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rajinder singh

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Section 106,113 A,113 B of Evidence Act, 498 A 304 B and 210 /34 = When prosecution proved death with in 7 years due to dowry harassment, the burden shift on accused to prove his innocence, else court can draw presumption under sec. 113 B of Evidence Act = Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not relieve the burden of prosecution to prove guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but where the prosecution has succeeded to prove the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts and the accused by virtue of special knowledge regarding such facts fail to offer any explanation then the Court can draw a different inference. 16. The ingredients necessary for application of Section 304­B IPC and the applicability of Section 113­B of the Evidence Act was discussed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Jaggu Ram, (2008)12 SCC 51. In the said case, this Court held as follows: “11.The ingredients necessary for the application of Section 304­B IPC are: 1. that the death of a woman has been caused by burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances; 2. that such death has been caused or has occurred within seven years of her marriage; and 3. that soon before her death the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband in connection with any demand for dowry. 12. Section 113­B of the Evidence Act lays down that if soon before her death a woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with any demand for dowry by the person who is accused of causing her death then the court shall presume that such person has caused the dowry death. The presumption under Section 113­B is a presumption of law and once the prosecution establishes the essential ingredients mentioned therein it becomes the duty of the court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. 13. A conjoint reading of Section 304­B IPC and Section 113­B, Evidence Act shows that in order to prove the charge of dowry death, prosecution has to establish that the victim died within 7 years of marriage and she was subjected to cruelty or harassment soon before her death and such cruelty or harassment was for dowry. The expression “soon before her death” has not been defined in either of the statutes. Therefore, in each case the court has to analyse the facts and circumstances leading to the death of the victim and decide whether there is any proximate connection between the demand of dowry, the act of cruelty or harassment and the death.” In the present case, the prosecution proved that the death of Santosh Kaur has occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances. Such death has occurred within a period of 9 months of her marriage i.e. much before seven years. The statements of PW­2 and PW­3 are trust­worthy and they stated that Santosh Kaur was subjected to harassment by her husband and other accused relatives in connection with demand for dowry just prior to death. The prosecution having established essential ingredients, it becomes the duty of the Court to raise a presumption that the accused caused dowry death. In the present case, the accused has failed to explain as to why he was in a hurry to cremate the deceased in the early morning of 24th January, 1993 while she died in the mid night of 23rd/24th January, 1993 i.e. within few hours. The village of deceased’s parents was just 17­18kms far from the village of the accused but the reason as to why they were not informed about the incident on the same day and why the accused had not waited for them to come is not explained. The accused has also failed to explain as to why according to the F.S.L. Report, an Organo Phosphorus Pesticide was found in the vomiting of the deceased. Therefore, the Trial Court rightly drew an inference that the accused­appellants were guilty of the offence for which they were charge.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40516 Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.14 OF 2007 RAJINDER SINGH …APPELLANT Versus STATE OF HARYANA     …RESPONDENTS With CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.15 OF 2007 J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. These two appeals are directed against  the common judgment dated 9th December, 2005 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in two separate Criminal Appeal Nos. 392­SB of 1995 and 151­SB of 1995, whereby the learned Single Judge   dismissed   the   appeals   preferred   by   the   accused and affirmed the conviction and sentence awarded by the Additional Session Judge, Yamuna Nagar at Jagadhri. 2.The   appellants   were   tried   for   offences   under Sections   498­A  … Continue reading

claimants are entitled to same compensation fixed already on relied judgement in the absence of negative grounds= in Balbir Singh’s case the value of the land was fixed to a sum of Rs.50,000/- per bigha. We are, therefore, of the view that while every other reasoning of the Division Bench in adopting the value, which was fixed in Balbir Singh’s case was justified, there is no need to deduct any amount from the said value, in as much as the exemplar relied upon by the Division Bench in Balbir Singh’s case, were all sale deeds pertaining to the period 18.01.1982 to 22.07.1983 i.e., prior to the very first notification issued in respect of the present acquisition of all the four villages viz., 01.08.1983, which notification pertains to the lands belonging to the appellants which were situated in Sahibabad Daulatpur village. = The appeals stand partly allowed by enhancing the compensation from Rs.42,000/- per bigha as determined by the Division Bench of the High Court to a sum of Rs.50,000/- per bigha, in respect of both categories of land. With the above modification in the rate of land value, the appeals stand partly allowed. Needless to add that appellants would be entitled for consequential benefits as per the law, if any.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40474 Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.949 OF 2005 Premwati …. Appellant VERSUS Union of India & Ors. ….Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL NO.2443 OF 2005 Rajinder Singh (D) by Lrs. …. Appellants VERSUS Delhi College of Engineering ….Respondent J U D G M E N T … Continue reading

