This tag is associated with 11 posts

Land acquisition Act – Under sec.51 A no court can discard the comparable registered sale deed merely because no one belongs to the sale deed not examined = ] Court should considered the highest sale value if not discard for any reasons = when acquisition was not for house sites, no deduction can be done for amenities = claimants are entitled interest on solatium also = Since claimed less amount , the apex court fixed compensation as prayed by claimant= Himmat Singh and others ….Appellants versus State of M.P. and another ….Respondents = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41038

Land acquisition Act –  Under sec.51 A no court can discard the comparable registered sale deed merely because no one belongs to the sale deed not examined = ] Court should considered the highest sale value if not discard for any reasons =  when acquisition was  not for house sites, no deduction can be done … Continue reading

In this case, as vehicle has been sold by complainant during pendency of appeal which was filed in the year 2007 and decided in the year 2012, complainant ceases to be a consumer under C.P. Act and complaint is liable to be dismissed.

published in NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION                                                 NEW DELHI          REVISION PETITION NO. 2622 OF 2012 (From the order dated 16.04.2012 in Appeal No. 302/2007 of the Punjab State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chandigarh)                                                             M/s. Honda Cars India Ltd. Plot No. A-1, Sector 40/41, Suraj Pur – Kasna Road, Greater Noida Indl. Dev. Area Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P. – 201 306                                          …Petitioner/Opp. Party … Continue reading

Service Matter – Whether the petitioners, whose names were included in the select list prepared for recruitment to Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) are entitled to be appointed against the posts which became available due to the resignation of two of the appointees and the unfilled posts of reserved categories is the question which arises for consideration in these petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution.= once the appointments are made against the advertised posts, the select list gets exhausted and those who are placed below the last appointee cannot claim appointment against the posts which subsequently become available. = “At the outset it should be noticed that the select list prepared by APSC could be used to fill the notified vacancies and not future vacancies. If the requisition and advertisement was only for 27 posts, the State cannot appoint more than the number of posts advertised, even though APSC had prepared a select list of 64 candidates. The select list got exhausted when all the 27 posts were filled. Thereafter, the candidates below the 27 appointed candidates have no right to claim appointment to any vacancy in regard to which selection was not held. The fact that evidently and admittedly the names of the appellants appeared in the select list dated 17-7-2000 below the persons who have been appointed on merit against the said 27 vacancies, and as such they could not have been appointed in excess of the number of posts advertised as the currency of select list had expired as soon as the number of posts advertised are filled up, therefore, appointments beyond the number of posts advertised would amount to filling up future vacancies meant for direct candidates in violation of quota rules. Therefore, the appellants are not entitled to claim any relief for themselves. The question that remains for consideration is whether there is any ground for challenging the regularisation of the private respondents.” In view of the above noted legal position, the decision taken by the High Court not to enter the petitioners name in the register to facilitate their appointment against the de-reserved posts or the posts vacated by the general category candidates cannot be faulted, more so because the State Government had already approved fresh recruitment and the Commission issued advertisement for 71 posts including 6 reserved category posts. In the result, the writ petitions are dismissed.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40643 Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 73 OF 2013 Raj Rishi Mehra and others …Petitioners versus State of Punjab and another …Respondents WITH WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 77 OF 2013 O R D E R Whether the petitioners, whose names were included in the select … Continue reading

