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DEATH CONFIRMED = Herein, A1 and A2 have committed a cold blooded murder in a pre-ordained fashion without any provocation whatsoever. The motive behind the gruesome act was to avenge the act of informant in approaching the machinery of law enforcement inspite of threats by the appellants. The victims were five innocent children and wife of the informant who were sleeping unalarmed when the appellants came and locked them inside their house while it was set ablaze. Further, wrath of A1 and A2 is reflected in their act of first gagging the informant, thereafter attempting to burn him alive and later, when he tried to escape, firing at him thereby leaving no stone unturned in translating their threats into reality. As a result of the aforesaid incident, having witnessed the threats of burning given by the A1 to the informant tuned into reality, none but the family of the deceased-informant came forth to depose against the appellant-accused persons during the trial. The crime, enormous in proportion having wiped off the whole family, is committed so brutally that it pricks and shocks not only the judicial conscience but even the collective conscience of the society. It demands just punishment from the Court and the Court is bound to respond within legal parameters. The demand for justice and the award of punishment have to be in consonance with the legislative command and the discretion vested in the Courts. “…the punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of wrong doing; and, in order to maintain respect for the law, it is essential that the punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the objects of punishments as being a deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else… The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong doer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not.” 90. In light of the aforesaid, having regard to the gravity of the offence committed, we are of the considered opinion that with regard to A1 and A2 this case falls into the category of rarest of the rare cases and is not a case where imprisonment for life is an adequate sentence and thus, constrained to reach the inescapable conclusion that death sentence imposed on A1 and A2 be confirmed. 91. Therefore, the sentence of death imposed on A1 and A2 is confirmed and the sentence awarded to A3 is commuted to life imprisonment till the rest of his life. 92. The order of stay on the execution of the capital punishment of A1 and A2 is vacated.
punishable in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40794 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.249-250 OF 2011 DEEPAK RAI Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF BIHAR Respondent(s) WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1747-1748 OF 2011 JAGAT RAI AND ANR. Appellant(s) … Continue reading
Alteration of conviction under sec302 to sec. 325 IPC = .In a sudden fight, a simple act of throwing stone does not comes under sec. 302 without the prosecution proving the intention and motive on the part of accused who has no previous score with the deceased = .In the course of that altercation appellant No.2 does appear to have hurled a stone towards the deceased which hit and injured him but there is nothing to show that the injury was by itself sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course nor is there anything to show that there was any pre-concert between the appellant-Manoj and his father to kill the deceased. In the absence of any evidence, let alone evidence that is reliable and cogent, to show that appellant No.2 intended to cause death or shared the intention to cause death with his son, it is difficult to sustain his conviction for murder punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The prosecution has not even alleged a motive against appellant No.2. The motive based on illicit relationship between appellant-Manoj and the wife of the deceased, could hardly be attributed to appellant No.2, no matter, the incident started with an altercation in which even he got involved. The sudden fight between the appellants on the one hand and the deceased on the other, escalated into a tragedy for the deceased but the responsibility for the gruesome assault, cannot be shifted from Manoj who used a dangerous weapon like a Sword to fatally injury the deceased. The stone thrown by appellant No.2 may have triggered the incident to its ugly end but beyond that appellant No.2 cannot be attributed the responsibility of murder with or without the assistance of Section 34 of the IPC. Appellant No.2 can at best be held guilty of causing grievous hurt to the deceased punishable under Section 325 of the IPC. = The conviction of appellant No.2 is, however, altered from Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC to Section 325 IPC. Appellant No.2 has been in jail for nearly 3½ years now which sentence should, in our opinion, suf
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40529 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.852 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P (Crl.) No.2597 of 2012) Manoj and Anr. …Appellants Versus State of Karnataka …Respondent J U D G M E N T T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal by special leave arises … Continue reading
WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT AND MURDER = the confessions made by the accused persons and the issue of leading to discovery of articles.=There can be no shadow of doubt that the confession part is inadmissible in evidence. It is also not in dispute that the panch witnesses have turned hostile but the facts remains that the place from where the dead body of the deceased and other items were recovered was within the special knowledge of the appellant.- wherein it has been ruled that by virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct of the accused person is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact. The evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that the accused pointed out to the police officer the place where the dead body of the kidnapped person was found would be admissible as conduct under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act or not. It is now well settled that recovery of an object is not discovery of a fact as envisaged in the section. In the case at hand, the factum of information related to the discovery of the dead body and other articles and the said information was within the special knowledge of the present appellant. Hence, the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events is attracted and, therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that recovery or discovery in the case at hand is a relevant fact or material which can be relied upon and has been correctly relied upon.; the last seen theory = The appellant has been identified by Kantibhai, PW-13, and Durlabhbhai, PW-15, and their evidence remains totally embedded in all material particulars. It has been proven by the prosecution that the Maruti Zen car belongs to the appellant. There has been no explanation offered by the accused in this regard, though such incriminating materials were put to him. – the injuries found on the dead body were approximately four days old. On the contrary, from the testimony of Madhuben, PW-14, wife of the deceased, it is evincible that she had talked on telephone to both the accused persons. Thus, the circumstance pertaining to the theory of last seen deserves acceptance. ;WHEN THE QUESTION OF NON- EXAMINATION OF WITNESS ARISE = “It is true that if a material witness, who would unfold the genesis of the incident or an essential part of the prosecution case, not convincingly brought to fore otherwise, or where there is a gap or infirmity in the prosecution case which could have been supplied or made good by examining a witness who though available is not examined, the prosecution case can be termed as suffering from a deficiency and withholding of such a material witness would oblige the court to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution by holding that if the witness would have been examined it would not have supported the prosecution case. On the other hand if already overwhelming evidence is available and examination of other witnesses would only be a repetition or duplication of the evidence already adduced, nonexamination of such other witnesses may not be material. In such a case the court ought to scrutinise the worth of the evidence adduced. The court of facts must ask itself — whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was necessary to examine such other witness, and if so, whether such witness was available to be examined and yet was being withheld from the court. If the answer be positive then only a question of drawing an adverse inference may arise. If the witnesses already examined are reliable and the testimony coming from their mouth is unimpeachable the court can safely act upon it, uninfluenced by the factum of nonexamination of other witnesses.”; NON- explanation under Section 313 CrPC = Though all the incriminating circumstances which point to the guilt of the accused had been put to him, yet he chose not to give any explanation under Section 313 CrPC except choosing the mode of denial. It is well settled in law that when the attention of the accused is drawn to the said circumstances that inculpated him in the crime and he fails to offer appropriate explanation or gives a false answer, the same can be counted as providing a missing link for building the chain of circumstances.; SCOPE OF SEC.120 -B =It is urged by him that A-2 stood on the same footing as the appellant and hence, the High Court should have acquitted him. It is also canvassed by him that A-2 has been acquitted of the charge of criminal conspiracy and, therefore, the appellant deserves to be acquitted. The High Court has taken note of the fact that A-2 was not identified by any one in the test identification parade. It has also noticed number of material contradictions and omissions and, accordingly, acquitted A-2. As far as the appellant is concerned, all the circumstances lead towards his guilt. As far as conspiracy under Section 120B is concerned, we are inclined to think that the High Court erred in not recording an order of acquittal under Section 120B as no other accused had been found guilty. The conviction under Section 120B cannot be sustained when the other accused persons have been acquitted, for an offence of conspiracy cannot survive if there is acquittal of the other alleged co-conspirators.- Resultantly, the appeal fails except for the acquittal for the offence of conspiracy. However, as we have sustained the conviction under Section 302 IPC and all the sentences are directed to be concurrent, the acquittal for the offence punishable under Section 120B would not help the appellant.
PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40453 Page 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1044 OF 2010 Harivadan Babubhai Patel … Appellant Versus State of Gujarat .. Respondent J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. The appellant, A-1, along with Dipakbhai Zinabhai Patel, A- 2, Raghubhai Chaganbhai Patel, A-3, and … Continue reading
Ram Deo Prasad has been awarded death penalty for raping and inflicting injuries to a four year old child causing her death. = we feel it quite unsafe to confirm the death sentence awarded to the appellant. Hence, while confirming his conviction under sections 376 and 302 of the Penal Code, we set aside the death sentence given to the appellant and substitute it by imprisonment for life that should not be less than actual imprisonment for a period of 18 years. The case of the appellant for any remission under the Code of Criminal Procedure may be considered only after he has served out 18 years of actual imprisonment. 48. In the result, the appeal is dismissed subject to the modification in sentence.
Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1354 OF 2012 RAM DEO PRASAD … APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF BIHAR … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T Aftab Alam,J. 1. The appellant Ram Deo Prasad has been awarded death penalty for raping and inflicting injuries to a … Continue reading
convicted under section 302 read with section 34 of the Penal Code and is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life =The facts of the case in hand are quite different. It is seen above that it was the appellant who struck the first blow on the right side of the head of Dharmaraj and according to the post-mortem report that blow itself might have caused his death. We have, therefore, no doubt that the facts of the case clearly attract section 34 of the Penal Code in so far as the appellant is concerned. 16. In light of the discussions made above, we find no merit in the appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed. 17. This Court by its order dated October 7, 2005 granted bail to the appellant. His bail bonds shall stand cancelled. He shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out his remainder sentence.
1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1326 OF 2005 LOKESH SHIVAKUMAR … APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T Aftab Alam, J. 1. The … Continue reading
Delay in lodging complaint=The accused was charged for the offences punishable under Section 7(1)(d) of the PCR Act and Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code. =As rightly found by the learned Magistrate the incident was happened on 23.03.2003 at about 5.30 P.M., and the report was not immediately lodged, PW.2 went to an Advocate, took his advice and the complaint was lodged only on the next day at 11.00 P.M., i.e., nearly 30 hours after the incident. The Police Station is said to be not far off and it is just 15 KMs from the village. When the other witnesses were present, there is no reason as to why PW.2 should go and consult an Advocate and the complaint should be prepared when PW.2 himself is a Sarpanch. Therefore, it is quite clear that the complaint apart from being lodged after long delay in consultation with an Advocate, the purpose of it can be really seen. From the material evidence on record, it appears that there might have been questioning of the Sarpanch by the villagers and in that some verbal exchanges might have taken place and the incident seems to have been magnified. The learned Magistrate has given sufficient reasons to extend the benefit of doubt to the accused and there are no compelling reasons to come to a different conclusion.
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE N.R.L.NAGESWARA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL No.68 OF 2012 JUDGMENT:- The appeal is filed against the acquittal of the accused in Calendar Case No.184 of 2003 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Special Mobile Court, Krishna, Machilipatnam. 2. The accused was charged for the offences punishable … Continue reading
or causing “the dowry death” of his wife Savita, the appellant is convicted under section 304-B and is given the minimum statutory sentence of 7 years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.1,000/- with the default sentence of rigorous imprisonment for three months. He is additionally convicted under sections 306 and 498-A. Under these two sections he was sentenced to imprisonment for lesser periods and all the sentences were directed to run concurrently. =in course of his examination under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it was repeatedly put to the appellant that Savita committed suicide by setting herself on fire in face of his persistent demand for dowry (see question Nos. 15, 16, and 24). The appellant of course denied the accusation saying “it is false” but he never said before the trial court that Savita caught fire accidentally by falling down on the chulha. It is, thus, clear that the plea of accidental fire is being raised for the first time before this Court and hence, it can not be entertained. 8. In the result, we find no merit in the appeal, it is accordingly dismissed.
