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for conviction under Section 304B of IPC, it is obligatory on the part of the prosecution to establish that the death occurred within seven years of marriage. Sans the requirement of seven years, in this case, the offence would fall only under Section 498A of IPC. And for that matter, sans any of the five ingredients discussed at Paragraph 6 above herein, the offence will fall out of Section 304B of IPC. It has to be noted that the deceased had two children, the son had died earlier and there is a surviving daughter who is stated to be around seven years. Whether the said age of the daughter is at the time of evidence or at the time of the death of the deceased, is not clear. Neither PW-1, father of the deceased nor PW- 2 Sarpanch or any other witness has given any evidence with regard to the date of marriage. No document whatsoever has been produced with regard to the marriage. There is no evidence even with regard to the date of birth of the children. Also, according to PW-1 father of the deceased, the marriage had taken place five to seven years back. It has to be noted that DW-1 elder devrani/sister-in-law of the deceased had stated in her evidence that the marriage had taken place around eleven years back. Nobody has even spoken on the exact date of marriage. The death reportedly took place on 06.04.1990. The evidence was recorded in 1996. The High Court counted the eleven years from the date of recording of the evidence. However, on going through the evidence, it is not at all clear as to whether the same is with respect to the date of tendering evidence or with respect to the date of the incident. Hence, we set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). The conviction under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is confirmed. However, taking note of the late evening age of the appellant, the substantive sentence is limited to the period undergone by him during the investigation/trial.

 published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40720 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1308 OF 2013 Gurdip Singh … Appellant (s) Versus State of Punjab … Respondent (s) J U D G M E N T KURIAN, J.:   1. Close to be called a centenarian, the appellant is before us challenging the conviction … Continue reading

M. Padmanabhacharlu – Great Father

Passing Night  Relieved the life from Great Journey of 85 years  My Father’s soul rest in Great Peace with out bedridden Great Personality stands for his words and Deeds – Great Father  My father left behind him adorable Works & adoptable Life Style Work till last breathe ; Never be burden for yourself ; Save your health & … Continue reading

Section 302, read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 High court acquitted, apex court confirmed the same = (I) The first information report has not been registered at the time and in the manner as it ought to have been written. (II) The counter FIR lodged by the respondents herein was written by Munshi (dead) on the dictation given by the Inspector of Police and not in accordance with the version given by the informant-respondent. (III) The report (Ex.P-13), which ought to have been lodged at the behest of the respondents herein, revealed that the respondents herein had used the lathis and a country-made pistol in selfdefence. (IV) There had been material discrepancies/contradictions/ inconsistencies in regard to the lodging of FIR and investigation so far as the statements of Pratap Singh, Head Constable and R.D. Yadav, S.O., and the entries made in the Rojnamcha. The cumulative effect of all the same creates a doubt in the prosecution story. (V) The FIR in the instant case against the respondents herein had been lodged by Pyare Chowkidar as directed by one Bilal Miyan who had informed him that Jagan had been killed by the party of Munshi and others. The said Bilal Miyan was neither an eye-witness, nor has been examined by the prosecution. (VI) Bilal Miyan had been informed by Ram Bharose about the murder of Jagan but who had not disclosed as who had killed Jagan. Thus, it was not clear as who had killed Jagan and the prosecution could not get any support whatsoever from the FIR. (VII) The evidence led by the prosecution shows that the offence was committed inside the house. Ram Bharose, witness, had seen it from Gallery. No such Gallery had been shown in the site plan. (VIII) The evidence had been that the rifle which was allegedly used in the murder was a single barrel gun but the empty cartridges used in the shooting were not recovered from the spot. No explanation had been furnished as what had happened to those empty cartridges. (IX) As per the prosecution, 3 live cartridges and one country-made pistol were found at the spot, though as per Ram Bharose, witness, the shot was fired from a single barrel gun. (X) The aforesaid contradictions led to the inference that Jagan had been murdered at some other place and in some other manner which was not brought on record by the prosecution. 10Page 11 (XI) It was nobody’s case that Collector Singh had fired two shots upon Jagan and even according to the postmortem report, there was no injury caused by the country-made pistol. (XII) There had been material contradictions regarding locking of the place where Jagan was detained and no explanation was there as who had opened that lock. (XIII) Ram Bharose and Rameshwar had been interested witnesses and their statements were full of discrepancies and contrary to the prosecution case. In view of the fact that no eye-witness was examined, the said material contradictions become most material. (XIV)The prosecution failed to explain the grievous injuries found on the person of Gobardhan and Munshi – accused herein. = This Court has laid down sufficient guidelines for interference by the superior court against the order of acquittal. In exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances to interfere and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40481 Page 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.824 of 2007 State of U.P. …Appellant Versus Gobardhan & Ors. …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been filed by the State of U.P. against the judgment and order dated … Continue reading

