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R. V. Raveendran

This tag is associated with 7 posts

Victims of Uphaar Tragedy = apex court felt that there is no appropriate laws for dealing with this type of cases=These appeals relate to the fire at Uphaar Cinema Theatre in Green Park, South Delhi on 13.6.1997, resulting in the death of 59 patrons and injury to 103 patrons. During the matinee show of a newly released film on 13.6.1997, the patrons of the cinema hall which was full were engrossed in the film. Shortly after the interval, a transformer of Delhi Vidyut Board installed in the ground floor parking area of Uphaar Cinema, caught fire. The oil from the transformer leaked and found its way to the passage outside where many cars were parked. Two cars were parked immediately adjoining the entrance of the transformer room. The burning oil spread the fire to nearby cars and from then to the other parked cars. The burning of (i) the transformer oil (ii) the diesel and petrol from the parked vehicles (iii) the upholstery material, paint and other chemicals of the vehicles and (iv) foam and other articles stored in the said parking area generated huge quantity of fumes and smoke which consisted of carbon monoxide and several poisonous gases. As the ground floor parking was covered all round by walls, and the air was blowing in from the entry and exit points, the smoke and noxious fumes/smoke could not find its way out into open atmosphere and was blown towards the staircase leading to the balcony exit. On account of the chimney effect, the smoke travelled up. Smoke also travelled to the air-conditioner ducts and was sucked in and released into the auditorium. The smoke and the noxious fumes stagnated in the upper reaches of the auditorium, particularly in the balcony area. By then the electricity went off =(a) The compensation awarded by the High Court in the case of death is reduced from Rs.18 lacs to Rs.10 lacs (in the case of those aged more than 20 years) and Rs.15 lacs to Rs. 7.5 lacs (in the case of those aged 20 years and less). The said sum is payable to legal representatives of the deceased to be determined by a brief and summary enquiry by the Registrar General (or nominee of learned Chief Justice/Acting Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court). (b) The compensation of Rs.One lakh awarded by the High Court in the case of each of the 103 injured persons is affirmed. (c) The interest awarded from the date of the writ petition on the aforesaid sums at the rate of 9% per annum is affirmed. (d) If the legal representatives of any deceased victim are not satisfied with the compensation awarded, they are permitted to file an application for compensation with supporting documentary proof (to show the age and the income), before the Registrar General, Delhi High Court. If such an application if filed within three months, it shall not be rejected on the ground of delay. The Registrar General or such other Member of Higher Judiciary nominated by the learned Chief Justice/Acting Chief Justice of the High Court shall decide those applications in accordance with paras above and place the matter before the Division Bench of the

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS 7114-15 OF 2003 Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi … Appellant Vs. Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy & Ors. … Respondents With CA 7116/2003 & CA 6748/2004 J U D G M E N T R.V. Raveendran, J. These appeals are filed … Continue reading

land acquisition act = private land with tenancy encumbrances when acquired comparable sale can be adopted and land is worth for open market value as it is private land and not saddled with conditional purchase. Let us assume the value of a property which is not subject to any lease is Rs.Ten lakhs. If that property was subject to a lease and if the possession was with the lessee, a purchaser will offer only Rs.Five lakhs as he will be purchasing a property with an encumbrance and will not be getting physical possession. But when the property subject to a lease is acquired, under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, what is acquired is not only the landlord’s right, title and interest, but also the lessee’s right and interest. In other words the property with all rights, free from

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8539 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 982/2009) Rajendra Vassudev Deshprabhu (dead) Through Lrs. & Ors. … Appellants Vs. Deputy Collector (Retd.) & Land Acquisition Officer, Panaji … Respondents J U D G M E N T R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J. Leave … Continue reading