Appointment of Special police officers from ex-service men = whether this court can compel the State of Punjab to create posts and absorb the appellants into the services of the State on a permanent basis consistent with the Constitution Bench decision of this court in Umadevi’s case. = The appellants herein assert that all the appellants are ex- servicemen and registered with the employment exchange. They were recruited as Special Police Officers.[2] = i) That it will not be possible to provide police guard to banks unless the Banks were willing to pay for the same and additional force could be arranged on that basis, it was decided that police guards should be requisitioned by the Banks for their biggest branches located at the Distt. and Sub Divisional towns. They should place the requisition with the Distt. SSPs endorsing a copy of IG CID. In the requisition, they should clearly state that the costs of guard would be met by them. It will then be for the police department to get additional force sanctioned. This task should be done on a top priority. In the meantime depending upon the urgency of the need of any particular branch, police Deptt. may provide from police strength for its protection. ii) For all other branches guards will be provided by Distt. SSP after selecting suitable ex-servicemen or other able bodied persons who will be appointed as Special Police Officer in terms of Section 17 of the Police Act. Preference may be given to persons who may already be in possession of licence weapons. All persons appointed as SPO for this purpose will be given a brief training for about 7 days in the Police Lines in the handling of weapons taking suitable position for protection of branches. These SPOs will work under the discipline and control and as per Police Act, they will have the same powers, privileges and protection and shall be amenable to same penalty as an ordinary police personnel.”= The other factor which the State is required to keep in mind while creating or abolishing posts is the financial implications involved in such a decision. The creation of posts necessarily means additional financial burden on the exchequer of the State. Depending upon the priorities of the State, the allocation of the finances is no doubt exclusively within the domain of the Legislature. However in the instant case creation of new posts would not create any additional financial burden to the State as the various banks at whose disposal the services of each of the appellants is made available have agreed to bear the burden. If absorbing the appellants into the services of the State and providing benefits at par with the police officers of similar rank employed by the State results in further financial commitment it is always open for the State to demand the banks to meet such additional burden. Apparently no such demand has ever been made by the State. The result is – the various banks which avail the services of these appellants enjoy the supply of cheap labour over a period of decades. It is also pertinent to notice that these banks are public sector banks. We are of the opinion that neither the Government of Punjab nor these public sector banks can continue such a practice consistent with their obligation to function in accordance with the Constitution. Umadevi’s judgment cannot become a licence for exploitation by the State and its instrumentalities. For all the abovementioned reasons, we are of the opinion that the appellants are entitled to be absorbed in the services of the State. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The judgments under appeal are set aside. We direct the State of Punjab to regularise the services of the appellants by creating necessary posts within a period of three months from today. Upon such regularisation, the appellants would be entitled to all the benefits of services attached to the post which are similar in nature already in the cadre of the police services of the State. We are of the opinion that the appellants are entitled to the costs throughout. In the circumstances, we quantify the costs to Rs.10,000/- to be paid to each of the appellants.

published in       http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40625   Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1059 OF 2005 Nihal Singh & Others …Appellants Versus State of Punjab & Others …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6315 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 12448 of 2009) Bhupinder Singh & Others …Appellants Versus … Continue reading

Land Acquisition Act = whether the officers of the Union Territory of Chandigarh other than the Administrator could issue notifications under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the 1894 Act, = Notification dated 1.10.2002 cannot be saved at this belated stage and the Competent Authority cannot issue declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act after 11 years of the issue of notification under Section 4(1). – In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned order is set aside and Notifications dated 1.10.2002 and 29.9.2003 are quashed insofar as the same relate to the lands of the appellants. The parties are left to bear their own costs.

   reported in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40587      NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.5885 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 27221 of 2011) Gurbinder Kaur Brar and another …Appellants versus Union of India and others …Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL NO.5884 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 25387 … Continue reading

What is the meaning of the expression ‘the service’ in Article 233(2) of the Constitution of India? What is meant by ‘advocate’ or ‘pleader’ under Article 233(2)? Whether a District Attorney/Additional District Attorney/Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor/Assistant Advocate General, who is full time employee of the Government and governed and regulated by the statutory rules of the State and is appointed by direct recruitment through the Public Service Commission, is eligible for appointment to the post of District Judge under Article 233(2) of the Constitution? = Assistant District Attorney, Public Prosecutor and Deputy Advocate General – recorded undisputed factual position that they were appearing on behalf of their respective States primarily in criminal/civil cases and their appointments were basically under the C.P.C. or Cr.P.C. That means their job has been to conduct cases on behalf of the State Government/C.B.I. in courts. Each one of them continued to be enrolled with the respective State Bar Council. In view of this factual position and the legal position that we have discussed above, can it be said that these appellants were ineligible for appointment to the office of Additional District and Sessions Judge? Our answer is in the negative .- did not cease to be advocate while working as Assistant District Attorney/Public Prosecutor/Deputy Advocate General, the period during which they have been working as such has to be considered as the period practising law.= We, accordingly, hold that the five private appellants (Respondent Nos. 9,12,13,15 and 18 in CWP No. 9157/2008 before the High Court) fulfilled the eligibility under Article 233(2) of the Constitution and Rule 11(b) of the HSJS Rules on the date of application. The impugned judgment as regards them is liable to be set aside and is set aside. 91. Appeals are allowed as above with no order as to costs.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 561 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 17463 of 2010) Deepak Aggarwal …… Appellant Vs. Keshav Kaushik and others …… Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 562-567 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 17723-17728 of 2010) CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 568-572 OF … Continue reading

