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Or.22, rule 10 C.P.C- In a suit by partnership firm of two partners , when one partner dies pending suit, the suit can be continued by another partner M/s AVK Traders … Appellant Versus Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited … Respondent = Reported in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40915

Or.22, rule 10 – In a suit by partnership firm of two partners , when     one partner dies pending suit, the suit can be continued by another partner despite of non-joining of uninterested legal heirs of deceased partner as the entire interest devolves on the surviving partner as per rule 10 of Or. 22 of … Continue reading

the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, = whether certain regulations framed by the University Grants Commission had a binding effect on educational institutions being run by the different States and even under State enactments.= However, within this class of institutions there is a separate group where the State Governments themselves have taken a decision to adopt the scheme. In such cases, the consequences envisaged in the scheme itself would automatically follow. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court in all these matters in the light of the various submissions made on behalf of the respective parties. The several Appeals, Writ Petitions and the Transferred Case, which involve the same questions as considered in this batch of cases, are all dismissed. However, the Appeals filed by the State of Uttarakhand and Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 6724, 13747 and 14676 of 2012 are allowed. As far as the Transfer Petition Nos. 1062-1068 OF 2012 are concerned, the same are allowed and the Transferred Cases are dismissed. The Contempt Petitions are disposed of by virtue of this judgment. However, persons who have continued to work on the basis of the interim orders passed by this Court or any other Court, shall not be denied the benefit of service during the said period. The Appeals and Petitions having been dismissed, both the State Authorities and the Central Authorities will be at liberty to work out their remedies in accordance with law.

reported in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40584 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.5527-5543 OF 2013                      [@ SLP (C) Nos. 18766-18782/2010] 1 Jagdish Prasad Sharma etc. etc.    … Appellants Vs. 2 State … Continue reading

Registration-Sale-When complete-If complete only on date of registration Preemption Indian Registration Act, 1908 (XVI of 1908), ss. 47 and 61. =P executed a sale deed on January 31, 1946, in respect of a house in favour of D and presented it for registration on the same day. On coming to know of the execution of the sale deed, the appellant who had a right of preemption, made the talab-i-mowasibat on February 2, 1946. The deed was copied out in the Registrar’s books on February 9, 1946, and thereupon the registration became complete as provided in s. 61 of the Registration Act. The appellant filed a suit for preemption. D resisted the suit on the ground that the sale was completed on February 9, 1946, and the talab had been made prematurely. The appellant contended that in view Of s. 47 Registration Act a registered document operated from the time it would have otherwise operated and the sale was completed on the date of its execution. Held (per Sinha, C. J., Sarkar and Mudholkar, jj.) that the sale was completed only on February 9, 1946, when the registration was complete, that the talab was made prematurely and that the suit must fail. Section 47 merely permitted a document when registered to operate from a date which may be earlier than the date on which it was registered, it did not say when the sale would be deemed to be complete. A sale which was required to be registered was not completed until the registration of the deed was completed. Tilakdhari Singh v. Gour Narain, A.I.R. (1921) Pat. 150, Nareshchandra Datta v. Gireeshchandra Das, (1935) I.L.R. 62 Cal. 979, and Gobardhan Bar v. Guna Dhar Bar, I.L.R. (1940) II Cal. 270, approved. Bindeshri v. Somnath Bhadry, A.I.R. (1916) All. 199 and Gopal Ram v. Lachmi Himir, A.I.R. (1926) All. 549, distin- guished. Per Das Gupta and Ayyangar, jj. –The sale was completed on the day of execution and the talab was made at the right time. Section 61 had nothing to do with the time when the sale evidenced by the registered deed became complete; it refers merely to the fact that the registering officer had completed his duty. Section 47 provided when a sale was deemed to be completed. There was no difference between the time when a sale 475 became effective and the time it could be held to be completed. Under s. 47 the crucial test for determining the time from which the registered document was to have effect or be deemed to be completed was the intention of the parties. The sale deed shows that the parties intended that the deed should be effective from the date of execution. =1961 AIR 1747, 1962( 2 )SCR 474, , ,

