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Rajendra Mal Lodha

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professional misconduct of the advocate=1. (a) Whether the Respondent-Advocate purchased the property from Jitendra Singh Bhakna as described at Page No. 5 in Sale Deed dated 3.11.99 of which the Respondent Advocate who was attesting witness? (b) Whether the Respondent Advocate deliberately filed suit for eviction in the name of Jitendra Singh Bhakna against the complainant although the respondent was the owner thereof as mentioned in the sale deed dated 3.11.99? (c) Whether the respondent advocate has been guilty of professional mis-conduct? 2. Result ? = who having knowledge purchased a disputed property with ulterior motive=The punishment for professional misconduct has twin objectives – deterrence and correction. Having

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 2293 OF 2005 DHANRAJ SINGH CHOUDAHRY Appellant (s) VERSUS NATHULAL VISHWAKARMA Respondent(s) WITH Civil Appeal NO. 4484 of 2005 J U D G M E N T R.M. Lodha, J. These two Appeals have been preferred by Advocate Dhanraj Singh Choudhary … Continue reading

allotment of one large gala/shop in the Wholesale Fruit and Vegetable Market, Vashi. =In 1985, Mumbai Agricultural Produce Market Committee (for short, ‘Market committee’) decided to shift subsidiary wholesale markets of fruit and vegetable in city of Mumbai at Vashi. In 1995, the construction of the new wholesale market at Vashi was completed. The controversy arose in respect allotment of galas/shops to the traders =We, accordingly, hold that the appellant is entitled to one small gala in the Fruit Market at Vashi. 20. Mr. Shantha Kr. Mahale, learned counsel for the Market Committee-respondent No. 1, submitted that two small galas in Fruit Market were presently available. In view of that, we direct the Market Committee (respondent No. 1) to allot one small gala to the appellant immediately and in no case later than one month from today. Upon allotment of the said gala, the appellant shall occupy allotted small gala as early as may be possible and in no case later than one month from the date of allotment. On allotment of one small gala, the appellant shall hand over vacant possession of Gala No. F-158 to the Market Committee and in any case within one month therefrom.

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 10701-10702 OF 2011 (arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No(s). 11878-11879 of 2008) HANUMANT MURLIDHAR GAVADE Appellant(s) VERSUS MUMBAI AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET & ORS. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T R.M. Lodha, J. Leave granted. 2. The dispute in … Continue reading

service matter= correction of date of birth in service register =1984 Rules were amended subsequently. By G.O. Ms. No. 383, Fin. & Plg., dated November 16, 1993, Rule 2-A was

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CIVIL APPEAL No. 6964 OF 2004 HIGH COURT OF A.P. … APPELLANT(s) Versus N. SANYASI RAO . RESPONDENT(s)   J U D G M E N T R.M. LODHA, J. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh, on the administrative side, through its Registrar … Continue reading

service matter – promotion= It needs no emphasis that a judicial officer has to be disciplined and must behave as a responsible officer. Indiscipline in the judiciary cannot be tolerated. However, as noted above, the remarks of the District Judge that the appellant was, `irresponsible and indisciplined officer who has no regard for superiors or truth’ have been expunged/substituted by the Inspecting Judge. The effect of such expunction/substitution is that the appellant cannot be considered an irresponsible or indisciplined officer on the basis of remarks recorded by the District Judge. The gravity of what has been recorded in column (3) is, thus, lost. Moreover, the root of the problem between the two senior judicial officers appears to be clash of ego. In the words of Samuel Johnson, every man is of importance to himself. The observation noted in column (3), `He never came to me in the chamber or at the residence to discuss any problem relating to Nazarat’ indicates that the District Judge was not happy with the appellant for having not given due importance to him. 18. Be that as it may, due to consideration of the remarks recorded by the District Judge and not taking into consideration that 15

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2307 OF 2011 Pratap Singh …. Appellant Versus State of U.P. & Anr. ….Respondents JUDGMENT R.M. Lodha, J. The appellant – a judicial officer – having not been promoted in the substantive vacancy to Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service (for short, `UPHJS’) … Continue reading

