This tag is associated with 4 posts

No bail when there is a history of involvement of number of crimes and when there is possibility of tampering of witnesses = ATAMARAM Vs. STATE OF U.P.& ANR published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40881

 Grounds for cancellation of Bail :-           1. Kunwar  Singh           was involved in a number of cases including four shown  pending  in           the Gang Chart including one for murder and another for  rape.    2. Moreover           Respondent no.2 is involved … Continue reading

For a cheque issued by a third party-Bank Manager cannot be prosecuted u/s 138 N.I. Act.

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD  Reserved AFR CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION NO. 21683 OF 2007 R.K. Dixit………………………………………………Applicant versus State of U.P. and others……………………….Respondent Hon’ble Vinod Prasad, J. Applicant R.K. Dixit, Manager Allahabad Bank/Field Officer, Allahabad Bank Branch, P.S. Civil Lines, District Moradabad has approached this court u/s 482 Cr.P.C., through instant Application, praying for quashing … Continue reading

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – s. 173 – Motor accident – Resulting in death – Claim for compensation – Award by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal – Appeal by insurer contending that application for claim being u/s 173, not maintainable in view of s.53 of Employees States Insurance Act, 1948 – Appeal dismissed by High Court =On appeal, Held: Entitlement to the claim to be worked out by the Tribunal by taking note of s. 53 – Employees States Insurance Act, 1948 – s. 53. Regional Director, ESI Corporation and Anr. v. Francis De Costa and Anr. 1993 Suppl.(4) SCC 100; A. Trehan v. Associated Electrical Agencies 1996(4) SCC 255 and Bharagath Engg. v. R. Rangamayaki 2003(2)SCC 138, relied on. Case Law Reference: 1993 Suppl.(4) SCC 100 Relied on Para 6 1996(4) SCC 255 Relied on Para 7 2003(2) SCC 138 Relied on Para 8 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3324 of 2009. From the Judgment & Order dated 28.10.2002 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in FAFO No. 2019 of 2002. Atul Nanda, R. Hakeem, Sanjay Bhardwaj and P.N. Puri for the Appellants. K. Radhakrishnan, B. Sunita Rao, Sunita Sharma, S.N. Terdol and Sushma Suri for the Respondents.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3324 of 2009 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 5989 of 2003) National Insurance Co. Ltd. ….Appellant Versus Hamida Khatoon and Ors. ….Respondents JUDGMENT Dr. ARIJTI PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Division … Continue reading

Allowing the appeal, this Court HELD : 1.1. Order 21, Rule 84 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is almost similar in terms to Rule 285-D of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952, which provides for deposit of 25 percent of the bid amount immediately and on failure to do so re-sale of the property forthwith. Rule 285-D requires the person declared to be purchaser to deposit immediately 25 percent of the amount of his bid, and in default of such deposit the property shall be resold forthwith and such person who failed to deposit 25 percent of the bid amount shall be liable for the expenses incurred in the first sale and the deficiency of price, if any, which may occur on the re-sale would be recovered from such defaulting purchaser as arrears of land revenue. The word “immediately” and the expression “re-sale of the property forthwith” are meaningful and significant. [237-B, F] 1.2. The word “immediately” connotes and implies that the deposit should be made without undue delay and within such convenient time as is reasonably required for doing the thing same day with all convenient speed excluding the possibility of rendering the other associated corresponding act and duty cast upon the officer/authority conducting the sale as envisaged by Rule 285-D is to put up the property for re-sale ‘forthwith’ on the failure of the declared purchaser to deposit 25 percent of the bid amount The word “immediately” therefore, connotes proximity in time to comply and proximity in taking steps to re- sell on failure to comply the requirement of deposit as first condition that is to take place within relatively short-interval of time and without any other intervening recurrence. The meaning of the word immediately has to be determined by the context in which it has been used and the purpose for which the statute using the word was enacted. That being so the rule casts an obligation on the purchaser to deposit 25 percent of the bid amount immediately and if he fails to do so the property shall be re-sold forthwith. [237-H, 238-A-C] 2.1. Further the Rule 285-D provides for re-sale of the property forthwith on the failure of the purchaser to deposit 25 percent of the bid amount The word ‘forthwith’ is synonymous with the word Immediately” which means with all reasonable quickness and within a reasonably prompt time. It, therefore, necessarily follows that the intention of the Legislature is that as soon as it becomes known that the purchaser has failed to deposit 25 percent immediately after he is declared as purchaser, the property shall be put to re-sale forthwith without any loss of time or postponement of the date of re-sale. [238-D-E] 2.2. The provision of Rule 285-D has been made mandatory because if the property is not re-sold forthwith and on the same day or within a day or two, sufficient number of purchasers may not be forthcoming and the property may not fetch adequate and fair price to the prejudice of the judgment-debtor. Another reason for making this provision as mandatory is that if on the failure of the purchaser to deposit 25 percent of the bid amount immediately on the day the person is declared to be purchaser then the sale of the property will have to be postponed to some other date and according to the provisions contained in Rule 285- G no sale after the postponement under Rule 285-D in default of payment of the purchase money shall be made until a fresh proclamation has been issued as prescribed for the original sale. It is to avoid this situation and the delay in the sale that the provisions under Rule 285-D has been made mandatory and on the non compliance of the same the sale becomes a nullity. [238-F-H] 2.3. It is settled law that the provisions of Order 21, Rule 84, 85 and 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure are mandatory and the provisions of Rules 285-D and 285-E being similar in terms of the aforementioned corresponding provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure there is no escape from declaring the sale a nullity if Rule 285-D is not complied with. [239-G] Mani Lal Mohan Lal v. Syed Ahmed, A.I.R. (1954) SC 349, referred to. 3. Rule 285-D does not contemplate any payment by cheque but a cash deposit of 25 percent of the bid amount has to be made in accordance with the requirement of the rule, otherwise the very purpose of the mandatory rule 285-D would be frustrated and rendered nugatory. If 25 percent of the bid amount is accepted by cheque and subsequently the purchaser changes his mind and advises his banker not to encash the cheque or there is no amount in the account of the purchaser in the bank and the cheque is bounced, the purpose of Rule 285-D would be frustrated and thus the mandatory provision would be rendered nugatory. The result would be that neither the authorities would be in a position to forfeit any amount of the purchaser nor the authority would be in a position to defray the expenses of the sale as contemplated by Rule 285-E. The deposit of 25 percent of the bid amount by cheque will therefore, not be a valid tender within the meaning of the rule. [240-D-F] Hiralal v. Mst. Champa, A.I.R. (1955) Allahabad 226 and M/s Progres-sive Industrial Enterprises v. Bank of Baroda, A.I.R. (1989) M.P. 177, ap- proved. Kirloskar Bros. Ltd. v. I.T. Commissioner, A.I.R. (1954) S.C. 429; I.T. Commissioner v. M/s. Ogale Glass Works Ltd., A.I.R. (1966) Madras 435 and Mohidden Bi v. Khatoon Bi, held inapplicable. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2589 of 1995.

PETITIONER: RAO MAHMOOD AHMED KHAN THROUGH THEIR L.R. Vs. RESPONDENT: SHRI RANBIR SINGH & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT22/02/1995 BENCH: FAIZAN UDDIN (J) BENCH: FAIZAN UDDIN (J) AGRAWAL, S.C. (J) CITATION: 1995 AIR 2195 1995 SCC Supl. (4) 275 JT 1995 (2) 383 1995 SCALE (1)842 ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT: 1. Leave granted. 2. Learned counsel for … Continue reading

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