This tag is associated with 21 posts

Whether the legal heirs are entitled for insured amount ,when a person died during the grace period of payment of premium to his LIC POIICY, ? – yes- Payment of premiums – A grace period of one month but not less than 30 days will be allowed for payment of yearly, half-yearly or quarterly premiums and 15 days for monthly premiums. If death occurs within this period and before the payment of the premium then due, the policy will still be valid and the sum assured paid after deduction of the said premium as also unpaid premium/s falling due before the next anniversary of the policy. If the premium is not paid before the expiry of the days of grace, the policy lapses.’ 10. The aforesaid clause specifically provides that grace period of one month shall not be less than 30 days. One month can extend upto 31 days. And, therefore, in the present case, during the grace period the deceased expired. Hence, as per the aforesaid clause the policy would be valid and the heirs are entitled to the sum assured after deduction of the premium payable”.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI REVISION PETITION No. 1338 OF 2011 (From the order dated 07.02.2011 in First Appeal No.238 of 2010 of the West Bengal State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Kolkata) Life Insurance Corporation of India Represented by its Branch Manager Sainthia Branch                                                                  Petitioner P.O. & P.S. Sainthia District Birbhum, West Bengal versus … Continue reading

4. Disconnection of TV channel signals 4.1 No broadcaster or multi system operator shall disconnect the TV channel signals to a distributor of Page 23 of 29 TV channels without giving three weeks‟ notice to the distributor clearly giving the reasons for the proposed action. Provided that a notice would also be required before disconnection of signals to a distributor of TV channels if there was an agreement [a written agreement], permitting the distribution of the broadcasting service, which has expired due to efflux of time. Provided further that no notice would be required if there is no [written agreement], permitting the distribution of the signals. 4.3 A broadcaster/ multi system operator/ distributor of TV channels shall inform the consumers about such dispute to enable them to protect their interests. Accordingly, the notice to disconnect signals shall also be given in two local newspapers out of which at least one notice shall be given in local language in a newspaper which is published in the local language, in case the distributor of TV channels is operating in one district and in two national newspapers in case the distributor of TV channels is providing services in more than one district. The period of three weeks mentioned in sub-clauses 4.1 and 4.2 of this regulation shall start from the date of publication of the notice in the newspapers or the date of service of the notice on the service provider, whichever is later.” 53. Bare perusal of Clause 4.1 of the Regulations and the proviso appended thereto would clearly go to show that no notice would be required to be issued if a written agreement permitting distribution of signals has not been entered into. . There cannot be any doubt or dispute that the Petitioner must restitute the benefit, it received by way of supply of signals of the channels from the Respondent of which it is the Content Aggregator in terms of the interim order. If the area Indira Nagar did not form part of the agreement, the Petitioner must restore the benefit in relation thereto to the Respondent. We, however, in view of the submissions of Mr.Mishra need not go into the question of quantum thereof. 66. Sofar as question of balancing the equities between the parties is concerned, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the same does not arise. 67. Petitioner is not entitled to any equity. It having not entered into any agreement in respect of the area of Indira Nagar, it cannot be permitted by reason of a judicial fiat to continue to operate in the said area without any agreement in that behalf. It having resorted to unauthorized cable casting has made itself liable for discontinuance of supply of signals at the hands of the Respondent. Respondent cannot be deprived of such a right to which it is otherwise entitled to under the Regulations. Page 29 of 29 68. Liberty is granted to the Respondent to file an appropriate petition with regard to realization of its dues. 69. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed with costs and with the aforementioned observations

TELECOM DISPUTES SETTLEMENT & APPELLATE TRIBUNAL NEW DELHI Dated : 2.5.2012 Petition No.254 (C)/2011 Lucknow 9 Cable Network Pvt. Ltd. … Petitioner Vs. MSM Discovery Pvt. Ltd. … Respondent BEFORE: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.B. SINHA, CHAIRPERSON HON’BLE MR.P.K. RASTOGI, MEMBER For Petitioner : Mr.Vikram Singh, Advocate Mr.Kamal Kapoor, Advocate. For Respondent : Mr.A.C. Mishra, Advocate.Page … Continue reading

Title: Method and apparatus for enhanced nano-spectroscopic scanning I have reviewed the examiner’s report, and I agree that there are appropriately raised objections. The applicant has chosen not to defend the application. They have provided no submissions disputing the objections, and have not proposed any amendment to attempt to overcome the objections. In these circumstances there are no reasonable prospects of the applicant overcoming the objections. The application should be refused.