Punjab custom–Principles to be observed in dealing with customary law stated–Essentials of valid custom. = The plaintiff, a Rajput belonging to Tehsil Garhshankar in the District of Hoshiarpur (Punjab), instituted a suit against the defendant for the recovery of the properties which belonged to a deceased Gurkha woman R and which she had acquired by way of gift from a stranger, alleging that he was the lawfully wedded husband of Rand that accord- ing to custom which applied to the parties with regard to succession he was entitled to succeed to the moveable and immoveable properties of R in preference to the defendant who was his daughter by R. Held, that even if it be assumed that R was lawfully married to the plaintiff, the question to be decided would be whether succession to property which R had received as a gilt from a stranger and which she owned in her own right would be governed by the custom governing her husband’s family and not her own. Such marriage as was alleged to have been contracted by the plaintiff being evidently an act of rare occurrence, the rule of succession set up by the plaintiff cannot be said to derive its force from long usage and the plaintiff was not, in any event, entitled to succeed. Their Lordships laid down the general principles which should be kept in view in dealing with questions of custom- ary law as follows: (1) It should be recognised that many of the agricultur- al tribes in the Punjab are governed by a variety of cus- toms, which depart from the ordinary rules of Hindu and Muhammadan law, in regard to inheritance and other matters mentioned in section 5 of the Punjab Laws Act, 1872. (2) In spite of the above fact, there is no presumption that a particular person or class of persons is governed by custom, and a party who is alleged to be governed by custom- ary law must prove that he is so governed and must also prove the existence of the custom set up by him. (See Daya Ram v. Sohel Singh and Others, 110 P R. (1906) 390 at 410; Abdul Hussein Khan v. Bibi Song Dero, L.R. 45 I.A. 10). (3) A custom, in order to be binding, must derive its force from the fact that by long usage it has obtained the force of law, but the English rule that “a CUstOm, in order that it may be legal and binding, must have been used so long that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary” should not be strictly 826 applied to Indian conditions. All that is necessary to prove is that the usage has been acted upon in practice for such a long period and with such invariability as to show that it has, by common consent, been submitted to as the established governing rule of a particular locality. (See Mt. Subhani v. Nawab, A.I.R. 1941 P.C. 21 at 32). (4) A custom may be proved by general evidence as to its existence by members of the tube or family who would natur- ally be cognizant of its existence and its exercise without controversy, and such evidence may be safely acted on when it is supported by a public record of custom such as the Riwaj-i-am or Manual of Customary Law. (See Abroad Khan v. Mt. Channi Bibi, A.I.R. 1925P.C. 267 at 271). (5) No statutory presumption attaches to the contents of a Riwaj-i-am or similar compilation, but being a public record prepared by a public officer in the discharge of his duties under Government rules, the statements to be found therein in support of custom are admissible to prove facts recited therein and will generally be regarded as a strong piece of evidence of the custom. The entries in the Riwaj-i-am may however be proved to be incorrect, and the quantum of evidence required for the purpose of rebutting them will vary with the circumstances each case. The presumption of correctness attaching to a Riwaj-i-am may be rebutted, if it is shown that it affects adversely the rights of females or any other class of persons who had no opportunity of appearing before the revenue authorities. (See Beg v. Allah Ditta, A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 129 at 131 ;Saleh Mohammad v. Zawar Hussain A.I.R. 1944 P.C. 18; Mt. Subhani v. Nawab, A.I.R. 1941 P.C. 21 at 25). (6)When the question of custom applicable to an agricultur- ist is raised, it is open to a party who denies the applica- tion custom to show that the person who claims to be gov- erned by it has completely and permanently drifted away from agriculture and agricultural associations and settled for good in urban life and adopted trade, service, etc., as his principal occupation and means and source of livelihood, and does not follow other customs applicable to agriculturists. (See Muhammad Hayat Khan v. Sandhe Khan and Others, 55 P.R. (1906) 270 at 274; Muzaffar Muhammad v. Imam Din, I.L.R. (1928) 9 Lab. 120, 125). (7) The opinions expressed by the compiler of a Riwaj-i-am or Settlement Officer as a result of his intimate knowledge and investigation of the subject, are entitled to weight which will vary with the circumstances of each case. The only safe rule to be laid down with regard to the weight to be attached to the compiler’s remarks is that if they repre- sent his personal opinion or bias and detract from the record of long standing custom, they will not be sufficient to displace the custom, but if they are the result of his inquiry and investigation as to the scope of the 827 applicability of the custom and any special sense in which the exponents of the custom expressed themselves in regard to it, such remarks should be given due weight. (See Narain Singh v. Mr. Basant Kaur A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 419 at 421,422; Mr. Chinto v. Thelur, A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 98S; Khedam Hussain v. Mohammad Hussain, A.I.R. 1941 Lah. 73 at 79). =1952 AIR 231, 1952SCR 825, , ,