PETITIONER: RAM SARAN LALL AND OTHERS Vs. RESPONDENT: MST. DOMINI KUER AND OTHERS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/04/1961 BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) GUPTA, K.C. DAS AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA MUDHOLKAR, J.R. CITATION: 1961 AIR 1747 1962 SCR (2) 474 CITATOR INFO : R 1969 SC 244 (11) F 1972 SC2162 (4,5,7) ACT: … Continue reading

cancellation of pattadar pass book and title deed =The Mandal Revenue Officer, Chittamur without verifying the facts of the case and without conducting enquiry as contemplated in Rule 6 of the AP Rights in Land & Pattadar Pass books Rules, 1989, had issued pattadar pass book and title deeds in favour of the petitioner. It is well settled that Revisional power is wider enough and is meant to be exercised to set right glaring illegalities or orders passed in violation of the provisions of the Act or misuse or abuse of power by the lower authorities or to prevent miscarriage of justice and the Joint Collector could exercise revisional jurisdiction which enabled him to call for and examine any record of rights prepared or maintained under Section 3 or any order passed or proceedings taken by any recording authority or an appellate authority to satisfy himself as to the regularity of such record, or order or proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision taken or order made therein and had powers to pass orders amending, modifying, annulling, reversing or remitting the matter for reconsideration. Further it is well settled that any order passed non est in the eye of law can be questioned at any time before any Court or Tribunal. In view of the above, both the Courts below have rightly restored the pattadar pass book and title deed in favour of Maramreddy Munisundara Ramireddy, father of the petitioner and hence, the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner does not merit consideration.

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE ASHUTOSH MOHUNTA WRIT PETITION No. 1687 OF 2011. DATED 2nd February, 2011. BETWEEN Maramreddy Sekhar Reddy                                                         …Petitioner and The Joint Collector, Nellore, SPSR Nellore District and ors ….Respondents. HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE ASHUTOSH MOHUNTA WRIT PETITION No. 1687 OF 2011. ORDER:           Questioning the validity and legality of the order dated 12.02.2011 passed by the … Continue reading

Muslim law-Religious endowment-Surplus income to be dis- tributed amongst the members of the family-Claim by females- If governed by custom or personal law-Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 (26 of 1937), as amended by Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Madras Amendment) Act, 1949 (Mad. 18 of 1949), S. 2. Limitation-Declaratory suit with consequential relief-If maintainable-Right to sue-Computation-Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908), art. 120. =Under a scheme a Board of Trustees was appointed for administration of the Durga and a Masjid for the maintenance of which the Nawab of Carnatic had granted two villages in Inam. The income of the institution after disbursing the expenses had since long been shared by the descendants in four families in equal shares. The scheme also provided that the surplus income was to be distributed amongst the members of the said four families. One of the descendants died leaving him surviving his wife and two daughters who were obstructed in the performance of the “Urs” by the appellant’s father. The said Muslim female members filed a suit for declaration that they were entitled to enjoy the properties and to manage the Durga, perform the “Urs” festival and receive all incomes, endowments and perquisites thereof once in every eight years according to their turn. The right to a share in the income was denied by the appellant contending that by custom in the family, females were excluded from inheritance and that the claim was barred by the law of limitation and that, in any event, the suit for mere declaration was not maintainable. Held, that a suit for declaration of rights with a consequential relief for injunction was not a suit for declaration simpliciter; it was a suit for declaration with further relief and was not barred under art. 120 Of the Indian Limitation Act merely because the contesting defendant did not recognise the right. The period of six years prescribed by art. 120 is to be computed from the date when the right to sue accrued and there could be no right to sue until there was an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and unequi- vocal threat to infringe that right. If under the law a person was entitled to any legitimate right, the mere denial of the right will not set the period of limitation running against the person entitled to such right. 68 Held, further, that on the enactment of the Shariat Act 26 Of 1937, as amended by the’ Madras Act r8 Of 1949, the Muslim Personal Law applies in all cases relating to the matters specified notwithstanding any customer usage to the contrary even at the stage of appeals, if other conditions prescribed under the Act are fulfilled. Kunj Behari Prasadji Purshottam Prasadji v. Keshavld Hiralal. (1904) I.L.R. 28 Bom. 567, discussed. Syed Roshan Ali v. Mt. Rehmat Bibi and Others, A.I.R. 1943 Lah. 219, disapproved. =1961 AIR 808, 1962( 1 )SCR 67, , ,

