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Tamil Evangelical Lutheran Church (TELC) – is not a society – Apex court held that when it is not a society the question of exemption and not to exemption from application of Societies Registration Act – does not arise – all the officers and all the court below failed to take notice of the same under sec. 4 of the Act – Apex court held that In our opinion, the expression “Societies” (registered under the 1860 Act) occurring in Section 53 must be understood to mean only those Societies which do not fall under the exemption granted under Section 4(3) of the Act. Unless the expression “Societies” occurring under Section 53 of the Act is understood to mean Societies other than those whose object is promotion of religion, atheletics or sports, the Act would result in creation of two classes of Societies having the same object, but one class is subjected to the discipline of the Act and the other class exempted from it – all other things being equal except the accident of an existing Society on the date of the Act also happens to be a Society registered under the 1860 Act. Such an interpretation which would be in violation of Article 14 is certainly required to be avoided. There can neither be any reasonable basis for such classification nor any purpose to be achieved by such classification. Therefore, the Act is not applicable to TELC at all. Looked at in the abovementioned background of the statutory scheme, we are of the opinion that the entire litigation between the parties herein is without any basis in law. It resulted in wastage of time of the judiciary as well as the administration. Apparently neither of the parties nor the administration had the time to examine or inclination to examine the scheme of the 1975 Act. We are sorry to say, even the judiciary (Bar & Bench) did not do any better. In view of our above conclusion, it is really not necessary for us to examine various submissions made in this appeal by both the parties as all the submissions proceeded on the assumption that TELC is a Society governed by the provisions of the Act. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed. The judgment under appeal is set- aside. The second respondent, if he still has any legally tenable grievance de hors the 1975 Act, is free to pursue such remedy to him under the law.= CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8458 OF 2014 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.9592 of 2012) H.A. Martin & Others …Appellants Versus Moses Thambi Pillai & Others …Respondents = 2014 – Sept. Month – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41880

Tamil Evangelical Lutheran Church (TELC) – is not a society – Apex court held that when it is not a society the question of exemption and not to exemption from application of Societies Registration Act – does not arise – all the officers and all the court below failed to take notice of the same … Continue reading

Deposit of Title Deeds – Registration when requires ? – Mutation of entry in Revenue records about mortgage when arises = STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. Vs. NAVIR SINGH & ANR published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40878

Mutation of entry of deposit of title deeds in revenue records when not covered by State Govt.     Notification , can not be changed;   As per sec.59 of T.P.Act Deposit of title deeds evidenced with separate memorandum requires no Registration  =       Deposit of title deeds when required to be registered … Continue reading

Sec.6, 33,35,38, Art. 23,47 – A of Schedule 1-A of the Stamp Act – admissibility of a document- an agreement of sale= OMPRAKASH Vs. LAXMINARAYAN & ORS. published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40861

Sec.6, 33,35,38, Art. 23,47 – A of Schedule 1-A of the  Stamp  Act – admissibility of a document-     an agreement of sale with delivery of possession scribed on Rs.50/- only – admissible only on payment of stamp duty and penalty – irrespective of pleadings.        In  the  present  case,  an     … Continue reading

