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undergone mental torture at the hands of insensible police officials. He might have agitated to ameliorate the cause of the poor and the downtrodden, but, the social humiliation that has been meted to him is quite capable of destroying the heart of his philosophy. It has been said that philosophy has the power to sustain a man’s courage. But courage is based on self-respect and when self-respect is dented, it is difficult even for a very strong minded person to maintain that courage. The initial invincible mind paves the path of corrosion. As is perceptible, the mindset of the protectors of law appears to cause torment and insult and tyrannize the man who is helpless in custody. There can be no trace of doubt that he is bound to develop stress disorder and anxiety which destroy the brightness and strength of the will power. It has been said that anxiety and stress are slow poisons. When torment is added, it creates commotion in the mind and the slow poisons get activated. The inhuman treatment can be well visualized when the appellant came out from custody and witnessed his photograph being circulated with the self-condemning words written on it. This withers away the very essence of life as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. Regard being had to the various aspects which we have analysed and taking note of the totality of facts and circumstances, we are disposed to think that a sum of Rs.5.00 lacs (Rupees five lacs only) should be granted towards compensation to the appellant and, accordingly, we so direct. The said amount shall be paid by the respondent State within a period of six weeks and be realized from the erring officers in equal proportions from their salary as thought appropriate by the competent authority of the State. 47. Consequently, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 5703/2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 34702 of 2010) Dr. Mehmood Nayyar Azam ….. Appellant Versus State of Chattisgarh and Ors. … Respondents   J U D G M E N T     Dipak Misra, J   Leave granted. 2. Albert … Continue reading

Penal Code, 1860-Sections 375, 376, 417 and 90-Rape-Accused forcibly committed sexual intercourse with a girl of tender age and thereafter continued to do so by promising to marry her-Girl became pregnant and he refused to marry her-Held: He is guilty of offence punishable u/ss.376 and 417 as his intention was never bonafide-Consent of girl was not obtained voluntarily but under misconception of fact that he intends to marry her-Such consent cannot condone the offence-Section 90 IPC can be invoked-Evidence Act, Section 114-A. Prosecution’s case was that the prosecutrix PW-1 had been attending to cooking at her sister’s house where accused was a frequent visitor. He persuaded her to indulge in sexual intercourse. She resisted to this for sometime but one day accused forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her against her will and consent. When she protested that he had spoiled her life, he promised that he would marry her. Thereafter, he continued to have sexual intercourse with her. When she became pregnant, she insisted him to marry her but he refused. PW-1 told her sister about her pregnancy. Matter was reported to Panchayat. Accused accepted the guilt and promised to marry but subsequently absconded from village. Police registered a case for offence punishable u/ss. 376 and 417 IPC. PW-1 was sent for medical examination. Doctor confirmed about the pregnancy and further opined that the age of PW-1 was not less than 15 years and not more than 17 years. Sessions Judge acquitted the accused. On appeal, High Court held that the sexual intercourse by accused with PW-1 by falsely promising to marry her, attracts the category of offence punishable u/ss. 376 and 417 IPC and sentenced him to undergo RI for 7 years. In these appeals, the questions for consideration are, that when the accused committed sexual intercourse with PW-1 holding out a promise for marriage whether this will amount to a consent or not and whether this conduct of accused falls under any of one six description of Section 375 IPC. Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. The conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant is correct and no case is made out for interference. The intention of the accused was, right from the beginning, not honest and he kept on promising that he will marry her, till she became pregnant. This kind of consent obtained by the accused cannot be said to be any consent because she was under a misconception of fact that the accused intends to marry her, therefore, she had submitted to sexual intercourse with him. This fact is also admitted by the accused that he had committed sexual intercourse which is apparent from the testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 3 and before Panchayat of elders of the village. The poor girl submitted to the lust of the accused completely being misled by the accused who held out the promise for marriage. This kind of consent taken by the accused with clear intention not to fulfil the promise and persuaded the girl to believe that he is going to marry her and obtained her consent for the sexual intercourse under total misconception cannot be treated to be a consent. Hence, Section 90 IPC can be invoked. [767-c-d; e-f; 768-a] Jayanti Rani Panda v. State of West Bengal and Anr., (1984) Crl.L.J.1535 – distinguished. 2.1. It is always matter of evidence whether consent was obtained willingly, or consent has been obtained by holding a false promise which the accused never intended to fulfil. If the court of facts come to the conclusion that the consent has been obtained under misconception and the accused persuaded a girl of tender age that he would marry her then in that case it can always be said that such consent was not obtained voluntarily but under a misconception of fact and the accused right from the beginning never intended to fulfil the promise. Such consent cannot condone the offence. [768-b-c] Emperor v. Mussammat Soma, (1917) Crl.L.J.R. 18 and Deelip Singh Alias Dilip Kumar v. State of Bihar, [2005] 1 SCC 88, distinguished. 2.2. What is a voluntary consent and what is not a voluntary consent depends on the facts of each case. In order to appreciate the testimony, one has to see the factors like the age of the girl, her education and her status in the society and likewise the social status of the boy. If the attending circumstances lead to the conclusion that it was not only the accused but prosecutrix was also equally keen, then in that case the offence is condoned. But in case a poor girl placed in a peculiar circumstance where her father has died and she does not understand what the consequences may result for indulging into such acts and when the accused promised to marry but he never intended to marry right from the beginning then the consent of the girl is of no consequence and falls in the second category as enumerated in Section 375 – “without her consent”. A consent obtained by misconception while playing a fraud is not a consent. [771-b-d] Uday v. State of Karnataka, [2003] 4 SCC 46, distinguished. Reg. v. William, (1850) Crl. Law. Cases 220 Vol. IV; The Queen v. Flattery, (1877) 2 QBD 410 and The King v. Williams, (1923) 1 KB 340 – referred to. 3. In terms of Section 114 A introduced by amendment in Evidence Act, a presumption is raised as to the absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape. If sexual intercourse has been committed by the accused and if it is proved that it was without the consent of the prosecutrix and she states in her evidence before the court that she did not consent, the Court shall presume that she did not consent. Presumption has been introduced by the legislature in the Evidence Act looking to atrocities committed against women. Sunita Pandit and Rameshwar Prasad Goyal for the Appellant. P. Vinay Kumar and D. Bharathi Reddy for the Respondent., 2006(6 )Suppl.SCR760 , 2006(11 )SCC615 , 2006(9 )SCALE692 ,

CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 1369 of 2004 PETITIONER: Yedla Srinivasa Rao RESPONDENT: State of A.P. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/09/2006 BENCH: A.K. Mathur & Altamas Kabir JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT A.K. MATHUR, J. Both these appeals arise out of two orders passed on 25.2.2004 and 18.6.2004 by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh convicting and sentencing accused – … Continue reading

SO MANY PARENTS ENTERTAINING DOUBT TO SAY THAT THEY HAVE FORCED TO GIVE DOWRY SEC.7(3) OF THE D.P.ACT PROTECTS THE PARENTS WHO GAVE DOWRY.“The petitioner has sought prosecution on the basis of the statement of giving dowry by the father of the complainant. From perusal of the statement made in the complaint, I find no such incriminating statement of voluntarily giving dowry for marriage. The statement regarding giving presents ‘UPHAR’ does not come within the ambit of definition of dowry. Moreover, the father of the complainant is an aggrieved person from whom dowry was being demanded. Such aggrieved person is protected under Section 7 (3) from prosecution under the Act.”