VP Holding, LLC [2012] APO 2 (10 January 2012) Last Updated: 11 January 2012 IP AUSTRALIA   AUSTRALIAN PATENT OFFICE   VP Holding, LLC [2012] APO 2   Patent Application: 2010214699   Title: Method and apparatus for enhanced nano-spectroscopic scanning   Patent Applicant: VP Holding, LLC   Delegate: E J Knock   Decision Date: 10 January … Continue reading

1. “Whether the Appellate Tribunal is justified in holding that development of software amounts to manufacture of an article or goods and the export of such goods secure the benefit of deduction to the assessee u/s.80HHC of the I.T. Act ? 2. Whether the Appellate Tribunal is justified in not holding that insertion of Sec. 80HHE of the I.T. Act w.e.f. 1.4.1991 providing for grant of deduction on software development only w.e.f. 1.4.1991 militates against grant of such deduction u/s.80HHC for the anterior period ?”

A.P.HIGH COURT THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI MADAN B. LOKUR AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR ITTA No.42 of 1999 2-1-2012 The Commissioner of Income Tax, A.P.-I,Hyderabad M/s. Ajay Automation (P) Ltd., Hyderabad COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER: Shri S.R. Ashok, Senior Standing Counsel for Income Tax COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT: – JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble the … Continue reading

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD 2. The appellant herein is one of the leading and most reputed company in India and dealing in all goods of manufacturing and marketing quality edible oil, toiletries, coconut oil, cosmetic products, masala, spices of various kinds, butter, ghee, milk and dairy products and goods allied thereto. In the year 1941 they adopted the trade mark “SHALIMAR” from the initial of their trading style and has been using continuously in respect of wide range of goods and services. The said name “SHALIMAR” is the appellant’s house mark. 25. In an opposition proceedings, the onus is on the applicant for registration to prove his case. The respondent herein who is the applicant for registration has failed to satisfy that the registration if granted would not cause any confusion or deception. 26. The respondent’s adoption in our considered opinion is not honest. When the adoption is dishonest, the respondent cannot be said to be the proprietor of the trade mark. It is also stated that when the adoption is dishonest any amount of user will be of no use. The respondents when are not the proprietors of the trade mark the registration would then be in contravention of Section 18 of the Act. 27. The class of customers are to be considered while deciding the question of similarity. The word and device of “CHEF” is the feature which is likely to cause confusion among the public. The class of customers in the instant case would be both literate and illiterate people who would go by the overall artistic work. Therefore there is every possibility of confusion being caused among the public. 28. For the above reasons, we are of the view that the impugned trade marks cannot be granted registration. Consequently, the appeal OA/26/2010/TM/CH is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous Petition No.125/2010 in OA/26/2010/TM/CH is closed.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATEBOARD Guna Complex Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443, Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai-600018     M.P. No.125/2010 in OA/26/2010/TM/CH AND OA/26/2010/TM/CH            WEDNESDAY, THIS THE 4th DAY OF APRIL, 2012     Hon’ble Smt. Justice Prabha Sridevan                     …   Chairman Hon’ble Ms.S. Usha                                                        …  Vice-Chairman     Shalimar Chemical Works Limited, an Indian Public … Continue reading