PETITIONER: C.MOHAMMED YUNUS Vs. RESPONDENT: SYED UNISSA AND OTHERS DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/02/1961 BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. KAPUR, J.L. HIDAYATULLAH, M. CITATION: 1961 AIR 808 1962 SCR (1) 67 CITATOR INFO : R 1966 SC 470 (13) F 1974 SC 923 (49) ACT: Muslim law-Religious endowment-Surplus income to be dis- tributed amongst the … Continue reading

Indian Partnership Act, Section 69(2)-bar under-scope of-explained. The question involved in the instant appeal was whether a suit by an unregistered firm to enforce a right not arising from a contract to which it was a party or arising from a contract entered into by it in connection with its business, but for the enforcement of a right arising out of a contract entered into by its partner when the firm was his proprietary concern which he continued to the partnership when constituted was maintainable against third party and not barred under the provisions of section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act. =Allowing the appeals, the court HELD. 1.1 Once registration is granted, even though after the filing of the suit, the suit should be held to be maintainable as from the date on which registration is granted subject to the law of limitation. Subsequent registration of the firm would not cure the initial defect in the filing of the suit. [527-F-G; 528-D] M/s.Shreeram Finance Corporation v. Yasin Khan and Ors, [1989] 3 SCC 476; D.D.A. v. Kochhar construction Work and Anr., [1998] 8 SCC 559 and U.P. State Sugar corporation Ltd. v. Jain Construction Co. and Anr., [2004] 7 SCC 332, relied upon. 1.2. After coming into the existence of the partnership and having transferred to the said partnership all his assets and liabilities of his proprietary concern, the erstwhile proprietor has no subsisting exclusive right to enforce the liability against others since such rights as he had as the proprietor vested in the partnership, Such a partner in his personal capacity could not sue the respondent firm for the amount in question, if the firm of which he was a partner was for reason of non-registration unable maintain a suit. He can not, therefore, either file a suit for claim any relief in the suit filed by the partnership asserting his right as the erstwhile proprietor. [529-F-G] Addanki Narayanappa and Anr. v. Bhaskara Krishnappa (D) & Ors., [1966] 3 SCR 400, relied upon. 1.3. The bar under Section 69(2) would apply to a suit for enforcement of right arising from a contract entered into by the unregistered firm with a third party in the course of business dealings with such third party. If the right sought to be enforced does not arise from a contract to which the unregistered firm is a party, or is not entered into in connection with the business of the firm with a third party, the bar of Section 69(2) will not apply. [533-E-F] Haldiram Bhujiawala and Anr. v. Anand Kumar Deepak Kumar and Anr., [2000] 3 SCC 25, relied upon. Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property, [1998] 7 SCC 184, referred to. 2.1. Observations made and principles laid down in a judgment if obiter do not have the force of a binding precedent. However, that does not preclude the Court from appreciating the reasons given for the principles laid down, and if the reasoning appears to the Court to be cogent, and merits acceptance, the same may be accepted by the Court and applied to the case before it. V.A. Mohta, B.J. Aggarwal, S.G. Hartalkar, J.S. Wad, Ashishwad, Neeraj Kumar, Arvind Gupta and Simanti Chakrabarti for the Appellant. S.V. Deshpande, Prashant Kumar, V. Sheshagiri and Rahul Prasanna Dave for the Respondents.=, 2006(8 )Suppl.SCR524 , , 2006(12 )SCALE232 , 2007(4 )JT564