A.P.HIGH COURT   THE HON‘BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU                         CRIMINAL PETITION NO.7352  OF 2010 ORDER: This petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings in Cr. No.115 of 2010 on the file of Kanchanbagh Police Station, Hyderabad, which was registered for the offence punishable under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short ‘the … Continue reading

SERVICE MATTER The controversy pertaining to reservation in promotion for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes with consequential seniority as engrafted under Articles 16(4A) and 16(4B) and the facet of relaxation grafted by way of a proviso to Article 335 of the Constitution of India being incorporated by the Constitution (Seventy-seventh Amendment) Act, 1995, the Constitution (Eight-first Amendment) Act, 2000, the Constitution (Eighty-second Amendment) Act, 2000 and the Constitution (Eighty-fifth Amendment) Act, 2001 at various stages having withstood judicial scrutiny by the dictum in M. Nagaraj v. Union of India[1], the issue of implementation of the same through existing statutory enactment by the State Legislature and the subsequent rules framed by the authorities of the State or concerned corporation of the State of Uttar Pradesh, has, as the learned counsel appearing for both sides in their astute and penetrating manner have pyramided the concept in its essentiality, either appeared too simple that simplification may envy or so complex that it could manifest as the reservoir of imbalances or a sanctuary of uncertainties. Thus, the net result commands for an endeavour for a detailed survey of the past and casts an obligation to dwell upon the controversy within the requisite parameters that are absolutely essential for adjudication of the lis emanated in praesenti.=In the ultimate analysis, we conclude and hold that Section 3(7) of the 1994 Act and Rule 8A of the 2007 Rules are ultra vires as they run counter to the dictum in M. Nagaraj (supra). Any promotion that has been given on the dictum of Indra Sawhney (supra) and without the aid or assistance of Section 3(7) and Rule 8A shall remain undisturbed. 43. The appeals arising out of the final judgment of Division Bench at Allahabad are allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The appeals arising out of the judgment from the Division Bench at Lucknow is affirmed subject to the modification as stated hereinabove. In view of the aforesaid, all other appeals are disposed of. The parties shall bear their respective costs.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 2608 OF 2011 U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. … Appellant Versus Rajesh Kumar & Ors. … Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4009____ OF 2012 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 10217/2011) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. _4022___ OF 2012 (arising out of SLP (C) No. … Continue reading

Penal Code, 1860: s.306 – Suicidal death of a pregnant woman in her matrimonial home within 4 years of her marriage – Husband and in-laws convicted by trial court u/s 304-B – High Court converting the conviction of husband u/s 306 and acquitting the in-laws – HELD: There was no evidence of any demand for dowry soon before the death – High Court concluded that deceased had not committed suicide on account of demands for dowry but due to harassment caused by her husband and it had compounded the acute depression from which deceased was suffering after the murder of her father – High Court was fully justified in convicting the husband u/s 306 – Criminal Law – Framing of charges. ss. 304-B and 306 – Dowry death and abetment of suicide – Explained. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: ss. 221(1) and (2) – Framing of charge – Conviction by trial court u/s 304- B IPC – High Court converting the conviction to one u/s 306 IPC – HELD: Nature of offence punishable u/ss 304-B and 306 IPC are not of distinct/different categories – High Court appropriately converted the conviction from s. 304-B to s. 306 IPC. The wife of the appellant, who was pregnant, committed suicide in her matrimonial home within four years of her marriage with the appellant. The prosecution case was that the accused, namely, the appellant and his parents, harassed the deceased for dowry. The trial court held that the evidence on record indicated that demands for dowry had been made from the deceased time and again and that she had been harassed and compelled to commit suicide. It further held that ingredients of s.304-B IPC were satisfied on the presumptions raised u/s 114-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 and, accordingly, convicted the three accused u/s 304 IPC with a sentence of 7 years RI each. On appeal, the High Court held that the deceased had not committed suicide on account of demands for dowry, but due to harassment caused by the husband. It converted the conviction of the husband from s.304-B IPC to s.306 IPC with two years RI and acquitted his parents. In the instant appeal filed by the husband-accused, it was contended for the appellant that because of the murder of the father of the deceased by extremists, she was under acute depression as a result of which she committed suicide and there was no distinction between his case and the case of his parents who were acquitted by the High Court; and that the High Court committed a grave error in convicting him u/s 306 IPC as the nature of offence punishable u/s 304 IPC was distinct and different from the offence punishable u/s 306 IPC and he was never charged with s.306 IPC. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The High Court, on examination of the entire evidence, concluded that the deceased had not committed suicide on account of demands for dowry but due to harassment caused by her husband, in particular, demanding that she should claim one of the two houses left behind by her father after his murder by extremists. The harassment by the appellant had compounded the acute depression from which the deceased was suffering after the murder of her father. There was no evidence of any demand for dowry soon before her death, and there was no demand whatsoever that the house in question should be transferred to either of the accused. Under s.304-B IPC, the cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband “for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry” is a prelude to the suicidal death of the wife. Such suicidal death is defined as `dowry death’. The High Court has recorded a firm finding that the harassment was not for or in connection with any demands for dowry. But, at the same time, the High Court has concluded that the wife committed suicide due to the harassment of the appellant, in particular. The deceased had committed suicide by drinking Organo Phosphorus poison. In such circumstances, the High Court was, therefore, fully justified in convicting the appellant u/s 306 IPC. [para 9-10] [118-E-H; 119-A-D] 2.1. It cannot be said that the appellant could not have been convicted u/s 306 IPC in the absence of a charge being framed against him under the said section. Both the trial court and the High Court have held that the deceased had committed suicide. Therefore, the nature of the offence u/s 304-B and 306 IPC are not distinct and different categories. Mere omission or defect in framing charge would not disable the court from convicting the accused for the offence which has been found to be proved on the basis of the evidence on record. In such circumstances, the matter would fall within the purview of ss. 221 (1) and (2) Cr.P.C. The High Court upon meticulous scrutiny of the entire evidence on record rightly concluded that there was no evidence to indicate the commission of the offence punishable u/s 304-B IPC. It was also observed that the deceased had committed suicide due to harassment meted out to her by the appellant but there was no evidence on record to suggest that such harassment or cruelty was made in connection to any dowry demands. Thus, cruelty or harassment sans any dowry demands which drives the wife to commit suicide attracts the offence of `abetment of suicide’ u/s 306 IPC and not s. 304-B IPC which defines the offence and punishment for `dowry death’. [para 11-12] [119-E-F; 120-C-D; 122-D-H] 2.2. In the facts of the case, the High Court very appropriately converted the conviction from s. 304-B to s. 306 IPC. There has been no failure of justice in the conviction of the appellant u/s 306 IPC by the High Court, even though the specific charge had not been framed. [para 12-13] Sangaraboina Sreenu Vs. State of A.P. 1997 (3) SCR957= 1997 (5) SCC 348; and Shamnsaheb M. Multtani Vs. State of Karnataka 2001 (1)SCR 514= 2001 (2) SCC 577- distinguished. Case Law Reference: 1997 (3) SCR 957 distinguished para 11 2001 (1)SCR 514 distinguished para 11 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 590 of 2005. From the Judgment and Order dated 6.10.2004 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 406-SB of 1992. V.C. Mahajan, Sarwa Mitter (for M/s. Mitter & Mitter Co.) for the Appellant. Kuldip Singh, R.K. Pandey, H.S. Sandhu and Ajay Pal for the Respondent.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 590 OF 2005 Narwinder Singh … Appellant VERSUS State of Punjab …Respondent JUDGMENT SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. 1. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 6th October, 2004 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in … Continue reading

Allowing the appeal of MDA and dismissing the appeal filed by the auction purchaser, the Court HELD: 1.1. A tender is an offer. It is something which invites and is communicated to notify acceptance. It must be unconditional; in the proper form, the person by whom tender is made must be able to and willing to perform his obligations. The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. However, a limited judicial review may be available in cases where it is established that the terms of the invitation to tender were so tailor made to suit the convenience of any particular person with a view to eliminate all others from participating in the bidding process. The bidders participating in the tender process have no other right except the right to equality and fair treatment in the matter of evaluation of competitive bids offered by interested persons in response to notice inviting tenders in a transparent manner and free from hidden agenda. No bidder is entitled as a matter of right to insist the Authority inviting tenders to enter into further negotiations unless the terms and conditions of notice so provided for such negotiations. [Para 17] [683-G-H; 684-A-D] 1.2. The disposal of the public property by the State or its instrumentalities partakes the character of a trust. The methods to be adopted for disposal of public property must be fair and transparent providing an opportunity to all the interested persons to participate in the process. The Authority has the right not to accept the highest bid and even to prefer a tender other than the highest bidder, if there exist good and sufficient reasons, such as, the highest bid not representing the market price but there cannot be any doubt that the Authority’s action in accepting or refusing the bid must be free from arbitrariness or favoritism. [Para 18] [684-E-G] 1.3. A mere look at the tender notice makes it clear that the two plots of land admeasuring 37,000 and 20,000 sq.mts. meant for establishing engineering colleges were advertised as a single item, though the specified reserved price was different. AMS itself