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state bank of india

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Murder- how to prove circumstantial evidence -a best example=Indian police have got technical and electronic knowledge= “26. Holding that the call record Ex.PW-22/A evidences that two calls from Chandigarh were received on the mobile number 9871879824 in the afternoon of 23.7.2005, corroborates the testimony of the wife of the deceased who was staying at Chandigarh on 23.7.2005 that she had talked to the deceased over telephone in the afternoon of 23.7.2005, which in turn establishes that the mobile number 9871879824 was being used by the deceased on the date of his death; that the call records Ex.PW- 22/A and Ex.PW22/B establishes that the handset having IEMI No.350608101231170, which handset was used by the accused on a regular basis, was used by the deceased on 10th and 11th July, 2005 and that this establishes that the deceased and the accused were in touch with each other; the call record Ex.PW-22/B evidences that the handset which was used by the deceased on the date of his death was in possession of the accused soon after the death of the deceased and that the same is a strong incriminating circumstance against the accused; that the prosecution has been able to establish that the handset which was used by the deceased before his death and the revolver which was the weapon of offence were recovered at the instance of the accused…..”

“REPORTABLE” IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2272 OF 2010 Gajraj …. Appellant Versus State (NCT) of Delhi …. Respondent J U D G M E N T JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J. 1. The facts, as they emerge from the judgment rendered by the Trial Court at Karkardooma in Sessions … Continue reading

Interim order : Interim direction to tenant, in a suit by creditor against landlords/borrowers to deposit arrears of rent in Court and to continue to deposit the rents in Court with a condition that tenant would pay interest if rent was not so deposited -Held: Such interim direction cannot be considered to be injunction order – Such interim direction would not fall under order 39 Rule 1 CPC as the prayer did not relate to clause (a), (b) or (c) of the said rule, nor under Order 39 rule 2 CPC as there was no contract between the creditor and the tenant nor any injury caused by tenant to bank – Injunction – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.39 rr.1 and 2. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Or.39 rule 2A – Application under – Held: Maintainable only when there is disobedience of any injunction granted or order made under Rule 1 or 2 of Or.39 or breach of the terms on which injunction was granted or the order was made – Direction to pay money either by way of final or interim order is not an injunction – On facts, on an application by bank, interim direction to tenant to deposit rents to the loan account of landlord/borrower – Tenant vacated the tenanted godown – Landlord had no locus to file application under Or.39 r.2A alleging disobedience of interim order – Trial court erred in misinterpreting the interim order and in allowing the application under Or.39 r.2A. Contempt jurisdiction : Held: Cannot be invoked for enforcement of money decree or directions/orders for payment of money – If garnishee who is directed to pay money does not pay the amount, the remedy is execution and not action for contempt or disobedience in Or.39 r.2A – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.21 r.46B, Or.39 r.2A – Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The respondent-defendant no. 1 and his brother offered to construct and let out godowns to appellant and for that purpose obtained loan of Rs.10 lakhs from Bank for construction of godowns and mortgaged their properties in favour of Bank. Three godowns were constructed by respondent and his brother and let out to appellant for five years in 1978. On instruction of lessors, appellant credited the rents to the loan account of lessors with the bank. Appellant vacated the said godowns and surrendered back possession in December, 1983. The Bank filed suit against the respondent-defendants 1 to 3 and their guarantors for recovery of loan amount, by sale of mortgaged properties and balance if any personally from the borrowers and their guarantors. Respondent contested the claim on the ground that the loan was obtained for constructing godowns for appellant who had agreed to remain in occupation of those godowns till repayment of entire loan amount and appellant had vacated the godowns prematurely and should be made party to the suit and also made liable for payment of the suit claim. The trial court directed impleadment of appellant as seventh defendant in the suit. In June, 1994, during pendency of suit, appellant took one godown on month to month lease with a condition to surrender same without any notice. On 18.1.1996, the bank filed an application in its suit, seeking an interim direction to appellant to restrain it from paying the rent for the said godown to lessors and to deposit the rents to the loan account of defendants 1 to 3 with the bank. The trial Court allowed the application by order dated 27.5.1996. It held that when appellant earlier took the godowns on rent for five years, the borrowers had authorized the Bank to receive the rent with the condition that if the lease was not continued, the lessors-borrowers would be liable to pay the loan amount from their own resources. It further held that bank was authorized under the loan documents executed by the lessors to receive the rents in respect of the mortgaged property directly from the tenant. It directed appellant to deposit rent payable to landlords upto 31.3.1996 with the Bank by way of fixed deposit in the name of lessors. In regard to the rent payable from 1.4.1996, in respect of every 12 months, the court directed that 2 months rent be paid directly to lessors and 10 months rent be deposited with plaintiff Bank; and that if appellant failed to deposit rent as directed, it would be liable to pay interest. Appellant vacated