Section 26 of Specific Relief Act, 1963: Section 26 of the Special Relief Act 1963 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’) provides for rectification of instruments, where through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties, an instrument in writing does not express the real intention, then the parties may apply for rectification. However, clause 4 thereof, provides that such a relief cannot be granted by the court, unless it is specifically claimed. -Undue influence – Section 16 of Contract Act, 1872: Section 16 of the Contract Act provides that a contract is said to be induced by “undue influence” where the relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other, and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other. “The doctrine of ‘undue influence’ under the common law was evolved by the Courts in England for granting protection against transactions procured by the exercise of insidious forms of influence spiritual and temporal. The doctrine applies to acts of bounty as well as to other transactions in which one party by exercising his position of dominance obtains an unfair advantage over another. The Indian enactment is founded substantially on the rules of English common law. The first sub-section of S.16 lays down the principle in general terms. By sub-section (2) a presumption arises that a person shall be deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of another if the conditions set out therein are fulfilled. Sub-section (3) lays down the conditions for raising a rebuttable presumption that a transaction is procured by the exercise of undue influence. The reason for the rule in the third sub-section is that a person who has obtained an advantage over another by dominating his will may also remain in a position to suppress the requisite evidence in support of the plea of undue influence.”- when fraud, mis-representation or undue influence is alleged by a party in a suit, normally, the burden is on him to prove such fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation. But, when a person is in a fiduciary relationship with another and the latter is in a position of active confidence the burden of proving the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence is upon the person in the dominating position, he has to prove that there was fair play in the transaction and that the apparent is the real, in other words that the transaction is genuine and bona fide. In such a case the burden of proving the good faith of the transaction is thrown upon the dominant party, that is to say, the party who is in a position of active confidence.- it is crystal clear that even though the document may be admissible, still its contents have to be proved and in the instant case, as the appellant did not examine either the attesting witnesses of the document, nor proved its contents, no fault can be found with the judgment impugned before us. Section 26 of the Act, provides for rectification of a document if the parties feel that they have committed any mistake. Also, it was only, the father of the parties who could have sought rectification of the deed. Mere rectification by parties herein does not take the case within the ambit of Section 26 of the Act. Taking note of the statutory provisions of Section 16 of the Contract Act and the parameters laid down by this Court for application of doctrine on undue influence, the High Court has reached a correct conclusion. In view of the above, we reached the following inescapable conclusions: i) Neither of the party has examined the attesting witness to document Ex.A-3. As such a witness could have explained the conduct of the parties and deposed as to who had prepared the document Ex.A-3. ii) It is evident from the language of the deed (Ex.A-3) that it has been prepared either by a lawyer or a deed writer. iii) The said document (Ex.A-3) does not bear either the signature, or the address of the scribe. The appellant has also not examined the scribe, nor has he disclosed who such person was. This would have revealed the correct position with respect to whether the respondent no.1 had signed blank papers, or whether she had come to him for the execution of the document with the attesting witnesses and appellant. Additionally, the scribe could have explained who had bought the non judicial stamp paper for the document Ex. A-3. iv) The consideration for executing document (Ex.A-3) seems to be the redemption of the property mortgaged jointly by both the parties, to one Advocate Krishnaswamy, with whom the deeds of title Ex.A1 and Ex.A2 had been kept as security. The said mortgagee has not been examined by the appellant to show as to whether the respondent No.1 22Page 23 was also a party to the mortgage and who had placed the title deed of her property with him. v) In his examination-in-chief, the appellant had made a false statement that he was not made aware of the settlement deed Ex.A-1 till 26th June of 1982, as it was given to him by his mother on that date before her death. Such a statement stands completely falsified, as the document Ex.A-1 reveals, that he had been put in possession by his father, with the permission of respondent No.1 , as the property in Door No.23 had been given to her and it was made clear that the respondent No .1 had absolute right of enjoyment to the said property. vi) Document Ex. B3 dated 29th July 1983 is subsequent to document Ex.A-6, wherein settlor Mr. Sandy had written to respondent No.1 that he had given Door No.23 to her. Thus, the settlor never intended otherwise. vii) The document Ex.A3 shows that the mistake was discovered in the last week of May 1982. So it was agreed to rectify the error, therefore the parties undertook the same as a rectification under Section 26 of the Act. In the written statement filed by the appellant, in the suit filed by the respondent No.1 , Paragraph no. 7 & 9 refers to the mistake and also, the rectification. Thus, the document Ex.A-3 cannot be read as an “agreement to exchange.” It can be read only as a 23Page 24 rectification deed, which could have been done only by the settlor and not by the contesting parties. viii) Considering the respective area of the properties bearing nos.22 and 23, the contract can definitely be held “unconscionable”. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that appeals are devoid of any merit. The same are accordingly dismissed. No costs. CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2184-2185 OF 2004 These appeals are squarely covered by the aforesaid decision in the main matters i.e. C.A No. 2178-2179 of 2004. The same are, accordingly, dismissed.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2178-2179 OF 2004 Joseph John Peter Sandy …Appellant Versus Veronica Thomas Rajkumar & Anr. …Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2184-2185 OF 2004 J U D G M E N T Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. These appeals have been preferred … Continue reading