mentioned different and separate bids in their tender and made a bid at Rs.560 per sq.m. for 20,000 sq.mts plot which was less than that of the reserved price. The Authority was not under any legal or constitutional obligation to entertain the bid which was much below the reserved price. The plea that there was some vagueness, uncertainty and misunderstanding in the matter of depiction of rates is clearly an after thought. AMS never sought any clarification whatsoever from the Authority as regards the fixation of reserved price in respect of 20,000 sq. mts. of plot. This plea was not raised even in the Writ Petition filed by the AMS. [Para 19] [684-G-H; 685-A-D] 1.4. The MDA, though not under any obligation, provided a further opportunity to the Society and expressed its willingness to part away with the land, provided AMS agreed to pay the reserved rate of Rs.690 per sq.m. AMS did not avail this opportunity. It expressed its desire to purchase the said land @ Rs.560 per sq.m. only. It is difficult to discern as to on what basis AMS asserted its right and insisted that the Authority should part away with its valuable land at a price lesser than that of the reserved price. AMS proceeded on the assumption as if it has some unassailable right in respect of the said plot of land merely because it had earlier got allotted adjoining plot of land for the construction of its buildings. Had the Authority conceded to the request so made by AMS it would have been an unfair and arbitrary decision and the courts may have interfered with the same in exercise of judicial review power. The tender process actually stood terminated with the letter of the MDA dated 27.11.2001 allotting 37,000 sq.mts. of land alone. The rights of AMS, if any came to an end when it informed the Authority – MDA that it was not claiming any right over the land admeasuring 20,000 sq.mts. and made a further request to delete its offer in respect of the said land. [Para 20] [685-D-H; 686-A-B] 1.5. The subsequent letters sent by AMS at its own choice is of no consequence. The MDA did not make any promise that the suggestion of AMS to allot the plot at Rs.560 per sq.m. was under its consideration. Many a letters including the letter dated 03.01.2002 of the Society makes it clear that there was no confusion whatsoever with regard to reserved price fixed at Rs.690 per sq.m. Once it is clear that there was no vagueness, uncertainty or any confusion with regard to the reserved price there is no scope for any interference in the matter by this court. The terms and conditions of tender were expressly clear by which the authority as well as the bidders were bound and such conditions are not open to judicial scrutiny unless the action of the tendering authority is found to be malicious and misuse of its statutory powers. [Para 21] [686-B-E] Tata Cellular v. UOI 1994 (6) SCC 651; Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. 2000 (2) SCC 617; Directorate of Education v. Educomp Datamatic Ltd. 2004 (4) SCC 19; Association of Registration Plates vs. UOI 2005 (1) SCC 676 and Global Energy Ltd. v. Adani Exports 2005 (4) SCC 435; Purvanchal Projects Ltd. v. Hotel Venues 2007(10) SCC 33, relied on. 1.6. The bids offered by AMS received their due attention in a fair and transparent manner free from any bias at the hands of MDA. No rights of AMS have been infringed by MDA in not giving opportunity to involve itself in lengthy negotiations. The Authority was free to make its choice and to invite fresh bids after the Society relinquished its claim in respect of the disputed plot by letter dated 17.09.2001 which was accepted by MDA. The decision of the Authority was duly communicated to the AMS by letter dated 27.11.2001. The decision so taken by the MDA resolved in infringement of rights of AMS. [Para 22] [686-F; 687-A-B] 2.1. The authorities owe a duty to act fairly but it is equally well settled that in judicial review, the court is not concerned with the merits or correctness of the decision, but with the manner in which the decision is taken or the order is made. The Court cannot substitute its own opinion for the opinion of the authority deciding the matter. [Para 25] [689-E-F] 2.2. By way of judicial review, the court cannot examine the details of the terms of the contract which have been entered into by the public bodies or the State. Courts have inherent limitations on the scope of any such enquiry. If the contract has been entered into without ignoring the procedure which can be said to be basic in nature and after an objective consideration of different options available taking into account the interest of the State and the public, then the court cannot act as an appellate court by substituting its opinion in respect of selection made for entering into such contract. But at the same time the courts can certainly examine whether `decision making process’ was reasonable, rational, not arbitrary and violative of Article 14. [Para 25] [689-G-H; 690-A-B] Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India 1979 (3) SCC 489; Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J & K 1980 (4) SCC 1; Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana 1985 (3) SCC 267; Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation 1990 (3) SCC 752; Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M & N Publications 1993(1) SCC 445; A.B. International Exports v. State Corporation of India. 