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Rajasthan High Court

This tag is associated with 15 posts

Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 – sec.42, 66 and 175 – the registered sale deed dated 12.01.1962 executed prior to 1.5.1964 against the provisions of Act cannot be held to be void.The suit filed by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar after about 31 years of the sale is barred by limitation u/s 175 of the Act.-Apex court held that Therefore, it is clear that the proceeding for restoration of land initiated by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar was barred by limitation and was not maintainable. We, accordingly, set aside the impugned judgment dated 2.02.2012 passed by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court as well as judgement and order dated 23.05.2002 passed by the Single Judge. The appeal is allowed. No costs.= Ram Karan (Dead) Through LRs. & ors. … APPELLANTS VERSUS State of Rajasthan and Ors. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – June. Part -http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41718

   Rajasthan  Tenancy  Act,  1955 – sec.42, 66 and 175 – the registered sale deed dated 12.01.1962 executed  prior  to 1.5.1964 against the provisions of Act cannot be held to be void.The suit filed by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar after  about  31  years  of  the sale is barred by limitation u/s 175 of the Act.-Apex court held that Therefore, it is … Continue reading

Pension Scheme by Autonomous University with out approval of Governor which depends for Grants on Govt. – not valid = 39. Statutes how made – 1. Statutes under this Act shall be proposed by the Board and submitted to the Chancellor for his assent and shall come into force only after the assent is received and notified by the Vice-Chancellor. 2. Any statutes may be amended or repealed by the Board with the assent of the Chancellor. 3. All Statutes made under this Act shall be published in the official Gazette.”= Section 39 of the Act, it was obligatory on the part of the Board of Management of the University to submit the resolutions dated 7th December, 2000 and 18th December, 2009 to the Chancellor i.e. to the Governor of the State of Rajasthan before inviting options from the employees. If the assent of the Chancellor, i.e. the Governor of the State of Rajasthan is not received by the University, the amended statute would not come into force.- Upon carefully going through the statutory provisions, we are of the view that the High Court ought not to have constrained the University to continue to pay pension to the respondent-employees, especially in view of the fact that the change effected in the payment of retiral benefits to the employees was never approved by the Chancellor of the University as required under Section 39 of the Act.- though the University is an autonomous body, it is much dependent on the State of Rajasthan in its financial matters. It gets substantial funds from the State for performing its duties and possibly for the said reason the State has control over it in the financial affairs. Be that as it may, Section 39 of the Act makes it mandatory to get approval or assent of the Chancellor of the University before effecting any change in the Statute.= For the aforestated reasons, in our opinion, the order dated 3rd June, 2011 passed by the appellant, whereby both the resolutions passed by the University in relation to giving options to its employees for changing the Contributory Provident Fund scheme to the Pension Scheme, is absolutely just and legal. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was not correct while quashing and setting aside the order dated 3rd June, 2011 passed by the appellant-State of Rajasthan.= whether the University can continue to give pension to the employees? Answer to the question would be in the negative. If issuance of show cause notice is a mere formality, in our opinion, that would not affect the decision taken by the University in pursuance of the order dated 3rd June, 2011 because the order dated 3rd June, 2011 passed by the appellant-State is absolutely legal and by virtue of the said order, the resolutions dated 7th December, 2000 and 18th December, 2009 passed by the University have been quashed. In the aforestated circumstances, we quash and set aside the impugned judgment delivered by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, which has confirmed the judgment delivered by the learned single Judge. The order dated 3rd June, 2011 passed by the appellant-State shall operate and the employees shall be given retiral benefits as per the Contributory Provident Fund Scheme which was in force prior to 7th December, 2000. So far as the retired employees are concerned, they must have been paid pension in pursuance of the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of the High Court. As all the appeals have been allowed, some financial adjustments will have to be made and possibly there would be some recovery from some of the employees. We clarify that upon overall adjustment of the entire amount, if any employee has to return any amount to the University, as a special case, no demand shall be raised by the University in view of the fact that the employees must have retired long back and they must have adjusted their financial affairs upon knowing the fact that they had a regular income of pension.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40829     REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8469 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.12350 of 2013)   State of Rajasthan …APPELLANT   VERSUS   A.N. Mathur & Ors. ….RESPONDENTS   WITH   C.A.No.8470/2013 @ SLP(C)No.12351/2013, C.A.No.8471/2013 @ SLP(C)No.12352 /2013, C.A.No.8472/2013 … Continue reading