the said godown on 7.2.1997. Thereafter, the respondent filed an application under Order 39 r. 2A CPC alleging that appellant disobeyed the order dated 27.5.1996. In the said application respondent prayed that action be taken against appellant and its officers for contempt, by seizing and auctioning their movable and immovable properties and by sending its four officers to prison for not depositing the rents in terms of order dated 27.5.1996. In the said application, the respondent contended that in view of the interim order dated 27.5.1996, appellant became liable to deposit the rent for the three godowns from 1.12.1983 till 31.3.1996 and also to continue to pay the rents from 1.4.1996. The application was resisted by appellant and its officers. The trial court by order dated 15.12.2004 allowed the said application. It interpreted the order dated 27.5.1996 as directing appellant to deposit rent of three godowns from December, 1983 up to 31.3.1996. Consequently, it held that appellant was liable to pay the said arrears with interest at 13% per annum (Rs. 1, 12, 24, 792/-) and as the said amount was not deposited, appellant was held liable under Order 39 Rule 2A CPC for disobedience of the order dated 27.5.1996. It also directed that the assets of appellant should be attached under order 39 Rule 2A CPC. The High Court dismissed the appeal with an observation that it was not competent to consider the validity of the `injunction order’ in an appeal against an order passed under order 39 Rule 2A CPC, for disobedience of the `injunction order’. The High Court assumed that in the appeal against the order dated 15.12.2004 passed under Order 39 Rule 2A, appellant was trying to challenge the validity of the `injunction order’ dated 27.5.1996. Hence the present appeal. =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The order dated 27.5.1996 was passed on an application dated 12.1.1996 filed by the plaintiff bank. It was not filed either under Rule 1 or 2 of Order 39 CPC. In fact, the application did not mention the provision of law under which it was filed. The bank did not claim that appellant had any privity of contract with it, nor claimed that appellant was a co-obligant. In the application, the bank specifically stated that the relief sought by it in the said application for deposit of rent was in regard to the godown belonging to defendants 1 to 3 that was taken on rent by appellant during June, 1994. There is a further clear averment in the application that it had vacated the godowns earlier taken by it on lease, after the lease period (of 5 years) and that appellant had again taken one godown on rent during the pendency of the suit and that the application related to that godown. The order dated 27.5.1996 did not consider any claim for rent in regard to the three godowns which were vacated in December 1983. The court did not hold or direct that appellant was liable to pay any amount by way of rent or otherwise in regard to the three godowns for the period December, 1983 to 31.3.1996. In fact there was no reference to the three godowns at all except to the statement of the bank that appellant had vacated those godowns after the lease period (in December 1983). Thus there was no application for an `injunction’, nor any order of `injunction’ by the court. An interim direction to a tenant in a suit by the creditor against the landlords/borrowers, to deposit the arrears of rent in court and to continue the deposit the rents in court with a condition that the tenant would pay interest if the rent was not so deposited, cannot be considered to be an order of `injunction’. In a general sense, though every order of a court which commands or forbids is an injunction, but in its accepted legal sense, an injunction is a judicial mandate operating in personam by which, upon certain established principles of equity, a party is required to do or refrain from doing a particular thing. A direction to pay money either by way of final or interim order, is not considered to be an `injunction’ as assumed by the courts below. [Para 16] [1121- D-H; 1122-A-G] Howard C. Joyce – A Treatise on the Law relating to injunctions (1909) S. 1 – referred to. 1.2. Admittedly the application dated 12.1.1996, on which the order dated 27.5.1996 was passed, did not fall under Rule 1 of Order 39 CPC as the prayer therein did not relate to any of the three matters mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the said rule. It did not also fall under Rule 2 of Order 39 as admittedly there was no contract between the bank and appellant nor any allegation that appellant was committing any injury of any kind to the bank. Therefore, the order dated 27.5.1996 was not an order under either Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 CPC. The suit itself was for recovery of the amounts due by the borrowers, by sale of the mortgaged properties belonging to the borrowers (defendants 1 to 3) and to recover the balance personally from the borrowers and guarantors (defendants 1 to 6). When appellant was subsequently added as seventh defendant at the instance of defendants 1 to 3, no relief was sought against appellant nor was the prayers amended seeking any decree against appellant. If there was no prayer in the suit against appellant, obviously no interim relief could have been sought against appellant as a defendant. Even assuming that the final relief was sought against appellant also, the position is that appellant was only a `garnishee defendant’ and not a `principal defendant’. The order dated 27.5.1996 was not an injunction order, but an interim prohibitory (garnishee) order by way of attachment before judgment, in regard to the rents payable for one godown taken by it on lease in June, 1994. [Para 17] [1122-G-H; 1123-A-D] 2.1. An application under Order 39, Rule 2A CPC is maintainable only when there is disobedience of any `injunction’ granted or other order made under Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 or breach of any of the terms on which the injunction was granted or the order was made. The application by the bank, on which the said order dated 27.5.1996 was