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punjab national bank

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Service matter – VRS scheme 2000 – Pension Who completed 20 years of service are entitled to the benefit of Regulation 29 by the date of VRS – Regulations 28 , 29 and Regulation 18 of the Pension Regulations, 1995 – High court relying on earlier DB bench judgement of Punjab National Bank dismissed the writ petition as the employees who took voluntary service not completed the requisite period for granting pension – basing on that judgment Bank filed this appeal – Apex court held that Regulation 18 of the Pension Regulations, 1995 provides that if broken period is more than six months, it shall be treated as one year. Therefore, all the respondents-writ petitioners having completed more than 19 years and 6 months of service in the Bank, they are to be treated to have completed 20 years of service. The aforesaid question was neither raised nor decided in the case of ‘Bank of Baroda’ or ‘Bank of India’. In view of the aforesaid fact, the appellant-Bank cannot derive the benefit of the decision of this Court in Bank of Baroda as the employees who were parties before the Court in the said case had not completed 20 years of service. As per the decision of this Court in Bank of India, the respondents-writ petitioners having completed 20 years of service are entitled to the benefit of Regulation 29.In view of the finding recorded above, the appeals do not have merit in reference with the impugned judgment,they are, accordingly, dismissed. No costs. = STATE OF BANK OF PATIALA … APPELLANT VERSUS PRITAM SINGH BEDI & ORS. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41751

 Service matter – VRS scheme 2000 – Pension  Who completed  20  years  of  service  are entitled to the benefit of Regulation 29 by the date of VRS – Regulations 28 , 29 and Regulation 18 of  the  Pension  Regulations,  1995 –  High court relying on earlier DB bench judgement of Punjab National Bank dismissed the writ petition  as … Continue reading

Pension would be granted only after completion of 15 years service = Punjab National Bank & Ors. …Appellants Vs. Ram Kishan …Respondent – judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40885

Pension would be granted only after completion of 15 years service =     The respondent  also  sought  voluntary  retirement  under  this         scheme.  His application was  accepted  and  he  was  given  voluntary         retirement  on  15.12.2000.   He  was  also  accorded   superannuation         benefits … Continue reading

Board not liable to pay any amount to the Bank towards subsidy amount as the Borrower committed default =The Borrower had borrowed money from the Bank for its business and as per policy of the State of Karnataka, the Board had assured the Bank that by way of subsidy, the amount of interest would be paid by the Board to the Bank, provided there was no default in repayment of the principal amount by the Borrower.= the Board has been wrongly saddled with the liability of paying Rs.75,213/-.= The question only is with regard to the liability of the Board. The Board is neither a borrower nor a guarantor. = The Commission and the Karnataka State Khadi and Village Industries Board, will have no liability of any kind either in respect of the principal amount of loan or payment of 4% or revised rate of interest to be borne by the borrowers for which interest subsidy eligibility certificate has been issued by the Commission. Its liability shall be restricted only to the extent of payment of interest subsidy as per scheme. The Commission would be liable to pay interest subsidy as per the scheme only for the period of which the loan is sanctioned by the Bank and is not liable to pay such interest subsidy for the defaulted period 87-88.”= In other words, upon default committed by the Borrower, the Board was absolved of its liability of paying interest on behalf of the Borrower to the Bank and its liability was only to the effect that it would surrender its first charge over the moveable and immoveable assets of the borrower in favour of the Bank. 10. In spite of the aforestated facts, the trial court came to the conclusion that the Board was liable to pay interest which was due and payable by the Borrower. In our opinion, the said finding of the trial court is not correct. Even the High Court’s view of confirming the said finding is not correct and therefore, we quash and set aside the judgment of the appellate court as well as the decree passed by the trial court so far as it makes the Board liable to pay the interest on behalf of the Borrower. In view of the contents of the aforestated letter dated 23rd March, 1988, the Board shall surrender its first charge over all the moveable and immoveable assets of the Borrower in favour of the Bank as soon as possible. 11. The appeal stands partially allowed to the above extent with no order as to costs. Karnataka State K.V. Industries Board …..APPELLANT VERSUS Punjab National Bank & Ors. ….RESPONDENTS

published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40772 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8182 OF 2003 (Arising out of SLP ( C) No. 12161 of 2006)   Karnataka State K.V. Industries Board …..APPELLANT   VERSUS Punjab National Bank & Ors. ….RESPONDENTS   1 J U D G M E N T   … Continue reading

