,000/- had been spent towards nursing and Rs.1,37,000/- had to be spent for Physiotherapist. Looking at the fact that Rajanala Ravi Krishna will have to remain dependant for his whole life on someone and looking at the observations made by the Tribunal, which have been reproduced hereinabove, in our opinion, his life is very miserable and there would be substantial financial burden on the appellants for the entire life of their injured son. At times it is not possible to award compensation strictly in accordance with the law laid down as in a particular case it may not be just also. We are hesitant to say that it is a reality of life that at times life of an injured or sick person becomes more miserable for the person and for the family members than the death. Here is one such case where the appellants, even during their retired life will have to take care of their son like a child especially when they would have expected the son to take their care. 13. Though, the High Court has rightly followed the principle laid down in the case of Sarla Verma (supra), in our opinion, the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is more just.

NON-REPORTABLE     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8083 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.26872 of 2011)   R. Venkata Ramana & Anr. …..Appellants Versus   The United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. …..Respondents   J U D G M E N T   … Continue reading

cut off date for starting the professional courses can not be extended = it is not possible to accede to the request of the petitioner to change the time-schedule when the last date for admitting the students, which was July 15, 2013, expired long ago. If the Central Government forwards the application to the DCI at this juncture, DCI shall hardly have any time to look into the feasibility of the scheme as per the requirements contained in Regulation 21. We have to keep in mind that in the schedule annexed to the Regulations 2006, six to eight months time is given to the DCI for this purpose. We are, thus, of the view that the High Court did not commit any error in holding that in the given circumstances mandamus could not be issued to the Central Government to exercise its discretionary powers in a particular manner to modify the time-schedule. Sanctity to the time-schedule has to be attached. It is too late in the day, in so far as present academic session is concerned, to give any direction.- This Court has highlighted the importance of cut off date for starting the professional courses, particularly medical courses, and repeatedly impressed upon that such deadline should be tinkered with. (See: Priya Gupta vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2012) 7 SCC 433 and Maa Vaishno Devi Mahila Mahavidyalaya vs. State of U.P. (2013) 2 SCC 617. 10. We, thus, do not find any error in the impugned judgment of the High Court. This petition is bereft of any merit and is accordingly dismissed.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40787   [REPORTABLE]     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (Civil) No. 22910 OF 2013   Educare Charitable Trust ……Petitioner   Vs.   Union of India & Anr. ….Respondents       J U D G M E N T       A.K.SIKRI,J.   … Continue reading

DEATH CONFIRMED = Herein, A1 and A2 have committed a cold blooded murder in a pre-ordained fashion without any provocation whatsoever. The motive behind the gruesome act was to avenge the act of informant in approaching the machinery of law enforcement inspite of threats by the appellants. The victims were five innocent children and wife of the informant who were sleeping unalarmed when the appellants came and locked them inside their house while it was set ablaze. Further, wrath of A1 and A2 is reflected in their act of first gagging the informant, thereafter attempting to burn him alive and later, when he tried to escape, firing at him thereby leaving no stone unturned in translating their threats into reality. As a result of the aforesaid incident, having witnessed the threats of burning given by the A1 to the informant tuned into reality, none but the family of the deceased-informant came forth to depose against the appellant-accused persons during the trial. The crime, enormous in proportion having wiped off the whole family, is committed so brutally that it pricks and shocks not only the judicial conscience but even the collective conscience of the society. It demands just punishment from the Court and the Court is bound to respond within legal parameters. The demand for justice and the award of punishment have to be in consonance with the legislative command and the discretion vested in the Courts. “…the punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of wrong doing; and, in order to maintain respect for the law, it is essential that the punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the objects of punishments as being a deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else… The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong doer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not.” 90. In light of the aforesaid, having regard to the gravity of the offence committed, we are of the considered opinion that with regard to A1 and A2 this case falls into the category of rarest of the rare cases and is not a case where imprisonment for life is an adequate sentence and thus, constrained to reach the inescapable conclusion that death sentence imposed on A1 and A2 be confirmed. 91. Therefore, the sentence of death imposed on A1 and A2 is confirmed and the sentence awarded to A3 is commuted to life imprisonment till the rest of his life. 92. The order of stay on the execution of the capital punishment of A1 and A2 is vacated.