PETITIONER: THAKUR GOKALCHAND Vs. RESPONDENT: PARVIN KUMARI. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/05/1952 BENCH: FAZAL ALI, SAIYID BENCH: FAZAL ALI, SAIYID BOSE, VIVIAN CITATION: 1952 AIR 231 1952 SCR 825 CITATOR INFO : R 1971 SC1398 (6) RF 1991 SC1654 (15,35) ACT: Punjab custom–Principles to be observed in dealing with customary law stated–Essentials of valid custom. HEADNOTE: … Continue reading

Whether the Haryana Housing Board (for short, `the Board’) could ignore the time limit of 7 years specified in clause 2(w) of the Hire Purchase Tenancy Agreement executed by the appellants as per the requirement of

1   REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4211 OF 2004   Ishwar Dass Nassa and others … Appellants versus State of Haryana and others … Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4209 OF 2004 Pyare Lal and others … Appellants versus State of Haryana and others … Respondents … Continue reading

Murder case – dying declaration of victim -The fact that the incident occurred on 28.7.2003 and Kamini Verma eventually died on 1.8.2003, i.e., 4 days after the recording of the dying declaration also shows that she could certainly have been fit to make her dying declaration on 28.7.2003. Her fitness was actually recorded on the dying declaration by Dr. D.P. Dogra PW11. A number of prosecution witnesses reveal

1 “REPORTABLE” IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2423 OF 2009 Deepak Verma …. Appellant Versus State of Himachal Pradesh …. Respondent WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.157 OF 2010 Dheeraj Verma …. Appellant Versus State of Himachal Pradesh …. Respondent J U D G M E N T JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, … Continue reading

This dispute between the State of Himachal Pradesh (Plaintiff), on the one hand, and the Union of India (defendant No.1), State of Punjab (defendant No.2), State of Haryana (defendant No.3), State of Rajasthan (defendant No.4) and Union Territory of Chandigarh (defendant No.5), on the other hand, under Article 131 of the Constitution of India relates to the power generated in the Bhakra-Nangal and Beas Projects.= Whether the State of Himachal Pradesh is entitled to an allocation of 7.19% in addition to 12% free power as claimed above, of the total power generated in Bhakra-Nangal & Beas Projects from the date of commissioning of the Projects or the appointed date (01.11.1966)? (Plaintiff) 10. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for a sum of Rs.2199.77 crores against the defendants jointly and severally, as compensation/reimbursement for their failure to supply to the plaintiff 12% and 7.19% shares (on account of distress caused/surrender of rights to generate power and on account of transfer of population to the plaintiff State respectively in the power generated in these projects upto the date of the filing of the present suit and such further sums as may be determined, as entitlement of the plaintiff for the period subsequent to the filing of the suit? (Plaintiff) 11. Whether the Plaintiff-State is entitled to the award of any interest on the amounts determined as its entitlement? (Plaintiff)” =It is hereby declared that the Plaintiff-State is entitled to 7.19% of the power of the composite State of Punjab from the Bhakra-Nangal Project with effect from 01.11.1966 and from Beas Project with effect from the dates of production in Unit I and Unit II. (iii) It is ordered that Defendant No.1 will work out the details of the claim of the Plaintiff-State on the basis of such entitlements of the Plaintiff, Defendant No.2 and Defendant No.3 in the tables in Paragraph 77 of this judgment as well as all other rights and liabilities of the Plaintiff-State, Defendant No.2 and Defendant No.3 in accordance with the provisions of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 and file a statement in this Court within six months from today stating the amounts due to the Plaintiff-State from Defendant Nos. 3 and 4. (iv) On the amount found to be due to the Plaintiff- State for the period from 01.11.1966 in the case of Bhakra-Nangal Project and the amount found due to the Plaintiff-State for the period from the dates of production in the case of Beas Project, the Plaintiff-State would be

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ORIGINAL SUIT NO. 2 OF 1996 State of Himachal Pradesh …… Plaintiff Versus Union of India & Ors. …… Respondents J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. This dispute between the State of Himachal Pradesh (Plaintiff), on the one hand, and … Continue reading

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