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compassionate employment= Father of the respondent who was working as a Class III employee with the appellant Bank died on 19.4.2006 while in harness. The respondent applied for compassionate appointment on 12.5.2006. B. During the pendency of the application filed by the respondent, a new scheme dated 12.6.2006 came into force with effect from 6.10.2006. Clause 14 thereof provides that all applications pending on the date of commencement of the scheme shall be considered for grant of ex-gratia payment to the family instead of compassionate appointment.= A scheme containing an in pari materia clause, as is involved in this case was considered by this Court in State Bank of India & Anr. vs. Raj Kumar (2010) 11 SCC 661. Clause 14 of the said Scheme is verbatim to clause 14 of the scheme involved herein, which reads as under: Date of effect of the scheme and disposal of pending applications: The Scheme will come into force with effect from the date it is approved by the Board of Directors. Applications pending under the Compasionate Appointment Scheme as on the date on which this new Scheme is approved by the Board will be dealt with in accordance with Scheme for payment of ex-gratia lump sum amount provided they fulfill all the terms and conditions of this scheme.”= The Court considered various aspects of service jurisprudence and came to the conclusion that as the appointment on compassionate ground may not be claimed as a matter of right nor an applicant becomes entitled automatically for appointment, rather it depends on various other circumstances i.e. eligibility and financial conditions of the family, etc., the application has to be considered in accordance with the scheme. In case the Scheme does not create any legal right, a candidate cannot claim that his case is to be considered as per the Scheme existing on the date the cause of action had arisen i.e. death of the incumbent on the post. In State Bank of India & Anr. (supra), this Court held that in such a situation, the case under the new Scheme has to be considered. 14. In view of the above position, the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge as well as by the Division Bench is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The appeal is allowed and the impugned judgments of the High Court are set aside. 15. The respondent may apply for consideration of his case under the new Scheme and the appellant shall consider his case strictly in accordance with clause 14 of the said new Scheme within a period of three months from the date of receiving of application. With these observations, appeal stands disposed of.

 published in       http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40634  REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.6348 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C)No.13957/2010) MGB GRAMIN BANK Appellant (s) VERSUS CHAKRAWARTI SINGH Respondent(s) O R D E R 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated 27.1.2010 … Continue reading