1 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.11 OF 2006 Sharad … Appellant Versus The State of Maharashtra … Respondent J U D G M E N T Aftab Alam,J. 1. For causing “the dowry death” of his wife Savita, the appellant is convicted under section 304-B … Continue reading
do not justify benefit of probation to the appellant for good conduct or for any reduction of sentence.=On the South-North Road at the East side of Carter Road, Bandra (West), Mumbai in the early hours of November 12, 2006 between 3.45 – 4.00 a.m., a car ran into the pavement killing seven persons and causing injuries to eight persons. The appellant – Alister
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1318-1320 OF 2007 Alister Anthony Pareira …Appellant Versus State of Maharashtra …Respondent JUDGEMENT R.M. LODHA, J. On the South-North Road at the East side of Carter Road, Bandra (West), … Continue reading
PENAL CODE, 1860 : ss. 363, 366, 368 and 376 – Kidnapping, wrongful confinement and rape – Conviction by trial court with 7 years R.I. – Acquittal by High Court -Held : Prosecutrix being less than 18 years of age, was removed from the lawful custody of her brother and was taken to a city by two adult males under threat and kept in a room for many days where one of the accused had forcible sexual intercourse with her – The High Court was not at all justified in taking a different view from the trial court – High Court has dealt with the matter with casual approach and its judgment is not only cryptic and perfunctory but it has also not taken into consideration the crucial evidence on record – Rape is a heinous crime, and once it is established, justice must be done to the victim of crime by awarding suitable punishment to the accused – Judgment of High Court set aside and that of trial court restored – Evidence – Sentence/sentencing s. 90 and s.375, Clauses `Firstly’ and `Secondly’ – Rape – Expressions `against her will’ and `without her consent’ – Explained – Held: The concept of consent in the context of s. 375 has to be read with s.90. s.375, Clause `Sixthly’ -Held: Prosecutrix at the relevant time being about 17 + years of age, Clause `Sixthly’ would not be applicable. EVIDENCE: Age of prosecutrix – Medical evidence and oral testimony – The evidence of prosecutrix and her elder brother stating her age as 13 years at the relevant time -Medical evidence indicating her age as 17 years – Held : The trial court on consideration of evidence on record rightly recorded a categorical finding that the prosecutrix was about 17 + years of age at the time of occurrence – It cannot be said that best evidence has been withheld – There is no rule, much less an absolute rule that two years have to be added to the age determined by the doctor – High Court fell in grave error in observing that prosecutrix could be even 19 years of age at the time of occurrence. Evidence of the victim of rape – Held : A victim of sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime – Her evidence is similar to that of an injured complainant or witness – The testimony of prosecutrix, if found reliable, by itself may be sufficient to convict the culprit and no corroboration of her evidence is necessary – Court must be sensitive and responsive to the plight of such victim of sexual assault. F.I.R. – Delay in registration of -A village girl kidnapped from her village and taken to city – FIR registered after 10 days – Held: The brother has given a plausible explanation – The delay in registration of the FIR has been reasonably explained – Delay/Laches. ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: Criminal justice – Criminal cases relating to offences against the State, corruption, dowry death, domestic violence, sexual assault, financial fraud and cyber crimes – Need to be fast tracked – Immediate and urgent steps required to be taken in amending the procedural and other laws – The investigators need to have professional orientation and modern tools – Police reforms as directed in Prakash Singh’s case1 suggested to be carried out. The respondent (A-1) along with two others (A-2 and A-3) kidnapped the prosecutrix from the fields of her village on 19.9.1989. A-3, the woman accomplice, accompanied them up to the road. Thereafter A-1 and A-2 took the prosecutrix to a city and was kept in a rented room for few days, where she was ravished by A-1. Meanwhile P.W.1, the elder brother of the prosecutrix, made a complaint to the Superintendent of Police on 28.9.1989 that A-1 to A-3 had kidnapped her. The FIR was registered the following day and the prosecutrix was recovered on 13.10.1989. She was medically examined the same day. Her statement u/s 164 Cr. P.C. was recorded by the Magistrate on 17.10.1989. A-1 was charged with for offences punishable u/ss 363, 366, 368 and 376 