Extra-ordinary delay even charge sheet not filed due to Non- Availability of original records of misappropriation – for the same offence the accused was exonerated in departmental proceedings – FIR is quashed = It is not disputed by the respondent that the departmental proceeding was initiated against the appellant with regard to identical charges made in the FIR. It was alleged that as per CAG Inquiry Report dated 15th December, 2008 Rs.4,39,617/- has been misappropriated by the appellant, all the copies of original bills and documents are available in the office of CAG and the original documents are available in the office of the Directorate, State Literacy Programme. In the departmental proceeding identical allegation was made that as per the Inquiry Officer Report, an embezzlement of Rs.4,39,617/- was found to be done by the appellant. 32. During the investigation inspite of several requests made by the Investigating Agency (Police), the records in respect of allegation were not produced. No evidence came against the appellant-Lokesh Kumar Jain, from the file of the education department. As the case was pending since long and there was no possibility of availability of record in the near future, FR No.67/2000 against the appellant was filed before the CJM, Dausa. The CJM, Dausa by his order dated 18th November, 2000 on perusal of Final Report, in exercise of power conferred under Section 156(3) Cr.PC directed the SHO, Dausa to re-investigate the case with the assistance of complainant and to procure the original records. Inspite of order dated 18th November, 2000, for nine years, records were not made available, as apparent from the Inquiry Report dated 15th December,2008. There is nothing on the record, even by way of counter affidavit filed before this Court to show that record has now been traced to make it available to the Investigating Agency. There is no probability of finding out original documents or evidence mentioned in the counter affidavit. Though, delay has been alleged on the part of the appellant, there is nothing on the record to suggest that the appellant caused delay in the matter of investigation. On the other hand, the silence on the part of the respondent regarding availability of the original record or other evidence before the Investigating Agency shows that the delay caused due to inaction on the part of the respondent. Therefore, in our view, keeping investigation pending for further period will be futile as the respondent including Directorate for the State Literacy Programme is not sure whether original records can be procured for investigation and to bring home the charges. Considering the fact that delay in the present case is caused by the respondent, the constitutional guarantee of a speedy investigation and trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is thereby violated and as the appellant has already been exonerated in the departmental proceedings for identical charges, keeping the case pending against the appellant for investigation, is unwarranted, the FIR deserves to be quashed. 34. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the FIR No.10/2000 lodged in Police Station, Dausa as against the appellant is hereby quashed.

  published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40537   REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 888 OF 2013 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(Crl.)NO.4513 OF 2012) LOKESH KUMAR JAIN … APPELLANT VERUS STATE OF RAJASTHAN … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T 1 SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Leave granted. This appeal has … Continue reading

JURISDICTION = whether, in view of clause 18 of the consignment agency agreement (for short, ‘agreement’) dated 13.10.2002, the Calcutta High Court has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the application made by the appellant under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘1996 Act’). = Conclusion: 28. For the reasons mentioned above, I agree with my learned Brother that in the jurisdiction clause of an agreement, the absence of words like “alone”, “only”, “exclusive” or “exclusive jurisdiction” is neither decisive nor does it make any material difference in deciding the jurisdiction of a court. The very existence of a jurisdiction clause in an agreement makes the intention of the parties to an agreement quite clear and it is not advisable to read such a clause in the agreement like a statute. In the present case, only the Courts in Kolkata had jurisdiction to entertain the disputes between the parties.

Published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40511 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5086 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 5595 of 2012) M/s. Swastik Gases P. Ltd. … Appellant Vs. Indian Oil Corp. Ltd. … Respondent JUDGMENT R.M. LODHA, J. Leave granted. 2. The short question that arises for consideration … Continue reading

SECOND MARRIAGE NOT A BAR IN ALLOWING SET ASIDE EXPARTE DIVORCE DECREE = = Order – IX Rule 13 CPC with a prayer to set aside the ex parte decree OF DIVORCE. Since there was delay of 153 days in filing it, she filed I.A No.480 of 2006.= The very fact that the proceedings are pending in the Courts at Raipur and Visakhapatnam, discloses that the relationship was not cordial and the acts resorted to by the respondent in obtaining the ex parte decree and then immediately contacting second marriage can not at all be countenanced, much less the Court can put a seal of approval upon it. Though the status of the second marriage contacted by the respondent may be at a stake, it cannot outwit the gross injustice done to the petitioner. 6. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in Surendra Kumar v. Kiran Devi1. It is difficult to treat that as a precedent for the proposition that whenever one of the spouses contacts second marriage, after obtaining a decree for divorce, the decree cannot be set aside thereafter. Further, in the instant case, the trial Court did not record any finding to the effect that the notice in the O.P. was served upon the petitioner. 7. Hence, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the delay of 153 days in filing the application to set aside the ex parte decree is condoned. Since the reasons that weigh with the Court for condonation of delay would hold good for setting aside the ex parte decree, the I.A. filed under Order – XXXIX Rule – 13 CPC was allowed. REPORTED/PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=9784