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 4092 of 1998 PETITIONER: Purushottam & Anr RESPONDENT: Shivraj Fine Art Litho Works & Ors DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/11/2006 BENCH: B.P. Singh & Altamas Kabir JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T B.P. Singh, J In this appeal by special leave the plaintiffs are the appellants. Their suit against … Continue reading

The modus operandi in such SA/GPA/WILL transactions is for the vendor or person claiming to be the owner to receive the agreed consideration, deliver possession of the property to the purchaser and execute the following documents or variations thereof: (a) An Agreement of sale by the vendor in favour of the purchaser confirming the terms of sale, delivery of possession and payment of full consideration and undertaking to execute any document as and when required in future. Or An agreement of sale agreeing to sell the property, with a separate affidavit confirming receipt of full price and delivery of possession and undertaking to execute sale deed whenever required. (b) An Irrevocable General Power of Attorney by the vendor in favour of the purchaser or his nominee authorizing him to manage, deal with and dispose of the property without reference to the vendor. Or A General Power of Attorney by the vendor in favour of the purchaser or his nominee authorizing the attorney holder to sell or transfer the property and a Special Power of Attorney to manage the property. (c) A will bequeathing the property to the purchaser (as a safeguard against the consequences of death of the vendor before transfer is effected). =It has been submitted that making declaration that GPA sales and SA/GPA/WILL transfers are not legally valid modes of transfer is likely to create hardship to a large number of persons who have entered into such transactions and they should be given sufficient time to regularize the transactions by obtaining deeds of conveyance. It is also submitted that this decision should be made applicable prospectively to avoid hardship. = We have merely drawn attention to and reiterated the well-settled legal position that SA/GPA/WILL transactions are not `transfers’ or `sales’ and that such transactions cannot be treated as completed transfers or conveyances. They can continue to be treated as existing agreement of sale. Nothing prevents affected parties from getting registered Deeds of Conveyance to complete their title. The said `SA/GPA/WILL transactions’ may also be used to obtain specific performance or to defend possession under section 53A of TP Act. If they are entered before this day, they may be relied upon to apply for regularization of allotments/leases by Development Authorities. We make it clear that if the documents relating to = We make it clear that our observations are not intended to in any way affect the validity of sale agreements and powers of attorney executed in genuine transactions. For example, a person may give a power of attorney to his spouse, son, daughter, brother, sister or a relative to manage his affairs or to execute a deed of conveyance. A person may enter into a development agreement with a land developer or builder for developing the land either by forming plots or by constructing apartment buildings and in that behalf execute an agreement of sale and grant a Power of Attorney empowering the developer to execute agreements of sale or conveyances in regard to individual plots of land or undivided shares in the land relating to apartments in favour of prospective purchasers. In several States, the execution of such development agreements and powers of attorney are already regulated by law and subjected to specific stamp duty. Our observations regarding `SA/GPA/WILL transactions’ are not intended to apply to such bonafide/genuine transactions.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.13917 OF 2009 Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. …..Petitioner Vs. State of Haryana & Anr. ….Respondents J U D G M E N T R. V. Raveendran J. By an earlier order dated 15.5.2009 [reported in Suraj Lamp & Industries … Continue reading

Equitable set-off–Suit by patnidar against zemindar for possession of land with mesne profits–Decree in favour of patnidar-Claim by zemindar to set off against mesne profits rent, revenue and cesses which accrued after deliv- ery of possession–Maintainability. = Where a patnidar has obtained a decree against his zemindar for possession of resumed chaukidari chakran lands with mesne profits from the date on which the zemindar wrongfully took 783 possession of them, the zemindar is not entitled to deduct by way of equitable set-off from the amount of mesne profits payable by him under the decree, the amounts due to him on account of rent, revenue and cesses for a period subsequent to the date of delivery of possession of the lands inasmuch as the two cross demands do not arise out of the same trans- action. The transaction which led to the plaintiff’s demand for mesne profits resulted from the defendant’s wrongful act as trespasser, while the transaction which gave rise to the zemindar’s demand arose out of the relationship of landlord and tenant and the obligations resulting therefrom.

