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No medical negligence = False claim alleging that operation was done over the dead body by playing mellow drama patient was joined with heart ailment for two days for claiming operation charges -No medical negligence Dismissed = Surinder Singh -verses -1. Escorts Heart Institute & Research Centre and others = published in http://164.100.72.12/ncdrcrep/judgement/00131111150515946OP46402.htm

No medical negligence = False claim alleging that operation was done over the dead body by playing mellow drama  patient was joined with heart ailment, for two days for claiming operation charges -No medical negligence Dismissed =   Opposite parties have proved on record the nurses charts / notes maintained by Duty nurses who attended to the patient Virendr Kaur after the surgery till … Continue reading

M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for brevity “the Act”) to file the suit for eviction.= In a suit for eviction and mesne profits , on failure to prove relationship of land lord and tenant , no eviction should be granted basing on title, plaintiff ought have to file a suit for declaration of title and possession, and the period indulged in this proceedings arrest the period of adverse possession = Tribhuvanshankar … Appellant Versus Amrutlal …Respondent = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40966

M.P.  Accommodation  Control Act, 1961 (for brevity “the Act”) to file the  suit  for      eviction.= In a suit for eviction and mesne profits  , on failure to prove relationship of land lord and tenant , no eviction should be granted basing on title, plaintiff ought have to file a suit  for declaration of title and … Continue reading

The Lease Agreement is not registered – there is clear understanding about rate of rent and terms and conditions of lease between the parties evidencing correspondences – suit for recover of rent is maintainable – pending case, Bank vacated some portion of building – Bank directed to hand over the possession with out any suit for recovery = GULAB CHAND BHORA & ORS. … APPELLANT (S) VERSUS PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK & ANR. … RESPONDENT (S) = Published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40957

The Lease Agreement is not registered – there is clear understanding about rate of rent and terms and conditions of lease between the parties evidencing correspondences – suit for recover of rent is maintainable – pending case, Bank vacated some portion of building – Bank directed to hand over the possession with out any suit for recovery … Continue reading

Rs.6,08,00,550/ crores compensation to N.R.I. for the death of his wife = Medical Negligence – Compensation was fixed based on principles and theories of M.V. ACT = Dr. Balram Prasad … Appellant Vs. Dr. Kunal Saha & Ors. … Respondents= http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40897

Rs.6,08,00,550/ crores compensation to N.R.I. for the death of his wife  =  Medical Negligence – Compensation was fixed based on principles and theories of M.V. ACT =   The  patients irrespective of their social, cultural  and  economic  background  are entitled to be  treated  with  dignity  which  not  only  forms  their fundamental right but also their human right.    We, … Continue reading

NO INTEREST SHOULD BE GRANTED FOR A ERLIER PERIOD SPENT IN WRONG COURT ‘Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit’ No interest should be awarded ONGC LTD. Vs. M/S. MODERN CONSTRUCTION AND CO. published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40872

No interest shoudl be awarded – On presentation of a suit on the point of Jurisdiction after return under Or. VII, rule 10 C.P.C., Court should not grant interest from the date of filing of suit in earlier court as it is not presented on transfer. Hence any decree granting interest from the date of … Continue reading

Damage to the crop due pesticides – not proved; Claim by other persons whoes names not mentioned in the purchased Bill = (2012) 2 SCC 506 – National Seeds Corporation Ltd. Vs. M. Madhusudhan Reddy & Anr. in which it was held that not only the purchaser of goods, but also beneficiaries who use the goods with approval of the person who purchased goods fall within purview of consumer. We agree with the proposition of law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court, but in the case in hand, complainants have submitted in paragraph 1 of the complaint that they have purchased pesticides for a sum of Rs.9,000/- whereas bill dated 12.12.2006 is in the name of only Complainant no. 2. Further, perusal of complaint reveals that nowhere complainants have alleged that Complainant No. 1 and Complainant nos. 3 to 9 used aforesaid pesticides with approval of complainant no.2. In such circumstances, it cannot be inferred that Complainant No. 1 and Complainant Nos. 3 to 9 sprayed purchased pesticides on their crop with the approval of Complainant No. 2 who purchased pesticides from OP No. 2 and 3, and in such circumstances, Complainant No. 1 and Complainant 3 to 9 do not fall within purview of consumer and learned State Commission has not committed any error in holding that except Complainant No. 2, rest of the complainants do not fall within purview of consumer.- Complainants have not placed on record any laboratory report to substantiate that crops were damaged 100% due to application of pesticide. Report of Agriculture Development Officer only reveals that there was 100% damage to the wheat crop. These officers have not carried out any test to ascertain whether 100% damage to the wheat crop was due to application of purchased pesticides or not. They have mentioned damage as told by the complainants meaning thereby without carrying out any test regarding application of pesticides on the wheat crop. They have given report regarding damage to the crop due to application of purchased pesticides. 8. In the light of above discussion, we do not find any illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order and revision petition is liable to be dismissed.