APEX COURT UPHELD THAT THE SUIT FILED BY NATIONAL HOUSING BANK UNDER SPECIAL ACT ENACTED FOR PURPOSE OF HARSHAD S. MEHTA , IS ONLY AN EYE WASH =The entire scandal and the present litigation revolves around the second defendant (since deceased) – one Harshad S. Mehta (a notified person under Section 3(2) of the Act). The scandal exposes the shortcomings and loopholes in the administration of banking sector of this country, more particularly, the State-owned/controlled banks. 6. The National Housing Bank (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Plaintiff’) a statutory Corporation created by an Act of Parliament (Act No. 53 of 1987) filed two suits, one invoking the original jurisdiction of Bombay High Court (Suit No. 211 of 1995) and another before the Special Court established under the Act No. 27 of 1992 being Suit No. 2 of 1995. The said suits came to be filed against (i) the State Bank of Saurashtra which at that point of time was a subsidiary bank of the State Bank of India but later got amalgamated with the State Bank of India, (ii) Harshad S. Mehta, (iii) two of the employees of the plaintiff bank and (iv) the Custodian appointed under Section 3(1) of the Act 27 of 1992.= No oral evidence from plaintiff side except filing some documents – At the time when these documents were being tendered it was clarified to all parties that mere tendering of documents would only establish that there was in existence such a document and that it stated what is stated. It was clarified that the contents of the documents would not be deemed to have been proved. It was clarified that any party who wanted to prove the truth of the contents had to do so by positive evidence. As stated above, except for 2nd Defendant, no other party has led any oral evidence.”; Janakiraman Committee Report – not admissible = The Special Court Act though declares that the Court is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, it does not relieve the Special Court from the obligation to follow the Evidence Act. Further, the learned Judge extensively relied upon the second interim report of the Jankiraman Committee[11] on the ground that the same was tendered[12] by the 1st defendant. 51. Irrespective of the fact whether such a report is admissible in evidence or not, = It is well settled by a long line of judicial authority that the findings of even a statutory Commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 are not enforceable proprio vigore as held in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Others [AIR 1958 SC 538] and the statements made before such Commission are expressly made inadmissible in any subsequent proceedings civil or criminal. In our considered view the report of Janakiraman Committee is not evidence within the meaning of Evidence Act; There is absolutely no evidence on record regarding the payment of the above mentioned amount of Rs.55 crores (approx.) by the plaintiff-Bank to the Standard Chartered Bank except the Janakiraman Committee Report and the correspondence which is neither proved nor the content of the correspondence is explained. On the other hand, the Special Court recorded[17] with respect to the payment of Rs.55 crores (approx.) to the Standard Chartered Bank by the plaintiff – “In the plaintiff’s record there is no clear indication as to for what transaction this cheque had been issued. The plaintiffs were, therefore, not sure for what this cheque had been issued.” 62. In the background of the above discussed pleadings and evidence, we are of the opinion the suit is required to be dismissed on the ground that there is no evidence led by the plaintiff to establish its case. ; suppression of material facts = We must also record our disapproval of the finding recorded by the Special Court that the plaintiff did not suppress the truth. We are of the opinion that the plaintiff approached the Special Court with unclean hands by suppressing the relevant material. We shall first discuss the nature of the suppression and then examine the legal consequences that should follow.= The whole attempt of both the banks is to shield the officers on either side taking refuge under attractive legal pleas – which if examined in the context of the limited facts pleaded give a picture that the suit transaction is an innocuous transaction which unfortunately for the country is not. In our opinion the suit is a sheer abuse of the legal process.= both the plaintiff and respondent Banks simply reiterated their respective stands before the Committee of Secretaries. No attempt appears to have been made by the Government to find out the truth as to (1) how the plaintiff Bank parted with a high denomination cheque and gave custody of the same to Harshad Mehta and (2) as to how the first defendant Bank paid the various amounts to the dictation of Harshad Mehta in the absence of any authorisation by the plaintiff Bank. Be that as it may, if really the Government believed that the judgment of the Special Court does not require any interference, nothing stopped the Government from directing both the Banks to withdraw their appeals before this Court. 74. The whole exercise appears to be an eye wash. A thinly veiled scorn for the orders of this Court.= The professed purpose of the Special Courts Act – the back drop of the scandal that shook the nation – and the manner in which the litigation was conducted coupled with the absolute indifference of the Government to get at the truth only demonstrates the duplicity with which Governments can act. 76. We dismiss the suit and set aside the decree in toto. The consequences follow insofar as the appeals are concerned. But in the circumstances, we do not award any costs.

published in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40614  Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2155 OF 1999 State Bank of India Thr. General Manager …Appellant Versus National Housing Bank & Ors. …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2294 OF 1999 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3647 OF 1999 J U D G M E N … Continue reading

whether the respondent, who had sought voluntary retirement from service and was paid gratuity by the appellant under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (for short, ‘the 1972 Act’) along with Contributory Provident Fund is entitled to pension.

Page 1 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9024 OF 2012 Allahabad Bank …Appellant versus A.C. Aggarwal …Respondent J U D G M E N T G. S. Singhvi, J. 1. The question which arises for consideration in this appeal filed against the order of the Allahabad High Court … Continue reading