cell phone deficiency in service , consumer court has no jurisdiction= 5. In line with the judgement in the case of M. Krishnan (Supra), this Commission vide its order dated 21.5.2010 (Revision Petition No. No.1703 of 2010) in the case of Prakash Verma Vs. Idea Cellular Ltd. and Anr., dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner holding that any dispute between the subscriber and the telegraph authority can be resolved by taking recourse to arbitration proceedings only. The Special Leave Petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Apex Court vide its order dated 1.10.2010. In view of these judgements of the Apex Court which are binding on all the courts including Consumer Fora, no fault could be found with the impugned order. The order of this Commission in the case of Kumari Ambika Singh cannot provide any relief to the petitioner since in that case there was no reference to the aforesaid judgements of the Apex Court and the revision petition came to be dismissed in liminie and hence there was no point raised by the parties in respect of question of maintainability of the dispute under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. In any case, the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in respect of the dispute under section 7B of the Indian Telegraph Act, as is the case with the present dispute as well, has to be followed and there should not be any doubt about it. The revision petition devoid of any merit, therefore, is liable for dismissal and the same is accordingly dismissed but with no order as to costs.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI   REVISION PETITION NO. 3780 OF  2011 (Against the order dated 07.07.2011 in Appeal No. 862/2011 of the  Haryana State Consumer  Disputes Redressal Commission, Panchkula)   Lokesh Parashar Advocate R/o Holiwara Mohalla V.P.O., Tegaon and District Faridabad (Haryana)   …….. Petitioner (s)                               Vs.   1.  M/s Idea Cellular Ltd. … Continue reading

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD Application for removal of the trade mark “Krupa Homoeopathists” registered under No.1344586 in Class 42 from the register of trade marks under the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). =23. The impugned trade mark “Krupa Homoeopathists” has been put to use since 1997 which fact has not been refuted/denied by the applicant. The wordings in the letter dated 08.05.1998 written by the applicant on behalf of Dr. Sundara Rao to the respondent seems to be not natural. Dr. Sundara Rao could not have anticipated things in advance. The respondent’s explanation for adoption of the trade mark ‘K’ stands for Kothari and Rupa is her name is something which cannot be accepted. No doubt Dr. Sundara Rao with his blessings allowed the respondent to use the name “Krupa Homoeopathists” as her clinic name. The respondent has applied for registration after the death of Dr. Sundara Rao which cannot be said to be bonafide. Considering the facts stated above and in the interest of justice, we exercise our discretion and allow the registration to continue on the register with area limitation. The registration granted will be restricted to the State ofMaharashtra only. The applicant shall have the right to continue her services under the said trade mark. 24. Accordingly, the rectification application is disposed of with a direction to the Registrar of Trade Marks to impose the area limitation and to issue a fresh registration certificate on the respondent surrendering the original certificate of registration No.1344586 in Class 42. No order as to costs.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD Guna Complex Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443, Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai-600018     ORA/8/2010/TM/MUM     WEDNESDAY, THIS THE 28th DAY OF DECEMBER, 2011   Hon’ble Smt. Justice Prabha Sridevan                   …   Chairman Hon’ble Ms.S. Usha                                                  …  Vice-Chairman   Mrs. Susheelamma Sundara Rao                              …  Applicant Trading as Krupa Homoeopathists at No.31, City … Continue reading