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 6034 OF 2010 03-04-2013 Smt. Rachokonda Parvathi W/o. Venkata Subrahmanyam Rachakonda Venkata Subrahmanyam S/o.late R. Venkata Ramana. Counsel for the Petitioners: Sri Ravi Cheemalapati Counsel for the Respondent: Sri G. Ram Gopal <Gist: >Head Note: ?Cases referred AIR 1997 Rajasthan 63 ORDER: Petitioner is the … Continue reading

‘Jugaad’= wherein the complete liability of providing compensation in a vehicular accident had been fixed upon the appellant-Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the ‘RSRTC’), while unfastening the liability of the driver and the owner of the vehicle, known as ‘Jugaad’, under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’).= whether a particular vehicle can be defined as motor vehicle in terms of Section 2(28) of the Act, is to be determined on the facts of each case taking into consideration the use of the vehicle and its suitability for being used upon the road. Once it is found to be suitable for being used on the road, it is immaterial whether it runs on the public road or private road, for the reason, that actual user for a particular purpose, is no criteria to decide the name- The word `only’ used in Section 2(28) of the Act clearly shows that the exemption is confined only to those kinds of vehicles which are exclusively being used in a factory or in any closed premises. Thus, a vehicle which is not adapted for use upon the road, is only to be excluded. = if the tractor which is exclusively used for agricultural purpose, does require registration and insurance and driver also require a driving license, why the same provisions would not apply in case of `Jugaad’. = In view of the above, as the `Jugaad’ is covered in the definition of the motor vehicle under Section 2(28) of the Act, the statutory authorities cannot escape from their duty to enforce the law and restrain the plying of `Jugaad’. The statutory authorities must ensure that `Jugaad’ can be plied only after meeting the requirements of the Act. The same has become a menace to public safety as they are causing a very large number of accidents. ‘Jugaads’ are not insured and the owners of the `Jugaad’ generally do not have the financial capacity to pay compensation to persons who suffer disablement and to dependents of those, who lose life. Thus, considering the gravity of the circumstances, the statutory authorities must give strict adherence to the circular referred to hereinabove by the Central Government. However, we clarify that it is open to the statutory authorities to make exemptions by issuing a notification/circular specifically if such a vehicle is exclusively used for agricultural purposes but for that sufficient specifications have to be provided so that it cannot be used for commercial purposes. The matter is closed now.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.3265 of 2012 Chairman, Rajasthan State Road Transport …Petitioners Corporation & Ors. Versus Smt. Santosh & Ors. …Respondents O R D E R 1. Originally this petition had been filed challenging the judgment and order of the Rajasthan High Court … Continue reading

sub­clause (a) of clause (1) of Section 23 of Hindu Marriage Act = whether the person seeking divorce “is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief”. On such examination if it is so found that the person is taking advantage of his or her wrong or disability it is open to the Court to refuse to grant relief. = In the present case, both the Courts noticed the relevant facts and came to a definite conclusion that the appellant has not only been cruel to the respondent, but has also brought the situation to the point where the respondent had no option but to leave the matrimonial home. In this situation as the appellant was trying to take advantage of his own wrong, the Courts disallowed the relief as was sought for. We find that the order to that effect of the High Court does not suffer any infirmity, illegality or perversity; no interference is called for.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.3861 OF 2013 (arising out of SLP(C)No.20277 of 2007) ASHOK KUMAR JAIN       …. APPELLANT VERSUS SUMATI JAIN     ….RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Leave granted. 2. The   appellant   has   preferred   this   appeal   against the   judgment   dated   9th  March,   2007   passed   by   the Rajasthan   High   … Continue reading