IPC, A-2 u/ss 363, 366 and 368 IPC and A-2 u/ss 363 and 366 IPC. On the basis of the medical evidence, the trial court recorded the age of the prosecutrix about 17-1/2 years. A-2 died during the trial. The trial court acquitted A-3. A-1 was convicted of the offences charged and was, inter alia, sentenced to 7 years RI u/s 376. However, the High Court having acquitted A-1, the State filed the appeal. =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The expression `with or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age’ in s. 375, Clause `Sixthly’ of the Penal Code, 1860 assumes importance where a victim is under sixteen years of age. In the instant case, the prosecutrix had no formal education and, therefore, there is no school certificate available on record. In the FIR, the age of the prosecutrix has been stated to be 13 years. The prosecutrix in her statement u/s 164, Cr.P.C., and her elder brother (PW-1) in his deposition stated her age as 13 years at the relevant time. However, the doctor (PW-5), on the basis of the X-ray as well as physical examination of the prosecutrix, opined that she was 17 years of age. The trial court on consideration of the entire evidence recorded a categorical finding, and rightly, that the prosecutrix was about 17 + years of age at the time of occurrence and, therefore, Clause Sixthly of s.375 IPC is not applicable. [para 10] [419-H; 420-A-C] 1.2 The High Court conjectured that the age of the prosecutrix could be even 19 years. This appears to have been done by adding two years to the age opined by PW-5. There is no such rule much less an absolute one that two years have to be added to the age determined by a doctor. In the instant case, the brother of the prosecutrix has been examined as PW-1 and, therefore, it cannot be said that best evidence has been withheld. The High Court fell in grave error in observing that the prosecutrix could be even 19 years of age at the time of alleged occurrence. [paras 11-12] [420-H; 421-A-E] State of Karnataka v. Bantara Sudhakara @ Sudha & Anr. 2008 (10) SCR1161= 2008 (11)SCC3; Mussauddin Ahmed v. State of Assam (2009) 14 SCC 541- relied on 2.1 As regards clause `Firstly’, or clause `Secondly’ of s. 375 IPC, the expressions `against her will’ and `without her consent’ may overlap sometimes but surely the two expressions in clause `Firstly’ and clause `Secondly’ have different connotation and dimension. The expression `against her will’ would ordinarily mean that the intercourse was done by a man with a woman despite her resistance and opposition. On the other hand, the expression `without her consent’ would comprehend an act of reason accompanied by deliberation. [para 13] [421-F-H; 422-A-B] 2.2 The concept of `consent’ in the context of s. 375 IPC has to be read with s. 90 of the IPC. This Court in a long line of cases has given wider meaning to the word `consent’ in the context of sexual offences as explained in various judicial dictionaries. [paras 13-14] [422-A-B; 423-A] Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law (Second Edition), Volume 1 (1977) page 422; Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary (Fourth Edition), Volume 1 (1971) at page 555; In Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, (Volume 8A) at pages 205-206- referred to Holman v. The Queen ([1970] W.A.R. 2) – referred to State of H.P. v. Mango Ram 2000 (2) Suppl. SCR626= (2000) 7 SCC 224; Uday v. State of Karnataka 2003 (2) SCR 231= 2003 (4) SCC 46- relied on 3.1 A woman who is victim of sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime. Her evidence cannot be tested with suspicion as that of an accomplice. As a matter of fact, the evidence of the prosecutrix is similar to the evidence of an injured complainant or witness. The testimony of prosecutrix, if found to be reliable, by itself, may be sufficient to convict the culprit and no corroboration of her evidence is necessary. In prosecutions of rape, the law does not require corroboration. It is only by way of abundant caution that court may look for some corroboration so as to satisfy its conscience and rule out any false accusations. [para-19] [426- B-D] State of Maharasthra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain 1990 (1) SCR115= 1990 (1) SCC 550; State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & Ors. 1996 (1) SCR532= 1996 (2) SCC384; Vijay @ Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2010 (8) SCR1150= 2010 (8) SCC191 -relied on. 3.2 In examining the evidence of the prosecutrix the courts must be alive to the conditions prevalent in the Indian society and must not be swayed by beliefs in other countries. The courts must be sensitive and responsive to the plight of the female victim of sexual assault. The stigma that attaches to the victim of rape in Indian