Registration Act, 1908: SS. 17(1)(b) & 49: Partition- Document containing list of properties allotted to parties- Recital of past events-Registration whether necessary- Whether admissible in evidence to prove factum of partition. % = The parties are decendants of a common ancestor, who had two sons. These two branches of the family had joint properties, both agricultural and residential. The agricultural land was partitioned in 1955 and the names of the respective parties were duly mutated in the revenue records. This was followed by a partition of their residential properties including the house, ghers, ghetwars etc. The factum of partition was embodied in the memorandum of partition Exh. B-12 dated August 3, 1955 and bears the thumb impressions and signatures of the heads of the families, and later confirmed in the settlement dated January 31, 1971, Exh. P-1 written in the presence of a number of villagers. A dispute arose between the parties in February, 1971 when the respondents were sought to be prevented by the appellants from raising a boundary wall to a plot of land that had fallen to their share. In proceedings under s. 145 Cr. P.C., 1898, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate held that the father of the appellants was in actual possession of the disputed piece of land. In revision the Sessions Judge agreed with the conclusion arrived at by the Magistrate. On further revision the High Court affirmed the findings reached by the courts below. In a suit for declaration brought by respondents a Single Judge of the High Court came to the conclusion that the disputed plot belonged to them and it had fallen to their share in the partition of 1955 and later confirmed in the settlement dated 31st January, 1971. He construed the document Exh. p-12 to be a memorandum of family arrangement and not an instrument of partition requiring registration and therefore admissible in evidence under the proviso to s. 49 of the Act for a collateral purpose of showing nature of possession. In a Letters Patent appeal a Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the reasoning and 1107 conclusion arrived at by the Single Judge. In the appeal by special leave, it was contended for the appellants that the document Exh. P-12 does not contain any recital of a prior, completed partition but on its terms embodies a decision which is to be the sole repository of the right and title of the parties i.e. according to which partition by metes and bounds had to be effected. It, therefore, required registration under s. 17 of the Registration Act. Dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1. Partition, unlike the sale or transfer which consists in its essence of a single act, is a continuing state of facts. It does not require any formality, and therefore if parties actually divide their estate and agree to hold in severalty, there is an end of the matter. [1115B- C] 2. If the arrangement of compromise is one under which a person having an absolute title to the property transfers his title in some of the items thereof to the others, the formalities prescribed by law have to be complied with, since the transferees derive their respective title through the transferor. If, on the other hand, the parties set up competing titles and the differences are resolved by the compromise, there is no question of one deriving title from the other, and therefore the arrangement does not fall within the mischief of s. 17 read with s. 49 of the Registration Act as no interest in property is created or declared by the document for the first time. it is assumed that the title had always resided in him or her so far as the property falling to his or her share is concerned and therefore no conveyance is necessary. [1116C-E] Sahu Madho Das & Ors. v. Pandit Mukand Ram & Anr., [1955] 2 SCR 22; Khunni Lal v. Gobind Krishna Narain & Anr., LR (1911) 38 IA 87 and Lalla Oudh Behari Lall v. Mewa Koonwar, [1868] 3 Agra HC 82 at p. 84 refereed to. In the instant case, admittedly there was a partition by metes and bounds of the agricultural lands effected in the year 1955 and the shares allotted to the two branches were separately mutated in the revenue records. There was thus a disruption of joint status. All that remained was the partition of the ancestral residential house called rihaishi, the smaller house called baithak and ghers/ghetwars. The document Exh. P-12 does not effect a partition but merely records the nature of the arrangement arrived at as regards the division of the remaining property. The parties set out competing claims to the properties and there 1108 was an adjustment of the rights of the parties. The compromise was on the footing that there was an antecedent title of the parties to the properties and the settlement acknowledged and defined title of each of the parties. The opening words of the document are: ‘Today after discussion it has been mutually agreed and decided that …’ what follows is a list of properties allotted to the respective parties. From these words it is quite obvious that the document contains the recital of the past events and does not itself embody the expression of will necessary to effect the change in the legal relation contemplated. It cannot, therefore, be construed to be an instrument of partition. [1116F-G; 1114C-D] Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act lays down that a document for which registration is compulsory should, by its own force, operate or purport to operate to create or declare some rights in immovable property. Therefore, a mere recital of what has already taken place could not be held to declare any right and there would be no necessity of registering such a document. [1113H; 1114A] Rajangam Ayyar v. Rajangam Ayyar, LR (1923) 69 IA 123 and Nani Bai v. Gita Bai, AIR (1958) SC 706 referred to. 3. A document though unregistered can, however, be looked into under the proviso to s. 49 of the Act which allows documents which would otherwise be excluded, to be used as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument, for the limited purpose of establishing a severance in status, though that severance would ultimately affect the nature of the possession held by the members of the separated family as co-tenants. The document Exh. P-12 can be used for the limited and collateral purpose of showing that the subsequent division of the properties allotted was in pursuance of the original intention to divide. [1116G-H; 1117A] Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal, LR (1919) 46 IA 285 referred to. 4. In any view, the document Exh. P-12 is a mere list of properties allotted to the shares of the parties. It merely contains the recital of past events. It is, therefore, admissible in evidence. [1117B] Narayan Sakharam Patil v. Cooperative Central Bank, Malkapur & Ors., ILR (1938) Nag. 604; Bageshwari Charan Singh v. Jagarnath Kuari, LR (1932) 59 IA 130; Subramanian v. Lutchman, LR (1923) 15 IA 77; Ganpat Gangaji Patil v. Namdeo Bhagwanji Patil & Ors., ILR 1109 (1942) Nag. 73 and Mulla’s Registration Act, 8th Edn. pp. 54-57 referred to. =1988 AIR 881, 1988( 2 )SCR1106, , 1988( 1 )SCALE391 ,