punishable in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40794          REPORTABLE     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.249-250 OF 2011       DEEPAK RAI Appellant(s)   VERSUS   STATE OF BIHAR Respondent(s)   WITH   CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1747-1748 OF 2011       JAGAT RAI AND ANR. Appellant(s) … Continue reading

Mortgage – deposit of title deeds – default – sale underthe State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 – in meanwhile private sale – not valid – High court cannot set aside the corporation sale as it was done underthe State Financial Corporation Act, 1951= the property in question was duly advertised for sale pursuant whereto the fifth respondent had offered the highest amount. On acceptance of the said offer by the UPFC, the entire amount was paid and the sale was confirmed by the Corporation. No sale deed was however executed by the Corporation in favour of the fifth respondent. It also appears that before the property was put up for sale by the Corporation, the original owner, Smt. Nisha Devi Jaiswal had sold the same to the third and fourth respondents, who, in turn, had sold the same to the writ petitioner by sale deed dated 29.08.2001. The aforesaid sale by the original owners to the vendors of the writ petitioner and, thereafter, by said vendors to the petitioner himself was made when the property stood mortgaged in favour of the UPFC. It is in the above circumstances, that the writ petitioner had approached the High court seeking interference with the sale of the property made in favour of the fifth respondent pursuant to the advertisement dated 20.10.2002 issued by the UPFC and further for transfer of the property in favour of the writ petitioner besides restoration of possession thereof which was taken over by the Corporation. 13. The sale made by the UPFC in favour of the fifth respondent was in exercise of the statutory powers vested in the Corporation by Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951. Under the aforesaid provisions of the Act default in re-payment of any loan by an industrial undertaking vests in the Financial Corporation the right to take over the management or possession or both of the industrial concern along with the right to transfer the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation. By virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Act such transfer of property by the Corporation will vest in the transferee all rights in the property as if the transfer had been made by the owner thereof. 14. No serious issue either with regard to the validity of the exercise of the power under the Act or the manner of sale of the property by the Corporation pursuant to the advertisement dated 20.10.2002 had been raised in the Writ Petition. What was contended before the High Court is that the Writ Petitioner, Vishnu Dutt Sharma, had purchased the property by sale deed dated 29.08.2001 without any knowledge or information of the mortgage created by the original owner, Smt. Nisha Devi Jaiswal in favour of the Corporation and that the sale pursuant to the advertisement was also without notice to him. A right to the property based on certain equitable principles was also claimed to strengthen which, the offer covered by the interim order of the High Court dated 28.05.2003 was made by the writ petitioner. 15. The issues raised by the writ petitioner before the High court really pertained to the claim of better title of the writ petitioner to the property in question on the basis of the sale deed dated 29.08.2001. The validity of the sale deed dated 29.08.2001 executed in favour of the writ petitioner by his vendors during the subsistence of the mortgage in favour of the Corporation and the rights of the fifth respondent to the said property on the basis of the sale made in his favour by the Corporation pursuant to the advertisement dated 20.10.2002 are the issues that arose in the Writ Petition. Broad and expansive though the powers of the High Court under Article 226 may be, adjudication of the aforesaid questions, some of which also required proof of certain basic facts, in our view, was not appropriate in the domain of public law. Though the High Court in its order dated 05.12.2006 did not expressly say so, the affect of the several directions issued by it, in fact, amounts to an adjudication of the issues outlined above. 16. The essence of the dispute between the parties denuded the lis a public law character. Nor was any issue arising out of public law functions of the State or its authorities involved. In such a situation resort to the public law remedy should not have entertained by the High Court. (Vide Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra[1]). Even if the vindication of the writ petitioner’s rights under the sale deed dated 29.08.2001 is ignored and we are to proceed on the basis that the writ petitioner questioned the sale made by the Corporation, the writ petitioner would not be entitled to an adjudication of the rights of the parties inter se but at best to a judicial review of the administrative action of the Corporation with regard to the sale made (Vide Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. and ors. vs. Vardan Linkers and others[2] ) But as already noticed neither the exercise of the statutory power under the Act by the Corporation in the matter of the sale of the property nor the process of the sale transaction was questioned in the Writ Petition either on account of lack of jurisdiction or abuse of authority. In the above facts, the High Court should have refused an adjudication of the Writ Petition and, instead, ought to have required the aggrieved parties to seek their remedies in an appropriate manner and before the competent civil forum. 17. In view of the above discussions, we allow both the appeals and set aside the order dated 05.12.2006 passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital.

