//
archives

Rajasthan

This tag is associated with 49 posts

Service matter – whether respondent No. 2 is entitled to pension as claimed by him or he is eligible to get his retirement benefits under Contributory Provident Funds Scheme (for short “the C.P.F. Scheme”).= No- as he failed to choose his option with in 3 months of notification – Delay can not be accepted as it carry no value in the eye of law = The appellant-University accepted the option exercised by respondent No. 2 and therefore, it cannot be said that the deeming fiction incorporated in the Notification would help respondent No. 2. For sake of convenience, relevant extract of the Notification dated 17th August, 1991, is reproduced hereinbelow :- “….Thus all employees who were in service on 1.1.1990 shall have to exercise their option in writing, either for the pension scheme under these regulations or for continuance under the existing C.P.F. Scheme, within 3 months from the date of notification of this provision and shall submit the same to the Comptroller, Rajasthan Agriculture University, Bikaner in the prescribed form. The existing employees who do not exercise option within the period specified under these regulations shall be deemed to have opted for the pension scheme. Option once exercised shall be final and irrevocable…” 22. Though, respondent No. 2 did not exercise his option within the period prescribed under the aforestated Notification, when he had exercised the option on 3rd January, 1992, for continuing to be under the C.P.F. Scheme and when the appellant-University had graciously accepted the option exercised by respondent No. 2, he would not get benefit under the deeming fiction incorporated in the Notification. It would be unfair to the University if the submission of respondent No. 2 is accepted. A special favour was done to respondent No. 2 by accepting his option even after the prescribed period was over. Now, at this stage, after his retirement, respondent No. 2 wants to take undue advantage of the favour done to him by the appellant university, which cannot be permitted. Had respondent No. 2 not exercised his option at all, he would have been surely treated to have accepted the Pension Scheme but as he had given his option late, which had been graciously accepted by the appellant-University, it cannot be said that respondent No. 2 should be treated to have accepted the Pension Scheme. 23. All averments pertaining to employees of other universities are not relevant because each employer university would have its own scheme with regard to payment of retirement benefits to its employees. 24. We may add here that respondent No. 2 is a highly literate person and he must have known the consequences, when he had opted for the C.P.F. Scheme under his letter of option dated 3rd January, 1992. It was his conscious effort to see that he continues with the C.P.F. Scheme and the said effort was respected by the appellant- University by showing special favour, as his option was accepted even after the time prescribed in the Notification was over. 25. For the aforestated reasons, we are of the view that the High Court was in error by giving a direction to the appellant- University that respondent No. 2 should be given pension as if he had opted for the Pension Scheme. 26. The appeal stands allowed with no order as to costs.

   published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40698  REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7160 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 7781 of 2011)     Rajasthan Agriculture University, Bikaner …..Appellant   Versus State of Rajasthan & Ors. …..Respondents       J U D G M E N T … Continue reading

