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Rajasthan
Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 – sec.42, 66 and 175 – the registered sale deed dated 12.01.1962 executed prior to 1.5.1964 against the provisions of Act cannot be held to be void.The suit filed by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar after about 31 years of the sale is barred by limitation u/s 175 of the Act.-Apex court held that Therefore, it is clear that the proceeding for restoration of land initiated by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar was barred by limitation and was not maintainable. We, accordingly, set aside the impugned judgment dated 2.02.2012 passed by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court as well as judgement and order dated 23.05.2002 passed by the Single Judge. The appeal is allowed. No costs.= Ram Karan (Dead) Through LRs. & ors. … APPELLANTS VERSUS State of Rajasthan and Ors. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – June. Part -http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41718
Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 – sec.42, 66 and 175 – the registered sale deed dated 12.01.1962 executed prior to 1.5.1964 against the provisions of Act cannot be held to be void.The suit filed by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar after about 31 years of the sale is barred by limitation u/s 175 of the Act.-Apex court held that Therefore, it is … Continue reading
Service matter – option given at the time bifurcation of Rajasthan – as per the option rules, the respondent ought to have retire at the age of 58 years, but he was forced to go on superannuation at the age of 55 years only – High court set aside the orders of trial court and appellate court and allowed the claim – Apex court held that once the State of Rajasthan, with the previous approval of the Central Government, gave an option to Respondent No.1 not confined to any particular age of retirement but to elect between Regulations and the Rules of 1951, Respondent No.1 cannot be subsequently deprived of the benefits of enhanced age of retirement accruing to him on account of amendments in the Regulations made in the year 1962 when Respondent No.1 was still in service. After that amendment in the Regulations, his retirement age legally became 58 years. = State of Rajasthan & Anr. …..Appellants Versus C.P. Singh & Ors. …..Respondents= 2014 ( Apr.Part ) judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41386
Service matter – option given at the time bifurcation of Rajasthan – as per the option rules, the respondent ought to have retire at the age of 58 years, but he was forced to go on superannuation at the age of 55 years only – High court set aside the orders of trial court and appellate court and … Continue reading
Sec.406 I.P.C.- Criminal breach of Trust – police reported the case as false – protest petition and it’s appeal were dismissed by lower courts – High court in revision set aside the lower courts order and remanded the case finding prima faice offence for next step allowing protest petition – Apex court confirmed the High court order – Complainant clearly deposed that he had handed over gold while purchasing cloth in accused shop and were not returned – accused admitted the same – enough to hold prima faice case against the accused – accused admitted it – burden lies on him to prove non-guilty = Ghanshyam …. Appellant Vs. State of Rajasthan …. Respondent = Published in/Cited in / Reported in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41078
Sec.406 I.P.C.- Criminal breach of Trust – police reported the case as false – protest petition and it’s appeal were dismissed by lower courts – High court in revision set aside the lower courts order and remanded the case finding prima faice offence for next step allowing protest petition – Apex court confirmed the High … Continue reading
376(2)(g) and 302/34, IPC and sec. 306 of Cr.p.c – Approver – Lower court punished to death basing on the evidence of approver – High court disbelieved the version of approver as he has not disclosed himself as prima accused in the offence and lack of corroboration and set aside the sentence – Apex court set aside the high court order – punished for life etc., = State of Rajasthan …… Appellant Versus Balveer @ Balli & Anr. ….. Respondents – Reported in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40947
376(2)(g) and 302/34, IPC and sec. 306 of Cr.p.c – Approver – Lower court punished to death basing on the evidence of approver – High court disbelieved the version of approver as he has not disclosed himself as prima accused in the offence and lack of corroboration and set aside the sentence – Apex court set aside … Continue reading
sec. 354 outrage the modesty of women is to be considered stringy, no lenient view – Ajahar Ali … Appellant VERSUS State of West Bengal … Respondent published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40857
Sec. 354 outrage the modesty of women is to be considered stringy, no lenient view should be taken while granting punishment – Due to delay of 18 years, the accused is not entitled to any benefit under the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – No lenient view The provisions of Section 354 … Continue reading
Wrong procedure adopted by Magistrate = In a Kidnap case on a private complaint, when the police filed charge sheet excluding kidnap and filed only under sec. 323 and 343 of I.P.C. – with out conducting trial no court should pass orders on plea of guilty and releasing the accused on probation with a direction – not to affect his service = conviction of an employee in an offence permits the disciplinary authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the employee or to take appropriate steps for his dismissal/removal only on the basis of his conviction. The word “disqualification” contained in Section 12 of the 1958 Act refers to a disqualification provided in other statutes, as explained by this Court in the above referred cases, and the employee cannot claim a right to continue in service merely on the ground that he had been given the benefit of probation under the 1958 Act.”= the trial court had no competence to make any observation having civil consequences so far as the private respondents are concerned. The High Court rejected the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the appellant only on the ground that the appellant neither challenged the order of taking cognizance nor raised any objection at the time of reading over of the charges to the accused. The High Court failed to appreciate that before the statement of the appellant or any other witness could be recorded, the trial court disposed off the matter on the date when the application itself had been submitted admitting the guilt. Even otherwise if the trial court wanted to entertain any issue of plea bargaining under Chapter XXI-A, inserted w.e.f. 5.7.2006, then too the court was obliged there under to put the victim to notice before extending any such benefits that have been given in the present case. The procedure therefore appears to have been clearly violated. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant had no opportunity to raise any grievance before the appropriate forum.= In view of the above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the trial court dated 15.7.2011 as well as of the High Court dated 23.4.2012 are set aside. The matter is remitted
