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defamatory.= “Mamlatdar Shri Gambhirsinh Dhakre is caught red handed by the youngstersMamlatdar is indulged in illicit relations with the wife of Doctor who is residing at Ajwa Road- attempts to conceal the matter- why the Government is not taking any action against the Mamlatdar?”- A news item has the potentiality of bringing doom’s day for an individual. The Editor controls the selection of the matter that is published. Therefore, he has to keep a careful eye on the selection. Blue-penciling of news articles by any one other than the Editor is not welcome in a democratic polity.- ‘Editor’ to mean ‘the person who controls the selection of the matter that is published in a newspaper’. Section 7 raises the presumption in respect of a person who is named as the Editor and printed as such on every copy of the newspaper. The Act does not recognise any other legal entity for raising the presumption. Even if the name of the Chief Editor is printed in the newspaper, there is no presumption against him under Section 7 of the Act.” – for recalling an erroneous order of issuance of process, no specific provision of law is required, would run counter to the scheme of the Code which has not provided for review and prohibits interference at interlocutory stagesTherefore, we are of the opinion, that the view of this Court in Mathew’s case (supra) that no specific provision is required for recalling an erroneous order, amounting to one without jurisdiction, does not lay down the correct law.” .-In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the court in seisin of the case shall now proceed with the trial in accordance with law.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.433 OF 2013 (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 3475 OF 2008) GAMBHIRSINH R. DEKARE … APPELLANT VERSUS FALGUNBHAI CHIMANBHAI PATEL AND ANR. …RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J. The petitioner Gambhirsinh R. Dekare, at the … Continue reading

Order VI Rule 16 and Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. = whether, to maintain an election petition, it is imperative for an election petitioner to file an affidavit in terms of Order VI Rule 15(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in support of the averments made in the election petition in addition to an affidavit (in a case where resort to corrupt practices have been alleged against the returned candidate) as required by the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In our opinion, there is no such mandate in the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and a reading of P.A. Mohammed Riyas v. M.K. Raghavan & Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 511 which suggests to the contrary, does not lay down correct law to this limited extent. Another question that has arisen is that if an affidavit filed in support of the allegations of corrupt practices of a returned candidate is not in the statutory Form No. 25 prescribed by the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, whether the election petition is liable to be summarily dismissed. In our opinion, as long as there is substantial compliance with the statutory form, there is no reason to summarily dismiss an election petition on this ground. However, an opportunity must be given to the election petitioner to cure the defect. Further, merely because the affidavit may be defective, it cannot be said that the petition filed is not an election petition as understood by the Representation of the People Act, 1951 From the text of the relevant provisions of the R.P. Act, Rule 94-A and Form 25 as well as Order 6 Rule 15 and Order 19 Rule 3 of the Code and the resume of the case law discussed above it clearly emerges (i) a defect in the verification, if any, can be cured (ii) it is not essential that the verification clause at the foot of the petition or the affidavit accompanying the same should disclose the grounds or sources of information in regard to the averments or allegations which are based on information believed to be true (iii) if the respondent desires better particulars in regard to such averments or allegations, he may call for the same in which case the petitioner may be required to supply the same and (iv) the defect in the affidavit in the prescribed Form 25 can be cured unless the affidavit forms an integral part of the petition, in which case the defect concerning material facts will have to be dealt with, subject to limitation, under Section 81(3) as indicated earlier. Similarly the court would have to decide in each individual case whether the schedule or annexure referred to in Section 83(2) constitutes an integral part of the election petition or not; different considerations will follow in the case of the former as compared to those in the case of the latter.” “However, in fairness whenever such defects are pointed out then the proper course for the Court is not to dismiss the petition at the threshold. In order to maintain the sanctity of the election the Court should not take such a technical attitude and dismiss the election petition at the threshold. On the contrary after finding the defects, the Court should give proper opportunity to cure the defects and in case of failure to remove/cure the defects, it could result into dismissal on account of Order 6 Rule 16 or Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Though technically it cannot be dismissed under Section 86 of the Act of 1951 but it can be rejected when the election petition is not properly constituted as required under the provisions of CPC but in the present case we regret to record that the defects which have been pointed out in this election petition were purely cosmetic and do not go to the root of the matter and secondly even if the Court found them of serious nature then at least the Court should have given an opportunity to the petitioner to rectify such defects.” 65. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, it seems quite clear that the affidavit filed by Prasanna Kumar in compliance with the requirements of the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act was not an integral part of the election petition, and no such case was set up. It also seems quite clear that the affidavit was in substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. Therefore, the High Court was quite right in coming to the conclusion that the affidavit not being in the prescribed format of Form No.25 and with a defective verification were curable defects and that an opportunity ought to be granted to Prasanna Kumar to cure the defects. No submissions were made with regard to the striking out, in accordance with Order VI rule 16 of the CPC, of specifically objectionable paragraphs in the election petition. In any event this is a matter for trial and we see no reason to take a view different from that taken by the High Court. Conclusion: 67. There is no merit in these appeals and they are, accordingly dismissed, but without any costs.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2250-2251 OF 2013 Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 14172-14173 OF 2010 G.M. Siddeshwar … Appellant Versus Prasanna Kumar … Respondent WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2252-2255 OF 2013 Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 24886-24889 OF 2010 J U D G M … Continue reading