Act: Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002: s.17 – Default in repayment of secured debt – Notice issued u/s.13(2) to borrower to discharge liability -Application u/s.14 by secured creditor before Magistrate for taking possession of mortgaged properties, allowed – Writ petition by borrower/ guarantOTHERS before High Court, dismissed on the ground that an alternative remedy was available to them u/s.17 – On appeal, held: s.13(4) provides that if borrower fails to discharge his liability within the period specified in s.13(2) then secured creditor may take recourse to action to recover his debt – Secured creditor may, in order to enforce his rights u/s.13(4) take recourse to s.14 of the Act – An action u/s.14 constitutes an action taken after the stage of s.13(4), and, therefore, the same would fall within the ambit of s.17(1) – Thus, the Act itself contemplates an efficacious remedy for the borrower or any person affected by an action u/s.13(4) by providing for an appeal before the DRT – Ordinarily relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person – Therefore, High Court was fully justified in declining to exercise its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution – Constitution of India, 1950 – Articles 226 and 227. Respondent no.3 had advanced a loan amount of Rs. 4.50 crores to appellant no.6 on an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds of certain properties. Appellant Nos.1 to 5 were the guarantOTHERS Respondent no.3 issued a notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. Thereafter, respondent no.3 filed an application before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate under Section 14 of the Act for taking possession of the mortgaged properties. The Magistrate allowed the said application and directed the Assistant Registrar to take possession of the mortgaged properties after issuing notice to the appellants. Aggrieved by such notice issued by the Assistant Registrar, the appellants filed a writ petition before the High Court. The writ petition was dismissed on the ground that an alternative remedy was available to the appellants under Section 17 of the Act. The High Court also directed the respondents to maintain status quo in the matter for a period of 10 weeks from the date of its order, so as to enable the appellants to approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the Act. The appellants filed an application before the High Court seeking an extension of the status quo period. The High Court rejected the said application. The instant appeals were filed challenging the orders whereby the writ petition and the application were dismissed.Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. Section 13 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 deals with enforcement of security interest, providing that notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 69 or 69A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, any security interest created in favour of any secured creditor may be enforced, without the court’s intervention, by such creditor in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 13(2) of the Act provides that when a borrower, who is under a liability to a secured creditor, makes any default in repayment of secured debt, and his account in respect of such debt is classified as non-performing asset, then the secured creditor may require the borrower, by notice in writing, to discharge his liabilities within sixty days from the date of the notice, failing which the secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the rights given in Section 13(4) of the Act. Section 13(3) of the Act provides that the notice under Section 13(2) of the Act shall give details of the amount payable by the borrower as also the details of the secured assets intended to be enforced by the bank. Section 13(3-A) of the Act provides for a last opportunity for the borrower to make a representation to the secured creditor against the classification of his account as a non-performing asset. The secured creditor is required to consider the representation of the borrowers, and if the secured creditor comes to the conclusion that the representation is not tenable or acceptable, then he must communicate, within one week of the receipt of the communication by the borrower, the reasons for rejecting the same. Section 13(4) of the Act provides that if the borrower fails to discharge his liability within the period specified in Section 13(2), then the secured creditor, may take recourse to actions, to recover his debt. [Para 16] [610-G-H; 611-A-H; 612-A] 1.2. Section 14 of the Act provides that the secured creditor can file an application before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate, within whose jurisdiction, the secured asset or other documents relating thereto are found for taking possession thereof. If any such request is made, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate, as the case may be, is obliged to take possession of such asset or document and forward the same to the secured creditor. Therefore, it follows that a secured creditor may, in order to enforce his rights under Section 13(4), in particular Section 13(4)(a), may take recourse to Section 14 of the Act. An action under Section 14 of the Act constitutes an action taken after the stage of Section 13(4), and therefore, the same would fall within the ambit of Section 17(1) of the Act. Thus, the Act itself contemplates an efficacious remedy for the borrower or any person affected by an action under Section 13(4) of the Act, by providing for an appeal before the DRT. Therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that an efficacious remedy was available to the appellants under Section 17 of the Act. It is well-settled that ordinarily relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person. [Paras 16, 20 and 21] [612-G-H; 615-C-E] United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon AND OTHERS (2010) 8 SCC 110; Authorised Officer, Indian Overseas Bank AND ANOTHERv. Ashok Saw Mill (2009) 8 SCC 366; Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. AND ANOTHER(2003) 3 SCC 524; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai AND OTHERS (2003) 6 SCC 675; State Bank of India v. Allied Chemical Laboratories AND ANOTHER(2006) 9 SCC 252; City and Industrial Development Corporation v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala AND OTHERS (2009) 1 SCC 168 – relied on. Transcore v. Union of India AND ANOTHER(2008) 1 SCC 125, Mardia Chemicals Ltd. AND OTHERS v. Union of India AND OTHERS (2004) 4 SCC 311 – referred to. 1.3. In the instant case, apart from the fact that admittedly certain disputed questions of fact viz. non-receipt of notice under Section 13(2) of the Act, non-communication of the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate etc. were involved, an efficacious statutory remedy of appeal under Section 17 of the Act was available to the appellants, who ultimately availed of the same. Therefore, having regard to the facts obtaining in the case, the High Court was fully justified in declining to exercise its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The impugned judgments cannot be flawed, warranting interference by this Court. [Paras 22, 23] [616-D-F] Case Law Reference: (2008) 1 SCC 125 referred to Para 13 (2004) 4 SCC 311 referred to Paras 14, 16 (2010) 8 SCC 110 relied on Para 16 (2009) 8 SCC 366 relied on Para 19 (2003) 3 SCC 524 relied on Para 21 (2003) 6 SCC 675 relied on Para 21 (2006) 9 SCC 252 relied on Para 21 (2009) 1 SCC 168 relied on Para 21 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTON : Criminal Appeal Nos. 338-340 of 2011. From the Judgment AND Order dated 28.4.2009 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Crl. Writ Petition No. 707 of 2009 and order dated 08.5.2009 in Crl. Writ Petition No. 707 of 2009 and order dated 01.07.2009 in Application No. 178 of 2009 in Crl. Writ Petition No. 707 of 2009. Kranti Anand, Aishwarya Bhati, Rashid Khan, Angeline S. A. Rodriques, Buddy A. Ranganadhan, A.V. Rangam, Sushil Karanjakar, Sanjay Kharde, Asha Gopalan Nair for the appearing parties.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 338-340 OF 2011 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos.4436-4438 of 2009) KANAIYALAL LALCHAND SACHDEV & ORS. — APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. — RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T D.K. JAIN, J.: Leave granted. 2. Challenge in … Continue reading