published in http://164.100.72.12/ncdrcrep/judgement/0013092511533404RP444612.htm NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION                                                 NEW DELHI          REVISION PETITION NO. 4446 OF 2012 (From the order dated 13.07.2012 in Appeal No. 859/2011 of the Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Panchkula) 1. Devender Kumar S/o Sh. Khicchu 2. Radha Charan S/o Sh. Puran Lal 3. Mahendar S/o Sh. Heti 4. Devraj S/o Sh. Puran Lal 5. Parkash S/o Sh. Khema 6. Chander S/o Sh. Khajan Singh 7. Nand Kishore S/o Sh. Shiv Charan 8. Shyam S/o Sh. Uttam Singh 9. Rajender S/o Sh. Bhagmal All R/o of Village Mohna, … Continue reading

Though the property may have partaken the character of self acquired property during the life time of Venkatarao, after his death, it is available for partition among the class-I heirs. = whether the said matter is covered by Section 6 or Section 8 of the Act. = Section 6: Devolution of interest of coparcenary property: When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act: Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. Explanation 1.- For the purpose of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Explanation 2.- Nothing contained in the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein. Section 8: General rules of succession in the case of males.- The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of this Chapter:- a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class I of the Schedule; b) secondly, if there is no heir of class I, then upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class II of the Schedule; c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two classes, then upon the agnates of the deceased; and d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the cognates of the deceased. Section 6 gets attracted whenever a Hindu male, who was a member of coparcenary dies before any partition in the family has taken place. In such an event, his interest in the coparcenary property would devolve by survivorship and not by succession. In other words, if there existed four members in a coparcenary, each one of them would be entitled to 1/4th share in the event of any partition taking place; and if one of the coparcener’s dies before the partition has taken place, his interest in the coparcenary would result in change of shares meaning thereby; that the shares of the remaining three members would become 1/3rd each. Exception carved out under the proviso is that, if such coparcener is survived by a class-I female heir, his interest would devolve upon such class-I heir, or any male person claiming through her by succession. This can be exemplified by taking the instance of a son, who is a member of the coparcenary predeceasing his mother. In such an event, his share which would have been determined, had a partition taken place when he was alive would devolve upon his mother. However, it is only the male successors of the mother of the deceased, that would entitle to claim the said property through her. Section 8 operates in cases where a Hindu male, not being a member of coparcenary but holding property in his own right, dies. In such an event, the devolution would be through succession in favour of this class-I heirs, and in their absence to class-II heirs, and so on. A typical transformation of the character and nature of property takes place, in the event of death of a Hindu male, who held property in his own right. Take for instance; a Hindu male acquired property in different ways i.e., a) through his own efforts, i.e., self-acquisition or b) through partition in a joint family or c) through gift/settlement or other kinds of transfers from his kin or d) through succession. If during his life time any of his children demands partition of the said properties, he can resist the same by pleading that the properties, except those that have devolved through succession i.e., ancestral properties are his self acquisitions; and not available for partition. However, if he dies intestate, leaving behind the properties held by him, whether through succession, or in partition or through self-acquisition, or through transfer from his kin would become available for being shared by his class-I heirs. The properties, which, till his death were his self acquisitions would assume a different character and would be available for partition, among the class-I heirs of the deceased. In the instant case, Venkatarao died holding the suit properties in the form of self-acquisitions. Had any demand been made by his daughters for partition, during his life time, he could have effectively resisted the same by pleading that his self acquired properties are not available for partition. On his death, a substantial change takes place be it as regards the persons who can claim the share in it, or the nature of the property. The class-I heirs include not only his daughters i.e., second appellant and second respondent but also his mother and wife, first respondent and first appellant respectively, whereas the coparceners could have been his daughters alone. The property loses its character of self-acquisition and would be available for partition.