PETITIONER: ROSHAN SINGH & ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: ZILE SINGH & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT24/02/1988 BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) RAY, B.C. (J) CITATION: 1988 AIR 881 1988 SCR (2)1106 1988 SCALE (1)391 ACT: Registration Act, 1908: SS. 17(1)(b) & 49: Partition- Document containing list of properties allotted to parties- Recital of past … Continue reading

Registration Act (16 of 1908), s. 17(1) (c)-Partnership assets consisting of immovable property-Relinquishment by one partner of his share-Deed of relinquishment if should be registered. =The members of two Joint Hindu families (Appellants and Respondents) entered into partnership for carrying on business. The members of one family filed a suit in 1949 for dissolution of the partnership and the taking of accounts. The members of the second family raised the defence that the partnership was dissolved even in 1936 and that accounts were then settled between the two families. In support of that plea they relied upon an unregistered document, which showed that the partnership had come to an end. It was contended by the appellants-plaintiffs, that since the partnership assets included immovable property and the document recorded the relinquishment by the members 6f the plaintifffamily of their interest in those assets, the document was compulsorily registerable under s. 17(1)(c) of the Registration Act, 1908; and that as it was not registered, it was inadmissible in evidence to prove the dissolution as well as the settlement of accounts. HELD : The document only records the fact that the partnership had come to an end. It cannot be said to convey any immovable property by a partner to another, expressly or by necessary implication, nor is there any express reference to any immovable property, except a recital of a fact which had taken place earlier. Therefore, the unregistered deed of release by one family of its share in the partnership was admissible in evidence, even though the partnership owned immovable property. [410 D. E] The interest of a partner in partnership assets comprising of movable as well as immovable property should be treated only as movable property. His right during the insistence of the partnership is to get his share of the profits from time to time, as may be agreed upon among the partners, and his right after the dissolution of the partnership, or with his retirement from, the partnership, is only to receive e the money value of his share in the net partnership assets as on the date of dissolution or retirement, after a deduction of Liabilities and prior charges. [406 E; 407 F-G) Case law reviewed. =1966 AIR 1300, 1966( 3 )SCR 400, , ,

PETITIONER: ADDANKI NARAYANAPPA & ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: BHASKARA KRISHTAPPA AND 13 ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/01/1966 BENCH: MUDHOLKAR, J.R. BENCH: MUDHOLKAR, J.R. SARKAR, A.K. WANCHOO, K.N. CITATION: 1966 AIR 1300 1966 SCR (3) 400 CITATOR INFO : F 1967 SC 401 (9) RF 1968 SC 676 (6) D 1974 SC1066 (4,5) R 1977 SC 489 … Continue reading