Specific Relief Act, 1963: s.12 – Applicability of – Specific performance of contract – Agreement of sale of a house – Representation by vendor that he was absolute owner of the house – Receipt of advance money by vendor – Vendor’s wife sought cancellation of agreement on the ground that the vendor was not absolute owner of the house and she owned half share in the house which, by virtue of s.14 of Hindu Succession Act, was received by her on death of her son – Suit for specific performance of contract by vendee – Held: Vendee cannot seek specific performance of contract of entire house, and decree for specific performance can be granted only to the extent of vendor’s share in the house – The husband under such circumstances, in the absence of any express authority from the wife could not alienate or otherwise dispose of her Streedhana property – It was not a case of the performance of a part of the contract but the whole of the contract insofar as the vendor was concerned since he had agreed to sell the property in its entirety but it later turned out that vendor had only half share in the property and his wife held the remaining half – Thus, the agreement was not binding on the vendor’s wife – s.12 was not applicable in facts of the case -s.41 of the Transfer of Property Act was also not applicable since it was not the case of the vendee that the vendor was the ostensible owner of the property – Right to invoke s.4 of the Partition Act also not available to the vendee – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.41 – Partition Act, 1893 – s.4 – Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.14 – Contract. The original defendant no.1-vendor entered into an agreement of sale with the original plaintiff-vendee in respect of the suit house for a consideration of Rs.1 lac. The vendee paid Rs.10,000/- as advance and agreed to pay remaining consideration of Rs.90,000/- by 20.6.1984 whereupon sale deed was to be executed and registered. On 24.3.1984, the defendant no.2-vendor’s wife sent a notice to the vendee as well as to the vendor calling upon them to cancel the agreement as she held half share in the property having devolved upon her on the death of her son. She also stated in the notice that she was not willing to sell her share and was ready to purchase the share of her husband-vendor. The vendee sent reply to her notice that the agreement was binding on her and notice given by her was in collusion with the vendor. His correspondence with the vendor failed and he filed the suit for specific performance of the agreement against the vendor and his wife. He prayed for a direction to them to execute the sale deed and in the alternative, he prayed for refund of the advance amount along with interest. The vendor and his wife filed separate written statements. The vendor admitted execution of agreement and receipt of advance amount of Rs. 10,000/-. The vendor further averred that he had one son, who had half share in the property; the son died intestate and after his death, his half share devolved upon his wife and, thus vendodr did not have absolute title to the property and, therefore, was unable to execute the sale deed. The trial court decreed the suit with a direction to the vendor and his wife to execute registered sale deed as per the terms of the sale agreement. Aggrieved, the vendor’s wife filed appeal before the High Court. The High Court recorded the findings that the property was ancestral property in which the deceased son had half share on whose death that share devolved upon the vendor’s wife; the vendee could not be said to have any knowledge that the vendor’s wife had half share and in the absence of any express authority from his wife, the vendor could not alienate or otherwise dispose of her share in the property. The High Court finally held that the agreement of sale although covered the entire property but as the vendor had only half share and interest in the property, the decree for specific performance could only be granted to the extent of the vendor’s share in the property. The instant appeals were filed by the legal representatives of the vendee and also by the vendor’s wife challenging the order of the High Court. =Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. It was not in dispute that the agreement was an agreement of sale and there was concluded contract in this regard between the vendor and vendee. The vendor in his reply to the notice received from the vendee had not disputed the nature of the agreement. As a matter of fact, in view of the admitted position between the parties, particularly, the vendor and the vendee about the agreement, no issue was struck by the trial court in this regard nor any argument was advanced on behalf of the vendor before the trial court that the agreement was not an agreement of sale or that the same did not tantamount to concluded contract. Insofar as the vendor was concerned, he did not challenge the judgment passed by the trial court. It was only vendor’s wife who filed appeal before the High Court. Even before the High Court, no plea was raised by the vendor’s wife or the vendor that the agreement was not a concluded contract for sale of the property. [Paras 15, 16] [784-c; 785-C-e] 2. The finding of the two courts was divergent regarding question whether the property was ancestral property or not. The trial court held that the property was not the ancestral property but the High Court on