Order XXII Rule 4 is accordingly reproduced hereunder:- “4. Procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant – (1) Where one of two or more defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, or a sole defendant or sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit. (2) Any person so made a party may make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant. (3) Where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1), the suit shall abate as against the deceased defendant. (4) The Court whenever it thinks fit, may exempt the plaintiff from the necessity of substituting the legal representatives of any such defendant who has failed to file a written statement or who, having filed it, has failed to appear and contest the suit at the hearing; and judgment may, in such case, be pronounced against the said defendant notwithstanding the death of such defendant and shall have the same force and effect as if it has been pronounced before death took place. (5) Where- 20Page 21 (a) the plaintiff was ignorant of the death of a defendant, and could not, for that reason, make an application for the substitution of the legal representative of the defendant under this rule within the period specified in the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) and the suit has, in consequence, abated, and (b) the plaintiff applies after the expiry of the period specified therefor in the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), for setting aside the abatement and also for the admission of that application under section 5 of that Act on the ground that he had, by reason of such ignorance, sufficient cause for not making the application within the period specified in the said Act, the Court shall, in considering the application under the said section 5, have due regard to the fact of such ignorance, if proved.” This could only have been done, on the satisfaction that the parameters postulated under Order XXII Rule 4(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, stood complied. The fact that the aforesaid satisfaction was justified, has already been affirmatively concluded by us, hereinabove. We are therefore of the considered view, that the learned Single Judge committed no error whatsoever in proceeding with the matter in CS (OS) no.2501 of 1997 ex-parte, as against the sole defendant Sushil K.C., without impleading his legal representatives in his place. We therefore, hereby, uphold the determination of the learned Single Judge, with reference to Order XXII Rule 4(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 27. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit in the instant appeals and the same are accordingly dismissed.

Page 1 “REPORTABLE” IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.2600-2601 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 3307-3308 of 2012) Sushil K. Chakravarty (D) Thr. LRs. …. Appellant Versus M/s. Tej Properties Pvt. Ltd. …. Respondent J U D G M E N T Jagdish Singh Khehar, J. 1. Leave … Continue reading