2000 (3) SCC 553 and Administrative Law, 9th Edition, H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, relied on. Chief Constable of North Wales Police v. Evans (1982) 3 ALLER 141; R. v. Independent Television Commission, ex. P. TSW Broadcasting Limited (1996) JR 185; Nottinghamshire Country Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment (1986) 1 AllER 199 and Lochner v. New York 198 US 45, 76 (1995), referred to. 3.1. There is nothing on record to suggest that impugned decision was taken only for making higher financial gain and profit. However, there is nothing wrong even if any such effort was made by MDA to augment its financial resources. The effort, if any, made by MDA to augment its financial resources and revenue itself cannot be said to be unreasonable decision. It is well said that the struggle to get for the State the full value of its resources is particularly pronounced in the sale of State owned natural assets to the private sector. Whenever the Government or the authorities get less than the full value of the asset, the country is being cheated; there is a simple transfer of wealth from the citizens as a whole to whoever gets the assets `at a discount’. Most of the times the wealth of a State goes to the individuals within the country rather than to multi- national corporations; still, wealth slips away that ought to belong to the nation as a whole. The impugned action of the authority in the present case did not suffer from absence of jurisdiction nor was vitiated and ultra vires. Financial gain was not at the cost of any social welfare. [Paras 27 and 28] [693-A-D; 694-B] Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa (1991) 4 SCC 54 and Padma v. Hiralal Motilal Desarda & Ors. (2002) 7 SCC 564, referred to. 3.2. The MDA having considered the representation made by an individual to allot the land for residential purpose at the rate of Rs. 775/- per sq.m. and as well as a proposal/request of AMS to allot the land @ Rs. 690/- per sq. m. rejected both the suggestions and invited tenders after giving wide publicity. The decision of MDA could not be characterised as an unreasonable one. That was the only course left open to the Authority. The money to be realized by the sale of public auction is required to be applied towards meeting the expenses incurred by the Authority in the administration of the Act which mainly includes securing the development of the development area. [Para 29] [695-A-D] 3.3. In refusing to accept the tender of the AMS on the ground that the offer made by it was lower than that of the reserved price is legal, valid and by no stretch of imagination can be characterized as an illegal one. In fact, there was no option available to the MDA but to reject the tender of the AMS as the offer made was much below than the reserved price. [Para 30] [695-E-G] 4. The disputed land in the Master Plan was reserved for `Residential’ purpose. The residential category of use is a category in contrast with industrial, agricultural, commercial, recreational, green belt, or institutional category in use. It does not mean exclusive use for housing on every inch of the land. The expression residential use in the Master Plan means that the land can be used for housing, various other kinds of uses such as institutional, commercial etc. The MDA had earlier relaxed the use and made it for `educational’ purpose though it is earmarked for residential use in the Master Plan. There is nothing unreasonable in changing the land use and earmarking it again for `Residential’ use. Once it is clear that the land in the Master Plan was reserved for residential use where educational institutions could also be permitted within that area, it cannot be said that there has been a change of land use as such. [Para 31] [696-B-F] 5.1. AMS may have established Engineering Colleges to impart education and may have a role to play in providing education in engineering courses; but it cannot insist the MDA to provide land at the rate chosen by it for itself. The object of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 under which MDA is constituted was to provide for development of certain areas according to plan and for matters ancillary thereto. It is mainly concerned with an orderly development of the areas and balanced use of the available land within the development area. The Authority in law is not entitled to gift or freely make available any land or at a rate lesser than that of reserved price. [Para 32] [697-B-D] Unni Krishnan J.P. v. State of A.P. (1993) 1 SCC 645 and TMA Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481, referred to. 5.2. The MDA in terms of the directions of the Government vide G.O. dated 19.04.1996 has already decided to make the lands available to the institutions imparting education in engineering at a concessional rate i.e. to say 50% of the sector rate and accordingly fixed reserve price @ Rs. 690 per sq. meter. The public interest parameters have been duly taken into consideration by the Government itself in directing MDA to make the lands available to educational institutions at a concessional rate. It is difficult to appreciate as to what more the AMS expects from the Authority. The Society in fact availed that assistance from MDA on an earlier occasion but failed to avail the facility this time for which the AMS has to blame itself. The AMS having failed to offer at least the reserved price cannot be permitted to turn round and ask for a mandamus to allot the land in its favour based on self-serving representations. The AMS indulged to say the least in speculative litigation. The State had already made effective provision for securing right to education by resolving to make the land available at concessional rate to educational institutions imparting education in engineering courses. Obviously, such a decision was taken only with the view to give effect to the Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined under Article 41 of the Constitution of India. The AMS has no legal or constitutional right to make any perpetual demands and dictate terms to the MDA to allot any particular land at the chosen rate. [Para 32] [697-E-H; 698-A-D] 6. The expression `public interest’ if it is employed in a