as related to the persons dying intestate and maternal aunts are excluded from succession.

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICEV.V.S.RAO AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.N.RAO NALLA   CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.271 OF 2009   19.02.2010 BETWEEN:   Kavuri Lilliyamma, W/o.late Wilson           … Appellant           AND K.S.Joshua, S/o.late Satyanandam And others … Respondents       THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.N.RAO NALLA   CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL … Continue reading

mere pleadings are not enough, one has to file affidavit to prove the case. absence of affidavit is fatal=No evidence has been filed before us through this revision petition to rebut the ground on which the appeal came to be dismissed by the State Commission vide its impugned order. Coming to the merits, so far as the order of the District Forum is concerned, we find that as per the well-established procedure the District Forum has to settle the consumer disputes on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the complainant and the opposite party, where the opposite party denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint. Since the petitioner failed to prove its submissions through affidavit in evidence, the same could not be accepted by the District Forum. It is seen from the order of the District Forum that after filing its reply containing submissions not supported by any affidavit, the petitioner also chose to remain absent and was proceeded against ex parte. In the circumstances, we do not find any irregularity, illegality or jurisdictional error in the order passed by the District Forum or dismissal of the appeal of the petitioner by the State Commission through the impugned order.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI REVISION PETITION No. 2864 OF 2011 (From the Order dated 31.05.2011 in FA No 738/2011 of the Rajasthan State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Jaipur) Indian Institute of Professional Studies Through Mr. Anuj Kumar Goyal                                                       Petitioner Assistant Director Deep Bhawan, Polytechnic Chauraha Faizabad Road, Indira Nagar, Lucknow (U.P.) Versus Smt. … Continue reading

specific performance=the difference between earnest money – part of consideration=Mr. Misra submitted that the Corporation had no right to forfeit the amount of Rs.8,00,000/- (Rupees Eight Lacs) paid by the respondents as part consideration for the sale of the Unit and at best they could forfeit the earnest money of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) paid by the respondents while making the offer to purchase the Unit. There is no substance at all in the submission. The question of forfeiture of the earnest money would have arisen in case the parties had not acted upon in furtherance of the sale letter but the matter in this case went much beyond that stage. The parties agreed for the sale of Unit for an amount of Rs.40,00,000/- (Rupees Forty Lacs) out of which the respondents were required to make a down payment of Rs.8,00,000/- (Rupees Eight Lacs), which they did. On payment of the part consideration money, the possession of the Unit was made over to them. The respondents were, thus, under the legal obligation to pay the balance consideration of Rs.32,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty Two Lacs) in instalments and along with interest, as stipulated in the letter. The Corporation had, therefore, not only the right to retain Rs.8,00,000/- (Rupees Eight Lacs) paid to it as part consideration but also to realise the balance amount of consideration, in accordance with law.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1850 OF 2007 M/S. INDUSTRIAL PROMOTION AND INVESTMENT CORPORATION OF ORISSA LIMITED … APPELLANT VERSUS M/S. TUOBRO FURGUSON STEELS PRIVATE LIMITED & OTHERS … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T Aftab Alam, J. 1. This appeal, at the instance of … Continue reading