|REPORTABLE | IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 7597 of 2012 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) 6521/2007) PRADEEP KUMAR SHARMA … Appellant Versus U.P.F.C. RAJPUR ROAD, DEHRADUN & ORS … Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL No. 7598 of 2012 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) 11835/2007) J U D G M … Continue reading

The appellant was awarded the work relating to the construction of residential and non-residential building at Central Excavation Training Institute (CETI) vide work order dated 25.2.1987 for an amount of Rs.68,91,589/-. Appellant submits that for want of final drawings and delay in the supply of cement and other construction materials, including supply of water, the work was delayed, but completed on 1.4.1989 and handed over the buildings to the respondent. We are of the view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the amount awarded in respect of the water charges which comes to Rs.1,68,890.25. Going by the general terms and conditions of the contract, in our view, the department was bound to supply water, so found by the arbitrator, in our view, rightly. Therefore, that part of the award of the Arbitrator, with regard to the water charges, is upheld. However, the High Court, in our view, rightly denied the claim with regard to plaster of paris, therefore, not interfered with. Appeals are disposed of accordingly, subject to the above modification of the judgment of the High Court. However, there will be no order as to costs.

Non-Reportable   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6262 OF 2012 @ Special Leave Petition (C) No.24337 of 2009 NAND CONTR. & ENGR. THR G.D. AHUJA … Appellant(s) Versus NORTHERN COAL FIELD LTD. & ANR. … Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6263 OF 2012 @ Special Leave Petition (C) … Continue reading

This appeal is directed against order dated 14.3.2008 of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short, ‘the National Commission’) whereby the application filed by the appellant for review of order dated 9.9.2004 was dismissedIn our view, the appellant cannot make any grievance against the cost specified in the revised allotment letters issued on 22.1.1999 and 25.1.1999 because he had voluntarily sought change in the mode of purchase and unequivocally agreed to pay the cost i.e. Rs.5,23,232/- . The appellant’s plea that the cost of the flat cannot be more than what was specified in the registered sale deed sounds attractive but lacks merit. A careful reading of letters dated 22.8.1998, 27.11.1998 and 15.5.1999 sent by the appellant to the respondent makes it clear that he had conveyed his unequivocal willingness for registration of the sale deed showing the cost of the flat as Rs.4,31,918/- although the actual cost was Rs.5,23,232/-. Having taken advantage of the offer made by the Board to get the deed registered at a price less than the actual cost of the flat, the appellant cannot turn around and demand refund of Rs.1,01,314/-. 18. The appellant’s grievance against the quantum of compensation awarded by the State Commission also merits rejection because the complaint filed by him was not bona fide.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5584 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12334 of 2009) S. Srinivasa Murthy … Appellant versus Karnataka Housing Board … Respondent J U D G M E N T G. S. Singhvi, J. 1. This appeal is directed against order … Continue reading

“In the result I allow the writ petition, quash the order of dismissal dated February 11, 1988 and direct that the petitioner shall be reinstated in service forthwith with all consequential benefits from the date of his dismissal. Needless to say it would be open to the respondents, if so advised, to proceed against the petitioner afresh as per the Rules of the Education Code.” It is neither the pleaded case of the respondents nor it was argued before us that during the pendency of the enquiry, the appellant was kept under suspension and he was paid subsistence allowance. This being the position, there could be no justification to deny full salary to the appellant for the period between 5.11.2003 and 31.12.2005. 16. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the respondents are directed to pay full salary and allowances to the appellant for the period between 5.11.2003 and 31.12.2005. The needful be done within a period of two months from today by getting prepared a demand draft in the appellant’s name, which shall be delivered at his residential address on or before the end of two months period.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5372 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23219 of 2010) R.S. Misra … Appellant Versus Union of India and others … Respondents J U D G M E N T G. S. Singhvi, J. 1. This appeal is directed against … Continue reading

We may only mention that learned counsel for Craig Mcleod submitted that the order dated 07.01.2011 is in violation of the order passed by this Court on 29.11.2010.Therefore, without going into the larger issues raised before us, we grant liberty to Craig Mcleod to revive W.P.(C) No. 890 of 2012 filed (and subsequently withdrawn) by him in the High Court challenging the office order dated 07.01.2011 passed by the Vice Chancellor of the University. We expect the High Court to permit revival of the Writ Petition and decide it expeditiously since it is stated that Craig Mcleod has already lost two years of his education as result of this litigation.


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