Companies Act, 1956; Sections 529 and 529A-Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920; Section 47-Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 48-Company created first charge and second charge over its immoveable assets in favour of two lending banks respectively for loans obtained-Company Court ordered winding up of the Company and appointed an official Liquidator-First charge holder filed a suit for recovery before Debt Recovery Tribunal which is pending-Second charge holder filed a suit before trial court which was decreed-First charge holder lodged a claim before the Official Liquidator and filed an application before the Company Court for recovery of amount-Company Court dismissed the application holding that the bank is only entitled to pro-rata share since it had relinquished its first charge over the assets by filing a claim with the Official Liquidator-High Court dismissed the Second Appeal-Correctness of-Held, Section 529A of the Companies Act only deals with pari passu treatment of the dues of the workmen and secured creditors and does not deal with inter se priorities amongst the secured creditors-Claim of first charge holder will continue to prevail over the claim of the second charge holder as provided under Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act-Provision in the Act must be given effect to the extent the Parilament intended and not beyond it-Parliament never intended to deprive the first charge holder of its right under any Act. Appellant-Bank and two other banks (respondent nos. 3 and 4) advanced loan to respondent no. 1-Company for setting up a manufacturing plant. Respondent no. 2-bank also advanced a loan to the company for providing working capital funds. The company created a first charge in favour of the appellant and the two banks by way of equitable mortgage of little deeds of its immovable property. The company created a second charge with respondent no.2 by way of constructive delivery of title deeds. Court passed an order directing winding up of the company and appointed an Official Liquidator under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The appellant and the two banks filed a suit for recovery of money before Debt Recovery Tribunal. The appellant and the two banks filed an application before the Company Court under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 to continue with the suit for recovery of the security and remain outside the winding up proceedings, which was granted. Respondent no.2 filed a suit before trial court against the company for recovery of money. In the meantime, the Official Liquidator issued a public notice to all the creditors to put forth their claim of their debts. The appellant lodged a claim with the Official Liquidator. The trial court decreed the suit filed by respondent no.2. The appellant and the two banks filed a Company Application before the Company Court claiming first charge over the assets of the company. The Company Court held that on filing a claim with the Official liquidator, the appellant and the two banks had relinquished their first charge over the assets of the company and are hence only entitled to pro-rata share out of the sale proceeds. The Second Appeal filed before Division Bench of the High Court was dismissed. In appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that section 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 comes into play by reason of the provisions of Chapter V of the Companies Act, 1956; that wrong reliance was placed on section 47(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 ignoring other provisions of the Act; the first charge holders and second charge holders could not be equated; that respondent no. 2 also having filed a claim before the Official Liquidator, it should not have been given any preferential treatment; and that the right of the secured creditor does not get obliterated only because the appellant responded to the public notice issued by the office Liquidator; and that section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act would override the provisions of Section 529 of the Companies Act, 1956. Respondent no. 2, the bank contended under section 529-A of the Companies Act, 1956, no distinction is made amongst the secured creditors and hence the appellant cannot have a priority over its claim; that Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act is subservient to sections 529 and 529-A of the Companies Act as the latter had been enacted subsequent to the Transfer of Property Act; that the claim of the appellant shall rank pari passu only with all other secured creditors and not a preferential right; that having regard to the provisions of section 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, the appellant would be deemed to have relinquished its rights. Respondent Official Liquidator contended that having regard to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, the appellant would be deemed to have relinquished his rights. =Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. Section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956 contains a non-obstante clause. The non-obstante nature of a provision although may be of wide amplitude, the interpretative process thereof must be kept confined to the legislative policy. Only because the dues of the workmen and the debt due to the secured creditors are treated pari passu with each other, the same by itself would not lead to the conclusion that the concept of inter se priorities amongst the secured creditors had thereby been intended to be given a total go-by. A non-obstante clause must be given effect to, to the extent the Parliament intended and not beyond the same. Section 529-A of the Companies Act does not ex facie contain a provision on the aspect of priority amongst the secured creditors and, hence, it would not be proper to read thereinto things, which the Parliament did not comprehend. [545-d, f, h; 546-a] 1.2. While enacting a statute, the Parliament cannot be presumed to have taken away a right in property. Right to property is a constitutional right. Right to recover the money lent by enforcing a mortgage would also be a right to enforce an interest in the property. In terms of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 Act, the claim of the first charge holder shall prevail over the claim of the second charge holder. Such a valuable right, having regard to the legal position as obtaining in common law as also under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, must be deemed to have been known to the Parliament. Thus, while enacting the Companies Act, the Parliament cannot be held to have intended to deprive the first charge of the said right. Such a valuable right, therefore, must be held to have been kept preserved. [546-d, e, g] Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (P.) Ltd. v. Management and Ors., [1973] 1 SCC 813, referred to. 1.3. If the Parliament, while amending the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, intended to take away such a valuable right of the right charge holder, it could have stated so explicity. Deprivation of legal right existing in favour of a person cannot be presumed in construing the statute. In fact, a contrary presumption shall have to be raised. [546-h; 547-a] 1.4. Section 529(1)(c) of the Companies Act speaks about the respective rights of the secured creditors which would mean the respective rights of secured creditors vis-a-vis unsecured creditors. It does not envisage respective rights amongst the secured creditors. Merely because Section 529 of the Act does not specifically provide for the rights of priorities over the mortgaged assets, that, would not mean that the provisions of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act in relation to a company, which has undergone liquidation, shall stand obliterated. [547-b] 1.5. If the inter se priority of secured creditors gets obliterated by merely responding to a public notice, it would lead to deprivation of the secured creditor of his right over the security and would bring him at par with an unsecured creditor. The logical sequitor of such an inference would be that even unsecured creditors would be placed at par with the secured creditors. This could not have been the intendment of the legislation. [547-c, d] 1.6. The provisions of the Companies Act may be a special statute but if the special statute does not contain any specific provision dealing with the contractual and other statutory rights between different kinds of the secured creditors, the specific provisions contained in the general statute shall prevail. [547-e] Maru Ram v. Union of India and Ors., [1981] 1 SCC 107, referred to. 1.7. There does not exist any provision in the Companies Act which provides that the provisions of Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act would not be applicable in relation to the affairs of a company. Unless, expressly or by necessary implication, such a provision contrary to or inconsistent therewith carrying a different intent can be found in the Companies Act, Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be held to be inapplicable. [547-g, h] Mulla’s Transfer of Property, Act 9th edition, referred to. 1.8. Section 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act is attracted by virtue of Section 529(1) of the Companies Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 47 of the Insolvency Act would become applicable where a secured creditor voluntarily relinquishes his security for the general benefit of the creditors. The expression “relinquish” envisages a conscious act, i.e., an act where a person was aware of his right and then relinquishes the same. The same must be for the general benefit of the creditors. His action must lead to a conclusion that he, for one reason or the other, intended to stand in the queue for receiving money owed to him. It, however, does not stand obliterated only by the filing of an affidavit or proof of claim with the official liquidator. Such a claim had been filed pursuant to a notice issued by the official liquidator. If the creditor does not respond to the said notice, he would not be in a position to bring to the notice of the official liquidator, the existance of his right. [549-b-e] Ramantha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon, referred to. 1.11. Sub-Section (3) of Section 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act clearly envisages the position where he does not either relalise or relinquish his security. He, in such a situation, may state in his Affidavit of Proof, the particulars of the security and value at which he assesses the same. The consequences therefor would ensue. If the Official Receiver proceeds to sell the security, the Court first has to pay to amount at which the security was valued to the secured creditor out of the sale proceeds. [549-f] Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr., [1979] 2 SCC 529 and State Bank of Mysore v. Official Liquidator and Ors., (1985) 58 Company Cases Kar 609, referred to. Rajiv Shakdher, U.A. Rana and Srabonee Roy (for Gagrat & Co.) for the Appellant. Shrish Kumar Misra, V.P. Singh, Pankaj Bhatia, M.T. George, Sanjay Bhatt and Amit Kumar for the Respondents.