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40841 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1547 of 2013 Girraj Prasad Meena …Appellant Versus State of Rajasthan & Ors. …Respondents J U D G M E N T … Continue reading
Section 432 Cr.PC for remission and Section 433 Cr.PC for commutation – No Sentence should be considered for remission and commutation before serving of the minimum sentence = All murders shock the community; but certain murders shock the conscience of the Court and the community. The distinguishing aspect of the latter category is that there is shock coupled with extreme revulsion. What should be the penological approach in that category is one question arising for consideration in this case. What is the scope of consideration of Death Reference by the High Court under Chapter XXVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.PC’), is the other question. Whether there is any restriction on the exercise of power under Section 432 Cr.PC for remission and Section 433 Cr.PC for commutation in cases of minimum sentence is the third main issue.= In the present case, the respondent has been awarded life imprisonment under Section 302 of IPC. Under Section 376 of IPC also he has been awarded life imprisonment. The third substantive sentence is under Section 201 of IPC. All these sentences are ordered to run concurrently. The sentence of life imprisonment is till the end of one’s biological life. However, in view of the power of the State under Sections 432 and 433 of Cr.PC, in the present case, we are of the view that the sentences shall run consecutively, in case there is remission or commutation. We further make it clear that the remission or commutation, if considered in the case of the respondent, shall be granted only after the mandatory period of fourteen years in the case of offence under Section 302 of IPC. Punishment has a penological purpose. Reformation, retribution, prevention, deterrence are some of the major factors in that regard. Parliament is the collective conscience of the people. If it has mandated a minimum sentence for certain offences, the Government being its delegate, cannot interfere with the same in exercise of their power for remission or commutation. Neither Section 432 nor Section 433 of Cr.PC hence contains a non-obstante provision. Therefore, the minimum sentence provided for any offence cannot be and shall not be remitted or commuted by the Government in exercise of their power under Section 432 or 433 of the Cr.PC. Wherever the Indian Penal Code or such penal statutes have provided for a minimum sentence for any offence, to that extent, the power of remission or commutation has to be read as restricted; otherwise the whole purpose of punishment will be defeated and it will be a mockery on sentencing. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we make it clear that in the event of State invoking its powers under Section 432 or 433 of Cr.PC, the sentence under Section 376 of IPC shall not be remitted or commuted before seven years of imprisonment. In other words, in that eventuality, it shall be ensured that the respondent will first serve the term of life imprisonment under Section 302 of IPC. In case there is any remission after fourteen years, then imprisonment for a minimum period of seven years under Section 376 of IPC shall follow and thereafter three years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 201 of IPC. The sentence on fine and default as awarded by the Sessions Court are maintained as such.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40836 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 659 OF 2006 State of Rajasthan … Appellant (s) Versus Jamil Khan … Respondent (s) J U D G M E N T KURIAN, J.: 1. All murders shock the community; but certain murders shock the conscience of the Court and … Continue reading
monitor the investigation= whether this Court should continue to monitor the investigation, as directed earlier, even after filing of the charge- sheet. = monitoring of a case is continued till the investigation continues but when the investigating agency, which is appointed by the court, completes the investigation, files a charge-sheet and takes steps in the matter in accordance with the provisions of law before a competent court of law, it would not be proper for this Court to keep on monitoring the trial which is continuing before a competent court. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that since the investigation has already been completed, charge- sheet has been filed, trial has already commenced, it is not necessary for this Court to continue with the monitoring of the case in question. In these circumstances, we have to answer the question in the negative. Accordingly, we direct that it is not necessary to monitor the matter in question any further since the matter is in the domain of the competent court. All the applications are accordingly disposed of.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40830 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION NO.21811 OF 2010 WITH CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION NO.17950 OF 2011 AND CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION NO.15638 OF 2012 IN CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION NO.21811 OF 2010 IN SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 3212 OF … Continue reading