published in http://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2011/sa/sa_1198_2011.html *HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY +S.A. No.1198 of 2011 %15.12.2011 # Sadhineni Rajani and another. ….. APPELLANTS AND Sadhineni Hymavathi and others.   …..RESPONDENTS ! Counsel for the appellants:   SRI C.Panduranga Rao ^ Counsel for the respondents: SRI G. Pedda Babu. < Gist: > Head Note: ? Cases referred:    [1] AIR 1953 Supreme Court 495 … Continue reading

Hindu succession Act – scope of sec. 6 and sec. 8 = a suit for declaration that sale deed dated 19.6.1993 executed by respondent No.2 in favour of respondent No.1 is illegal, void, without jurisdiction and inoperative on the rights of the appellant with consequential relief of possession and permanent prohibitory injunction. = 1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the property in dispute has devolved upon the heirs of Baba Surinder Singh Bedi under proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. 2. Whether in view of the proviso of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act the succession of property of Baba Surinder Singh Bedi on his heirs under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act will change the nature and nomenclature of property from ancestral/coparcenary property to that of self acquired property. = “6. When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act: Provided that, if the deceased had left his surviving a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative, specified in that class who claims, through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. Explanation I. – For the purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not.” The interest of Nanak Chand shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. In view of Explanation I of Sec. 6, Nanak Chand would have got 1/5th interest on partition between him and his wife and three sons. If once the interest of Nanak Chand is determined to be 1/5th before his death, his interest would devolve upon his widow, three sons and three daughters equally and thus the share of each one of them would be 1/5 x 1/7, that is, 1/35th each. The claim of these heirs cannot be denied merely because some of them have not advanced the claim. When the question of determination of share among the heirs crops up before the Court, the Court has to see that every heir gets his due. Shri Itorora appearing for the respondents could not successfully meet the point raised on behalf of the appellant.” = The bare perusal of Section 6 of the Act makes it clear that in this situation the estate of Baba Surinder Singh would devolve under Section 8 and not under Section 6 of the Act. In view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, respondent No.2 would inherit his share in the estate of late Baba Surinder Singh in his individual capacity and not alongwith his son appellant. Once this is the position then the appellant has no right to assail the sale dated 19.6.1993 made by respondent No.2 in favour of respondent No.1.

published in http://164.100.138.36/casest/generatenew.php?path=data/judgment/2013old/&fname=RSA4822000.pdf&smflag=N IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA R.S.A.No. 482 of 2000. Judgment reserved on : 6.5.2010 Date of decision : 14.6. 2010. Capt. Arminder Singh Bedi (Amninder Singh Bedi) ..Appellant. Versus Guru Nanak Dev University and another . ..Respondents. Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Kuldip Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting ?1 … Continue reading

Consumer Act – purchase of building for commercial use does not come under consumer Act -“Whether, M/s. Nav Bharat Press (Raipur), is a ‘consumer’, in accordance with Section 2(1)(d)(i)?”.= how can a Partnership Firm, which is transacting the business of printing and publication of Newspapers, can be said to be a ‘Consumer’?” It is clear that the employees, representatives, correspondents, etc., would transact the commercial activity. – A bare perusal of this case, clearly goes to show that the Guest House is meant for ‘commercial purpose’. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the said premises will be used by a person, exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood, by means of self-employment. – The complainant is not a ‘consumer’. Therefore, we dismiss the complaint, but it can approach the appropriate forum for redressal of its grievances, as per lawWe, therefore, impose punitive costs in the sum of Rs.10,000/-, which be paid in Prime Minister’s Relief Fund, towards Uttarakhand Tragedy, within 60 days, otherwise, it would carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum, till realization. .

published in http://164.100.72.12/ncdrcrep/judgement/00130807110012955CC19313.h NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI   CONSUMER COMPLAINT NO.  193 OF  2013 M/s Nav Bharat Press (Raipur) 20/21, Bharat Chambers, Pragati Layout Rajeev Nagar, Wardha Road Somalwada, Nagpur Through its Partner, Sh.Sameer                                  ….. Complainant   Versus 1. M/s Sahara Prime City Ltd. Zonal Office, 2nd Floor Godrej Millennium Building 9th Koregaon Park Road Near Taj … Continue reading