non-appointment to the post of a Civil Judge in Andhra Pradesh as her husband Sri Srinivasa Chowdary, who is practicing as an Advocate in the Courts at Markapur is having close links with CPI (Maoist) Party which is a prohibited organization. – on selection, the Civil Judges remain on probation for a period of two years, and the District Judges and the High Court have ample opportunity to watch their performance. Their probation can be extended if necessary, and if found unsuitable or in engaging in activities not behoving the office, the candidates can be discharged. – Prima facie, on the basis of the material on record, it is difficult to infer that the appellant had links/associations with a banned organization. The finding of the Division Bench in that behalf rendered in para 19 of the impugned judgment can not therefore be sustained. – we are clearly of the view that the High Court has erred firstly on the administrative side in discharging its responsibility under Article 234 of the Constitution, and then on the Judicial side in dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant, by drawing an erroneous conclusion from the judgment in the case of Kali Dass Batish (supra). Having stated so, the 33Page 34 Court can not grant the mandamus sought by the appellant to issue an appointment order in her favour. As held by this Court in para 17 of Harpal Singh Chauhan Vs. State of U.P. reported in 1993 (3) SCC 552, the court can examine whether there was any infirmity in the decision making process. The final decision with respect to the selection is however to be left with the appropriate authority. In the present matter the Division Bench ought to have directed the State Govt. to place all the police papers before the High Court on the administrative side, to enable it to take appropriate decision, after due consideration thereof. 30. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and order dated 19.3.2009 rendered by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is hereby set-aside. The first respondent State Government is directed to place the police report (produced before the Division Bench) for the consideration of the High Court on the administrative side. The first respondent should do so within two weeks from the receipt of a copy of this judgment. The selection committee of the High Court shall, within four weeks thereafter consider all 34Page 35 relevant material including this police report, and the explanation given by the appellant, and take the appropriate decision with respect to the appointment of the appellant, and forward the same to the respondent no 1. The first respondent shall issue the consequent order within two weeks from the receipt of the communication from the High Court. This appeal and the Writ Petition No. 26147 of 2008 filed by the appellant in the High Court will stand disposed off with this order. In the facts of this case, we refrain from passing any order as to the cost.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1389 OF 2013 (@ out of SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 23312/2009) Smt. K. Vijaya Lakshmi … Appellant Versus Govt. of Andhra Pradesh Represented by its Secretary Home (Courts C1) Department and another … Respondents J U D G E M E … Continue reading

