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Whether the registration is in contravention of the provisions of Sections 9 (1) (a) & 11 (1) (a) & (b) of the Act…..Ans:-No = M/s. Anuj Textiles Pvt. Limited, 8/5, Rup Chand Ray Street, Kolkatta – 700 001. …Applicant in all applications (Represented by Shri Debnath Ghosh & Gorgi Sen ) Vs. M/s. Anushree Textiles Pvt. Ltd., 14, Amratolla Street, Kolkata – 700 001. … Respondents in all applications (Represented by Shri Mittal Das Gupta) published in http://www.ipab.tn.nic.in/209-2013.htm

As per Section 21 of the Act any person may oppose an application for registration.  As per Sections 47 and 57 of the Act, only a person aggrieved shall file an application for rectification.   Whether the registration is in contravention of the provisions of Sections 9 (1) (a) & 11 (1) (a) & (b) … Continue reading

that they will take appropriate proceedings against the tenant. made in revenue proceedings is not an admission of plaintiffs possession ?= application made by the respondent for obtaining exemption certificate under Section 88C, should have been accepted as evidence in favour of the plaintiff, viz. that they will take appropriate proceedings against the tenant. 6. The revenue proceedings do show that the defendant has made some such statements, but those statements were made while seeking exemption. The Civil Court had to decide on the basis of the material that was adduced in evidence by the plaintiff before it. The Trial Judge could not hold that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property on the basis of the material provided. The evidence of the plaintiff herself shows that her father was an officer in the aforesaid company, her husband was an officer in Merchant Navy and she was required to go along with him and she never visited this particular area i.e. the suit property for a number of years.- If the plaintiff was in possession of a parcel of land and cultivating the land, she would have got the appropriate certificate under Section 32-G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act and claimed to be “protected tenant”. The plaintiff failed to obtain that certificate also. That apart, if the plaintiff was in possession of the land and cultivating the same, as is contended by her, there would have been a number of documents which could have been produced and relied upon by her, like electricity bills, bills for payment of water charges, etc. and even for that matter, an affidavit or evidence of the neighbours could have been obtained and placed on record. But nothing of that kind was filed by the plaintiff and ultimately the suit was dismissed.

‘     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 28538 OF 2011 EDNA SUSHILA SAMUEL Appellant(s) :VERSUS: WAMAN KRISHNA GALANDE (D) THR.LRS. & ORS. Respondent(s) O R D E R 1. This special leave petition seeks to challenge the judgment and order dated 8.7.2011 passed by learned … Continue reading

the claim of the petitioners belonging to ‘Thakar, Scheduled Tribe’ was rejected.= the certificate issued in favour of Dilip Pandurang Pawar would be of no assistance to the petitioners as the documents discovered by the Vigilance Cell relating to local school register from 1st August, 1890 to 27th June, 1941 clearly proved that The conclusions recorded by the Scrutiny Committee are reasonable and fully supported by the material placed on record. Therefore, the conclusions reached by the Scrutiny Committee, and affirmed by the High Court cannot be said to be either perverse or based on no evidence. In view of the above, we find no merit in both the Special Leave Petitions. Accordingly, both the special leave petitions are dismissed.


Indian Penal Code, 1860 : Sections 295-A, 499, 500 r/w. 34-Defamation-Interview to a film magazine- Appellant making statements against a particular community-Alleged to be deliberate, malicious and outraging the religious feelings of that community-Complaint-Magistrate taking cognizance and issuing notice to appellant-Challenge before High Court which held that no offence under S.295A made out but the allegations constitute prima facie offence triable by Magistrate under S.500 =On appeal held the allegations do not contain essential facts constituting offence under S.295A-The complaint filed before the Judicial Magistrate Pune does not contain allegations to constitute an offence of defamation punishable under S.500-Hence that complaint quashed-Complaint filed before the Judicial Magistrate Nasik-High Court was right in refusing to quash the complaint under S.500. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1696 of 1996. =, 1996( 5 )Suppl.SCR 771, 1996( 6 )SCC 263, 1996( 6 )SCALE769 , 1997(10 )JT 469