But if the presence of the complainant on that date was quite unnecessary, then resorting to the step of axing down the complaint may not be proper exercise of power envisaged in the Section. The discretion must, therefore, be exercised judicially and fairly without impairing the cause of administration of criminal justice.”= “256. Non-appearance or death of complainant. (1) If the summons has been issued on complaint, and on the day appointed for the appearance of the accused, or any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing may be adjourned, the complainant does not appear, the Magistrate shall, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, acquit the accused, unless for some reason he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day: Provided that where the complainant is represented by a pleader or by the officer conducting the prosecution or where the Magistrate is of opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary, the Magistrate may dispense with his attendance and proceed with the case. (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall, so far as may be, apply also to cases where the non-appearance of the complainant is due to his death. ” Considering the above decision along with Section 256 Cr.P.C., it is a discretion of the Magistrate to adjourn the matter or dispose of the matter, the Magistrate has to exercise his discretion judicially. Since it is a matrimonial dispute and the complainant is residing away from her matrimonial home, the learned Magistrate has to give one more opportunity to put forth her case. But the discretion exercised by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate is not legally sustainable. But however, the matter is pending in the matrimonial Court (i.e.) Sub-Court Tambaram in respect of divorce petition filed by the husband under Section 13(1)(i)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. Considering the gravity of the complaint and relationship between both sides, I am of the view, the order passed by the learned XV Metropolitan Magistrate is liable to be set aside and hence, it is hereby set aside.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED:25.06.2012 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE R. MALA Criminal Appeal No.709 of 2010 K.Niranjani .. Appellant/Complainant v. 1.R.T.Dinesh 2.R.T.Giri 3.T.Amsa .. Respondents Prayer:Criminal appeal filed under Section 378 of Cr.P.C., against the judgment dated 19.10.2010, in M.P.No.5872 of 2010 in D.V.C.No.1 of 2010, on the file of … Continue reading