So far as the appeal filed by the State of Rajasthan, viz. Civil Appeal No. 1494 of 2008 is concerned, it mainly challenges the impugned judgment on the ground that by virtue of methodology directed to be employed in the said judgment, the State would suffer substantial loss as the lessee company, viz. Hindustan Zinc Limited would be paying much less royalty than what it is supposed to pay. 3. On the other hand, an appeal has also been filed by Hindustan Zinc Limited as it has been aggrieved by the direction issued by the High Court, whereby the amount of royalty has been directed to be re-calculated.=The negligible contents of metal which remains in the mining area by way of tailings, slimes or rejects, which are returned to the mother earth cannot be said to be the part of metal content in the ore produced. “Dumped tailings or rejects may be liable to payment of royalty if only they are sold or consumed”.- whether the details given by the lease holder on the basis of which royalty is calculated is correct. Upon carefully going through the impugned judgment and the judgment delivered by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, we find that the courts below did not commit any mistake in arriving at the conclusion that the holder of the lease was not liable to pay the amount demanded under the impugned notices because, by virtue of Notification dated 12th September, 2000 read with the relevant Rules, the lease holder is supposed to pay royalty only on the contents of metal in ore produced and not on the metal contained in the tailings, rejects or slimes which had not been taken out of the leased area and which had been dumped into dumping ground of the leased area. For the afore-stated reasons, we do not find any substance in the appeal and therefore, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. So far as the present appeal is concerned, it has been filed by Hindustan Zinc Limited as it has been aggrieved by the directions whereby the matter has been ordered to be remitted to the mining engineer for re-computing the royalty payable on lead and zinc contained in the ore produced. The submission on behalf of the appellant-company was to the effect that as the entire concentrate has been taken out of the leased area and as the quantity of concentrate of lead and zinc was very much known, it was not necessary to give such a direction because there is no question with regard to re-computation of royalty on the basis of metal contained in ore produced. We find substance in what has been submitted because the metal concentrate which had been taken out from the leased area is known to the parties and therefore, it is not necessary to have any further details regarding the ore produced by the appellantcompany. 40. We, therefore, quash the afore-stated direction and the appeal filed by the appellant-company is allowed to the above effect with no order as to costs.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1494 OF 2008 State of Rajasthan & Ors. …..APPELLANTS VERSUS Hindustan Zinc Ltd. & Anr. ….RESPONDENTS WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1526 OF 2008 J U D G M E N T ANIL R. DAVE, J. 1. Being aggrieved by the judgment … Continue reading

Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, – “…..Conduct of an accused must have nexus with the crime committed. It must form part of the evidence as regards his conduct either preceding, during or after the commission of the offence as envisaged under Section 8 of the Evidence Act….”- The general good behaviour of the appellant and the fact that he had no bad habit have no nexus with the offence alleged against the appellant and are not relevant when other circumstances have established beyond reasonable doubt that it is the appellant and the appellant alone who has committed the murder of the deceased.

Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 221 of 2007 Vivek Kalra …… Appellant Versus State of Rajasthan ….. Respondent J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. This is an appeal against the judgment dated 25.10.2004 of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, … Continue reading

Sections 498A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code.the FIR lodged by respondent 2 insofar as it relates to appellants 1, 2 and 3 deserves to be quashed. The allegations are extremely general in nature. No specific role is attributed to each of the appellants. Respondent 2 has stated that after the marriage, she resided with her husband at Ahmedabad. It is not clear whether appellants 1, 2 and 3 were residing with them at Ahmedabad. The marriage took place on 9/7/2002 and respondent 2 left her matrimonial home on 15/2/2003 i.e. within a period of seven months. Thereafter, respondent 2 took no steps to file any complaint against the appellants. Six years after she left the house, the present FIR is lodged making extremely vague and general allegations against appellants 1, 2 and 3. It is important to remember that appellant 2 is a married sister-in-law. In our opinion, such extra ordinary delay in lodging the FIR raises grave doubt about the truthfulness of allegations made by respondent 2 against appellants 1, 2 and 3, which are, in any case, general in nature. We have no doubt that by making such reckless and vague allegations, respondent 2 has tried to rope them in this case along with her husband. We are of the confirmed opinion that continuation of the criminal proceedings against appellants 1, 2 and 3 pursuant to this FIR is an abuse of process of law. In the interest of justice, therefore, the FIR deserves to be quashed insofar as it relates to appellants 1, 2 and 3. 9. Hence, impugned judgment and order dated 14/9/2011 passed by the Rajasthan High Court in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.1935 of 2009 is quashed and set aside insofar as it refuses to quash the FIR in question against appellants 1, 2 and 3. FIR No.66 of 2009 lodged at Mahila Thana, District Jodhpur, Rajasthan is quashed insofar as it relates to appellants 1, 2 and 3 viz. Smt. Chandralekha, Vandana and Vinita respectively. We make it clear that so far as Rajeev Bhandari s/o. Meghraj Bhandari is concerned, the proceedings shall go on in accordance with law. We have not quashed FIR No.66 of 2009 insofar as it relates to Rajeev Bhandari. Needless to say that the court seized of the complaint shall deal with Rajeev Bhandari’s case independently, without being influenced by anything said by us on the merits of the case and in accordance with law.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2070 OF 2012 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9092 of 2011]   CHANDRALEKHA & ORS. … APPELLANTS Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR. … RESPONDENTS   O R D E R 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal, by special leave, … Continue reading

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