while examining the tortuous liability of the tort-feasor has examined the criteria for awarding compensation for death of children in accident between age group of 10 to 15 years and held in the above case that the compensation shall be awarded taking the contribution of the children to the family at Rs.12,000/- p.a. and multiplier 11 has been applied taking the age of the father and then under the conventional heads the compensation of Rs.25,000/- was awarded. Thus, a total sum of Rs.1,57,000/- was awarded in that case. After noting the submission made on behalf of TISCO in the said case that the compensation determined for the children of all age groups could be double as in its view the determination made was grossly inadequate and the observation was further made that loss of children is irrecoupable and no amount of money could compensate the parents. Having regard to the environment from which the children referred to in that case were brought up, their parents being reasonably well-placed officials of TISCO, it was directed that the compensation amount for the children between the age group of 5 to 10 years should be three times. In other words, it should be Rs.1.5 lakhs to which under the conventional heads a sum of Rs.50,000/- should be added and thus total amount in each case would be Rs.2 lakhs. Further, in the case referred to supra it has observed that in so far as the children of age group between 10 to 15 years are concerned, they are all students of Class VI to Class X and are children of employees of TISCO and one of the children was employed in the Company in the said case having regard to the fact the contribution of the deceased child was taken Rs.12,000/- p.a. appears to be on the lower side and held that the contribution of such children should be Rs.24,000/- p.a. In our considered view, the aforesaid legal principle laid down in Lata Wadhwa’s case with all fours is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand having regard to the fact that the deceased was 10 years’ old, who was assisting the appellants in their agricultural occupation which is an undisputed fact. We have also considered the fact that the rupee value has come down drastically from the year 1994, when the notional income of the non- earning member prior to the date of accident was fixed at Rs.15,000/-. Further, the deceased boy, had he been alive would have certainly contributed substantially to the family of the appellants by working hard. In view of the aforesaid reasons, it would be just and reasonable for us to take his notional income at Rs.30,000/- and further taking the young age of the parents, namely the mother who was about 36 years old, at the time of accident, by applying the legal principles laid down in the case of Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation[3], the multiplier of 15 can be applied to the multiplicand. Thus, 30,000 x 15 = 4,50,000 and 50,000/- under conventional heads towards loss of love and affection, funeral expenses, last rites as held in Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas[4], which is referred to in Lata Wadhwa’s case and the said amount under the conventional heads is awarded even in relation to the death of children between 10 to 15 years old. In this case also we award Rs.50,000/- under conventional heads. In our view, for the aforesaid reasons the said amount would be fair, just and reasonable compensation to be awarded in favour of the appellants. The said amount will carry interest at the rate of 9% p.a. by applying the law laid down in the case of Municipal Council of Delhi v. Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy[5], for the reason that the Insurance Company has been contesting the claim of the appellants from 1992-2013 without settling their legitimate claim for nearly about 21 years, if the Insurance Company had awarded and paid just and reasonable compensation to the appellants the same could have been either invested or kept in the fixed deposit, then the amount could have earned five times more than what is awarded today in this appeal. Therefore, awarding 9% interest on the compensation awarded in favour of the appellants is legally justified.=Accordingly, we pass the following order: I) The appeal is allowed and the impugned judgments and awards of both the Tribunal and High Court are set aside. II) The awarded amount of Rs.5,00,000/- with interest at the rate of 9% per annum should be paid to the appellants from the date of filing of the application till the date of payment. III) We direct the Insurance Company to issue the demand draft drawn on any Nationalized Bank by apportioning the compensation amount equally with proportionate interest and send it to the appellants within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.7137 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.21139 of 2011) KISHAN GOPAL & ANR. … APPELLANTS Vs. LALA & ORS. … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T V.Gopala Gowda, J. This appeal has been filed by the appellants questioning the … Continue reading

The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 & the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short ‘the 2000 Act’) = whether or not the appellant, who was admittedly not a juvenile within the meaning of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (for short ‘the 1986 Act’) when offences were committed but had not completed 18 years of age, on that date, will be governed by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short ‘the 2000 Act’) and be declared as a juvenile in relation to the offences alleged to have been committed by him. = the age of the appellant as on the date of the commission of the offence i.e. 06.05.1995 was 17 years, 11 months and 5 days and hence less than 18 years, and hence when we apply provisions of the 2000 Act, the appellant has to be treated as a juvenile, being less than 18 years of age on the date of the crime and hence entitled to get the benefit of the provisions of the 2000 Act read with Rules. 8. We are therefore inclined to affirm the order of conviction, however, the sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court is set aside and the matter is sent to the concerned Juvenile Justice Court for imposing adequate sentence. Appeal is allowed as above.

 reported in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40582    Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 556 OF 2004 Ketankumar Gopalbhai Tandel Appellant Versus State of Gujarat Respondent   J U D G M E N T K.S. Radhakrishnan, J. The question that falls for consideration in this appeal is whether or not the … Continue reading

Acquittal of murder case = It is a well settled principle of law that when the genesis and the manner of the incident is doubtful, the accused cannot be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. Inasmuch as the prosecution failed to establish the circumstances in which the appellant was alleged to have fired at the deceased, the entire story has to be rejected. 19) In the light of the above discussion, though we are unable to accept the contention relating to the right of private defence as pleaded by learned counsel for the appellant, on going through the entire prosecution case, coupled with the reasoning of the High Court accepting the claim of the other accused, i.e., A-2 and A-3, the entire prosecution case is to be rejected as unbelievable. In such circumstances, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt, accordingly, we set aside his conviction and sentence.

published in          http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40570         REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 889 OF 2009   Arshad Hussain …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Rajasthan … Respondent(s) 2     J U D G M E N T   P.Sathasivam,J. 1) This appeal has … Continue reading