APEX COURT UPHELD THAT THE SUIT FILED BY NATIONAL HOUSING BANK UNDER SPECIAL ACT ENACTED FOR PURPOSE OF HARSHAD S. MEHTA , IS ONLY AN EYE WASH =The entire scandal and the present litigation revolves around the second defendant (since deceased) – one Harshad S. Mehta (a notified person under Section 3(2) of the Act). The scandal exposes the shortcomings and loopholes in the administration of banking sector of this country, more particularly, the State-owned/controlled banks. 6. The National Housing Bank (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Plaintiff’) a statutory Corporation created by an Act of Parliament (Act No. 53 of 1987) filed two suits, one invoking the original jurisdiction of Bombay High Court (Suit No. 211 of 1995) and another before the Special Court established under the Act No. 27 of 1992 being Suit No. 2 of 1995. The said suits came to be filed against (i) the State Bank of Saurashtra which at that point of time was a subsidiary bank of the State Bank of India but later got amalgamated with the State Bank of India, (ii) Harshad S. Mehta, (iii) two of the employees of the plaintiff bank and (iv) the Custodian appointed under Section 3(1) of the Act 27 of 1992.= No oral evidence from plaintiff side except filing some documents – At the time when these documents were being tendered it was clarified to all parties that mere tendering of documents would only establish that there was in existence such a document and that it stated what is stated. It was clarified that the contents of the documents would not be deemed to have been proved. It was clarified that any party who wanted to prove the truth of the contents had to do so by positive evidence. As stated above, except for 2nd Defendant, no other party has led any oral evidence.”; Janakiraman Committee Report – not admissible = The Special Court Act though declares that the Court is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, it does not relieve the Special Court from the obligation to follow the Evidence Act. Further, the learned Judge extensively relied upon the second interim report of the Jankiraman Committee[11] on the ground that the same was tendered[12] by the 1st defendant. 51. Irrespective of the fact whether such a report is admissible in evidence or not, = It is well settled by a long line of judicial authority that the findings of even a statutory Commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 are not enforceable proprio vigore as held in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Others [AIR 1958 SC 538] and the statements made before such Commission are expressly made inadmissible in any subsequent proceedings civil or criminal. In our considered view the report of Janakiraman Committee is not evidence within the meaning of Evidence Act; There is absolutely no evidence on record regarding the payment of the above mentioned amount of Rs.55 crores (approx.) by the plaintiff-Bank to the Standard Chartered Bank except the Janakiraman Committee Report and the correspondence which is neither proved nor the content of the correspondence is explained. On the other hand, the Special Court recorded[17] with respect to the payment of Rs.55 crores (approx.) to the Standard Chartered Bank by the plaintiff – “In the plaintiff’s record there is no clear indication as to for what transaction this cheque had been issued. The plaintiffs were, therefore, not sure for what this cheque had been issued.” 62. In the background of the above discussed pleadings and evidence, we are of the opinion the suit is required to be dismissed on the ground that there is no evidence led by the plaintiff to establish its case. ; suppression of material facts = We must also record our disapproval of the finding recorded by the Special Court that the plaintiff did not suppress the truth. We are of the opinion that the plaintiff approached the Special Court with unclean hands by suppressing the relevant material. We shall first discuss the nature of the suppression and then examine the legal consequences that should follow.= The whole attempt of both the banks is to shield the officers on either side taking refuge under attractive legal pleas – which if examined in the context of the limited facts pleaded give a picture that the suit transaction is an innocuous transaction which unfortunately for the country is not. In our opinion the suit is a sheer abuse of the legal process.= both the plaintiff and respondent Banks simply reiterated their respective stands before the Committee of Secretaries. No attempt appears to have been made by the Government to find out the truth as to (1) how the plaintiff Bank parted with a high denomination cheque and gave custody of the same to Harshad Mehta and (2) as to how the first defendant Bank paid the various amounts to the dictation of Harshad Mehta in the absence of any authorisation by the plaintiff Bank. Be that as it may, if really the Government believed that the judgment of the Special Court does not require any interference, nothing stopped the Government from directing both the Banks to withdraw their appeals before this Court. 74. The whole exercise appears to be an eye wash. A thinly veiled scorn for the orders of this Court.= The professed purpose of the Special Courts Act – the back drop of the scandal that shook the nation – and the manner in which the litigation was conducted coupled with the absolute indifference of the Government to get at the truth only demonstrates the duplicity with which Governments can act. 76. We dismiss the suit and set aside the decree in toto. The consequences follow insofar as the appeals are concerned. But in the circumstances, we do not award any costs.

published in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40614  Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2155 OF 1999 State Bank of India Thr. General Manager …Appellant Versus National Housing Bank & Ors. …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2294 OF 1999 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3647 OF 1999 J U D G M E N … Continue reading

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