PETITIONER: RAJA BHUPENDRA NARAIN SINGHA BAHADUR Vs. RESPONDENT: MAHARAJ BAHADUR SINGH AND OTHERS.(Civil Appeals Nos. 68 to 9 DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/04/1952 BENCH: MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND BENCH: MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND AIYAR, N. CHANDRASEKHARA BOSE, VIVIAN CITATION: 1952 AIR 201 1952 SCR 782 ACT: Equitable set-off–Suit by patnidar against zemindar for possession of land with mesne … Continue reading

Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958: ss.46 and 56 – Application under, for removal/rectification of entry in the register of trade mark – Held: Can only be preferred by a `person aggrieved’ – The applicant must not only be a `person aggrieved’ on the date of the application but must continue to remain a `person aggrieved’ until such time the application is finally decided – To be a `person aggrieved’, there must be likelihood of some injury or damage to the applicant by such trade mark – In the instant case, while ordering removal of appellant’s mark from the register of trade marks, it was incumbent upon the IPAB to consider and satisfy itself about the locus standi of the applicant to be heard as a `person aggrieved’ – Having not done so, the applications for rectification/removal of the subject trade marks from the register need to be considered afresh by the IPAB – Trade Marks Act, 1999. Words and phrases: Expression `person aggrieved’ – Connotation of, in the context of s.46 and s.56 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. The first respondent filed three separate applications before the High Court under Sections 46 and 56 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 praying for the removal/rectification of the appellant’s mark `infosys’ from the register of trade mark in respect of Classes 7, 9 and 16. In the meantime, the 1958 Act was repealed by the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the three petitions for rectification/removal of registered trade marks were transferred to the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB). In another suit filed by the appellant for infringement of trade mark, an affidavit was filed by the first respondent on July 14, 2004, wherein it was stated that the name of its company was changed from Jupiter Infosys Limited to Jupiter International Limited and no dispute was remaining between the parties under the trade mark. The IPAB allowed the three applications of the first respondent. The instant appeals were filed challenging the order of the IPAB. Partly allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. Whether the application is under Section 46 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 or under Section 56 or a composite application under both the sections, it is a pre-requisite that the applicant must be a person aggrieved. Section 46(1) enables any person aggrieved to apply for removal of registered trade mark from the register on the ground of non-use as stated in clause (a) and/or clause (b). To be an aggrieved person under Section 46, he must be one whose interest is affected in some possible way and it must not be a mere fanciful suggestion of grievance. A likelihood of some injury or damage to the applicant by such trade mark remaining on the register may meet the test of locus standi. The persons who are aggrieved are all persons who are in some way or the other substantially interested in having the mark removed – where it is a question of removal from the register; including all persons who would be substantially damaged if the mark remained, and all trade rivals over whom an advantage was gained by a trader who was getting the benefit of a registered trade mark to which he was not entitled. Section 56 provides for varying situations in which the person aggrieved may apply for rectification of the registered trade mark from the register. Although both Sections, namely, Sections 46 and 56 require `person aggrieved’ to apply for removal of the registered trade mark from the register or rectification of a trade mark in the register, the expression `person aggrieved’ for the purposes of these two Sections has different connotations. Section 46 speaks for private interest while Section 56 speaks of a public interest. [Paras 27, 28, 30] [332-B-H] Hardie Trading Ltd. & Anr. v. Addisons Paint & Chemicals Ltd. (2003) 11 SCC 92, relied on. The Royal Baking Powder Company v. Wright, Crossley, and Co. (1898) 15 RPC 677 – referred to. Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names (11th edition) – referred to. 2. It is true that the appellant in opposition to the applications for removal/rectification of trade mark did not specifically challenge in its counter affidavits the locus standi of the first respondent to be heard as a person aggrieved. Obviously, in the absence of any specific objection by the appellant to that effect, no specific issue was framed by the High Court whether the applicant was an aggrieved person. The applications were transferred to the IPAB in terms of Section 100 of the 1999 Act. The IPAB examined the matter in light of the issues that were framed by the High Court although in the written submissions before it, the objection was raised that the first respondent has ceased to have locus standi in view of the subsequent events, particularly, change of the name of the first respondent from Jupiter Infosys Ltd. to Jupiter International Ltd. It was incumbent upon the IPAB to consider and satisfy itself about the locus standi of the first respondent to be heard as a person aggrieved. In the first place, when the first respondent applied for rectification/removal in respect of three registrations in Classes 7, 9 and 16, it must have shown in respect of each of them that it is a `person aggrieved’ and the IPAB must have separately considered in respect of each registration the locus standi of the first respondent as the considerations for each entry might not have been common. Secondly, during the pendency of the applications, certain events had taken place which had some bearing on the question of locus standi of the first respondent insofar as invocation of Section 46(1) of the 1958 Act is concerned. In the affidavit filed by the first respondent on July 14, 2004 before the Additional District Judge, an unequivocal and categorical statement was made that there was not any more any dispute between the plaintiff (appellant) and defendant (first respondent) under the Trade Mark and that the defendant has already changed the name of the company from “Jupiter Infosys Ltd.” to “Jupiter International Ltd.” The grievance of the applicant when he invokes Section 46(1) must not only be taken to have existed on the date of making application but must continue to exist when such application is decided. If during the pendency of such application, the applicant’s cause of complaint does not survive or his grievance does not subsist due to his own action or the applicant has waived his right or he has lost his interest for any other reason, there may not be any justification for rectification as the registered trade mark cannot be said to operate prejudicially to his interest. The applications made by the first respondent for rectification/removal of the subject trade marks from the register need to be considered afresh by the IPAB. The three applications are restored to the file of IPAB for hearing and disposal afresh in accordance with law. [Paras 30, 31, 34] [335-H; 336-A-G; 337-C-E] M/s. Eagle Potteries Private Ltd. v. M/s. Eagle Flask Industries Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1993 Bombay 185; L. Chandrakumar v. Union of India & Ors. (1997) 3 SCC 261; Agha Hyder Hussain & Anr. v. Omar Khayyam Wineries (Pvt.) Ltd. & Anr. AIR 1977 Mad 166; Nestle’s Products (India) Ltd. v. P. Thankaraja & Anr. AIR 1978 Mad 336; Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba v. Tosiba Appliances Company & Ors. (2008) 10 SCC 766, referred to. Lever Brothers, Port Sunlight Ltd. v. Sunniwite Products Ltd. (1949) 66 RPC 84; The Ritz Hotel v. Charles of the Ritz (1989) RPC 333; Australian Wine Importers’ Trade Mark (1889) 6 RPC 311; In re Apollinaris Company’s Trade- Marks (1891) 2 Ch. 186; Philosophy Di Alberta Ferretti 2003 R.P.C. 15; Keystone Knitting Mills Trade Mark 1929 (1) Ch.D. 92; Motor Terms Company Pty. Limited. v. Liberty Insurance Ltd. (1967) 116 C.L.R.177 – referred to. Case Law Reference: (2003) 11 SCC 92 relied on Para 16 2008) 10 SCC 766 referred to Para 16 AIR 1993 Bombay 185 referred to Para 18 (1949) 66 RPC 84 referred to Para 18 (1989) RPC 333 referred to Para18 (1889) 6 RPC 311 referred to Para 18 (1997) 3 SCC 261 referred to Para 20 AIR 1977 Mad 166 referred to Para 21 2003 R.P.C. 15 referred to Para 21 1929 (1) Ch.D. 92 referred to Para 21 (1967) 116 C.L.R.177 referred to Para 21 AIR 1978 Mad 336 referred to Para 23 (1898) 15 RPC 677 referred to Para 29 AIR 1978 Mad 336 referred to Para 23 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 5743-5743 of 2005. From the Judgment & Order dated 9.9.2004 of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board at Chennai in TRA Nos. 25 to 27/2003/TM/CH (OP Nos. 764 to 766/01). D. Banerjee, Akhil Sibal, Sushant Singh, Manav Kumar, Anusha Natarajan, Praveen Radhi, P.C. Arya, Gautam Panwani, V.K. Sinha (for S.K. Verma) for the Appellant. Vibhav Gaggar, Ajay Bhargava, Vanita Bhargava, Amit Verma, Saba Grover for the Respondents.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5743-5745 OF 2005 Infosys Technologies Ltd. …… Appellant Vs. Jupiter Infosys Ltd. & Anr. …… Respondents JUDGMENT R.M. LODHA, J. These three appeals by special leave are directed against the order dated September 9, 2004 passed by Intellectual Property Appellate Board (for … Continue reading

Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. The object of providing concessional rate of duty, on the kerosene used for illuminating oil burning lamps, was to provide some relief to those economically backward sections of society who use kerosene for illumination and other domestic purposes and, therefore, the benefit of concessional rate of duty was available only on the kerosene cleared by the assessee to the Public Distribution System. [Para 13] [366-C] 2. In the light of the object and context of the notifications, it becomes abundantly clear that the word “ordinarily” used in the Notifications implies that the kerosene must be ordinarily used for illumination purposes, and it would be immaterial if the kerosene is also used for other domestic purposes. [Para 16] [367-B] Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai vs. J.D. Orgochem Ltd. (2008) 16 SCC 576; Viswa and Co. vs. The State of Gujarat (1966) 17 S.T.C. 581 – referred to. 3. From the perusal of the two Notifications, it is plain that the benefit of concessional rate of duty extends only to that variety of kerosene that: (i) has a smoke point of 18mm or more, and (ii) is ordinarily used as an illuminant in oil burning lamps. It is manifest that these two conditions are conjunctive and, therefore, the twin conditions need to be satisfied in order to avail of the concessional rate of duty. In the instant case, the fact that the assessee cleared kerosene manufactured by it to industrial consumers would entail that the assessee cannot claim the benefit of Notifications No. 5/98-CE and 5/99-CE. [Para 17] [367-C-D] Union of India and Anr. vs. Hemraj Singh Chauhan and Ors. (2010) 4 SCC 290; State of A.P. vs. V. Sarma Rao and Ors. (2007) 2 SCC 159 – relied on. Union of India and Ors. vs. Vipinchandra Hiralal Shah (1996) 6 SCC 721 – referred to. Case Law Reference: (2008) 16 SCC 576 Referred to Para 11 (1966) 17 S.T.C. 581 Referred to. Para 11 (2010) 4 SCC 290 Relied on. Para 14 (1996) 6 SCC 721 Referred to. Para 14 (2007) 2 SCC 159 Relied on. Para 15 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7041-7043 of 2002. From the Judgment & Order dated 21.01.2002 of the Central Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in Appeal No. E/682-684/2001-C. Alok Yadav, M.P. Devanath for the Appellant. P.P. Malhotra, ASG, S. Wasim A. Qadri, Ron Bastian, Anil Katiyar for the Respondent.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 7041-7043 OF 2002 M/S INDIAN OIL CORPORATION — APPELLANT LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL — RESPONDENT EXCISE, VADODARA JUDGMENT D.K. JAIN, J.: 1. These civil appeals under Section 35L(b) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (for short “the Act) are directed against … Continue reading

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