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD This Appeal arises out of the order dated 30.09.2006 refusing the application for registration and the opposition under No. 172888 in Class 9. The appellants herein filed an application for registration of the Trade Mark CAP CAB on 03.11.2000 in Class 9 under No. 967948 claiming user since 01.04.1986 in respect of various kinds of electrical wires and cables. The said application was advertised before acceptance in the Trade Mark Journal MEGA – 6 dated 25.11.2003 at page 3580 under the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The respondent herein filed their notice of opposition opposing the registration on the ground that they are the Registered Proprietors of the Trade Mark CAP CAB under No. 750328 in Class 17 as of 03.01.1997. The respondent had also filed an application under No. 750328 in Class 17 which is under opposition. The respondent’s main contention was that they had adopted the Trade mark as early as 1981 and had been using the same continuously and extensively since then. =23. On perusal of the records, it is seen that both the appellants and the respondents are carrying on a business of similar goods with identical marks. In the case of deciding the issue of deceptive similarity, the class of customers are to be considered. The class of customers here would belong to all categories. In such circumstances, we will have to consider the priority in use. Though the respondents claim user since 1981, their documents are only of the year 1990 whereas the appellants documents are from the year 1986. The public who are aware of the appellants goods since 1986 are likely to associate the goods only with that of the appellants goods. There is no doubt the onus is always on the appellant / applicant to prove that there has been no instance of confusion in the market. The appellant being prior in use, if at all there is confusion it will only be because of the respondent’s goods. The onus, therefore now shifts on the respondent to prove confusion, which has not been satisfied. We, therefore, do not think there is any valid reason to refuse the application for registration. 24. For the above mentioned reasons, the appeal is allowed and the application for registration of the trade mark CAP CAB under No. 967948 in Class 9 is allowed to proceed for registration. No order as to costs. In view of the fact that the appeal has been disposed off, nothing survives in the Miscellaneous Petition.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATEBOARD Guna Complex Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443 Anna Salai,  Teynampet, Chennai-600018                                             ***** (CIRCUIT BENCH SITTING AT DELHI)   M.P.No.280/2007 IN  OA/08/2007/ TM/DEL AND OA/08/2007/TM/DEL   WEDNESDAY THIS THE 28th DAY OF DECEMBER,  2011   HON’BLE SMT.JUSTICE PRABHA SRIDEVAN                …  CHAIRMAN HON’BLE MS. S. USHA                                                      …  VICE CHAIRMAN   Shri Rajnish Kohli, S/o Shri … Continue reading