APEX COURT OVERRULED THE CLAUSE 13 OF KUMARI MADHURI PATILS CASE WHEREIN THE THEN APEX COURT GAVE NEARLY 15 DIRECTIONS IN UPHOLDING CASTE CERTIFICATES = Respondents 1 to 3 claimed that they belonged to `Dhobi’ caste, a scheduled caste in Bhopal district of Madhya Pradesh, and secured appointment to posts reserved for Schedule Castes. The appellant, who was the President of the Schedule Caste Employees Association, made a complaint to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that respondents 1 to 3 did not belong to any scheduled caste and had produced false caste certificates. = These two appeals have been referred by a two Judge bench, to a larger bench by order of reference dated 31.3.2010 doubting the legality and validity of the directions issued in Madhuri Patil. We extract below the relevant portion of the order of reference: “In Kumari Madhuri Patit’s case, as many as fifteen directions were given, which, in our opinion, are all legislative in nature. In our opinion, if a Court feels that some law should be made, then it can only make a recommendation to that effect to the legislature but it cannot itself legislate. It is upto the legislature to accept the recommendation or not. =we hold that the second sentence of clause 13 providing that where the writ petition is disposed of by a single judge, no further appeal would lie against the order of the division bench (even when there is a vested right to file such intra-court appeal) and will only be subject to a special leave under Article 136, is not legally proper and therefore, to that extent, is held to be not a good law. The second sentence of direction No.(13) stands overruled.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.3467 of 2005 WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.3468 of 2005 Dayaram … Appellant Vs. Sudhir Batham & Ors. … Respondents J U D G M E N T R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J. Respondents 1 to 3 claimed that they belonged to `Dhobi’ caste, a scheduled … Continue reading

service matter =The Rajasthan Public Service Commission, first respondent holds examinations for direct recruitment to State and subordinate service posts under the Rajasthan State and Subordinate Services (Direct Recruitment by Combined Competitive Examinations) Rules 1962 (`Rules’ for short). Appellant appeared as an `open market candidate’ in the 1983 examination and was selected to Rajasthan Tehsildar Services (Subordinate service) and = Sub-rule 1 of Rule 11 of Rules provided that the number of chances which a candidate appearing at the examinations can avail of, shall be restricted to three, for direct recruitment to posts specified in Schedules I and II of the Rules. The said rule was amended by notification dated 30.3.1990 whereby the ceiling in regard to the number of chances to appear in the examination was relaxed by increasing it from 3 to 4 examinations.= Having regard to the bar contained in Rule 4(2)(v), the appellant could not have appeared for the examination for the year 1990, as an NGE candidate, as by then he had appeared only thrice as an open market candidate and had not exhausted all the four chances as an open market candidate.

Not Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8399 OF 2011 [Arising out of SLP [C] No.27941/2008] Ashok Kumar Jain … Appellant Vs. Rajasthan Public Service Commission Through its Chairman & Ors. … Respondents J U D G M E N T R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J. Leave granted. 2. The Rajasthan … Continue reading