given statute is to be understood and interpreted in the light of the entire scheme, purpose and object of the enactment but in the absence of the same it cannot be pressed into service to confer any right upon a person who otherwise does not possess any such right in law. The High Court virtually converted the judicial review proceedings into an inquisitorial one. The way proceedings went on before the High court suggest as if the High Court was virtually making an inquiry into the conduct and affairs of the MDA in a case where the court was merely concerned with the decision making process of the MDA in not accepting the offer/tender of the AMS in respect of the disputed plot on the ground that the offer so made was less than that of the reserved price fixed by the MDA. The High Court went to the extent of holding that there was a concluded contract between MDA and AMS. [Para 33] [697-E-H; 698-A-D] 7. The AMS expressed its willingness to pay such reasonable price as may be fixed by this Court. The prices of the land in the vicinity of are have gone up many times and as at present prevailing rates are very high. Equity is not a one way street. The conduct of the AMS does not entitle it to get any such relief in equity. [Para 34] [700-A-C] 8. The cancellation of the auction was not tenable. But the fact remains the appellant, the auction purchaser deposited only an amount of Rs. 5,50,000/- towards earnest money out of huge amount of total consideration. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances, interference with the order of cancellation passed by MDA on 14.5.2007 in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is not called for. [Para 38] [701-E-F] 9. The MDA shall be at liberty to call for fresh tenders in accordance with law but duly notifying the land use for both `educational’ and `residential’ and invite bids accordingly. It shall permit AMS and other educational institutions intending to participate in the auction. In view of the undertaking given by MDA to this Court it shall not raise any objection for the use of the land for educational purposes in case if any educational institution is found to be the successful bidder. The bids shall obviously be invited from the intending bidders duly notifying the `residential’ and `educational’ use. [Para 39] [701-G-H; 702-A] Case Law Reference 1994 (6) SCC 651 relied on Para 21 2000 (2) SCC 617 relied on Para 21 2004 (4) SCC 19 relied on Para 21 2005 (1) SCC 676 relied on Para 21 2005 (4) SCC 435 relied on Para 21 2007(10) SCC 33 relied on Para 21 1979 (3) SCC 489 relied on Para 25 1980 (4) SCC 1 relied on Para 25 1985 (3) SCC 267 relied on Para 25 1990 (3) SCC 752 relied on Para 25 1993(1) SCC 445 relied on Para 25 2000 (3) SCC 553 relied on Para 25 (1982) 3 ALLER 141 referred to Para 23 (1996) JR 185 referred to Para 25 (1986) 1 AllER 199 referred to Para 26 198 US 45, 76 (1995) referred to Para 26 (1991) 4 SCC 54 referred to Para 28 (2002) 7 SCC 564 referred to Para 29 (1993) 1 SCC 645 referred to Para 32 (2002) 8 SCC 481 referred to Para 32 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2619 of 2009. From the Judgment & Order dated 16.11.2007 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 18578 of 2002. WITH C.A. Nos. 2620-2621 of 2009. P.S. Patwalia, Rakesh Dwivedi Sunil Gupta, J.S. Attri, Shiva Kumar Sinha, Kavin Gulati, Rashmi Singh, T. Mahipal, Vinay Garg, Ajay Kumar, Deepam Grag, Jyoti Sharma and Avnish Pandey for the appearing parties.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 2619 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.3215 of 2008) Meerut Development Authority …Appellant Versus Association of Management Studies & Anr. …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 2620-2621 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.1602-1603 of 2008) Pawan Kumar Agarwal …Appellant Versus … Continue reading

the High Court are set aside to the extent that the first respondent had acquired the status of confirmed employee and, therefore, holding of enquiry is imperative. As far as the conclusion recorded by the Division Bench that no stigma was cast on the respondent is concerned, the same having gone – unchallenged, the order in that regard is not disturbed. The parties shall bear their respective costs. =”It has been held in that case that a probationer cannot after the expiry of the probationary period automatically acquire the status of a permanent member of a service, unless of course the rules under which he is appointed expressly provide for such a result. Therefore even though a probationer may have continued to act in the post to which he is on probation for more than the initial period of probation, he cannot become a permanent servant merely because of efflux of time, unless the Rules of service which govern him specifically lay down that the probationer will; be automatically confirmed after the initial period of probation is over. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners before us that the part of r. 486 (which we have set out above) expressly provides for automatic confirmation after the period of probation is over. We are of opinion that there is no force in this contention. It is true that the words used in the sentence set out above are not that promoted officers will be enable or qualified for promotion at the end of their probationary period which are the words to be often found in the rules in such eases; even so, though this part of r. 486 says that “promoted officers will be confirmed at the end of their probationary period”, it is qualified by the words “if they have given satisfaction”. Clearly therefore the rule does not contemplate automatic confirmation after the probationary period of two years, for a promoted officer can only be confirmed under this rule if he has given satisfaction.”