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL commission= bank deposits =It also stands to reason that had there been any mala fide action on the part of any employee of the respondent bank in encashing the FDR in question, such a person could have easily encashedthe complainant’s remaining three FDRs also. Further, the action of the petitioner/complainant to claim payment of the four FDRs made in 1961 after nearly 39 years without any enquiry, etc., in the long intervening period is most unusual. 7. In conclusion, therefore, I do not find any jurisdictional error, legal infirmity or material irregularity in the impugned order of the State Commission to warrant action under section 21 (b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The revision petition is, therefore, dismissed, with the further observation that (as admitted before the Fora below) the Bank shall pay to the petitioner within six weeks the maturity amount of the remaining three FDRs along with interest thereon at the rates applicable from time to time. If the order is not complied with within the stipulated period, the entire amount including regular interest shall carry further interest @ 15% per annum from the date of this order.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI REVISION PETITION NO. 3073 OF 2007  (From the order dated 29.05.2007 of the Punjab Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chandigarh in Appeal. no. 597 of 2002) Dr. Narinder Mohan Wadhera Son of Shri Ram Wadhera Resident of 189 Basant Avenue                                               Petitioner Amritsar versus 1. The State Bank of India Local Head Office, Sector 17, Chandigarh Through its Chief General Manager                                 Respondents 2.  State … Continue reading