re-appraisal of the evidence did not agree with that finding. The High Court concluded that under section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the share devolved upon the mother and it would become her Streedhana property. The husband under such circumstances, in the absence of any express authority from the wife, cannot alienate or otherwise dispose of her Streedhana property. The High Court correctly considered this aspect and there is no justifiable reason to take a view different from the High Court. [Para 17] [785-F; 786-B-C] 3. As regards applicability of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the High Court rightly observed that it was not even the case of the vendee that the vendor was the ostensible owner of the property and, therefore, Section 41 has no application. In view of the findings of the High Court, the conclusion that the vendee is not entitled to seek specific performance of the agreement to the extent of half share of vendor’s wife cannot be faulted. [Para 18] [786-F, G] 4. As regards the question whether the agreement could be enforced against the vendor to the extent of his half share, the terms of the agreement would show that the vendor represented to the vendee that he was absolute owner of the property that fell to his share in the partition effected with his brothers and he did not have any male child. The vendor assured the vendee that excepting him none had got any right over the property and he would obtain the witness signatures of his daughters and get their voluntary consent letters in his favour. It is clear from the evidence that the vendee had no knowledge that vendor’s wife had half share in the property which devolved upon her on the death of her son intestate. Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 prohibits specific performance of a part of a contract except in the circumstances under sub-sections (2), (3) and (4). The circumstances mentioned in these sub-sections are exhaustive. Section 12 is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. The instant case is not a case of the performance of a part of the contract but the whole of the contract insofar as the vendor is concerned, since he had agreed to sell the property in its entirety but it later turned out that the vendor had only half share in the property and his wife held the remaining half. The agreement is binding on the vendor as it is without being fractured. As regards him, there is neither segregation or separation of contract nor creation of a new contract. In the facts and circumstances, there was no impediment for enforcement of the agreement against the vendor to the extent of his half share in the property. [Paras 19, 21, 24] [786-H; 787-A, B; 788-F-H] Kartar Singh v. Harjinder Singh & Ors. (1990) 3 SCC 517; Manzoor Ahmed Magray v. Ghulam Hassan Aram & Ors. (1999) 7 SCC 703; Abdul Rashid Khan (Dead) & Ors. v. P.A.K.A. Shahul Hamid & Ors. (2000) 10 SCC 636 – relied on. HPA International v. Bhagwandas Fateh Chand Daswani & Ors. (2004) 6 SCC 537, distinguished. 5. The High Court rightly concluded that Section 4 of the Partition Act, 1893 was not attracted. It is only after the sale deed is executed in favour of the vendee that right under Section 4 of the Partition Act, 1893 may be available. Similarly, insofar as vendee is concerned, he has right to apply for partition of the property and get the share demarcated only after the sale deed is executed in his favour. Section 44 of the T.P. Act is also of no help to the case of vendor’s wife. [Para 26] [797-F] Ghantesher Ghosh v. Madan Mohan Ghosh & Ors. (1996) 11 SCC 446; Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and Ors. v. Bibi Husn Bano and Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 492; Shanmughasundaram & Ors. v. Diravia Nadar (Dead) By LRs. & Anr. (2005) 10 SCC 728, referred to. 6. The balance sale consideration of Rs. 90,000/- was deposited by the vendee on July 18, 1991 before the trial court and was lying there for more than 19 years. Therefore, there was no merit in the contention of the vendor’s wife that it was not proved that vendee was ready and willing to purchase the property all along. The plea that the decree granted by the High Court would result in hardship since the vendor and vendor’s wife are dead and their 10 daughters had been residing in the property was also not accepted since the facts do not constitute hardship justifying denial of decree for specific performance to the extent of vendor’s half share in the property. [Paras 27, 28] [797-G; 798-D, E] Case Law Reference: (1990) 3 SCC 517 relied on Para 21 (1999) 7 SCC 703 relied on Para 22 (2000) 10 SCC 636 relied on Para 23 (2004) 6 SCC 537 distinguished Para 24 (1996) 11 SCC 446 referred to Para 25 (2005) 5 SCC 492 referred to Para 25 (2005) 10 SCC 728 referred to Para 25 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6088 of 2003. From the Judgment & Order dated 23.12.2002 of the High Cout of A.P. at Hyderabad in AN No. 287 of 1994. WITH C.A. No. 7265 of 2003. Sudha Gupta and A.T.M. Sampath for the appearing parties.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6088 OF 2003 Kammana Sambamurthy (D) By LRs. …Appellants Versus Kalipatnapu Atchutamma (D) & Ors. …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7265 OF 2003 JUDGEMENT R.M. Lodha, J. The original contesting parties are dead. They are now represented by their legal representatives. This … Continue reading