society, ordinarily, rules out the leveling of false accusations. The observations made in the case of Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai must be kept in mind invariably while dealing with a rape case. [para 22] [429-C-G] Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat 1983 (3) SCR 280= 1983 ( 3 ) SCC 217-relied on 3.3 The contention on behalf of the respondent that no alarm was raised by the prosecutrix at the bus stand or the other places where she was taken and that creates serious doubt about truthfulness of her evidence, overlooks the situation in which the prosecutrix was placed. She had been kidnapped by two adult males, one of them – A-1 – wielded fire-arm and threatened her and she was taken away from her village, and kept in a rented room for many days where A-1 had sexual intercourse with her. Whenever she asked A-1 for return to her village, she was threatened and her mouth was gagged. The absence of alarm by her at the public place cannot lead to an inference that she had willingly accompanied A-1 and A-2. The circumstances made her submissive victim and that does not mean that she was inclined and willing to intercourse with A-1. She had no free act of the mind during her stay with A-1 as she was under constant fear. Although there are certain contradictions and omissions in her testimony, but such omissions and contradictions are minor and on material aspects, her evidence is consistent. The prosecutrix being illiterate and rustic young woman, some contradictions and omissions are natural as her recollection, observance, memory and narration of chain of events may not be precise. [para 23] [431-G-H; 432-A-E] 3.4 Except the bald statement of A-1 u/s 313 Cr.P.C. that he has been falsely implicated due to enmity, nothing has been brought on record that may probabalise that the prosecutrix had motive to falsely implicate him. The circumstances even do not remotely suggest that the prosecutrix would put her reputation and chastity at stake for the reason stated by A-1 u/s 313 Cr.P.C. that a case was pending between A-1 and one `SR’. The evidence of the prosecutrix is reliable and has rightly been acted upon by the trial court. [para 24] [432-G-H; 433-A] 4. Although the lady doctor (PW-5) did not find any injury on the external or internal part of body of the prosecutrix and opined that the prosecutrix was habitual to sexual intercourse but, that does not make the testimony of the prosecutrix unreliable. The fact of the matter is that the prosecutrix was recovered almost after three weeks. Obviously the sign of forcible intercourse would not persist for that long period. It is wrong to assume that in all cases of intercourse with the women against will or without consent, there would be some injury on the external or internal part of the victim. The prosecutrix has clearly deposed that she was not in a position to put up any struggle as she was taken away from her village by two adult males. The absence of injuries on the person of the prosecutrix is not sufficient to discredit her evidence; she was a helpless victim. Due to fear she did not and could not inform the neighbours where she was kept. [para 25] [433-B-D] 5. As regards the belated FIR, suffice it to observe that PW-1 He deposed that when he returned to his home in the evening from agricultural field, he was informed that his sister (prosecutrix) who had gone to ease herself had not returned. He searched for her and he was told by the two villagers that she was seen with the accused. He contacted the relatives of the accused for return of his sister. He did not lodge the report immediately as the honour of the family was involved. It was only after few days that when his sister did not return and there was no help from the relatives of the accused that he made the complaint on 28.9.1989 to the Superintendent of Police, who marked the complaint to the Circle Officer and the FIR was registered on 30.9.1989. The delay in registration of the FIR is, thus, reasonably explained. The High Court was in grave error in concluding that there was no reasonable and plausible explanation for the belated FIR and that it was lodged after consultation and due deliberation and that creates doubt about the case. [para 26] [433-E-H; 434-A] 6. The High Court was not at all justified in taking a different view or conclusion from the trial court. The judgment of the High Court is vitiated by non-consideration of the material evidence and relevant factors eloquently emerging from the prosecution evidence. The High Court in a sketchy manner reversed the judgment of the trial court without discussing the deposition of the witnesses as well as all relevant points which were considered and touched upon by the trial court. The High Court has dealt with the matter