PETITIONER: SHATRUGHNA PRASAD SINHA Vs. RESPONDENT: RAJBHAU SURAJMAL RATHI & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/09/1996 BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. FAIZAN UDDIN (J) G.B. PATTANAIK (J) ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT: O R D E R Leave granted. Though the respondents were duly served and on an occasion appeared in person, subsequently they did not appear. … Continue reading

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order 3 rule 1, 2-Power of attorney-Acts done by-Doesn’t include deposing in place and instead of the principal-Held, Power of attorney holder may depose for the principal in respect of the acts rendered in pursuance of power of attorney-He cannot depose for the principal for the acts done by the principal nor in respect of matter which principal can have personal knowledge. Civil disputes: Conduct of the parties-Significance of-Filing objection claiming ownership after the order of attachment-Getting their power of attorney holder examined to prove their co ownership instead of themselves-Held, parties have not approached the court with clean hands. Foreign Exchange (Immunity) Scheme, 1991: Foreign exchange-receipt of-Scheme protects the recipient from prosecution under FERA and Income Tax but doesn’t prohibit from disclosing the sources- Remittance so received can’t be described as income much less independent income. In the recovery proceeding initiated against the family members including the husbands of the appellants, the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) ordered for attachment inter alia of the Suit property. Appellants objected to the attachment claiming to have contributed for the purchase of the property from their independent income. While remitting the matter to DRT to record a finding on the ownership of the appellants, the apex court permitted the parties to lead evidences, however, it was clarified that the burden of proving their shares will be on the appellants. For the remittances under the Foreign Exchange (Immunity) Scheme’ 1991 it was contended that the appellants are immune from disclosing the sources of receipt. At the DRT, instead of getting themselves examined they got their power of attorney holder examined who was none else but the husband, himself a judgement debtor, of one of the appellant. DRT decided in favour of the appellants. High Court set aside that order. In appeal before this court, Respondent inter alia contended that power of attorney holder can apply or act but such act can’t extend to deposing as witness. =Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD 1.1. In the context of the directions given by this Court, shifting the burden of proving on the appellants that they have a share in the property, it was obligatory on the appellants to have entered the box and discharged the burden by themselves. The question whether the appellants have any independent source of income and have contributed towards the purchase of the property from their own independent income can be only answered by the appellants themselves and not by a mere holder of power of attorney from them. The power of attorney holder does not have the personal knowledge of the matter of the appellants and, therefore, he can neither depose on his personal knowledge nor can he be cross-examined on those facts which are to the personal knowledge of the principal. [688-F-G-H] 1.2. The word “acts” employed in Order III, Rules 1 and 2 CPC, confines only in respect of “acts” done by the power of attorney holder in exercise of power granted by the instrument. The term “acts” would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. In other words, if the power of attorney holder has rendered some “acts” in pursuance to power of attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for the acts done by the principal and not by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter which only the principal can have a personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be cross-examined. [689-A-B- C] 1.3. Appellants have failed to establish that they have any independent source of income and they have contributed to for the purchase of the property from their own independent income. [689-D-E] Shambhu Dutt Shastri v. State of Rajasthan, (1986) 2 WLL 713, approved. Ram Prasad v. Hari Narain & Ors., AIR (1998) Raj 185 and Dr. Pradeep Mohanbay v. Minguel Carlos Dias, (2000) Vol.102 Bom C.R. 754, referred to. Humberto Luis v. Minguel Carios, (2002) 2 Bom. C.R. 754, overruled. 2. In civil dispute the conduct of the parties is material. The appellants have not approached the Court with clean hands. From the conduct of the parties it is apparent that it was a ploy to salvage the property from sale in the execution of Decree. [689-G] Vidyadhar v. Manikrao and Anr., [1999] 3 SCC 573, referred to. 3. Regarding the capital received from foreign remittances under Foreign Exchange (Immunity) Scheme, 1991, it is true that as per the terms of the scheme the recipient will not be required to disclose for any purpose the nature and source of remittances and further no enquiry or investigation will be commenced against the recipient under any law on the ground that he has received such remittance. It only protects the appellant from prosecution under FERA and income tax. It does not prohibit the appellants from disclosing the sources. Furthermore, the remittance, so received by the appellants, could not be described as income, much less an independent income. [693-G-H; 694-A-B] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6790 of 2003.