SUIT: Suit for declaration of title, possession, permanent injunction and mesne projects – Plaintiffs came to know of the property only when they cleared the bank loan taken by their father mortgaging the property – Plaintiffs claimed that defendants in unlawful possession – Trial Court decreeing the suit – High Court reversing it – On appeal, Held : Neither the title to the property nor the adverse possession thereof proved by defendants – Hence Trial Court’s well considered judgment restored – High Court’s judgment set aside – Adverse possession. The suit property was purchased by one `N’, who died leaving all his properties to his sons (the plaintiffs) under a will. He had mortgaged the suit property as also other properties to a Bank. The plaintiffs were prosecuting their studies at the time of their father’s death. Plaintiffs became aware of the suit property only when they cleared the bank loan and got back the title deeds. They traced the suit property and found the defendant in unauthorized possession. Therefore, they filed the suit for declaration of title, possession, permanent injunction and mesne profits. The trial court decreed the Suit. On appeal, the High Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and dismissed the suit. Hence the appeal. =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1. The High Court has neither discussed the evidence relating to identity of the suit property nor held that the trial court’s finding that plaintiffs have established their title and identity of the suit property was erroneous. The High Court has rejected the entire case of the plaintiffs merely on the ground that in the mortgage suit of the Bank, the Katha number of the property is wrongly given. The plaintiffs have offered a simple and acceptable explanation in regard to the wrong Katha number. [Para 12] [625-A-C] 2. The first appellate court can re-appreciate evidence and record findings different from those recorded by the trial court. It is well settled that if the appraisal of evidence by the trial court suffers from material irregularity, as for example when its decision is based on mere conjectures and surmises, or when its decision relied upon inadmissible evidence or ignores material evidence or when it draws inferences and conclusions who do not naturally or logically flow from the proved facts, the appellate court is bound to interfere with the findings of the trial court. It is equally well settled that where the trial court has considered the entire evidence and recorded several material findings, the first appellate court would not reverse them on the basis of conjectures and surmises or without analyzing the relevant evidence in entirety. As the final court of facts, if the first appellate court is reversing the judgment of the trial court, it is bound to independently consider the entire evidence. The High Court has ignored these well settled principles. [Para 8] [622-E-H; 623-A] 3. In law, possession follows title. The plaintiffs having established title to the suit property, will be entitled to decree for possession, unless their right to the suit property was extinguished, by reason of defendant being in adverse possession for a period of twelve years prior to the suit. [Para 13] [625-E-F] 4. The sale deed dated 18.11.1985 alleged to have been executed by Gowramma (Ex.D1 is a certified copy) was clearly a fabricated document in regard to an non-existing site obviously with the intention of laying claim over the suit property. The said deed did not convey any right, title or interest to the defendant in respect of the suit property. [Para 15] [627-F-G] 5. To establish a claim of title by prescription, that is adverse possession for 12 years or more, the possession of the claimant must be physical/actual, exclusive, open, uninterrupted, notorious and hostile to the true owner for a period exceeding twelve years. It is also well settled that long and continuous possession by itself would not constitute adverse possession if it was either permissive possession or possession without animus possidendi. The pleas based on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. Unless the person possessing the property has the requisite animus to possess the property hostile to the title of the true owner, the period for prescription will not commence. [Paras 17 and 18] [629-A-C] Periasami vs. P. Periathambi 1995 (6) SCC 523; Md. Mohammad Ali (dead) by LRs. vs. Jagdish Kalita 2004 (1) SCC 271 and P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy vs. Revamma 2007 (6) SCC 59 – relied on. Mohan Lal (Dead through LRs) vs. Mirza Abdul Gaffar 1996 (1) SCC 639, held inapplicable. 6. The only material produced by defendant to show that he was in possession from 1962, is the recital in the sale deed dated 18.11.1985. As the sale deed dated 18.11.1985 is established to be a bogus and false document, the claim of defendant that he was in occupation of the suit site as a tenant from 1962, is liable to be rejected. [Para 19] [630-E-F] 7.1. The judgment in O.S. No.578/1978 (Ex.P13) relied upon by defendant and the evidence of PW2 and PW3 would clearly establish that the defendant was residing in the property of Muddukrishna (site No.9) adjoining the suit property as a tenant, and that he had unauthorizedly put up a temporary cattle shed in the suit property in or about the year 1978. This may at best prove adverse possession of suit property by defendant from 1978. [Para 23] [632-F-H] 7.2. The defendant has not produced any evidence to show that he was in possession of the suit property for a period of 12 years prior to the filing of the suit by plaintiff on 24.6.1987. Neither the correspondence between defendant and City Survey Department subsequent to the suit nor the katha, sanction of plan and tax receipts of the years 1991, 1992, and 2002 (all subsequent to the suit), are of any relevance. The defendant did not examine either Gowramma or any other neighbour to show that he was in continuous possession of the suit property for more than 12 years. Except his vague and interested statement which is proved to be false, there is no evidence to show that he was in possession for a period of 12 years prior to the suit of plaintiffs. [Para 24] [633-A-C] 7.3. When defendant claimed title and that was proved to be false or fabricated, then the burden is heavy upon him to prove actual, exclusive, open, uninterrupted possession for 12 years. In this case he did not make out such possession for 12 years prior to the suit. While the plaintiffs have made out a clear and absolute title of the property, the defendant has not been able to make out title or adverse possession for more than 12 years. The High Court did not examine any of these aspects and by a cursory judgment, reversed the well considered judgment of the trial court. Therefore the decision of High Court cannot be sustained. The judgment and decree of the High Court is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court is restored. [Paras 25 and 26] [633-C-F] Case Law Reference: 1996 (1) SCC 639 held inapplicable Para 16 1995 (6) SCC 523 relied on Para 17 2004 (1) SCC 271 relied on Para 17 2007 (6) SCC 59 relied on Para 17 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4125 of 2009. From the Judgment & Order dated 12.09.2006 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in RFA. No. 394 of 2004. Rajesh Mahale for the Appellants. Brijesh Kalappa and Divya Nair, N. Ganpathy for the Respondent.

