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Small claims court

This tag is associated with 15 posts

By reason of the Limitation Act, 1963 the legal position as was obtaining under the old Act underwent a change. In a suit governed by Article 65 of the 1963 Limitation Act, the plaintiff will succeed if he proves his title and it would no longer be necessary for him to prove, unlike in a suit governed by Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, that he was in possession within 12 years preceding the filing of the suit. On the contrary, it would be for the defendant so to prove if he wants to defeat the plaintiff’s claim to establish his title by adverse possession. =Md. Mohammad Ali (Dead) By LRs. RESPONDENT: Sri Jagadish Kalita & Ors. = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=19379

By reason of the Limitation Act, 1963 the legal position as was obtaining under the old Act underwent a change. In a suit governed by Article 65 of the 1963 Limitation Act, the plaintiff will succeed if he proves his title and it would no longer be necessary for him to prove, unlike in a … Continue reading

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Agreement to sell land – Non-execution of – Suit for specific performance – Grant of decree and plea of seller that time was essence of contract rejected – However, High Court setting aside the decree – Validity of – Held: Recital in the agreement that earnest money would be forfeited upon failure to execute agreement within stipulated period makes it clear that parties never intended time to be essence of contract – More so, seller did not prove his plea – Thus, decree granted by trial court upheld – Buyer directed to deposit balance consideration amount and seller would execute sale deed. = PETITIONER: Balasaheb Dayandeo Naik (Dead)through LRs & Ors RESPONDENT: Appasaheb Dattatraya Pawar = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspx

Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Agreement to sell land – Non-execution of – Suit for specific performance – Grant of decree and plea of seller that time was essence of contract rejected – However, High Court setting aside the decree – Validity of – Held: Recital in the agreement that earnest money would be forfeited … Continue reading

Fraud on party also void one = Fraudulently obtained a consent decree with in 3 days on illiterate women = kept quiet for long time and again filed another suit for injunction against the same women basing on earlier decree – where the fraud came to light – All lower courts went on routine manner with out analyzing the evidence – how the decree will be passed against one sharers with out adding co sharers and how the court pass a decree with out hearing the parties under or.10, rule 1 C.P.C. – which clearly discloses a fraud = Allowed the civil appeal and set aside all decrees and judgement of lower courts = “Fraud generally lights a candle for justice to get a look at it; and rogue’s pen indites the warrant for his own arrest.” 26. Ex consequenti, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the High Court in the Second Appeal as well as the judgments and decrees of the courts below are hereby set aside and as a natural corollary the judgment and decree dated 27.11.1973 is also set aside. There shall be no order as to costs. ““Fraud-avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal” observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree – by the first court or by the highest court – has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings.” Smt. Badami (Deceased) By her L.R. ….. Appellant Versus Bhali … Respondent = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspx

SUIT: Fraudulent suit – Suits for permanent injunction and possession – Based on an earlier compromise decree – Held: All facets of fraud get attracted to the case at hand – A rustic and illiterate woman is taken to court by a relation on the plea of creation of a lease deed and magically in … Continue reading

Novation of Contract = IMS Learning Resources Private Limited, the respondent herein, filed CS (OS) No.2316 of 2011 in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi for a permanent injunction restraining infringement of a registered trademark, infringement of copyright, passing off of damages, rendition of accounts of profits and also for other consequential reliefs against the appellant herein. Appellant preferred IA No.18 of 2012 under Section 8, read with Section 5 -of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for rejecting the plaint and referring the dispute to arbitration and also for other consequential reliefs. The High Court rejected the application vide its order dated 16.04.2012 holding that that earlier agreements dated 01.04.2007 and 01.04.2010, which contained arbitration clause stood superseded by a new contract dated 01.02.2011 arrived at between the parties by mutual consent. = Exit paper would clearly indicate that it is a mutually agreed document containing comprehensive terms and conditions which -admittedly does not contain an arbitration clause. = We may indicate that so far as the present case is concerned, parties have entered into a fresh contract contained in the Exit paper which does not even indicate any disputes arising under the original contract or about the settlement thereof, it is nothing but a pure and simple novation of the original contract by mutual consent. Above being the factual and legal position, we find no error in the view taken by the High Court. The appeal, therefore, lacks merit and stands dismissed, with no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40682 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6997 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.33459 of 2012) M/s Young Achievers ….. Appellant Versus IMS Learning Resources Pvt. Ltd. ….Respondent   J U D G M E N T K.S. Radhakrishnan, J. Leave granted. 2. IMS Learning Resources … Continue reading