Court Fees Act, 1870 – s. 7(iv)(c) and (v) – Court fee – Computation of – In suits for a declaratory decree and consequential benefits – Filing of civil suit – Prayer for declaration that sale deed not binding on co- parcenary and for joint possession and court fee paid u/s. 7(iv)(c) – Courts below holding that the prayer was to seek cancellation of sale deeds and thus, court fee to be paid on the sale consideration mentioned in sale deeds – On appeal, held: Prayer was not for cancellation of sale deed but for a declaration that sale deed not binding on co-parcenary and for joint possession – Plaintiff was non-executant of sale deed – Thus, court fee was computable u/s. 7(iv)(c) – Orders of courts below set aside. The question which arose for consideration in these appeals is as to what is the court fee payable in regard to the prayer for a declaration that the sale deeds were void and not `binding on the co-parcenary’, and for the consequential relief of joint possession and injunction.= Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 Where the executant of a deed wants it to be annulled, he has to seek cancellation of the deed. But if a non-executant seeks annulment of a deed, he has to seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, or non-est, or illegal or that it is not binding on him. There is a difference between a prayer for cancellation and declaration in regard to a deed of transfer/conveyance. In essence in both the cases parties may be suing to have the deed set aside or declared as non-binding. But the form is different and court fee is also different. If the executant of the deed seeks cancellation of the deed, he has to pay ad-valorem court fee on the consideration stated in the sale deed. If the non-executant is in possession and sues for a declaration that the deed is null or void and does not bind him or his share, he has to merely pay a fixed court fee of Rs. 19.50 under Article 17(iii) of Second Schedule of the Court Fees Act, 1870. But if the non-executant is not in possession, and he seeks not only a declaration that the sale deed is invalid, but also the consequential relief of possession, he has to pay an ad-valorem court fee as provided under section 7(iv)(c) of the Act. Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act provides that in suits for a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the court fee shall be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The proviso thereto makes it clear that where the suit for declaratory decree with consequential relief is with reference to any property, such valuation shall not be less than the value of the property calculated in the manner provided for by clause (v) of section 7. [Para 6] 1.2. In the instant case, there is no prayer for cancellation of the sale deeds. The prayer is for a declaration that the deeds do not bind the “co- parcenery” and for joint possession. The plaintiff in the suit was not the executant of the sale deeds. Therefore, the court fee was computable under section 7(iv)(c) of the Act. The trial court and the High Court were not justified in holding that the effect of the prayer was to seek cancellation of the sale deeds and therefore, court fee had to be paid on the sale consideration mentioned in the sale deeds. Thus, the orders of the trial court and the High Court directing payment of court fee on the sale consideration under the sale deeds are set aside and trial court is directed to calculate the court fee in accordance with section 7(iv)(c) read with section 7(v) of the Act. [Paras 7 and 8] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2811-2813 of 2010. From the Judgment AND Order dated 19.3.2007 order dated 11.2.2008 and 16.5.2008 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CR No. 1482/2007 and RA No. 35 CII/2007 in Civil Revision No. 1482/2007 and C.M. No. #9445-C-II/2008 in C.M.#7001-C-II/2008 in R.A. 35-C-II/2007 in Civil Reivision #1482/2007. Suhrid Singh appellant in person. Labh Singh Bhangu and Madhu Moolchandani for the Respondent.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2811-2813 OF 2010 [Arising out of SLP [C] Nos.6745-47/2009] Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh … Appellant Vs. Randhir Singh & Ors. … Respondents J U D G M E N T R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J. Leave granted. The appellant filed a suit (Case No.381/2007) … Continue reading