whether a specified officer empowered under Section 54(1) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 as amended by the Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 2002 (Act 16 of 2003) to compound offences has power, competence and authority, on payment of a sum of money by way of composition of 1 =We hold, as we must, that a specified officer empowered under Section 54(1) of the 1972 Act as substituted by Act 16 of 2003 to compound offences, has no power, competence or authority to order forfeiture of the seized items on composition of the offence by a person who is suspected to have committed offence against the Act. Our answer to the question framed at the outset is in the negative.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2534 OF 2011 Princl. Chief Conservator of Forest & Anr. …. Appellants Versus J.K. Johnson & Ors. ….Respondents JUDGMENT R.M. Lodha, J. The significant and important question raised in this appeal, by special leave, is : whether a specified officer empowered under … Continue reading

women are entitled to equal shares and also equally liable for joint family debts=in pending cases, the recent amendment of 2005 of Hindu succession act is applicable even after the preliminary decree is passed=whether the preliminary decree can be modified ?= In Phoolchand1, this Court has stated the legal position that C.P.C. creates no impediment for even more than one preliminary decree if after passing of the preliminary decree events have taken place necessitating the readjustment of shares as declared in the preliminary decree. The court has always power to revise the 14 It is true that final decree is always required to be in conformity with the preliminary decree but that does not mean that a preliminary decree, before the final decree is passed, cannot be altered or amended or modified by the trial court in the event of 15

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8538 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 9586 of 2010) Ganduri Koteshwaramma & Anr. …. Appellants Versus Chakiri Yanadi & Anr. ….Respondents JUDGMENT R.M. Lodha, J. Leave granted. 2. The question that arises in this appeal, by special leave, is: … Continue reading

Specific Relief Act, 1963: s.12 – Applicability of – Specific performance of contract – Agreement of sale of a house – Representation by vendor that he was absolute owner of the house – Receipt of advance money by vendor – Vendor’s wife sought cancellation of agreement on the ground that the vendor was not absolute owner of the house and she owned half share in the house which, by virtue of s.14 of Hindu Succession Act, was received by her on death of her son – Suit for specific performance of contract by vendee – Held: Vendee cannot seek specific performance of contract of entire house, and decree for specific performance can be granted only to the extent of vendor’s share in the house – The husband under such circumstances, in the absence of any express authority from the wife could not alienate or otherwise dispose of her Streedhana property – It was not a case of the performance of a part of the contract but the whole of the contract insofar as the vendor was concerned since he had agreed to sell the property in its entirety but it later turned out that vendor had only half share in the property and his wife held the remaining half – Thus, the agreement was not binding on the vendor’s wife – s.12 was not applicable in facts of the case -s.41 of the Transfer of Property Act was also not applicable since it was not the case of the vendee that the vendor was the ostensible owner of the property – Right to invoke s.4 of the Partition Act also not available to the vendee – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.41 – Partition Act, 1893 – s.4 – Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.14 – Contract. The original defendant no.1-vendor entered into an agreement of sale with the original plaintiff-vendee in respect of the suit house for a consideration of Rs.1 lac. The vendee paid Rs.10,000/- as advance and agreed to pay remaining consideration of Rs.90,000/- by 20.6.1984 whereupon sale deed was to be executed and registered. On 24.3.1984, the defendant no.2-vendor’s wife sent a notice to the vendee as well as to the vendor calling upon them to cancel the agreement as she held half share in the property having devolved upon her on the death of her son. She also stated in the notice that she was not willing to sell her share and was ready to purchase the share of her husband-vendor. The vendee sent reply to her notice that the agreement was binding on her and notice given by her was in collusion with the vendor. His correspondence with the vendor failed and he filed the suit for specific performance of the agreement against the vendor and his wife. He prayed for a direction to them to execute the sale deed and in the alternative, he prayed for refund of the advance amount along with interest. The vendor and his wife filed separate written statements. The vendor admitted execution of agreement and receipt of advance amount of Rs. 10,000/-. The vendor further averred that he had one son, who had half share in the property; the son died intestate and after his death, his half share devolved upon his wife and, thus vendodr did not have absolute title to the property and, therefore, was unable to execute the sale deed. The trial court decreed the suit with a direction to the vendor and his wife to execute registered sale deed as per the terms of the sale agreement. Aggrieved, the vendor’s wife filed appeal before the High Court. The High Court recorded the findings that the property was ancestral property in which the deceased son had half share on whose death that share devolved upon the vendor’s wife; the vendee could not be said to have any knowledge that the vendor’s wife had half share and in the absence of any express authority from his wife, the vendor could not alienate or otherwise dispose of her share in the property. The High Court finally held that the agreement of sale although covered the entire property but as the vendor had only half share and interest in the property, the decree for specific performance could only be granted to the extent of the vendor’s share in the property. The instant appeals were filed by the legal representatives of the vendee and also by the vendor’s wife challenging the order of the High Court.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6088 OF 2003 Kammana Sambamurthy (D) By LRs. …Appellants Versus Kalipatnapu Atchutamma (D) & Ors. …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7265 OF 2003 JUDGEMENT R.M. Lodha, J. The original contesting parties are dead. They are now represented by their legal representatives. This … Continue reading

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