Condonation of Delay does not arise under sec.28 A of Land acquisition act = whether limitation for filing the application for re-determination of the compensation under Section 28A of the Act would commence from the date of the award or from the date of knowledge of the court’s award on the basis of which such application is being filed. 6. Though, there is nothing on record to substantiate the appellants’ claim that they could acquire the knowledge of the Court’s award only on 17.7.2006 and immediately took steps to file application for re-determination under Section 28A of the Act. 7. The issue involved herein is no more res-integra. The appellants’ case before the High Court as well as before us has been that the limitation would commence from the date of acquisition of knowledge and not from the date of award. = For the purpose of filing application under Section 28A of the Act, counsel for the appellants applied for a certified copy of the Court award on 17.5.2006, and though the copy of the said award was ready for delivery on 29.5.2006, it was obtained by learned counsel for the appellants only on 3.6.2006. Application for re-determination of the amount of compensation was filed on 18.7.2006 by the appellants, on the basis of the said Court’s award. D. The Special Land Acquisition Collector vide order dated 22.9.2008, rejected the said application on the ground that the same was filed with a delay of 4 days.= The legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” (See : The Martin Burn Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1966 SC 529; and Rohitas Kumar & Ors. v. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 30) In view of the above, we are of the candid view that none of the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants is tenable. 14. As the matters are squarely covered by the above referred to judgments, these appeals are devoid of any merit. The cases do not warrant any interference. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.

published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40681 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 6976-6980 of 2013   Popat Bahiru Govardhane Etc. …Appellants   Versus   Special Land Acquisition Officer & Anr. …Respondents   J U D G M E N T   Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.   1. These appeals have … Continue reading

Land Acquisition Actappellant- sec.4 notification, sec.6 and award can be challenged before taking possession with in reasonable time – Notice at locality is mandatory – no company and it’s site can be acquired for industrial purpose = Company itself is running an industry on the date of the notification, we are of the view that there is no justification in acquiring a running industrial unit for industrialization of the area.- In view of the above, it is clear that in spite of knowing the specific ground raised by the appellant about the non- publication of the substance of the notification as prescribed under the Act in the locality concerned, neither the State nor the Land Acquisition Collector availed the opportunity of filing reply refuting the same. In such circumstances, we have no other option except to hold that there was no publication of the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in the locality which is held to be mandatory. It is also relevant to point out that by effecting such publication in the locality, it would be possible for the person in possession, namely, either the owner or lessee to make their representation/objection in the enquiry under Section 5A. In addition to the same, such person “owner or occupier” is entitled to file their objections within 30 days from the date of publication in the locality and by non-publication of the same in the locality as provided under the Act, the owner or occupier loses his valuable right. For these reasons also, the acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed.= Under these circumstances, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 08.07.2008 and quash the land acquisition proceedings insofar as the appellant-Company is concerned.

 published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40657       REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 2 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6792 OF 2013 3 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 19869 of 2008)   M/s V.K.M. Kattha Industries Pvt. Ltd. …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Haryana & Ors. …. Respondent(s)     J U … Continue reading

GIFT = WILL = SETTLEMENT DEED = whether a document can be treated as a gift where the executor reserves his interest of maintenance throughout his life with certain other conditions or will or rather a mere settlement of its own kind.= Thus, Section 122 defines ‘gift’ as gift inter vivos or an absolute gift. An absolute gift, (which is the subject matter under the Act, 1882) or gift inter vivos as distinguished from a testamentary gift or one made in contemplation of death, is one by which the donee becomes in the lifetime of the donor, the absolute owner of the thing given. Further, in case of a gift the provision becomes operative immediately and under transfer in praesenti is intended and comes into effect.= In terms of Section 122 of the Act 1882, it is necessary that there should be vesting of interest forthwith, though possession and enjoyment of the property may be postponed to a later date. Even if a document is styled and registered as a settlement deed containing the recital of devolution of interest in the properties to vest on the death of a settler after his life time, such a document may be termed only as a ‘Will’ and not ‘gift deed’. 7. The fact that the document purports to reserve a life interest in the property to the donor with certain other terms is a ‘Will’. = “Settlement Deed” executed in 1922 is neither a `Will’ nor a gift. However, it did not transfer the title in favour of the second party therein. The executor of the said settlement deed sold the land to the respondents for consideration. The sale deed was valid and appellants could not claim any benefit under the said settlement deed, the title did not vest in favour of their predecessors in interest.