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 2012 (Arising out of SLP (c) No. 21400 of 2008)   Head Master, Lawrence School Lovedale ….. Appellant   Versus   Jayanthi Raghu & Anr. … Respondents     J U D G M E N T     Dipak … Continue reading

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA AT KAMPALA =On the night of 21 July 2001, PW3 left her home at night to attend to her daughter who lived nearby and was in labour pains. She left the appellant and the victim Sharon (PW2) sleeping in her house. After she had left, the appellant removed the victim, took her to his bed and defiled her. She felt a lot of pain and made a loud cry. Her grandmother returned and knocked on the door but the appellant refused to open the door. PW3 made a lot of loud noise and the appellant opened the door. She found the appellant in the house and noticed that the victim did not have her knickers on. She asked the victim why she did not have knickers. The victim told her, in the presence of the appellant, that it was the appellant who removed her knickers and had sexual intercourse with her. At that point, the appellant was seated in the house. PW3 could clearly see him with the help of a candle which had been left in the house and a lantern with which she had returned to the house. When asked why he had removed PW2’s knickers, the appellant replied that he had done nothing wrong. PW3 then examined the victim’s private parts =In the present case, the trial Judge imposed a sentence of imprisonment for life yet she qualified the sentence by limiting it to twenty years. In our view, the sentence was vague. The Court of Appeal confirmed the sentence of life imprisonment without clearing the vagueness. However, we think that this error did not make the sentence illegal. We are satisfied that the trial Judge intended to impose a sentence of imprisonment for twenty years. We therefore, find that the error made by the Court of Appeal did not occasion any miscarriage of justice. We uphold the sentence of twenty years imprisonment.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDAAT KAMPALA           (CORAM:          ODOKI C.J; TSEKOOKO, KATUREEBE, TUMWESIGYE AND KISAAKYE JJ.SC) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 08 OF 2009                                    BETWEEN TIGO STEPHEN:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::APPELLANT AND UGANDA::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::;:::::RESPONDENT [Appeal from Decision of the Court of Appeal sitting at Kampala (Twinomujuni, Kitumba, and Byamugisha JJ.A.) dated 23 March 2009 in Criminal Appeal No.170 of 2003]       JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Introduction This … Continue reading

Murder case mere strong motive does not prove the case in the absence of direct evidence= One could even say that the presence of motive in the facts and circumstances of the case creates a strong suspicion against the appellant but suspicion, howsoever strong, also cannot be a substitute for proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. 16. In the totality of the circumstances, we are of the view that the prosecution has not proved its case against the appellants who are, in our opinion, entitled to acquittal giving them the benefit of doubt. In the result, these appeals succeed and are hereby allowed. The appellants shall stand acquitted of the charges framed against them giving them the benefit of doubt.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1950 OF 2009 Sampath Kumar …Appellant Versus Inspector of Police, Krishnagiri …Respondent (With Crl. Appeal No. 66/2010 and Crl. Appeal No.1205/2010) J U D G M E N T T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. These appeals by special leave call in question the correctness … Continue reading

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