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Sec.271 of INCOME TAX ACT = The AO has to initiate penalty proceedings when he found difference between the reported and assessed income – No separate reasons not necessary to record whether to intiate proceedings or not – but the burden lies on the assessee to give suffcient reasons for show cause notice and the burden shift on the Ao then he has to given reasons for imposing penalty = MAK Data P. Ltd. … Appellant Versus Commissioner of Income Tax-II … Respondent = http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40925
Sec.271 of INCOME TAX ACT = The AO has to initiate penalty proceedings when he found difference between the reported and assessed income – No separate reasons not necessary to record whether to intiate proceedings or not – but the burden lies on the assessee to give suffcient reasons for show cause notice and the burden … Continue reading
Elections – Right of voter to vote none Candidates contested in Elections = None of the Above” (NOTA) may be provided in EVMs so that the voters= challenging the constitutional validity of Rules 41(2) & (3) and 49-O of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 (in short ‘the Rules’) to the extent that these provisions violate the secrecy of voting which is fundamental to the free and fair elections and is required to be maintained as per Section 128 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (in short ‘the RP Act’) and Rules 39 and 49-M of the Rules.- In the above backdrop, the petitioners herein prayed for declaring Rules 41(2) & (3) and 49-O of the Rules ultra vires and unconstitutional and also prayed for a direction to the Election Commission of India- Respondent No. 2 herein, to provide necessary provision in the ballot papers as well as in the electronic voting machines for the protection of the right of not to vote in order to keep the exercise of such right a secret under the existing RP Act/the Rules or under Article 324 of the Constitution.= we hold that Rules 41(2) & (3) and 49-O of the Rules are ultra vires Section 128 of the RP Act and Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution to the extent they violate secrecy of voting. In view of our conclusion, we direct the Election Commission to provide necessary provision in the ballot papers/EVMs and another button called “None of the Above” (NOTA) may be provided in EVMs so that the voters, who come to the polling booth and decide not to vote for any of the candidates in the fray, are able to exercise their right not to vote while maintaining their right of secrecy. Inasmuch as the Election Commission itself is in favour of the provision for NOTA in EVMs, we direct the Election Commission to implement the same either in a phased manner or at a time with the assistance of the Government of India. We also direct the Government of India to provide necessary help for implementation of the above direction. Besides, we also direct the Election Commission to undertake awareness programmes to educate the masses. 62) The writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid directions.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40835 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 1 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 161 OF 2004 People’s Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. …. Petitioner (s) Versus Union of India & Anr. …. Respondent(s) 2 J U D G M E … Continue reading
Section 78(5) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 (for short ‘the Act’).=The Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer, Bhiwadi had levied penalty in exercise of his powers under Section 78(5) of the Act against the owner of the vehicle who was carrying certain goods of the assessee.- “If one reads sub-section (5) of Section 78 in its entirety with Rule 53 of the 1995 Rules, it is clear that penalty was liable to be imposed for importation of any taxable goods for sale without furnishing a declaration in Form ST 18A completely filled in all respects. The duty to fill and furnish the said Form is imposed on the purchasing dealer. Therefore, Section 78(5) as it stood prior to 22.3.02 imposed penalty if possession or movement of goods took place inter alia in breach of Section 78(2)(a) on “the person in-charge”, which included the owner. In this connection it may be noted that sub- section (5) comes after sub-section 4(c) which talks about release of the goods to “the owner of the goods” on his giving of adequate security. It is the owner (importer) who has to fill in the Form ST 18A. It is the owner who is entitled to seek release under Section 78(4) on giving security. It is the owner who is entitled to hearing under Section 78(5) and, therefore, the expression “person in-charge of the goods” under Section 78(5) would include the owner. Moreover, under Section 78(2) the words used are “person in-charge of a vehicle or carrier of goods in movement” whereas the words in Section 78(5) which comes after sub-section (4) refers to “person in-charge of the goods”. The words “in movement” do not find place in Section 78(5) and therefore the expression “person in charge of goods” under Section 78(5) was wider than the expression “person in charge of goods in movement” under Section 78(2)(a). Consequently, the expression “person in-charge of the goods” under Section 78(5) who is given an opportunity of being heard in the enquiry would include the “owner of the goods”.= “person in-charge of the goods” under the old Section 78(5) is substituted by the words “the owner of the goods or a person authorized in writing by such owner or person in-charge of the goods”.- Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court and restore the order passed by the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer, Bhiwadi ASSISTANT COMMERCIAL TAXES OFFICER Vs. M/S PAREKH ENTERPRISES .