with casual approach. The judgment of the High Court is not only cryptic and perfunctory but it has also not taken into consideration the crucial evidence on record. On flimsy grounds, the accused convicted of a serious crime of kidnapping and rape has been acquitted. There is no application of mind to the evidence of the prosecutrix at all. There is no proper consideration of the evidence by the High Court. The judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and is set aside, and that of the trial court restored. [paras 27 and 29] [434-C-D; 435-D-E] 7. Rape is a heinous crime and once it is established against a person charged of the offence, justice must be done to the victim of crime by awarding suitable punishment to the crime doer. The facts that the incident is of 1989; the prosecutrix has married after the incident and A-1 has a family of his own and sending A-1 to jail now may disturb his family life, cannot be considered for a soft option. [para 28] [434-E] 8. A strong and efficient criminal justice system is a guarantee to the rule of law and vibrant civil society. Administration of criminal justice system is not working in our country as it should. The police reforms have not taken place despite directions of this Court in the case of Prakash Singh & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. The investigators need to have professional orientation and modern tools. On many occasions impartial investigation suffers because of political interference. The criminal trials are protracted because of non-appearance of official witnesses on time and the non-availability of the facilities for recording evidence by video conferencing. The public prosecutors have their limitations; the defence lawyers do not make themselves available and the court would be routinely informed about their pre-occupation with other matters; the courts remain over-burdened with the briefs listed on the day and they do not have adequate infrastructure. The adjournments thus become routine; the casualty is justice. It is imperative that the criminal cases relating to offences against the State, corruption, dowry death, domestic violence, sexual assault, financial fraud and cyber crimes are fast tracked and decided in a fixed time frame, preferably, of three years including the appeal provisions. It is high time that immediate and urgent steps are taken in amending the procedural and other laws to achieve the objectives. [para 28] [434-E-H; 435-A-C] Prakash Singh & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. 2006 (6) Suppl. SCR473 = 2006 (8) SCC1 – relied on. Case Law Reference:: 2008 (10) SCR1161 relied on para 11 (2009) 14 SCC 541 relied on para 12 2000 ( 2 ) Suppl. SCR 626 relied on para 17 2003 ( 2 ) SCR 231 relied on para 18 1990 ( 1 ) SCR 115 relied on para 19 1996 ( 1 ) SCR 532 relied on para 20 2010 (8 ) SCR1150 relied on para 21 1983 ( 3 ) SCR 280 relied on para 22 2006 (6 ) Suppl. SCR473 relied on para 28 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 769 of 2006. From the Judgment & Order dated 11.03.2003 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow in Criminal Appeal No. 484 of 1990. S.K. Dwivedi, AAG, S.N. Pandey, M.K. Dwivedi, Vandana Mishra, Ashutosh Sharma, Aviral Shukla (for Gunnam Venkateswara Rao) for the Appellant. Vishal Arun (for Abhijit Sengupta) for the Respondent.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 769 OF 2006 State of U.P. …Appellant Versus Chhoteylal …Respondent JUDGEMENT R.M. LODHA, J. The State of Uttar Pradesh is in appeal, by special leave, because the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow reversed the judgment of the trial … Continue reading
child abuse – acquitted =The accused was working as Teacher in a private school at Lingapur village, on 22.6.2002 during evening hours, the daughter of the defacto-complainant namely Tulasi informed her mother that the accused removed her underwear and inserted his pennies into her anus, as a result of which, she sustained bleeding injury to her private parts, thereafter the accused instructed the school attenders Smt.Mallamma and Chandrakala to wash the body and clothes of the victim. On 24.6.2002, the father of the victim and others questioned the accused about the incident, then the accused admitted his guilt but prayed not to give any report against him.
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.1416 of 2004 15-7-2011 Karri Simhachalam Naidu State of A.P.,rep. by P.P. Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri C.Praveen Kumar Counsel for the Respondents: The Public Prosecutor :JUDGMENT: This revision has arisen out of concurrent findings recorded by the Principal Assistant Sessions Judge, Ranga Reddy district … Continue reading
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