‘     IN THE SUPREMECOURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2401 OF 2002 Sankaran Bhaskaran & Ors. …Appellants Versus Kumaran Sarasamma & Ors. … Respondents O R D E R 1. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated 20.9.2001, passed by the High Court of Kerala … Continue reading

69. Effect of non- registration. — (2) No suit to enforce a right arising from a contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of a firm against any third party unless the firm is registered and the persons suing are or have been shown in the Register of Firms as partners in the firm.= In the instant case, the firm was no doubt registered. However, the name of the person (PW.1), who instituted the proceedings on behalf the firm, is said to have been inducted later on as a partner, but his name was not entered in the register of firms. The appellant did make an effort to convince the trial Court that intimation of PW.1 joining the firm as a partner was given, to the Registrar of Firms in Ex.A.5. The fact, however, remains that by the time the suit was filed, the name of PW.1 was not entered in the register of firms. – In M/s. Shreeram Finance Corporation v. Yasin Khan[3], the Supreme Court held that a suit filed on behalf of a reconstituted firm cannot be maintained, unless the name of the newly added partner, and in whose name the suit is filed has been entered in the register of firms. The ratio of that judgment gets straight away attracted to the facts of the present case. The law requires that it is only when the firm is registered and the name of such person acting as a partner is entered in the register of firms, that he would be entitled to validly institute the proceedings. – the observation of the Supreme Court reads: “In the present case the suit filed by the appellants is clearly hit by the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 69 of the said Partnership Act, as on the date when the suit was filed, two of the partners shown as partners as per the relevant entries in the Register of Firms were not, in fact, partners, one new partner had come in and two minors had been admitted to the benefit of the partnership firm regarding which no notice was given to the Registrar of Firms. Thus, the persons suing, namely, the current partners as on the date of the suit were not shown as partners in the Register of Firms. The result is that the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 69 of the said Partnership Act and the view taken by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court in this connection is correct…”

* THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY   + Second Appeal No.49 of 2013 %Dated 15.02.2013       #M/s. Chandu Financiers, Chittoor, rep. by its foreman Y.Raghu. …appellant. and   $ G.Ramakrishna Naidu and another   …Respondents     ! Counsel for appellant:     Sri Mehar Chand Noori   ^ Counsel for Respondents :  Sri Sumanth     < GIST: … Continue reading

The important question that falls for determination in the instant appeal is about the ambit and scope of the inherent powers of the High Courts under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”) in quashing of the criminal proceedings in non-compoundable offences relating to matrimonial disputes. – In our view, it is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly, when the same are on considerable increase. Even if the offences are non-compoundable, if they relate to matrimonial disputes and the court is satisfied that the parties have settled the same amicably and without any pressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends of justice, Section 320 of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or the subsequent criminal proceedings. 13) There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. The institution of marriage occupies an important place and it has an important role to play in the society. Therefore, every effort should be made in the interest of the individuals in order to enable them to settle down in life and live peacefully. If the parties ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law, in order to do complete justice in the matrimonial matters, the courts should be less hesitant in exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction. It is trite to state that the power under Section 482 should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection only when the court is convinced, on the basis of material on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. We also make it clear that exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it has to be exercised in appropriate cases in order to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. It is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes and Section 482 of the Code enables the High Court and Article 142 of the Constitution enables this Court to pass such orders. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in appropriate cases in order to meet the ends of justice and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. Under these circumstances, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court dated 04.07.2012 passed in M.CR.C. No. 2877 of 2012 and quash the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 4166 of 2011 pending on the file of Judicial Magistrate Class-I, Indore. 15) The appeal is allowed.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 447 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 6462 of 2012) Jitendra Raghuvanshi & Ors. …. Appellant(s) Versus Babita Raghuvanshi & Anr. …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam,J. 1) Leave granted. 2) The important question … Continue reading

liability of insurance companies =”One of the contentions raised in these appeals is the correctness of a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd., Chandigarh vs. Nicolletta Rohtagi and Ors., – 2002 (7) SCC 456, which is said to be pending consideration in a large number of cases before this Court. Assailing the correctness of the aforesaid decision Mr. Atul Nanda submits that therein the liability of the insurer to reimburse the insured on two premises, namely, (1) just compensation; and (2) whose liability would be to pay, as envisaged under sub-section (1) of section 149 vis-`- vis the right of the aggrieved persons (Which would include the insured) to prefer an appeal in terms of section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, had not been considered in the backdrop of the history in which sub-section (1) of section 149 was enacted. Apart from the question raised by Mr. Nanda, we are of the opinion that the matter may be considered from other angles, namely, whether the insurer shall be wholly without any remedy even if the amount of compensation is determined in violation of the standard formula envisaged under the second schedule of the Act or in clear violation of the ratio (s) laid down by this Court. We, therefore, are of the opinion that it is a fit case where the matter should be referred to larger Bench. We direct accordingly. Let the records of the case be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders.”

1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.6026-6027 OF 2007 United India Insurance Co. Ltd. … Appellant Vs. Shila Datta & Ors. … Respondents With Civil Appeal No. 6717 of 2004 Civil Appeal Nos. 798-800 of 2006 Civil Appeal Nos. 1891 of 2008 Civil Appeal No. 1889 of 2008 … Continue reading

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