Evidentiary value of Dying Declaration:=There is no particular form or procedure prescribed for recording a dying declaration nor it is required to be recorded only by a MagistrateAs a general rule, it is advisable to get the evidence of the declarant certified from a doctor. In appropriate cases, the satisfaction of the person recording the statement regarding the state of mind of the deceased would also be sufficient to hold that the deceased was in a position to make a statement. It is settled law that if the prosecution solely depends on the dying declaration, the normal rule is that the courts must exercise due care and caution to ensure genuineness of the dying declaration, keeping in mind that the accused had no opportunity to test the veracity of the statement of the deceased by cross-examination. As rightly observed by the High Court, the law does not insist upon the corroboration of dying declaration before it can be accepted. The insistence of corroboration to a dying declaration is only a rule of prudence. When the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is voluntary, not tainted by tutoring or animosity, and is not a product of the imagination of the declarant, in that event, there is no impediment in convicting the accused on the basis of such dying declaration. When there are multiple dying declarations, each dying declaration has to be separately assessed and evaluated and assess independently on its own merit as to its evidentiary value and one cannot be rejected because of certain variation in the other.. = “32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.- Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:- (1) when it relates to cause of death.- When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question. (2) ….. ….. ….. ….. (8) …. ….” It is clear from the above provision that the statement made by the deceased by way of a declaration is admissible in evidence under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. It is not in dispute that her statement relates to the cause of her death. In that event, it qualifies the criteria mentioned in Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. There is no particular form or procedure prescribed for recording a dying declaration nor it is required to be recorded only by a Magistrate. As a general rule, it is advisable to get the evidence of the declarant certified from a doctor. In appropriate cases, the satisfaction of the person recording the statement regarding the state of mind of the deceased would also be sufficient to hold that the deceased was in a position to make a statement. It is settled law that if the prosecution solely depends on the dying declaration, the normal rule is that the courts must exercise due care and caution to ensure genuineness of the dying declaration, keeping in mind that the accused had no opportunity to test the veracity of the statement of the deceased by cross-examination. As rightly observed by the High Court, the law does not insist upon the corroboration of dying declaration before it can be accepted. The insistence of corroboration to a dying declaration is only a rule of prudence. When the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is voluntary, not tainted by tutoring or animosity, and is not a product of the imagination of the declarant, in that event, there is no impediment in convicting the accused on the basis of such dying declaration. When there are multiple dying declarations, each dying declaration has to be separately assessed and evaluated and assess independently on its own merit as to its evidentiary value and one cannot be rejected because of certain variation in the other. In spite of stringent legislations in order to curb the deteriorating condition of women across the country, the cases related to bride burning, cruelty, suicide, sexual harassment, rape, suicide by married women etc. have increased and are taking place day by day. A complete overhaul of the system is a must in the form of deterrent punishment for the offenders so that we can effectively deal with the problem. In the case on hand, Vandana died within 3 years of her marriage at the instance of her mother-in-law and sisters-in-law due to the harassment meted out to her because of the inability to conceive a child and she was poured kerosene and burnt to death. Even though, the mother-in-law, who also filed a separate appeal, died on 10.02.2012, in view of clinching evidence led in by the prosecution, there cannot be any leniency in favour of the appellants, who are sisters-in-law of the deceased and at whose instance the deceased was burnt at the hands of her mother-in-law. 19) Accordingly, while agreeing with the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court, we find no merit in the appeal. Consequently, the same is dismissed.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1062 OF 2008   Ashabai & Anr. …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Maharashtra …. Respondent(s) 2       J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam,J. 1) This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 11.04.2007 passed … Continue reading

There is no evidence on record to establish that infuriated by his removal from service and non-payment of dues, the appellant masterminded the plot to abduct the children or played any active role in abducting them. If a telephone call was received making ransom demand and making grievance about alleged ill-treatment of the appellant, the police should have traced the calls and identified the caller. The police have failed to do so. Criminal courts recognize only legally admissible evidence and not farfetched conjectures and surmises. The High Court’s observation that there was a pre-conceived plan to abduct the children would not be applicable to the appellant because there is nothing on record to establish that the appellant met the co-accused and planned a strategy to abduct the children and demand ransom. His case stands on a different footing from that of the other accused. The case of the other accused will have to be dealt with on its own merit. The High Court was carried away by the heinous nature of the crime and, in that, it lost sight of the basic principle underlying criminal jurisprudence that suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof. If a criminal court allows its mind to be swayed by the gravity of the offence and proceeds to hand out punishment on that basis, in the absence of any credible evidence, it would be doing great violence to the basic tenets of criminal jurisprudence. We hope and trust that this is just an aberration. 12. In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order. The appellant – Md. Faizan Ahmad @ Kalu is ordered to be released forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. 13. The appeal is disposed of in the afore-stated terms.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 11 OF 2013 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.1636 of 2012] MD. FAIZAN AHMAD @ KALU … Appellant Versus THE STATE OF BIHAR … Respondent JUDGMENT (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal, by special leave, … Continue reading

“The assignment of a promissory note by the payee is a part of the “cause of action” within the meaning of S.20 (c), C.P.C. and the assignee can sue on it in the Court having jurisdiction where the assignment took place:

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE N.R.L.NAGESWARA RAO SECOND APPEAL NO.598 OF 2011 24-08-2012 M.R.Venu Smt.Veluchuri Lakshmi and others Counsel for the Appellant : Sri K.G.Krishna Murthy Counsel for the Respondent: Sri Ravi Cheemalapati <Gist : >Head Note: ? Cases referred: 1.AIR 2005 A.P. 37 2.AIR 1958 A.P. 451 3.1969 An.W.R. 222 4.AIR 1966 A.P. 334 5. … Continue reading