Penal Code, 1860/Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: Sections 409, 415, 420, 120-B/Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) – Alleged cheating of Bank – All six accused found guilty for offences under Section 120-B, 420 IPC and three accused found guilty for offence under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1) of Prevention of Corruption Act – Convicted – High Court affirming the order, but acquitting one accused – On appeal, Held: Prosecution failed to prove conspiracy as also wrongful gains – Impugned judgment unsustainable and set aside – Negotiable Instruments Act, Section 138. Constitution of India, 1950: Article 136 – Special Leave jurisdiction – Ordinarily concurrent finding of fact not interfered with – However, the jurisdiction must be exercised whenever it is required to do so for securing the ends of justice and to avoid injustice. A charge sheet was filed under Sections 120-B, 420 IPC r/w Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act alleging inter alia that there was criminal conspiracy between the accused persons to cheat the State Bank of India. Special Judge for CBI cases found A-1 to A-6 guilty for the offence under Section 120-B and 420 IPC, A-4 to A-6 were found guilty for the offence under Section 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Accordingly, he convicted and sentenced the accused. High Court dismissed the appeals of the accused, but acquitted A-6. Hence the appeals. =Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 For the purpose of constituting an offence of cheating, the complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. Even in a case where allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of the accused to keep his promise, in absence of a culpable intention at the time of making initial promise being absent, no offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code can be said to have been made out. [Para 21] [810- F-G] 1.2 It is reiterated that one of the ingredients of cheating as defined in Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code is existence of an intention of making initial promise or existence thereof from the very beginning of formation of contract. [Para 21] [810-H; 811-A] Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI (2003) 5 SCC 257; Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. & Ors. (2006) 6 SCC 736; Vir Prakash Sharma v. Anil Kumar Agarwal (2007) 7 SCC 373; All Carogo Movers (I) Pvt. Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain & Anr. 2007 (12) SCALE 391; R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta & Ors. 2008 (14) SCALE 85 and Sharon Michael & ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. 2009 (1) SCALE 627 – relied on. 2. It may be that there had been certain procedural irregularities in the transaction. However, sufficient evidence is available on record to show that the Officers had done so for the purpose of promoting the business of the Bank. In relation whereto or in respect whereof, initiatives had been taken by P.Ws. 19 and 20. It is furthermore not denied or disputed that after the cheque discounting facility was stopped in April, 1989 by Accused No.4, there has been a meeting at the residence of P.W. 20. In his deposition, the said witness categorically admitted that the said meeting was arranged at the instance of Accsued No.1. It is incomprehensible that a meeting has been arranged at his residence on the day he was on leave at the instance of Accused No.1. He must have developed grievance against the Accused No.4 as regards the stoppage of the said facility. If immediately thereafter the said facility had been restored by the Accused No.4, a stand taken by him that it was done under the oral instructions of the higher authorities appears to be plausible. [Para 22] [813-E-H; 814-A] 3. The prosecution apart from the fact that it had utterly failed to bring on record any evidence of conspiracy must also be held to have failed to bring on record any evidence of wrongful gain so as to attract the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 or otherwise. [Para 23] [814-A-B] 4. The findings arrived at by the Special Judge as also the High Court proved the ingredients of offence under Section 409 of the IPC. The accused persons, however, have not been charged for commission of the said offence. Conspiracy by and between the Bank officials and the Accused Nos. 1 to 3 has been stated to be for commission of the offence of cheating for the purpose of arriving at a finding that there has been a conspiracy so as to cheat the Bank. It was necessary for the prosecution to establish that there had been a meeting of mind at the time when the facility had been granted. Such meeting of mind on the part of the accused persons has not been proved. Furthermore, the prosecution case even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety does not lead to a finding that even Accused Nos. 1 to 3 had any wrongful intention at the time when the contract was initiated. [Para 24] [814-C-F] 5. It is one thing to say that there has been an abuse of a prevalent banking practice for the purpose of causing wrongful loss to the Bank and causing wrongful gain to others but it is another thing to say that by reason thereof, the ingredients of cheating are attracted.[Para 27] [814-H; 815-A] 6. It would bear repetition to state that accused persons have not been charged under Section 409 of the IPC; even the Accused Nos. 1 to 3 have not been charged for entering into a conspiracy with Accused Nos. 4, 5 and 6 in respect of commission of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is in the aforementioned situation, this Court is of the opinion that the judgment of conviction and sentence cannot be upheld. [Paras 28, 29] [815-B-D] Lala Ram & Ors. vs. State of U.P. (1990) 2 SCC 113 – relied on. 7. It is one thing to say that ordinarily a concurrent finding of fact shall not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Consti-tution of India but it is another thing to say that despite opining that accused are entitled to acquittal, a judgment of conviction passed against them should be upheld. In fact, the jurisdiction of this Court must be exercised wherever it is required to do so for securing the ends of justice and to avoid injustice.[Para 30] [815- H; 816-A-B] Case Law Reference (2003) 5 SCC 257 relied on Para 21 (2006) 6 SCC 736 relied on Para 21 (2007) 7 SCC 373 relied on Para 21 2007 (12) SCALE 391 relied on Para 21 2008 (14) SCALE 85 relied on Para 21 2009 (1) SCALE 627 relied on Para 21 (1990) 2 SCC 113 relied on Para 30 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 942 of 2009 From the Judgement and Order dated 17.07.2007 of the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No. 125 of 1998. With Criminal Appeal No. 945 of 2009 Criminal Appeal Nos. 943-944 of 2009 K.T.S. Tulsi, M. N. Krishnamani, Ravindra Shrivastava, Radha Rani, Hari Kumar, Kunal Verma, Krishna Kumar, Supriya Jain, Anup Jain, C. Batra, D. Mahesh Babu, Gaurava Bhagava, Raj Kamal, Rishi Malhotra, K.V. Mohan, with them for the Appellant. R. Datta, ASG, Rajni, P. Narasimha, B. Krishna Prasad, with them for the Respondent.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 942 OF 2009 [Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 7125 of 2007 S.V.L. MURTHY … APPELLANT Versus STATE REP. BY CBI, HYDERABAD … RESPONDENT WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 945 OF 2009 [Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 7145 of 2007 P. JAYAKUMAR … Continue reading

SRFAESI Act.=the first respondent-Bank is taking measures for taking possession/sale of the immovable property in pursuance of the possession notice dated 14.9.2010 issued under Section 13(4) of the SRFAESI Act. When once the Tribunal is seized off the matter and there is no decision rendered on merits, it is not open for this Court to determine the rights of the parties. Hence, we are not inclined to exercise our jurisdiction inasmuch as there is no decision rendered by the Tribunal on merits.

  HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE GHULAM MOHAMMED AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G. SHANKAR     WRIT PETITION  NO. 1691 OF 2011 Between: Sri K. Rajendra Naidu S/o Sri Seshaiah Naidu                                      ………….Petitioner   AND The State Bank of India  represented by its Authorized Officer  and one another                             ………….Respondents     ORDER: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Ghulam Mohammed) This Writ Petition has … Continue reading

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