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40817 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.8216 OF 2013 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.4194 OF 2010) ASSISTANT COMMERCIAL TAXES OFFICER APPELLANT(S) VERSUS M/S PAREKH ENTERPRISES RESPONDENT(S) O R D E R 1. Leave granted. 2. This … Continue reading
What emerges from the above discussion can be summarized in the form of following directions: (i) The voter has the elementary right to know full particulars of a candidate who is to represent him in the Parliament/Assemblies and such right to get information is universally recognized. Thus, it is held that right to know about the candidate is a natural right flowing from the concept of democracy and is an integral part of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. (ii) The ultimate purpose of filing of affidavit along with the nomination paper is to effectuate the fundamental right of the citizens under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The citizens are supposed to have the necessary information at the time of filing of nomination paper and for that purpose, the Returning Officer can very well compel a candidate to furnish the relevant information. (iii) Filing of affidavit with blank particulars will render the affidavit nugatory. (iv) It is the duty of the Returning Officer to check whether the information required is fully furnished at the time of filing of affidavit with the nomination paper since such information is very vital for giving effect to the ‘right to know’ of the citizens. If a candidate fails to fill the blanks even after the reminder by the Returning Officer, the nomination paper is fit to be rejected. We do comprehend that the power of Returning Officer to reject the nomination paper must be exercised very sparingly but the bar should not be laid so high that the justice itself is prejudiced. (v) We clarify to the extent that Para 73 of People’s Union for Civil Liberties case (supra) will not come in the way of the Returning Officer to reject the nomination paper when affidavit is filed with blank particulars. (vi) The candidate must take the minimum effort to explicitly remark as ‘NIL’ or ‘Not Applicable’ or ‘Not known’ in the columns and not to leave the particulars blank. (vii) Filing of affidavit with blanks will be directly hit by Section 125A(i) of the RP Act However, as the nomination paper itself is rejected by the Returning Officer, we find no reason why the candidate must be again penalized for the same act by prosecuting him/her. 28) The Writ Petition is disposed of with the above directions.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40768 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 1 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 121 OF 2008 Resurgence India …. Petitioner (s) Versus Election Commission of India & Anr. …. Respondent(s) 2 J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam, CJI. 1) This writ petition, under Article 32 of … Continue reading
Whether the amendment made in the Master Plan of Delhi vide Notification dated 20.9.1995 permitting utilization of the sites earmarked for Nursery Schools for other purposes is ultra vires the provisions of the Delhi Development Authority Act, 1957 (for short, ‘the Act’) or is otherwise arbitrary and whether allotment of 1000 sq. yards (in some paragraphs of the special leave petition and the documents annexed with it the size of the plot has also been mentioned as 1200 sq. yards) of land earmarked in Gulmohar Park for Nursery School to respondent No.4 – Kala Ashram, School of Dance and Drama, New Delhi is violative of the provisions of the Constitution and/or the Act are the questions which arise for consideration in this appeal filed against judgment dated 24.10.2008 of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.= “All executive actions of the Government of India and the Government of a State are required to be taken in the name of the President or the Governor of the State concerned, as the case may be [Articles 77(1) and 166(1)]. Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the President or the Governor of a State, as the case may be, are required to be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the President or the Governor, as the case may be [Articles 77(2) and 166(2)]. Article 77(3) lays down that: “77. (3) The President shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of India, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business.” Likewise, Article 166(3) lays down that: 166. (3) The Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business insofar as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion.” This means that unless an order is expressed in the name of the President or the Governor and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the rules, the same cannot be treated as an order on behalf of the Government. A noting recorded in the file is merely a noting simpliciter and nothing more. It merely represents expression of opinion by the particular individual. By no stretch of