The appellant, Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab @ Abu Mujahid (hereinafter referred to as ‘the appellant’ or as ‘Kasab’), who is a Pakistani national, has earned for himself five death penalties and an equal number of life terms in prison for committing multiple crimes of a horrendous kind in this country. Some of the major charges against him were: conspiracy to wage war against the Government of India; collecting arms with the intention of waging war against the Government of India; waging and abetting the waging of war against the Government of India; commission of terrorist acts; criminal conspiracy to commit murder; criminal conspiracy, common intention and abetment to commit murder; committing murder of a number of persons; attempt to murder with common intention; criminal conspiracy and abetment; abduction for murder; robbery/dacoity with an attempt to cause death or grievous hurt; and causing explosions punishable under the Explosive Substance Act, 1908. He was found guilty of all these charges besides many others and was awarded the death sentence on five counts, life-sentence on five other counts, as well as a number of relatively lighter sentences of imprisonment for the other offences.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1899-1900 OF 2011 MOHAMMED AJMAL MOHAMMAD AMIR KASAB @ ABU MUJAHID … APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA … RESPONDENT WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1961 OF 2011 STATE OF MAHARASHTRA … APPELLANT VERSUS FAHIM HARSHAD MOHAMMAD YUSUF ANSARI & ANOTHER … RESPONDENTS AND TRANSFER PETITION … Continue reading

D.V.C.- after the marriage, the first respondent and the complainant lived together. There is no basis to say that the respondents 2 and 3 and the complainant lived together in a shared house as defined though no doubt the other ingredients are satisfied. On this ground, the complaint is not tenable and hence ultimately the proceedings are to be quashed so far as the respondents 2 and 3 are concerned. In the result, the petition is dismissed so far as the first respondent is concerned and is allowed so far as the other respondents are concerned

THE HON‘BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY CRIMINAL PETITION No.4140 of 2010 2-8-2012 Nagamuthula Kondaiah State of A.P., rep. by P.P. & another. Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri P.SRIDHAR REDDY Counsel for the Respondent No.1: The Public Prosecutor < Gist: > Head Note: ? Cases referred: ORDER: 1. This petition is filed under Section 482 … Continue reading

“13-B.Divorce by mutual consent – (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act a petition for dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be presented to the district Court by both the parties to a marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnized before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment)Act, 1976, on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.. It is quite clear from the materials on record that although the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 26.3.2011, within 3 months of the marriage the petitioner filed a petition under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for a decree of nullity of the marriage. Thereafter, they have not been able to live together and lived separately for more than 1 year. In effect, there appears to be no marital ties between the parties at all. It is only the provisions of Section 13-B(2) of the aforesaid Act which is keeping the formal ties of marriage between the parties subsisting in name only. At least the condition indicated in Section 13-B for grant of a decree of dissolution of marriage by the mutual consent is present in the instant case. It is only on account of the statutory cooling period of six months that the parties have to wait for a decree of dissolution of marriage to be passed. 13. In the above circumstances, in our view, this is one of those cases where we may invoke and exercise the powers vested in the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. The marriage is subsisting by a tenuous thread on account of the statutory cooling off period, out of which four months have already expired. When it has not been possible for the parties to live together and to discharge their marital obligations towards each other for more than one year, we see no reason to continue the agony of the parties for another two months. 14. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and also convert the pending proceedings under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, before the Additional District Judge-01, West Delhi, into one under Section 13-B of the aforesaid Act and by invoking our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, we grant a decree of mutual divorce to the parties and direct that the marriage between the parties shall stand dissolved by mutual consent. The proceedings before the Additional District Judge-01, West Delhi, being HMA No.204 of 2012, is withdrawn to this Court on consent of the parties and disposed of by this order. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and also convert the pending proceedings under Section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, before the Additional District Judge-01, West Delhi, into one under Section 13-B of the aforesaid Act and by invoking our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, we grant a decree of mutual divorce to the parties and direct that the marriage between the parties shall stand dissolved by mutual consent. The proceedings before the Additional District Judge-01, West Delhi, being HMA No.204 of 2012, is withdrawn to this Court on consent of the parties and disposed of by this order.

|REPORTABLE | IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.5946 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP(C)No.21084 of 2012)   1 Devinder Singh Narula … Appellant   Vs.     2 Meenakshi Nangia … Respondent     J U D G M E N T   ALTAMAS KABIR, J. 1. Leave granted. … Continue reading

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