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 6790 of 2003 PETITIONER: Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani & Anr. RESPONDENT: Indusind Bank Ltd. & Ors. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/12/2004 BENCH: D.M. DHARMADHIKARI & H. K. SEMA JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T H.K.SEMA,J. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 23-4-2003. The … Continue reading

As second respondent had looked after their mother and their property, the appellants agreed for her continuing as licencee for some time. She did not however vacate=Normally this Court will not, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, interfere with finding of facts recorded by the first appellate court, which were not disturbed by the High Court in second appeal. But what should happen if the first appellate court reverses the findings of fact recorded by the trial court by placing the burden of proof wrongly on the plaintiffs and then holding that the plaintiffs did not discharge such burden; or if its decision is based on evidence which is irrelevant or inadmissible; or if its decision discards material and relevant evidence, or is based on surmises and conjectures; or if it bases its decision on wrong inferences drawn about the legal effect of the documents exhibited; and if grave injustice occurs in such a case on account of High Court missing the real substantial question of law arising in the appeal and erroneously proceeds on the basis that the matter does not involve any question of law and summarily dismisses the second appeal filed by the= The fact that was proved was possession of suit portions which was not in dispute, but not tenancy in regard to the suit portions, which was in dispute. In the absence of any documentary evidence showing the tenancy or payment of rent, the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 is more trustworthy and probable than the uncorroborated interested evidence of DW1. (The evidence of DWs. 2 and 3 does not have any bearing on the issue of tenancy claimed by respondents). We therefore find that the judgments of the first appellate court and the High Court are unsustainable and the finding of the trial court that respondents are gratuitous licencees was correct and justified.

1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8400-8401 OF 2011 [Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 6095-6096/2009] Dnyaneshwar Ranganath Bhandare & Anr. … Appellants Vs. Sadhu Dadu Shettigar (Shetty) & Anr. … Respondents J U D G M E N T R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J. Leave granted. Parties will be … Continue reading

whether the accused can be heard at the stage of sec.156[3] of Cr.P.C.= Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior counsel for respondent No.1 has pointed out that at this stage, namely, issuance of direction to the police for submission of report under Section 156(3) of the Code, the accused has no role and need not be heard. The said contention is undoubtedly in consonance with the procedure prescribed. However, in view of specific direction of the Division Bench of the High Court by a common order dated 10.06.2003, disposing off the cases by remitting the matter back to the Magistrate for reconsideration of the entire prayer as made by the complainant and to pass fresh orders, after giving adequate opportunity of hearing to both the sides, and decide afresh the application seeking direction under Section 156(3) by giving cogent reasons for coming to 3

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1868 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 590 of 2008 M/s Thermax Ltd. & Ors. …. Appellant(s) Versus K.M. Johny & Ors. …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P. Sathasivam, J. 1) Leave granted. 2) This … Continue reading

we are of the considered opinion that the case does not fall within the “rarest of rare cases”. The High Court was not =the High Court has confirmed the order of conviction dated 19.9.2001 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune in Sessions Case No.41 of 2000 for the offences of rape and murder, however, altered the sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the Trial Court to death sentence while allowing the criminal appeal of the State for enhancement of punishment. = On 24.10.1999, Pooja, deceased, aged 10 years was playing on the road between her house and the house of the appellant at about 4 p.m. along with her brother Nitesh (PW.3) and sister. She was found missing by Nitesh (PW.3) who searched for her but in vain. Smt. Tara (PW.1) mother of Pooja, deceased, who had been away for work, on being informed came back and looked around but Pooja could not be traced. Smt. Tara (PW.1) reached the police station at 9.30 p.m. to lodge the First Information Report (hereinafter called the “FIR”). While Smt. Tara (PW.1) was still in the police station, Khushal (PW.10) son of the appellant arrived at the police station and informed the police that the appellant, who was addicted to liquor, told him that he had killed Pooja, deceased and her dead body was lying under the cot in his house.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 2030-2031 of 2009 Haresh Mohandas Rajput …Appellant Versus State of Maharashtra …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. These appeals have been preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated 11.1.2008 in Criminal Appeal Nos.1020/2001 … Continue reading

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