imagination, such noting can be treated as a decision of the Government. Even if the competent authority records its opinion in the file on the merits of the matter under consideration, the same cannot be termed as a decision of the Government unless it is sanctified and acted upon by issuing an order in accordance with Articles 77(1) and (2) or Articles 166(1) and (2). The noting in the file or even a decision gets culminated into an order affecting right of the parties only when it is expressed in the name of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, and authenticated in the manner provided in Article 77(2) or Article 166(2). A noting or even a decision recorded in the file can always be reviewed/reversed/overruled or overturned and the court cannot take cognizance of the earlier noting or decision for exercise of the power of judicial review.” (emphasis supplied) 18. By applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgment to the facts of this case, we hold that note dated 2.12.1999 recorded by the Minister, Urban Development cannot be made basis for quashing the allotment made in favour of respondent No.4. 19. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40737 NON- REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7384 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.24415 of 2009) Delhi Union of Journalist Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. and others …Appellants versus Union of India and others …Respondents … Continue reading
M. Padmanabhacharlu – Great Father
Passing Night Relieved the life from Great Journey of 85 years My Father’s soul rest in Great Peace with out bedridden Great Personality stands for his words and Deeds – Great Father My father left behind him adorable Works & adoptable Life Style Work till last breathe ; Never be burden for yourself ; Save your health & … Continue reading
Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act as applied in the erstwhile State of Hyderabad agricultural lands not included = The appellants contended that under the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act as applied in the erstwhile State of Hyderabad where the lands were situated, the Ist respondent being the widow of deceesed Ramshetti, was not entitled to a share in the joint family agricultural lands. Agricultural lands are excluded from the provisions of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937. This contention has been negatived by the High Court. Hence the present appeal has been filed by the heirs of Veerappa.= It was submitted that prior to the enactment of the Hyderabad Hindu Women’s Right to Property (Extension to Agricultural Lands) Act, 1954, the Hindu women’s Right to Property Act as enacted in 1952 would not apply to agricultural land. The High Court has rightly negatived this contention. A subsequent Act cannot be used to interpret the provisions of an earlier enactment in this fashion. The language of the earlier Act is wide enough to cover agricultural land also. In the entire Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937, there is nothing which would indicate that the Act does not apply to agricultural land. The word ‘property’ is a general term which covers all kinds of property, including agricultural land. A restricted interpretation was given to thee original Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 enacted by the then Central Legislature, entirely because of the legislative entries in the Government of India Act, 1935, which excluded the legislative competence of the Central Legislature over agricultural lands. Such is not the case in respect of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property act, 1937, as enacted by the State Legislature of the State of Hyderabad. The ratio of the Federal Court judgment, therefore, would not apply. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that the subsequent Act of 1954 restricted the application of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 brought into force by the earlier Hyderabad Act of 1952. As is pointed out by the High Court, the Act of 1954 was enacted by way of abundant caution, to make sure that the agricultural lands were not considered as excluded from the scope of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act as enacted in 1952. The second Act is, therefore, clarificatory. The High Court has dealt at length with various decisions of this Court and other Court on thee question of interpretation of the said statute. Since we are in agreement with the reasoning and conclusion arrived at by the High Court, we are not again examining the cases referred to by the High Court. We, therefore, affirm the reasoning and conclusion arrived at by the High Court and dismiss this appeal. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=12909 PETITIONER: VAIJANATH & ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: GURAMMA & ANR. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/11/1998 BENCH: SUJATA V. MANOHAR, & G.B. PATTANAIK. ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT: ORDER The application to bring on record Respondent No.2 also as legal representative of deceased Respondent No. 1 is allowed. The Ist respondent was the widow of … Continue reading