service matter – The maximum punishment that could have been imposed on an employee after conducting due departmental enquiry was dismissal from service. The rule making authority, by way of amendment, has bifurcated the rule 9(vii) into two parts, namely, 9(vii)(a) and 9(vii)(b). As is evincible, the chargesheet only referred to the imposition of major penalty or to be dealt with under the said rules relating to major penalty. In this backdrop, it would be difficult to say that the employee had the vested right to be imposed a particular punishment as envisaged under the unamended rules. Once the charges have been proven, he could have been imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement or removal from service or dismissal from service. The rule making authority thought it apposite to amend the rules to introduce a different kind of punishment which is lesser than the maximum punishment or, for that matter, lesser 47Page 48 punishment than that of compulsory retirement from service. The order of compulsory retirement is a lesser punishment than dismissal or removal as the pension of a compulsorily retired employee, if eligible to get pension under the Pension Rules, is not affected. Rule 9(vii) was only dealing with reduction or reversion but issuance of any other direction was not a part of it. It has come by way of amendment. The same being a lesser punishment than the maximum, in our considered opinion, is imposable and the disciplinary authority has not committed any error by imposing the said punishment, regard being had to the nature of charges. It can be looked from another angle. The rule making authority has splitted Rule 9(vii) into two parts – one is harsher than the other, but, both are less severe than the other punishments, namely, compulsory retirement, removal from service or dismissal. The reason behind it, as we perceive, is not to let off one with simple reduction but to give a direction about the condition of pay on restoration and also not to 48 Page 49 impose a harsher punishment which may not be proportionate. In our view, the same really does not affect any vested or accrued right. It also does not violate any Constitutional protection. 51. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the order passed by the High Court that a double punishment has been imposed does not withstand scrutiny. 52. Consequently, the appeals are allowed. The orders passed by the High Court are set aside and the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is restored. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1428-1428 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 24224-24225 of 2008) The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others … Appellants Versus Ch. Gandhi …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. Leave granted. 2. The present appeals … Continue reading

The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) permits a federal employee subjected to a particularly serious personnel action such as a discharge or demotion to appeal her agency’s decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB or Board). Such an appeal may allege that the agency had insufficient cause for taking the action under the CSRA itself; but the appeal may also or instead charge the agency with discrimination prohibited by a federal statute. See 5 U. S. C. §7702(a)(1). When an employee alleges that a personnel action appealable to the MSPB was based on discrimination, her case is known as a “mixed case.” See 29 CFR §1614.302. Mixed cases are governed by special procedures set out in the CSRA and regulations of the MSPB and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Under those procedures, an employee may initiate a mixed case by filing a discrimination complaint with the agency. If the agency decides against the employee, she may either appeal the agency’s decision to the MSPB or sue the agency in district court. Alternatively, the employee can bypass the agency and bring her mixed case directly to the MSPB. If the MSPB upholds the personnel action, whether in the first instance or after the agency has done so, the employee is entitled to seek judicial review. Section 7703(b)(1) of the CSRA provides that petitions for review of MSPB decisions “shall be filed in the . . . Federal Circuit,” except as provided in §7703(b)(2). Section 7703(b)(2) instructs that “[c]ases of discrimination subject to the provisions of [§7702] shall be filed under [the enforcement provision of a listed antidiscrimination statute].” Those enforcement provisions all authorize suit in federal district court. The “cases of discrimination subject to the provisions of §7702” are those in which an employee “(A) has been affected by an action which [she] may appeal to the [MSPB], and (B) alleges that a basis for the action was discrimination prohibited by” a listed federal statute; in other words, “mixed cases.” In 2005, while an employee of the Department of Labor (DOL or agency), petitioner Carolyn Kloeckner filed a complaint with the agency’s civil rights office, alleging that DOL had engaged in unlawful sex and age discrimination by subjecting her to a hostile work environment. Following applicable EEOC regulations, DOL completed an internal investigation and report, and Kloeckner requested a hearing before an EEOC administrative judge. While the EEOC case was pending, Kloeckner was fired. Because Kloeckner believed that DOL’s decision to fire her was based on unlawful discrimination, she now had a “mixed case.” Kloeckner originally brought her mixed case directly to the MSPB. Concerned about duplicative discovery expenses between her EEOC and MSPB cases, she moved to amend her EEOC complaint to include her claim of discriminatory removal and asked the MSPB to dismiss her case without prejudice for four months to allow the EEOC process to go forward. Both motions were granted. In September 2006, the MSPB dismissed her appeal without prejudice to her right to refile by January 18, 2007. The EEOC case, however, continued until April 2007, when the EEOC judge terminated the proceeding as a sanction for Kloeckner’s bad-faith discovery conduct and returned the case to DOL for a final decision. In October, DOL ruled against Kloeckner on all of her claims. Kloeckner appealed to the Board in November 2007. The Board dismissed Kloeckner’s appeal as untimely, viewing it as an effort to reopen her old MSPB case months after the January 18 deadline. Kloeckner then brought this action against DOL in Federal District Court, alleging unlawful discrimination. The court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It held that, because the MSPB dismissed Kloeckner’s claims on procedural grounds, she should have sought review in the Federal Circuit under §7703(b)(1); in the court’s view, the only discrimination cases that could go to district court pursuant to §7703(b)(2) were those the MSPB had decided on the merits. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Held: A federal employee who claims that an agency action appealable to the MSPB violates an antidiscrimination statute listed in §7702(a)(1) should seek judicial review in district court, not the Federal Circuit, regardless whether the MSPB decided her case on procedural grounds or on the merits. Pp. 7–14. (a) Two sections of the CSRA, read naturally, direct employees like Kloeckner to district court. Begin with § 7703, which governs judicial review of MSPB rulings. Section 7703(b)(1) provides that petitions to review the Board’s final decisions should be filed in the Federal Circuit—“[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection.” Section 7703(b)(2) then provides that “[c]ases of discrimination subject to the provisions of [§7702]” “shall be filed under” the enforcement provision of a listed antidiscrimination statute. Each of the referenced enforcement provisions authorizes an action in federal district court. Thus, “[c]ases of discrimination subject to the provisions of [§7702]” shall be filed in district court. Turn next to §7702, which provides that the cases “subject to [its] provisions” are cases in which a federal employee “has been affected by an action which [she] may appeal to the [MSPB],” and “alleges that a basis for the action was discrimination prohibited by” a listed federal statute. The “cases of discrimination subject to” §7702 are therefore mixed cases. Putting §7703 and §7702 together, mixed cases shall be filed in district court. That is where Kloeckner’s case should have been, and indeed was, filed. Regardless whether the MSPB dismissed her claim on the merits or threw it out as untimely, she brought the kind of case that the CSRA routes to district court. Pp. 7–8. (b) The Government’s alternative view—that the CSRA directs the MSPB’s merits decisions to district court, while channeling its procedural rulings to the Federal Circuit—is not supported by the statute. According to the Government, that bifurcated scheme, though not specifically prescribed in the CSRA, lies hidden in the statute’s timing requirements. But the Government cannot explain why Congress would have constructed such an obscure path to such a simple result. And taking the Government’s analysis one step at a time makes it no more plausible. Pp. 8–13. 639 F. 3d 834, reversed and remanded