Constitution of India-Articles 25 and 26-Societies Registration Act, 1860-Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975-Sections 44 and 53-Suit filed before High Court to declare elections of a Society as null and void-Advocate Commissioner appointed by the High Court held elections and submitted a Report stating that the Society has become defunct-High Court set aside the elections on that ground-Correctness of-Held, State Act provides for mechanism for removal of a defunct Society from the Register of Societies and dissolve the registered Society-It is for the authorities under the Act and not the High Court to look into whether a Society has become defunct-Hence, setting aside the elections on the ground that the Society has become defunct is not valid. A Church, initially registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, came to be governed under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975. The Church runs a large number of schools and hospitals. A suit was filed against the Church before High Court to declare the elections conducted by its Society as null and void. The High Court appointed an Advocate Commissioner to hold the elections. The Commissioner conducted the elections and submitted a report to the High Court stating that the Society has become defunct. The High Court, on the basis of the report, gave directions to the elected members of the Society to apply for fresh registration with the Registrar of Societies. On non-compliance of the directions, the High Court set aside the elections of the Society. Appellant and one another, who were elected members, filed an application for impleading them as parties to the suit before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the application on the ground that the elections have already been declared null and void. The High Court appointed an Administrator for managing the Society. In appeal to this Court, the appellants contended that the High Court erred in declaring the elections null and void since the Registrar of Societies appointed under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 has sufficient powers to inquire into the affairs of a Society and cancel registration or order winding up or remove defunct societies from the Register; that the elections, conducted under the supervision of the Advocate Commissioner, have not been held to be unfair; that the order passed by the High Court on the basis of the purported consent of other elected members, without making them as parties, is a nullity; that the appointment of the Administrator was beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court; and that it violated the fundamental rights of the appellants under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. =Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. The Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 provides for the mode and manner in which registration of a society is to be cancelled and winding up of a society and removal of a defunct registered society from the registers maintained by the Inspector General of Registration. The statutory authority under the Act abdicated itself of its statutory functions. It was for the statutory authorities to take recourse to such actions as are provided for in the Act and Rules framed thereunder. In the event, the Society became defunct or other statutory requirements were not complied with by the members of the Society, penal measures could have been taken but in no situation the elections of the office bearers could have been set aside. [221-e, f; 226-a, b, c, d, e] 1.2. Right to contest an election of an office bearer of the Society is a statutory right of the member thereof. Such a right also exists under the bye-laws of the society. Once a valid election was held, the High Court could not have directed setting aside of an election only on the purported ground that it became defunct. The High Court in a pending suit could not have done so. It should have relegated the parties to take recourse to such remedies as are available in law for questioning the validity of the election before the appropriate forum. [226-e-f; 227-d-e] Board of Control for Cricket in India and Anr. v. Netaji Cricket Club and Ors., [2005] 4 SCC 741, referred to. 1.3. Keeping in view the interest of the general public, the Court can oversee its functions in case of mismanagement of charitable organisations, although run by minorities. The rights under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India are not absolute and unfettered. The right to manage does not carry with it a right to mismanage. [227-h; 228-a] Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and Anr. v. C.K. Rajan and Ors., [2003] 7 SCC 546, referred to. V. Giri, Ajay K. Jain, Dileep Pillai, Sajith P., M.P. Vinod, Dr. A. Francis Julian, Ashwani Bhardwaj, A. Mariarputham, Aruna Mathur and Mini N. Nair (for M/s. Arputham Aruna & Co.) for the Appellants. T.L.V. Iyer, S. Rajappa, Sumit Kumar, M.A. Chinnasamy and Ambrish Kumar for the Respondents.=2007 AIR 1337, 2006(6 )Suppl.SCR219 , 2006(11 )SCC624 , 2006(9 )SCALE245 , 2006(12 )JT432

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 4123 of 2006 PETITIONER: I. Nelson & Anr. RESPONDENT: Kallayam Pastorate & Ors. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/09/2006 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Dalveer Bhandari JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 26954-26969/2005) S.B. Sinha, J. Leave granted. The Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church (‘the Church’, … Continue reading

A.P.Society registration Act =The A.P. Legislature enacted the new Act in the year 2001. Section 31 of the new Act repeals the Societies Registration Act 1960. However, sub-section (2) thereof makes it clear that any steps taken under the old Act shall be deemed to have been taken under the new enactment= The society was registered about half a century ago. Its affairs were being administered by the managing committee, comprising of various office bearers, including President Treasurer and Secretary. The record discloses that the 2nd respondent and the father of the 3rd respondent contributed a sum of Rs.25,000/-, which was quite a considerable amount at that time and that the same was used in acquiring properties for the establishment of a Degree College at Markapur. As a measure of recognition of their generosity, the members resolved to appoint them as Presidents in terms of three years each with hereditary rights. This arrangement was incorporated in bye-law 9(b). The petitioner or for that matter, anyone did not raise objection for the past five decades. .=What Section 14 mandates is an election to the committee comprising of not less than three members. At any rate, the arrangement that was in existence under the old enactment is saved under sub- section (2) of Section 32. The trial Court has taken note of these developments and dismissed the S.R.O.P.= This Court is not inclined to take any different view.