APEX COURT UPHELD THAT THE SUIT FILED BY NATIONAL HOUSING BANK UNDER SPECIAL ACT ENACTED FOR PURPOSE OF HARSHAD S. MEHTA , IS ONLY AN EYE WASH =The entire scandal and the present litigation revolves around the second defendant (since deceased) – one Harshad S. Mehta (a notified person under Section 3(2) of the Act). The scandal exposes the shortcomings and loopholes in the administration of banking sector of this country, more particularly, the State-owned/controlled banks. 6. The National Housing Bank (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Plaintiff’) a statutory Corporation created by an Act of Parliament (Act No. 53 of 1987) filed two suits, one invoking the original jurisdiction of Bombay High Court (Suit No. 211 of 1995) and another before the Special Court established under the Act No. 27 of 1992 being Suit No. 2 of 1995. The said suits came to be filed against (i) the State Bank of Saurashtra which at that point of time was a subsidiary bank of the State Bank of India but later got amalgamated with the State Bank of India, (ii) Harshad S. Mehta, (iii) two of the employees of the plaintiff bank and (iv) the Custodian appointed under Section 3(1) of the Act 27 of 1992.= No oral evidence from plaintiff side except filing some documents – At the time when these documents were being tendered it was clarified to all parties that mere tendering of documents would only establish that there was in existence such a document and that it stated what is stated. It was clarified that the contents of the documents would not be deemed to have been proved. It was clarified that any party who wanted to prove the truth of the contents had to do so by positive evidence. As stated above, except for 2nd Defendant, no other party has led any oral evidence.”; Janakiraman Committee Report – not admissible = The Special Court Act though declares that the Court is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, it does not relieve the Special Court from the obligation to follow the Evidence Act. Further, the learned Judge extensively relied upon the second interim report of the Jankiraman Committee[11] on the ground that the same was tendered[12] by the 1st defendant. 51. Irrespective of the fact whether such a report is admissible in evidence or not, = It is well settled by a long line of judicial authority that the findings of even a statutory Commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 are not enforceable proprio vigore as held in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Others [AIR 1958 SC 538] and the statements made before such Commission are expressly made inadmissible in any subsequent proceedings civil or criminal. In our considered view the report of Janakiraman Committee is not evidence within the meaning of Evidence Act; There is absolutely no evidence on record regarding the payment of the above mentioned amount of Rs.55 crores (approx.) by the plaintiff-Bank to the Standard Chartered Bank except the Janakiraman Committee Report and the correspondence which is neither proved nor the content of the correspondence is explained. On the other hand, the Special Court recorded[17] with respect to the payment of Rs.55 crores (approx.) to the Standard Chartered Bank by the plaintiff – “In the plaintiff’s record there is no clear indication as to for what transaction this cheque had been issued. The plaintiffs were, therefore, not sure for what this cheque had been issued.” 62. In the background of the above discussed pleadings and evidence, we are of the opinion the suit is required to be dismissed on the ground that there is no evidence led by the plaintiff to establish its case. ; suppression of material facts = We must also record our disapproval of the finding recorded by the Special Court that the plaintiff did not suppress the truth. We are of the opinion that the plaintiff approached the Special Court with unclean hands by suppressing the relevant material. We shall first discuss the nature of the suppression and then examine the legal consequences that should follow.= The whole attempt of both the banks is to shield the officers on either side taking refuge under attractive legal pleas – which if examined in the context of the limited facts pleaded give a picture that the suit transaction is an innocuous transaction which unfortunately for the country is not. In our opinion the suit is a sheer abuse of the legal process.= both the plaintiff and respondent Banks simply reiterated their respective stands before the Committee of Secretaries. No attempt appears to have been made by the Government to find out the truth as to (1) how the plaintiff Bank parted with a high denomination cheque and gave custody of the same to Harshad Mehta and (2) as to how the first defendant Bank paid the various amounts to the dictation of Harshad Mehta in the absence of any authorisation by the plaintiff Bank. Be that as it may, if really the Government believed that the judgment of the Special Court does not require any interference, nothing stopped the Government from directing both the Banks to withdraw their appeals before this Court. 