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2012 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for … Continue reading

The complainant gave intimation of theft to opposite party on 12.8.2008. Opposite Party repudiated claim on account of violation of condition = complainant’s truck was insured by OP and during subsistence of insurance, the truck was stolen on 20.5.2008 and on the very same day FIR was lodged under Section 379 IPC. Complainant has not mentioned purposely in the complaint that when intimation of theft was given to OP. But, letter dated 19.8.2008 issued by OP by which claim was repudiated reveals that by letter dated 12.8.2008, intimation of theft was given by the complainant to OP meaning thereby intimation of theft was given to the Insurance Company after 83 days of theft. As per terms and conditions of the policy it was obligatory on the part of the complainant to intimate about theft to the OP immediately.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION                                                 NEW DELHI             REVISION PETITION NO. 4762 OF 2012 (From the order dated 18.9.2012 in Appeal No.233/11 of the Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Panchkula)     Surender S/o Shri Kishan Singh, R/o Vill. Bidhal, Distt. Sonepat, Haryana                                                                                   …        Petitioner/OP   Versus   National Ins. Co. Ltd. Azadpur Branch II (Direct Agent Branch) Laxmi Tower, C-1/3, Naini Wala Bagh, Azadpur Commercial Complex, Delhi  – 110 033                                       …    Respondents/Complainant   BEFORE … Continue reading

The analysis of the evidence afore-extracted, prima facie, shows that Sri S. Chaturvedi, presently Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police, Task Force (the then Assistant Commissioner of Police, Gopalapuram), orchestrated investigation to unduly benefit the 3rd respondent-landlord, and to the detriment of the petitioner-tenant (the victim). Under the protective umbrella of Sri S. Chaturvedi, Sri K. Venugopal, (the then Investigating Officer), short circuited the investigation and prepared a draft final report as “lack of evidence”. = If the State’s machinery fails to protect a citizen’s life, liberty and property, and the investigation is conducted in such a manner as to help the accused, it is but appropriate that the Court should step in to prevent the miscarriage of justice perpetrated on the victim. “The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope.” Courts have to ensure that the accused are punished, and the might or authority of the State is not used to shield them. If deficiency in investigation is visible or can be perceived by lifting the veil which hides realities or covers obvious deficiencies, courts have to deal with them with an iron hand within the framework of the law. It is the duty of the court to ensure that full and material facts are brought on record to avoid miscarriage of justice. The justice-delivery system cannot be allowed to be abused, misused and mutilated by subterfuge. (Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat9; Jennison v. Baker10 and Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan v. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble11).