the respondent has to be held guilty of medical negligence/deficiency in service at least on four counts. The respondent did not pay any attention to the patient’s persistent complaints of pain (as he himself admitted in his referral note for ERCP) till she presented with visible signs of jaundice and thus unduly delayed the diagnostic tests that were taken only on 02.10.2000. Secondly, having conducted an “exploratory” laparotomy on 04.10.2000, he failed to even attempt locating the cause of the bile leakage suffered by the patient though all standard literature (including that cited by the respondent) pointed to cystic duct stump leak as one of the most frequent causes of such leakage – such a situation was particularly likely in this case because the cholecystectomy was proceeded with by the respondent despite his inability to clearly separate the cystic duct and the cystic artery before their dissection and ligature. Further, after conducting the laparotomy, he delayed referring the patient for ERCP for no rhyme or reason though all standard literature (and hence the corpus of knowledge and practice based thereon expected of an ordinary medical practitioner of the relevant specialty) mandated such an investigation at the earliest because that is the most widely recommended way of both diagnosing and, in some situations also treating, bile anatomy injury/obstruction evidenced by either stricture/obstruction in the biliary tree or fistular leakage of bile flow. The respondent himself knew of this, according to his repeated admissions. It is really strange that this failure could be pleaded as an error of judgment. A physician can commit an error of judgment in a case of more than one options of (or, approaches to) diagnosis and/or treatment of a patient’s condition and he honestly believing one of them to be more appropriate than the other/s for that patient, though in retrospect that may turn out to be not so appropriate or advantageous to the patient. Here, in this case, the respondnet knew full well that the patient must undergo ERCP (or, an equivalent diagnostic or diagnostic-cum-therapeutic procedure), which he was not professionally competent to conduct. Why he delayed this reference to a qualified gastro-enterologist/endoscopist, or, in this case to the PGI, when he had not even been able to identify the patient’s biliary anatomy injury, leave alone repair it, may be a ‘judgment’ of sorts of this particualr surgeon but certainly not an error of judgment that an average informed and careful surgeon would make. Finally, there is incontrovertible evidence in the form of the signed consent documents that the respondent did not discharge the duty of disclosure in case of either surgery (cholecystectomy or laparotomy) as required of him under the law governing consent. We cannot also overlook the fact that this respondent’s recording of important treatment records could be interpreted to suggest an attempt at “improving” his case but perhaps that was not deliberate. It is unfortunate that the medical board did not go into these questions with the seriousness expected of an independent body of experts. However, there is no evidence at all that the acts of the respondent /OP were the proximate cause of Reeta’s eventual death and the respondent/OP cannot be held to account for that. 20. That brings us to the question of quantum of compensation. The complainant asked for Rs. 8.25 lakh (consisting of Rs. 5 lakh towards compensation for loss/damage due to medical negligence, Rs. 1.25 lakh for reimbursement of medical expenses and Rs. 2 lakh towards mental agony), with interest thereon @ 24% from the date of dispute till payment and costs of Rs. 5,000/-. In the case of “Lata Wadhwa & Others v State of Bihar & Others [(2001) 8 SCC 197], the Apex Court had taken the value of earnings of a simple housewife at Rs. 36,000/- p.m. while going into the question of compensation on account of deaths of several people that occurred in an accident in 1989. Smt. Reeta Dogra was also a simple housewife who died in 2000. Considering only the inflation since 1989, it would be reasonable to accept the sum of Rs. 10,000/- p.m. as the equivalent earning in December 2000. Applying the deduction of 1/3rd towards personal maintenance expenses, the contribution would work out to Rs. 80,000/- approx. per annum. Reeta was 46 at the time of her death and hence a multiplier of even 10 would lead to a compensation amount of Rs.8 lakh, which would have been payable in 2001 on which interest @ 9% per annum since 2001 would not be unreasonable. However, since we cannot attribute Reeta’s death solely to the acts of negligence on the part of the respondent/OP, the interest of equity would be met if his liability for compensation were restricted to Rs.7 lakh. 21. As a result, the appeal is partly allowed and the order of the State Commission is set aside. The respondent is directed to pay to the appellant/complainant the sum of Rs.7 lakh as consolidated compensation, including cost, within four weeks from the date of this order, failing which the sum would be liable to be paid with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of this order till realisation.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI FIRST APPEAL No. 248 OF 2002 (From the order dated 27.03.2002 of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Union Territory, Chandigarh in Complaint Case no. 6 of 2001) Rajinder Singh Dogra 3152, Sector 28 D                                                               Appellant Chandigarh versus Dr. P.N. Gupta P. N. Urology and Surgical Centre House no. 1359, … Continue reading

the recruitment process for the post of a Homoeopathic Officer for a Gram Panchayat Level Dispensary situated at Jhilu–I Gram Panchayat under Mongalkote Block in the district of Burdwan= the Guidelines for engagement of part-time Homoeopathic doctors in the Gram Panchayat Level Dispensaries are not related to the Guidelines for engagement of ‘AYUSH’ doctors for Gram Panchayat Level Dispensaries which falls under the National Rural Health Mission. As such, the ad-interim prayer of the petitioner is not entertained since this Court is, prima facie, satisfied that the Guidelines for recruitment of ‘AYUSH’ doctors is under a separate Scheme altogether which has no rational nexus with the Guidelines as contained in the notification dated 22nd February, 2010

1 43 11.01.2012 pg. WP No. 22635 of 2011 Dr. Abdul Basar Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. Mr. Subir Sanyal Mr. Saikat Banerjee Md. Hasanuz Zaman … For the petitioner Mr. Ram Mohan Pal … For the State Supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner in Court today be kept on record. The petitioner … Continue reading

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