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates the manufacture, sale, and labeling of prescription drugs. A brand-name drug manufacturer seeking FDA approval for a drug submits a new drug application (NDA) containing, among other things, a statement of the drug’s components and proposed labeling describing the uses for which the drug may be marketed. See 21 U. S. C. §§355(b)(1), (d). Once the FDA has approved a brand manufacturer’s drug, another company may seek permission to market a generic version by filing an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA). See §§355(j)(2)(A)(ii), (iv). But the FDA cannot authorize a generic drug that would infringe a brand manufacturer’s patent. To facilitate the approval of generic drugs as soon as patents allow, the Hatch-Waxman Amendments require a brand manufacturer to submit its patent numbers and expiration dates, §355(b)(1); and FDA regulations require a description of any method-of-use patent, known as a use code, see 21 CFR §§314.53(c)(2)(ii)(P)(3), (e). The FDA does not attempt to verify the accuracy of the use codes that brand manufacturers supply. Instead, it simply publishes the codes, patent numbers, and expiration dates in a large volume known as the Orange Book. After consulting the Orange Book, an ANDA applicant enters one of several certifications to assure the FDA that its generic drug will not infringe the brand’s patent. If the patent has not expired, an applicant may fulfill this requirement in one of two ways. First, it may submit a so-called section viii statement asserting that it will market the drug for only those methods of use not covered by the brand’s patent, see 21 U. S. C. §355(j)(2)(A)(viii), and proposing a label that “carves out” the still-patented method(s) of use, see 21 CFR 2 CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES, LTD. v. NOVO NORDISK A/S Syllabus §314.94(a)(8)(iv). The FDA will not approve an ANDA with a section viii statement if the proposed label overlaps at all with the brand’s use code. Second, the ANDA applicant may file a so-called paragraph IV certification stating that the brand’s patent “is invalid or will not be infringed by the [generic drug’s] manufacture, use, or sale.” 21 U. S. C. §355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). Such filing is treated as an act of infringement, giving the brand an immediate right to sue and resulting in a delay in the generic drug’s approval. In 2002, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a study detailing evidence that brands were submitting inaccurate patent information to the FDA in order to prevent or delay the marketing of generic drugs. In response, Congress created a statutory counterclaim available to generic manufacturers sued for patent infringement. The provision allows a generic manufacturer to “assert a counterclaim seeking an order requiring the [brand] to correct or delete the patent information submitted by the [brand] under subsection (b) or (c) [of 21 U. S. C. §355] on the ground that the patent does not claim . . . an approved method of using the drug.” 21 U. S. C. §355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(I). This case concerns the scope of the counterclaim provision. Respondents (collectively Novo) manufacture the brand-name version of the diabetes drug repaglinide. The FDA has approved three uses of the drug, but Novo’s method-of-use patent claims only one. Petitioners (collectively Caraco) wish to market a generic version of the drug for the other two approved methods of use. Caraco initially filed a paragraph IV certification and, considering this an act of infringement, Novo brought suit. Caraco then submitted a section viii statement and a proposed label carving out Novo’s patented therapy. But before the FDA could approve Caraco’s ANDA, Novo changed its use code to indicate that it held a patent on all three approved methods of using repaglinide. Because Caraco’s proposed label now overlapped with Novo’s use code, the FDA would not permit Caraco to employ section viii to bring its drug to market. Caraco filed a statutory counterclaim in the ongoing infringement action, seeking an order requiring Novo to “correct” its use code because the patent did not claim two of the three approved methods of using repaglinide. The District Court granted Caraco summary judgment, but the Federal Circuit reversed. It read the counterclaim’s phrase “the patent does not claim . . . an approved method of using the drug” as requiring Caraco to demonstrate that Novo’s patent does not claim any approved method of use; because the patent covers one approved method, the counterclaim was unavailable. The court also ruled that the counterclaim provision does not reach use codes because they are not “patent information submitted by the Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 3 Syllabus [brand] under subsection (b) or (c)” of §355. That information, the court concluded, consists only of the patent number and expiration date expressly required by the statutory provisions. Held: A generic manufacturer may employ the counterclaim provision to force correction of a use code that inaccurately describes the brand’s patent as covering a particular method of using a drug. Pp. 10–24. (a) The parties first dispute the meaning of “not an” in the phrase “the patent does not claim . . . an approved method of using the drug.” Novo contends that the counterclaim is available only if the patent claims no approved method of use, but Caraco reads this language to permit a counterclaim whenever a patent does not claim the particular method that the ANDA applicant seeks to market. In isolation, either of these readings is plausible, so the meaning of the phrase “not an” turns on statutory context, see Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. ___, ___. This context favors Caraco: Congress understood that a drug may have multiple methods of use, not all of which a patent covers; and a section viii statement allows the FDA to approve a generic drug for unpatented uses so that it can quickly come to market. The statute thus contemplates that one patented use will not foreclose marketing a generic drug for other unpatented ones. Within this scheme, the counterclaim naturally functions to challenge the brand’s assertion of rights over whichever discrete uses the generic company wishes to pursue; the counterclaim’s availability matches the availability of FDA approval under the statute. Pp. 11–15. (b) The parties further dispute whether use codes qualify as “patent information submitted by the [brand] under subsection (b) or (c)” of §355. A use code, which is a description of the patent, surely qualifies as “patent information.” Novo nonetheless contends that use codes are not “submitted under” subsections (b) and (c) because those provisions expressly require an NDA applicant to provide only “the patent number and the expiration date of any patent” claiming the drug or a method of its use. But §§355(b) and (c) also govern the regulatory process by which brands provide additional patent information to the FDA. The term “under” is broad enough to include patent information, like use codes, that brands submit as required by this scheme. This reading draws support from the Court’s prior decisions in e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U. S. 661, 665– 668, and Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129, 135; and it is bolstered by Congress’s use of the narrower phrases “described in” and “prescribed by” in neighboring provisions. See §§355(c)(2), (d)(6). Again, the conclusion that use codes are “submitted under” §§355(b) and (c) fits the broader statutory context. Use codes are pivotal to the FDA’s implementation of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, and so it is unsur- 4 CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES, LTD. v. NOVO NORDISK A/S Syllabus prising that the counterclaim provision’s language sweeps widely enough to embrace them. Pp. 15–18. (c) The counterclaim provision’s description of available remedies dispatches whatever remains of Novo’s arguments. The Court’s reading gives content to both remedies: It “delete[s]” a listing from the Orange Book when the brand holds no relevant patent and “correct[s]” the listing when the brand has misdescribed the patent’s scope. By contrast, Novo’s interpretation would all but read “correct” out of the statute. If, as Novo contends, the counterclaim is available only where the patent claims no approved method of use, the remedy will always be to delete the patent information. And if the counterclaim reaches only patent numbers and expiration dates, the Orange Book will include few if any mistakes in need of correction. Pp. 18– 20. (d) Novo advances two arguments relating to the counterclaim’s drafting history, but neither overcomes the statutory text and context. The company first points out that Congress failed to pass an earlier bill that would have required brands to file descriptions of method-of-use patents and would have allowed generic companies to bring civil actions to “delete” or “correct” the information filed. Because that bill would have allowed a generic applicant to challenge overbroad descriptions of a patent, Novo contends that this Court cannot read the statute that was eventually enacted as doing the same. But the earlier bill contained numerous items that may have caused its failure. And the limited criticism of its mechanism for challenging brands’ descriptions of their patents focused on the creation of an independent cause of action—stronger medicine than the counterclaim at issue here. Finally, between that bill’s demise and the counterclaim’s enactment, the FDA issued a rule requiring brands to supply use codes. The counterclaim provision’s drafters thus had no need to require this information. Novo next contends that Congress established the counterclaim only to address the impossibility of deleting an improperly listed patent from the Orange Book—a problem that had come to light when the Federal Circuit held in Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F. 3d 1323, that generics had no cause of action to delist a patent. Novo thus contends that the counterclaim is a mere delisting provision. But this Court thinks Mylan alerted Congress to a broader problem: that generic companies generally had no avenue to challenge the accuracy of brands’ patent listings, and that the FDA therefore could not approve proper applications to bring inexpensive drugs to market. Again, the proof of that lies in the statute itself—its text and context demonstrate that the counterclaim is available not only (as in Mylan) when the patent listing is baseless, but also (as here) Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 5 Syllabus when it is overbroad. Moreover, Congress’s equation of the two situations makes perfect sense. In either case, the brand submits misleading patent information to the FDA, delaying or blocking approval of a generic drug that infringes no patent and thus, under the statute, should go to market. Pp. 20–24. 601 F. 3d 1359, reversed and remanded. KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimou