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN WRIT PETITION No.25094 OF 2011 28-02-2012 Smt.Anjali Jain The Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad and 2 others Counsel for the petitioner: Sri M.V. Suresh Counsel for respondents : G.P. for Home; Sri P. Bhakthavastal ? Citations: 1) AIR 1974 SC 2105 2) AIR 1967 SC 295 3) AIR 1952 SC … Continue reading

Evidentiary value of Dying Declaration:=There is no particular form or procedure prescribed for recording a dying declaration nor it is required to be recorded only by a MagistrateAs a general rule, it is advisable to get the evidence of the declarant certified from a doctor. In appropriate cases, the satisfaction of the person recording the statement regarding the state of mind of the deceased would also be sufficient to hold that the deceased was in a position to make a statement. It is settled law that if the prosecution solely depends on the dying declaration, the normal rule is that the courts must exercise due care and caution to ensure genuineness of the dying declaration, keeping in mind that the accused had no opportunity to test the veracity of the statement of the deceased by cross-examination. As rightly observed by the High Court, the law does not insist upon the corroboration of dying declaration before it can be accepted. The insistence of corroboration to a dying declaration is only a rule of prudence. When the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is voluntary, not tainted by tutoring or animosity, and is not a product of the imagination of the declarant, in that event, there is no impediment in convicting the accused on the basis of such dying declaration. When there are multiple dying declarations, each dying declaration has to be separately assessed and evaluated and assess independently on its own merit as to its evidentiary value and one cannot be rejected because of certain variation in the other.. = “32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.- Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:- (1) when it relates to cause of death.- When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question. (2) ….. ….. ….. ….. (8) …. ….” It is clear from the above provision that the statement made by the deceased by way of a declaration is admissible in evidence under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. It is not in dispute that her statement relates to the cause of her death. In that event, it qualifies the criteria mentioned in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. There is no particular form or procedure prescribed for recording a dying declaration nor it is required to be recorded only by a Magistrate. As a general rule, it is advisable to get the evidence of the declarant certified from a doctor. In appropriate cases, the satisfaction of the person recording the statement regarding the state of mind of the deceased would also be sufficient to hold that the deceased was in a position to make a statement. It is settled law that if the prosecution solely depends on the dying declaration, the normal rule is that the courts must exercise due care and caution to ensure genuineness of the dying declaration, keeping in mind that the accused had no opportunity to test the veracity of the statement of the deceased by cross-examination. As rightly observed by the High Court, the law does not insist upon the corroboration of dying declaration before it can be accepted. The insistence of corroboration to a dying declaration is only a rule of prudence. When the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is voluntary, not tainted by tutoring or animosity, and is not a product of the imagination of the declarant, in that event, there is no impediment in convicting the accused on the basis of such dying declaration. When there are multiple dying declarations, each dying declaration has to be separately assessed and evaluated and assess independently on its own merit as to its evidentiary value and one cannot be rejected because of certain variation in the other. In spite of stringent legislations in order to curb the deteriorating condition of women across the country, the cases related to bride burning, cruelty, suicide, sexual harassment, rape, suicide by married women etc. have increased and are taking place day by day. A complete overhaul of the system is a must in the form of deterrent punishment for the offenders so that we can effectively deal with the problem. In the case on hand, Vandana died within 3 years of her marriage at the instance of her mother-in-law and sisters-in-law due to the harassment meted out to her because of the inability to conceive a child and she was poured kerosene and burnt to death. Even though, the mother-in-law, who also filed a separate appeal, died on 10.02.2012, in view of clinching evidence led in by the prosecution, there cannot be any leniency in favour of the appellants, who are sisters-in-law of the deceased and at whose instance the deceased was burnt at the hands of her mother-in-law. 19) Accordingly, while agreeing with the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court, we find no merit in the appeal. Consequently, the same is dismissed.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1062 OF 2008   Ashabai & Anr. …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Maharashtra …. Respondent(s) 2       J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam,J. 1) This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 11.04.2007 passed … Continue reading