74. The whole exercise appears to be an eye wash. A thinly veiled scorn for the orders of this Court.= The professed purpose of the Special Courts Act – the back drop of the scandal that shook the nation – and the manner in which the litigation was conducted coupled with the absolute indifference of the Government to get at the truth only demonstrates the duplicity with which Governments can act. 76. We dismiss the suit and set aside the decree in toto. The consequences follow insofar as the appeals are concerned. But in the circumstances, we do not award any costs.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40614 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2155 OF 1999 State Bank of India Thr. General Manager …Appellant Versus National Housing Bank & Ors. …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2294 OF 1999 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3647 OF 1999 J U D G M E N … Continue reading
the conviction of the appellant may be altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC or at the most under Section 304 Part-I IPC. – the occurrence took place suddenly and there was no premeditation on the part of the appellants. There is no evidence that the appellants made special preparation for assaulting the deceased with the intent to kill him. There is no dispute that the appellants assaulted deceased in such a manner that the deceased suffered grievous injuries which was sufficient to cause death, but we are convinced that the injury was not intended by the appellants to kill the deceased.= In the facts and circumstances of the case, in our considered opinion, the instant case falls under Section 304 Part II IPC as stated above. Although the appellants had no intention to cause death but it can safely be inferred that the appellants knew that such bodily injury was likely to cause death, hence the appellants are guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and are liable to be punished under Section 304 Part II IPC. 22. Accordingly, we modify the judgment of the trial court and the High Court and convert the conviction under Section 302 to 304 Part II IPC, and sentence the appellants to ten years’ imprisonment. The appeal is, therefore, disposed of with the modi
Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 805 OF 2009 Litta Singh & Anr. … Appellant(s) versus State of Rajasthan … Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T M.Y. Eqbal, J. The present appeal by special leave arises out of the judgment and order dated 8th … Continue reading
pendency of mercy petition =Articles 72 and 161 under which the President or the Governor, as the case may be, can grant pardons, reprieves, respites or remission of punishment or suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of any offence and as will be seen hereinafter, the President has exercised power under Article 72 in large number of cases for commutation of death sentence into life imprisonment except when the accused was found guilty of committing gruesome and/or socially abhorrent crime. = on account of prolonged detention in jail after his conviction and sentence to death, the petitioner has suffered physically and mentally, the same cannot be relied upon for recording a finding that the petitioner’s mental health has deteriorated to such an extent that the sentence awarded to him cannot be executed.; The statistics produced by the learned Additional Solicitor General show that between 1950 and 2009, over 300 mercy petitions were filed of which 214 were accepted by the President and the sentence of death was commuted into life imprisonment. 69 petitions were rejected by the President. The result of one petition is obscure. However, about 18 petitions filed between 1999 and 2011 remained pending for a period ranging from 1 year to 13 years. A chart showing the details of such petitions is annexed with the Judgment as Schedule ‘A’. The particulars contained in Schedule ‘A’ give an impression that the Government and the President’s Secretariat have not dealt with these petitions with requisite seriousness. We hope and trust that in future such petitions will be disposed of without unreasonable delay. 48. For the reasons stated above, we hold that the petitioners have failed to make out a case for invalidation of the exercise of power by the President under Article 72 of the Constitution not to accept the prayer for commutation of the sentence of death into life imprisonment. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed.
Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) D.NO. 16039 OF 2011 Devender Pal Singh Bhullar …Petitioner versus State of N.C.T. of Delhi …Respondent WITH WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 146 OF 2011 AND WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) No. 86 OF 2011 J U D G M E N T G. … Continue reading
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