Pension Scheme by Autonomous University with out approval of Governor which depends for Grants on Govt. – not valid = 39. Statutes how made – 1. Statutes under this Act shall be proposed by the Board and submitted to the Chancellor for his assent and shall come into force only after the assent is received and notified by the Vice-Chancellor. 2. Any statutes may be amended or repealed by the Board with the assent of the Chancellor. 3. All Statutes made under this Act shall be published in the official Gazette.”= Section 39 of the Act, it was obligatory on the part of the Board of Management of the University to submit the resolutions dated 7th December, 2000 and 18th December, 2009 to the Chancellor i.e. to the Governor of the State of Rajasthan before inviting options from the employees. If the assent of the Chancellor, i.e. the Governor of the State of Rajasthan is not received by the University, the amended statute would not come into force.- Upon carefully going through the statutory provisions, we are of the view that the High Court ought not to have constrained the University to continue to pay pension to the respondent-employees, especially in view of the fact that the change effected in the payment of retiral benefits to the employees was never approved by the Chancellor of the University as required under Section 39 of the Act.- though the University is an autonomous body, it is much dependent on the State of Rajasthan in its financial matters. It gets substantial funds from the State for performing its duties and possibly for the said reason the State has control over it in the financial affairs. Be that as it may, Section 39 of the Act makes it mandatory to get approval or assent of the Chancellor of the University before effecting any change in the Statute.= For the aforestated reasons, in our opinion, the order dated 3rd June, 2011 passed by the appellant, whereby both the resolutions passed by the University in relation to giving options to its employees for changing the Contributory Provident Fund scheme to the Pension Scheme, is absolutely just and legal. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was not correct while quashing and setting aside the order dated 3rd June, 2011 passed by the appellant-State of Rajasthan.= whether the University can continue to give pension to the employees? Answer to the question would be in the negative. If issuance of show cause notice is a mere formality, in our opinion, that would not affect the decision taken by the University in pursuance of the order dated 3rd June, 2011 because the order dated 3rd June, 2011 passed by the appellant-State is absolutely legal and by virtue of the said order, the resolutions dated 7th December, 2000 and 18th December, 2009 passed by the University have been quashed. In the aforestated circumstances, we quash and set aside the impugned judgment delivered by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, which has confirmed the judgment delivered by the learned single Judge. The order dated 3rd June, 2011 passed by the appellant-State shall operate and the employees shall be given retiral benefits as per the Contributory Provident Fund Scheme which was in force prior to 7th December, 2000. So far as the retired employees are concerned, they must have been paid pension in pursuance of the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of the High Court. As all the appeals have been allowed, some financial adjustments will have to be made and possibly there would be some recovery from some of the employees. We clarify that upon overall adjustment of the entire amount, if any employee has to return any amount to the University, as a special case, no demand shall be raised by the University in view of the fact that the employees must have retired long back and they must have adjusted their financial affairs upon knowing the fact that they had a regular income of pension.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40829 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8469 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.12350 of 2013) State of Rajasthan …APPELLANT VERSUS A.N. Mathur & Ors. ….RESPONDENTS WITH C.A.No.8470/2013 @ SLP(C)No.12351/2013, C.A.No.8471/2013 @ SLP(C)No.12352 /2013, C.A.No.8472/2013 … Continue reading
Section 78(5) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 (for short ‘the Act’).=The Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer, Bhiwadi had levied penalty in exercise of his powers under Section 78(5) of the Act against the owner of the vehicle who was carrying certain goods of the assessee.- “If one reads sub-section (5) of Section 78 in its entirety with Rule 53 of the 1995 Rules, it is clear that penalty was liable to be imposed for importation of any taxable goods for sale without furnishing a declaration in Form ST 18A completely filled in all respects. The duty to fill and furnish the said Form is imposed on the purchasing dealer. Therefore, Section 78(5) as it stood prior to 22.3.02 imposed penalty if possession or movement of goods took place inter alia in breach of Section 78(2)(a) on “the person in-charge”, which included the owner. In this connection it may be noted that sub- section (5) comes after sub-section 4(c) which talks about release of the goods to “the owner of the goods” on his giving of adequate security. It is the owner (importer) who has to fill in the Form ST 18A. It is the owner who is entitled to seek release under Section 78(4) on giving security. It is the owner who is entitled to hearing under Section 78(5) and, therefore, the expression “person in-charge of the goods” under Section 78(5) would include the owner. Moreover, under Section 78(2) the words used are “person in-charge of a vehicle or carrier of goods in movement” whereas the words in Section 78(5) which comes after sub-section (4) refers to “person in-charge of the goods”. The words “in movement” do not find place in Section 78(5) and therefore the expression “person in charge of goods” under Section 78(5) was wider than the expression “person in charge of goods in movement” under Section 78(2)(a). Consequently, the expression “person in-charge of the goods” under Section 78(5) who is given an opportunity of being heard in the enquiry would include the “owner of the goods”.= “person in-charge of the goods” under the old Section 78(5) is substituted by the words “the owner of the goods or a person authorized in writing by such owner or person in-charge of the goods”.- Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court and restore the order passed by the Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer, Bhiwadi ASSISTANT COMMERCIAL TAXES OFFICER Vs. M/S PAREKH ENTERPRISES .
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40817 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.8216 OF 2013 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.4194 OF 2010) ASSISTANT COMMERCIAL TAXES OFFICER APPELLANT(S) VERSUS M/S PAREKH ENTERPRISES RESPONDENT(S) O R D E R 1. Leave granted. 2. This … Continue reading
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