PROLOGUE : “Child Sexual Abuse happens because the system of silence around the act perpetuates it.” “Child Sexual Abuse represses children; the repression of children is unlikely to create a flourishing society, economically, emotionally, equally or spiritually”. [‘Bitter Chocolate’ – Child Sexual Abuse in India by Pinki Virani – Penguin Books – 2000] 2.Indian Scenario : 2.1.In order to examine the incidence of sexual abuse among child respondents, the questionnaire was administered to 12,447 children belonging to the five different categories including children in family environment, children in schools, children in institutions, children at work and street children. The study looked into four severe forms and five other forms of sexual abuse. Out of the total child respondents, 53.22% reported having faced one or more forms of sexual abuse that included severe and other forms. Among them 52.94% were boys and 47.06% girls. The age wise distribution of children reporting sexual abuse in one or more forms showed that though the abuse started at the age of 5 years, it gained momentum 10 years onward, peaking at 12 to 15 years and then starting to decline. This means that children in the teenage years are most vulnerable. [Sexual Abuse of Children : (para 6.2)] 2.2.Out of the total child respondents, 20.90% were subjected to severe forms of sexual abuse that included sexual assault, making the child fondle private parts, making the child exhibit private body parts and being photographed in the nude. Out of these 57.30% were boys and 42.70% were girls. Over one fifth of these children faced more than three forms of sexual abuse. Amongst these sexually abused children, 39.58% were in the age group of 5-12 years, 35.59% in the age group of 15-18 years and 24.83% in the age group of 13- 14 years. [Severe forms of sexual abuse :(para 6.2.1)] 2.3.From the data available, an analysis of severe forms of sexual abuse arranged age-wise revealed that sexual abuse crossed the 5% mark from the age of 10 years, peaked at 15 years and by the time the child reached 18 years, went below the 5% mark. 73% of the total incidence of child sexual abuse was reported among children between 11 and 18 years of age. Therefore the pre-adolescent to the adolescent child seems to be most at risk. It is also disturbing to note that children between 6 and 10 years also face severe forms of sexual abuse. [Study on Child Abuse : India 2007 : Ministry of Women and Child Development, Government of India : Pages 74, 75 and 76]

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT     DATED: 07/03/2012 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.CHANDRU W.P.(MD)No.8355 of 2011 and W.P.(MD)No.12572 of 2011 and M.P.(MD)No.1 of 2011 M.Veersamy .. Petitioner in both writ petitions Vs. 1.State of Tamilnadu, represented by Home Secretary, Secretariat, Fort St. George, Chennai. 2.District Collector, Madurai District, Collectorate, Madurai. 3.Superintendent … Continue reading

The visa card carried a personal accident cover, with risk coverage of Rs.4 lakhs.= even though the visa card was issued, however till declaration of assignment was not filled in, the deceased cannot be regarded as their customer. Therefore the question of payment of any amount does not arise. ? = it is clearly stated that the card issued only with personal accident benefit and he is entitled to the amount for an accident on road or in air travel. Therefore on reading the instruction under “Insurance benefit on you card” it cannot be said that the benefit commences only after filling of declaration of assignment. The evidence put before us do not show that such a condition was put forth by the opponent that the benefit under the card will not be available unless declaration cum undertaking was filled in.”

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI     REVISION PETITION NO. 1902 OF 2011 (Against the order dated 16.09.2010 in  Appeal No.1297/2006 of the State Commission, Gujarat)   Standard Chartered Bank 5th Floor, Sakar -3, Income Tax, Ashram Road Ahmedabad                                                                                                                                             ……….Petitioner   Versus Mr. Naran Bhai ShamjiBhai Bhandari R/o Tarwade, TA Distt. Amreli, Ahmedabad, Gujarat                                                                                                                                  …..Respondent     BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE  J. M. MALIK,                               PRESIDING MEMBER HON’BLE MR. VINAY KUMAR, MEMBER … Continue reading

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