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2011 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for … Continue reading

Supreme Court of Singapore – High Court 1 This is an appeal against an order of costs made by a District Judge in a defamation action arising from an email sent by the Appellant to two managers of the parent company of the Respondent’s employer. The District Judge had ordered that each party was to bear his own costs after dismissing the action. 33 Second, and perhaps more importantly, although the District Judge’s finding that the Email was not defamatory is not on appeal, it was at least arguable that the Email was defamatory. It is well established that the test for determining the natural and ordinary meaning of allegedly defamatory words is the meaning that the words would “convey to an ordinary reasonable person, not unduly suspicious or avid for scandal, using his general knowledge and common sense” (see Review Publishing Co Ltd and another v Lee Hsien Loong and another appeal [2010] 1 SLR 52 at [27]). In my view, the natural and ordinary meaning of the Email was that the Respondent was diverting business from DMS (his employer) to IT Wireless, a company of which he was a shadow director and from which he was receiving dividends. It is arguable that this meaning of the Email was defamatory. It is, of course, not defamatory to simply call someone a shadow director. However, the Email goes beyond that. The suggestion is that the Respondent was engaged in self-dealing. In establishing the defence of justification which the Appellant had pleaded as one of his defences, the Appellant would have to prove, inter alia, at the trial that the Respondent was indeed a shadow director of IT Wireless, the company that the Respondent was diverting business to whilst as an employee of DMS. If it was arguable that the Email was defamatory, then the Appellant’s conduct of the litigation in the proceedings below was reasonable. There was no reason therefore to depart from the general rule that costs should follow the event. 35 For the reasons above, I allow the appeal. The District Judge’s order that each party was to bear his own costs of the trial is set aside. I order the Respondent to pay the Appellant’s costs of the trial.

Low Leong Meng v Koh Poh Seng – [2012] SGHC 1 (3 January 2012) Low Leong Meng v Koh Poh Seng [2012] SGHC 1   Suit No: District Court Appeal No 31 of 2011 Decision Date: 3 January 2012 Court: High Court Coram: Chan Seng Onn J Counsel: Mr Simon Jones and Mr Jayagobi Jayaram (Grays … Continue reading

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