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1043 OF 2011 05-07-2011 Chirlamacherla Chinna Venkata Subbaiah Vasavi Kanyaka Parameswari Arts Counsel for the petitioner:Sri Nimmagadda Satyanarayana Counsel for respondents:– :ORDER: The 1st respondent-society was registered way back in the year 1966. It appears that respondent No.2 and his brother, by name Balaratnam, gave a … Continue reading

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Or. 39, r.1 – Temporary injunction – Suit for declaration and permanent injunction claiming suit property as ancestral property – Application for temporary injunction rejected by trial court holding that suit properties had already been partitioned and a deed of family settlement had been executed – High Court declining to interfere – Reliance upon deed of family settlement though not signed by one of the co-sharers – HELD: Factum of partition being a question of fact, prima facie view taken by courts below, for purposes of interim order, that oral partition had been effected, not interfered with – Deed of family settlement cannot be relied upon unless signed by all co-sharers – However, plaintiff, acting upon the said settlement, having executed sale deeds, it would not be open to him to question the deed of settlement – Keeping in view the balance of convenience and irreparable loss, the High Court while declining to grant temporary injunction has protected the interests of plaintiff by restraining the purchaser from alienating or transferring the property or from creating any third party rights therein during pendency of suit – Order of High Court not interfered with – Trial court would dispose of the suit expeditiously – Till then co-sharers would not create any third party right in respect of their shares in the suit property – Deeds and documents – Deed of family settlement – Evidentiary value of. The appellant filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction as also mandatory injunction in respect of the suit property claiming it to be ancestral property of his father. It was the case of the plaintiff that though a partition deed was executed on 8.2.1967, but it was only with the intention of giving a separate share to his step-brother, and rest of the properties remained joint as there was no partition by metes and bounds; that defendants 1 and 2 had no right to execute the agreement and Special Powers of Attorney dated 27.11.2004 in respect of the suit property in favour of defendants 8 and 9 nor did defendants 8 and 9 have any right to execute the sale deed dated 31.3.2006 in favour of defendant no. 10. The plaintiff-appellant prayed for a decree of permanent injunction against the defendants not to deal with the property without a partition having been effected and also prayed for a mandatory injunction on the defendants to remove the wall which had been erected in the suit property. An application for interim injunction was also filed, which was rejected by the trial court holding that a partition had been effected between the legal heirs concerned and their names were recorded in the municipal records and a deed of family settlement dated 8.2.1967 was executed. The deed of family settlement dated 8.2.1967 and the partition had been upheld in an earlier litigation arising out of a suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant which suit was decreed partly in his favour. In the miscellaneous appeal filed by the plaintiff-appellant against the order of the trial court rejecting the application for interim injunction, the High Court declined to interfere. In the instant appeal filed by the plaintiff, the questions for consideration before the Court were: (i) whether reliance could be placed on the family settlement dated 8.2.1967 since the same was not registered, thought it sought to apportion the shares of the respective co-sharers; and (ii) whether the family settlement could at all be relied upon since all the co-sharers were not signatories thereto.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.8290 OF 2009 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C)NO.27909 OF 2008) NARENDRA KANTE … Petitioner Vs. ANURADHA KANTE & ORS. … Respondents J U D G M E N T ALTAMAS KABIR, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and … Continue reading

Deed of Family Settlement seeking to partition joint family properties cannot be relied upon unless signed by all the co-sharers. In the instant case, admittedly, the Respondent No.8, Sau. Pratibha, was not a signatory to the Deed of Settlement dated 8th February, 1967, although, she is the daughter of Bapu Saheb Kante by his first

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.8290 OF 2009 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C)NO.27909 OF 2008) NARENDRA KANTE … Petitioner Vs. ANURADHA KANTE & ORS. … Respondents J U D G M E N T ALTAMAS KABIR, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and … Continue reading

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