1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4125 OF 2009 [Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8405 of 2007] L. N. Aswathama & Anr. … Appellant(s) Vs. P. Prakash … Respondent (s) O R D E R R. V. Raveendran, J. Leave granted. 2.The appellants are the plaintiffs in … Continue reading

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Order XIII Rule 3 : Evidence Act, 1872- Section 65 : Civil suit-Production of secondary evidence-No objection raised against the evidence at trial stage-Objection to mode of proof at appellate stage- Permissibility of such objection-Held: Mode of proof falls within procedural law-Such objection can be taken before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record and not at appellate stage. Respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for declaration that the suit plot was his and his brother’s absolute property and sought injunction restraining the appellant-defendant from entering the suit property. According to the respondent the title came to him through the sons of `G’ vide a registered sale deed dated 14.11.1944 Exhibit P-1 and later on under Exbt. P-2 a gift deed. Appellant claimed title of only a portion of the suit property claiming to have title of the same through wife of `G’. Appellant did not challenge Exbts. P-1 (the certified copy of sale deed) and P-2. Trial Court decreed the suit inter alia holding that Exbt P-l was admissible as the document was 30 years old and hence presumption under Section 90 of Evidence Act applied to the same and that Exbt. P-2 stood proved. Lower appellate Court, dismissed the suit holding that Exbts. P-l and P-2 were not proved as original sale deed (Exbt. P-l) was not produced, that plaintiff had not laid foundation for admissibility of secondary evidence under Section 65(a) and (f). In second appeal High Court upheld the order of trial Court In appeal to this Court appellant contended that the certified copy of the sale deed being secondary evidence was not admissible as no steps were taken to produce the original sale deed nor any step was taken to prove the loss of the same.

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 2434 of 2000 PETITIONER: SMT. DAYAMATHI BAI RESPONDENT: SRI K.M. SHAFFI DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/08/2004 BENCH: ASHOK BHAN & S.H. KAPADIA. JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T KAPADIA, J. This appeal by special leave is filed by the original defendant against the judgment and order dated 18th December, … Continue reading

Indian Limitation Act (9 of 1908), Arts. 91 and 95-Suit to set aside gift deed on grounds of undue influence and fraud- Period of limitation and starting point for Iimitation. =In 1938, the appellant executed a gift deed of four plots of land-two in village T and two in village L in favour of her husband. At that time the appellant was young and illiterate and her husband was in a position to dominate her will, and she believed that the document related only to the plots in village T which were originally the property of the husband. The properties in village L were inherited by the appellant from her father. They were very valuable and fertile and there was no reason whatever for her to gift them away to her husband. In 1941, the husband married a second wife but the appellant continued to live with him amicably till he died in 1949. Thereafter the conduct of the relatives of the second wife made her suspicious, and on enquiry, she found that the plots in village L were also included in the gift deed. She therefore filed a suit for setting aside the gift deed and for possession of all the four items of property, against the second wife and her children. The High Court, in appeal, dismissed the suit. In appeal to this Court, HELD : (1) The appellant’s husband included the two plots of land in village L in the gift deed by fraud and without the appellant’s knowledge. Since the fraudulent misrepresentation was with respect to the contents and not the character of the document the transaction was not void but only voidable. Therefore, the suit for setting aside the gift deed would be governed by Art. 95 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Since the Article prescribes a period of limitation of 3 years from the time when the fraud became known to the party wronged, and the suit in the present case was filed within a few days after the appellant came to know of the fraud, the suit with respect to the items in village L was within time and should be decreed. [800 G; 802 A-C, E] Clough v. L. & N. W. Railway, (1871) L.R. 7 Ex. 26; Foster v. Mackinon (1869) 4 C.P. 704, Sanni Bibi v. Siddik Hossain, A.I.R. 1919 Cal. 728 and Brindaban v. Dhurba Charan, A.I.R. 1929 Cal. 606, referred to. (2) As regards the plots in village T, in view of s. 16(3) of the Indian Contract Act, and s. II 1 of the Evidence Act the gift deed must be presumed to have been obtained by the appellant’s husband by undue influence. The suit with respect to these properties would therefore be governed by Art. 91. The period of limitation prescribed by the Article is three years and time begins to run from the date when the plaintiff discovered the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside and not from the date when the plaintiff escaped from the undue influence. Since the appellant in the present case knew at the very time of the execution of the gift deed that her husband prevailed upon her to convey the plots in village T to him by undue. influence, her suit was barred by limitation so far as he plots in village T are concerned. [803 A-B, D, E- G] L3 Sup. Cl/68-7 798 Someshwar Dutt v. Tirbhawan Dutt, 61 I.A. 224. applied.

PETITIONER: NINGAWWA Vs. RESPONDENT: BYRAPPA & 3 ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/01/1968 BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. SHAH, J.C. CITATION: 1968 AIR 956 1968 SCR (2) 797 CITATOR INFO : F 1990 SC 540 (6) F 1990 SC1173 (4,6,7) ACT: Indian Limitation Act (9 of 1908), Arts. 91 and 95-Suit to set aside gift … Continue reading

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