Extra-ordinary delay even charge sheet not filed due to Non- Availability of original records of misappropriation – for the same offence the accused was exonerated in departmental proceedings – FIR is quashed = It is not disputed by the respondent that the departmental proceeding was initiated against the appellant with regard to identical charges made in the FIR. It was alleged that as per CAG Inquiry Report dated 15th December, 2008 Rs.4,39,617/- has been misappropriated by the appellant, all the copies of original bills and documents are available in the office of CAG and the original documents are available in the office of the Directorate, State Literacy Programme. In the departmental proceeding identical allegation was made that as per the Inquiry Officer Report, an embezzlement of Rs.4,39,617/- was found to be done by the appellant. 32. During the investigation inspite of several requests made by the Investigating Agency (Police), the records in respect of allegation were not produced. No evidence came against the appellant-Lokesh Kumar Jain, from the file of the education department. As the case was pending since long and there was no possibility of availability of record in the near future, FR No.67/2000 against the appellant was filed before the CJM, Dausa. The CJM, Dausa by his order dated 18th November, 2000 on perusal of Final Report, in exercise of power conferred under Section 156(3) Cr.PC directed the SHO, Dausa to re-investigate the case with the assistance of complainant and to procure the original records. Inspite of order dated 18th November, 2000, for nine years, records were not made available, as apparent from the Inquiry Report dated 15th December,2008. There is nothing on the record, even by way of counter affidavit filed before this Court to show that record has now been traced to make it available to the Investigating Agency. There is no probability of finding out original documents or evidence mentioned in the counter affidavit. Though, delay has been alleged on the part of the appellant, there is nothing on the record to suggest that the appellant caused delay in the matter of investigation. On the other hand, the silence on the part of the respondent regarding availability of the original record or other evidence before the Investigating Agency shows that the delay caused due to inaction on the part of the respondent. Therefore, in our view, keeping investigation pending for further period will be futile as the respondent including Directorate for the State Literacy Programme is not sure whether original records can be procured for investigation and to bring home the charges. Considering the fact that delay in the present case is caused by the respondent, the constitutional guarantee of a speedy investigation and trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is thereby violated and as the appellant has already been exonerated in the departmental proceedings for identical charges, keeping the case pending against the appellant for investigation, is unwarranted, the FIR deserves to be quashed. 34. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the FIR No.10/2000 lodged in Police Station, Dausa as against the appellant is hereby quashed.

  published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40537   REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 888 OF 2013 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(Crl.)NO.4513 OF 2012) LOKESH KUMAR JAIN … APPELLANT VERUS STATE OF RAJASTHAN … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T 1 SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Leave granted. This appeal has … Continue reading

JURISDICTION = whether, in view of clause 18 of the consignment agency agreement (for short, ‘agreement’) dated 13.10.2002, the Calcutta High Court has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the application made by the appellant under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘1996 Act’). = Conclusion: 28. For the reasons mentioned above, I agree with my learned Brother that in the jurisdiction clause of an agreement, the absence of words like “alone”, “only”, “exclusive” or “exclusive jurisdiction” is neither decisive nor does it make any material difference in deciding the jurisdiction of a court. The very existence of a jurisdiction clause in an agreement makes the intention of the parties to an agreement quite clear and it is not advisable to read such a clause in the agreement like a statute. In the present case, only the Courts in Kolkata had jurisdiction to entertain the disputes between the parties.

Published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40511 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5086 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 5595 of 2012) M/s. Swastik Gases P. Ltd. … Appellant Vs. Indian Oil Corp. Ltd. … Respondent JUDGMENT R.M. LODHA, J. Leave granted. 2. The short question that arises for consideration … Continue reading

sec.302 ,/sec. 323 I.P.C. = No grounds to convert the case from sec.302 to sec.323 of Indian penal code = The Trial Court appreciated the evidence and came to conclusion that the respondents-accused were the aggressive party and they were five in numbers and all of them were armed.= Non- explanation of injuries on accused not fatal to the prosecution always = Before the non-explanation of the injuries on the person of the accused, by the prosecution witnesses, may be held to affect the prosecution case, the Court has to be satisfied of the existence of two conditions: (i) that the injuries on the person of the accused were also of a serious nature; and (ii) that such injuries must have been caused at the time of the occurrence in question. Where the evidence is clear, cogent and creditworthy; and where the court can distinguish the truth from falsehood, the mere fact that the injuries on the person of the accused are not explained by the prosecution cannot, by itself, be the sole basis to reject the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and consequently, the whole case of the prosecution.

PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40483 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs.1425-1426 of 2007 State of Rajasthan …Appellant Versus Shiv Charan & Ors. …Respondents J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. These appeals have been preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated 20.9.2005, passed … Continue reading

AGREEMENT HOLDERS HAVE NO LOCUS STANDI TO QUESTION THE ACQUISITION – NO SUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO CHALLENGE THE ACQUISTION = “It would be relevant to mention that the argument raised about certain lands of IAS & IPA officials being selectively left-out is without any substance. This argument would only suffice if the land belonging to the IAS/IPS officials on the date on of acquisition. This is apart from the fact that certain lands would be left out in acquisition proceedings. It is relevant to mention that no land belongs to any IAS/IPS official on the date of acquisition and any subsequent purchase would not invalidate the acquisition proceedings. Thus, the finding on this aspect does not suffer from any legal infirmity.” The aforesaid factual position has not been denied on behalf of the appellants before this Court.

PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40461 Page 1 “REPORTABLE” IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4824 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 4722 OF 2012) Rajendra Nagar Adarsh Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. … Appellant Versus State of Rajasthan & Ors. … Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4825 OF 2013 (Arising out … Continue reading

Murder case = i) As per site plan (Ex.P-9) mustard crop, standing on the land in dispute was destroyed by the tractor. ii) As many as 14 member of the complainant party sustained injuries. Veerpal died as a result of injuries received by him. iii) Member of complainant party had gone to the land in question unarmed and asked the accused party not to disturb mustard crop whereas accused party had gone with lethal weapons. iv) There is chequered history of litigation between the complainant party and the accused party. v) Accused Sita Ram and Ranveer had guns whereas accused Ranveer, Yogendra and Balla had kattas (country made pistols) and they indiscriminately opened fire at the members of complainant party. vi) According to Prahlad Singh I.O. (PW.29) cross case bearing FIR No.254/99 under sections 447, 323, 341, 147 and 148 IPC was registered against the members of accused party. Ghambhir Singh (appellant) sustained simple injuries that were incorporated in injury report (Ex.D.15).” 12. The High Court, after re-appreciating the evidence on record, has rightly rejected the contention of self-defence that had been raised, and acquitted some of the convicted accused, giving them the benefit of doubt. In light of such a fact-situation, we do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the impugned judgment.

Page 1NON-REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1946 of 2009Yogendra @ Yogesh & Ors. …AppellantsVersusState of Rajasthan …RespondentJ U D G M E N TDr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.1. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgmentand order dated 3.12.2007, passed by the High Court of Rajasthan(Jaipur Bench), in Criminal Appeal No.583 of … Continue reading

Complainant/respondent submitted application for sanction of loan to OP/petitioner and deposited Rs.39,326/- as process fee. Loan was not disbursed to the complainant; hence, complainant served notice on the OP for refund of process fee, but OP did not refund process fee. Complainant alleging deficiency on the part of OP filed complaint before District Forum. Respondent/OP did not appear before District Forum. During pendency of complaint, OP refunded Rs.39,326/- to the complainant. Learned District Forum after hearing complainant allowed complaint and directed OP to pay interest @ 9% p.a. on Rs.39,326/- from 5.10.2007 till date of payment and further awarded Rs.11,000/- for mental agony and Rs.3,000/- as cost of litigation. = Perusal of record reveals that as per Annexure P-5, loan was sanctioned by the petitioner, but disbursement of loan was subject to certain conditions, as mentioned in sanction letter. It appears that respondent did not avail loan facility due to technical difficulty as mentioned by respondent in letter dated 16.5.2010. Thus, it becomes clear that there was no deficiency on the part of petitioner. After filing of the complaint, process fee though non-refundable was refunded by the petitioner to the respondent and respondent vide Annexure P-7 dated 16.5.2010 apprised petitioner that now respondent has no grievance and he assured to withdraw all legal proceedings, which he has filed, meaning thereby, it was obligatory on the part of respondent to withdraw complaint filed before District Forum after receiving process fee. It appears that respondent has not acted with clean hands before District Forum. He has also mentioned wrong fact that loan was not sanctioned.- Once the respondent received process fee in full and final satisfaction, he should have withdrawn complaint as assured and he was not entitled to receive any interest on that amount as well compensation and cost as apparently there was no deficiency on the part of petitioner

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI     REVISION PETITION NO. 4797 of 2012 (From the order dated 14.09.2012 in Appeal No. 158/2012 of Rajasthan State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Jaipur)     I.D.B.I. Bank D-24, Durlabh Niwas, Prithviraj Road, C-Scheme, Jaipur, Rajasthan through Branch Manager             …   Petitioner/Opp. Party (OP) Versus 1. Subhash Shah S/o Om Prakash Shah R/o B-5, Hari Nagar, Shastri Nagar, Jaipur, Rajasthan 2. Sarika Shah W/o Subhash Shah R/o B-5, Hari Nagar, Shastri Nagar, Jaipur, … Continue reading

Blog Stats

  • 2,865,287 hits

ADVOCATE MMMOHAN

archieves

Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 1,903 other followers

Follow advocatemmmohan on WordPress.com