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 2332 of 2006 PETITIONER: ICICI BANK LTD. RESPONDENT: SIDCO LEATHERS LTD. & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/04/2006 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & P.K. Balasubramanyan JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.23360/2004) S.B. SINHA, J : Leave granted. Interpretation of Sections 529 and 529-A of … Continue reading

Companies Act, 1956; Sections 529 and 529A-Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920; Section 47-Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 48-Company created first charge and second charge over its immoveable assets in favour of two lending banks respectively for loans obtained-Company Court ordered winding up of the Company and appointed an official Liquidator-First charge holder filed a suit for recovery before Debt Recovery Tribunal which is pending-Second charge holder filed a suit before trial court which was decreed-First charge holder lodged a claim before the Official Liquidator and filed an application before the Company Court for recovery of amount-Company Court dismissed the application holding that the bank is only entitled to pro-rata share since it had relinquished its first charge over the assets by filing a claim with the Official Liquidator-High Court dismissed the Second Appeal-Correctness of-Held, Section 529A of the Companies Act only deals with pari passu treatment of the dues of the workmen and secured creditors and does not deal with inter se priorities amongst the secured creditors-Claim of first charge holder will continue to prevail over the claim of the second charge holder as provided under Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act-Provision in the Act must be given effect to the extent the Parilament intended and not beyond it-Parliament never intended to deprive the first charge holder of its right under any Act. Appellant-Bank and two other banks (respondent nos. 3 and 4) advanced loan to respondent no. 1-Company for setting up a manufacturing plant. Respondent no. 2-bank also advanced a loan to the company for providing working capital funds. The company created a first charge in favour of the appellant and the two banks by way of equitable mortgage of little deeds of its immovable property. The company created a second charge with respondent no.2 by way of constructive delivery of title deeds. Court passed an order directing winding up of the company and appointed an Official Liquidator under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The appellant and the two banks filed a suit for recovery of money before Debt Recovery Tribunal. The appellant and the two banks filed an application before the Company Court under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 to continue with the suit for recovery of the security and remain outside the winding up proceedings, which was granted. Respondent no.2 filed a suit before trial court against the company for recovery of money. In the meantime, the Official Liquidator issued a public notice to all the creditors to put forth their claim of their debts. The appellant lodged a claim with the Official Liquidator. The trial court decreed the suit filed by respondent no.2. The appellant and the two banks filed a Company Application before the Company Court claiming first charge over the assets of the company. The Company Court held that on filing a claim with the Official liquidator, the appellant and the two banks had relinquished their first charge over the assets of the company and are hence only entitled to pro-rata share out of the sale proceeds. The Second Appeal filed before Division Bench of the High Court was dismissed. In appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that section 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 comes into play by reason of the provisions of Chapter V of the Companies Act, 1956; that wrong reliance was placed on section 47(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 ignoring other provisions of the Act; the first charge holders and second charge holders could not be equated; that respondent no. 2 also having filed a claim before the Official Liquidator, it should not have been given any preferential treatment; and that the right of the secured creditor does not get obliterated only because the appellant responded to the public notice issued by the office Liquidator; and that section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act would override the provisions of Section 529 of the Companies Act, 1956. Respondent no. 2, the bank contended under section 529-A of the Companies Act, 1956, no distinction is made amongst the secured creditors and hence the appellant cannot have a priority over its claim; that Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act is subservient to sections 529 and 529-A of the Companies Act as the latter had been enacted subsequent to the Transfer of Property Act; that the claim of the appellant shall rank pari passu only with all other secured creditors and not a preferential right; that having regard to the provisions of section 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, the appellant would be deemed to have relinquished its rights. Respondent Official Liquidator contended that having regard to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 47 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, the appellant would be deemed to have relinquished his rights.

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 2332 of 2006 PETITIONER: ICICI BANK LTD. RESPONDENT: SIDCO LEATHERS LTD. & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/04/2006 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & P.K. Balasubramanyan JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.23360/2004) S.B. SINHA, J : Leave granted. Interpretation of Sections 529 and 529-A of … Continue reading

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