passed, was neither under Rule 1 nor under Rule 2 of Order 39 CPC and none of the ingredients required for an application under either Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 existed was found in the application by the bank. Even otherwise, the respondent had no locus to file an application under Order 39 Rule 2A alleging disobedience of the order dated 27.5.1996. The plaintiff bank which filed the application dated 12.1.1996 on which the said order dated 27.5.1996 was passed, did not complain of any disobedience or breach of the order dated 27.5.1996, nor sought any action or relief against appellant alleging non-compliance or disobedience of the order dated 27.5.1996. As the interim order dated 27.5.1996 was not made on an application made by the respondent and as the interim order was not intended for the benefit to the respondent who was the first defendant in the suit, he could not be said to be a person aggrieved by the alleged disobedience or breach of the order dated 27.5.1996. [Paras 18, 19] [1123-E-H; 1124-A-C] 2.2. The power exercised by a court under order 39, Rule 2A CPC is punitive in nature, akin to the power to punish for civil contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The person who complains of disobedience or breach has to clearly make out beyond any doubt that there was an injunction or order directing the person against whom the application is made, to do or desist from doing some specific thing or act and that there was disobedience or breach of such order. While considering an application under order 39 Rule 2A, the court cannot construe the order in regard to which disobedience/breach is alleged, as creating an obligation to do something which is not mentioned in the `order’, on surmises and inferences. The power under Rule 2A should be exercised with great caution and responsibility. It is shocking that the trial court entertained an application under Order 39 Rule 2A from a person who was not entitled to file the application, accepted an interpretation of the order which does not flow from the order, and created liability where none existed, resulting in attachments of the assets of appellant to an extent of more than Rs.1.12 crores. The order dated 15.12.2004 cannot be supported or sustained under any circumstances. [Para 24] [1127-B-F] 3.1. The garnishee proceedings are governed by Rules 46 and 46A to 46F of Order 21 CPC. The amount due by a garnishee, if disputed has to be determined as if it was an issue in the suit and the court can appropriate order determine the extent of liability of the garnishee. In this case, there was no adjudication of the amount payable by appellant. Whatever amount that was due in pursuance of the order dated 27.5.1996 in regard to one godown taken on lease in June 1994, was deposited by appellant and the plaintiff bank at whose instance the order was made has no complaint or grievance. [Para 20] [1124-D-H; 1125-A] 3.2. If a garnishee, or a defendant, who is directed to pay any sum of money, does not pay the amount, the remedy is to levy execution and not in an action for contempt or disobedience/breach under order 39 Rule 2A. This is evident from Rule 46B of Order 21 read with Rule 11A of Order 38 CPC. Contempt jurisdiction, either under the Contempt of Court Act, 1971, or under Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code, is not intended to be used for enforcement of money decrees or directions/orders for payment of money. The process and concept of execution is different from process and concept of action for disobedience/contempt. [Para 21] [1125-A-C] 4.1. The application dated 12.1.1996 filed by the bank did not claim or seek a direction for payment of alleged arrears of rent relating to three godowns taken on lease in the year 1978 and vacated in December 1983. In particular, it did not make any claim for rent, for the period December, 1983 to 31.3.1996 when appellant was not in occupation of three godown. The bank stated in its application that appellant had vacated those godowns after completion of the lease period (that is in December, 1983) and that subsequently during the pendency of the suit the appellant had taken one of those godowns again on rent in June, 1994. The relief claimed in the application was that in regard to the godown taken on rent by appellant in June, 1994, it should be directed to deposit the rents in court as the borrowers/debtors were attempting to collect the said rent and thereby deny the benefit of rent to the bank even though the borrowers had agreed under the loan documents that the rents in regard to the godowns could be directly received by the bank. Therefore when the application itself was only in regard to the rent for one godown from June, 1994 onwards, the trial court could not come to the conclusion that the said order dated 27.5.1996 directed FCI to deposit the rent for three godowns for the period December, 1983 to 31.3.1996 and that failure to do so was punishable under Order 39 Rule 2A CPC. The trial court by a convoluted reasoning based on a baseless interpretation of the order dated 27.5.1996 held that appellant had not placed any evidence in the proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2A that it had vacated the three godowns in December, 1983 and therefore, it continued to be liable to pay the rents for three godowns from December 1983 onwards. [Para 22] [1125-D-H; 1126-A-B] 4.2. It is not understandable how in a suit filed in the year 1991 by the bank against the borrowers for enforcement of mortgage, an order made on the bank’s application for deposit of rents relating to a godown taken in June, 1994, can be interpreted by the court considering the application under order 39 Rule 2A CPC, as containing a direction for deposit of rents in regard to three godowns vacated in December 1983, for the period December, 1983 to 31.3.1996. [Para 23] [1126-D-F] 5. It is unfortunate that the High Court dismissed the appeal on a wholly baseless and erroneous assumption that the appellant was trying to challenge only the order dated 27.5.1996, in the appeal against the order dated 15.12.2004. When a huge liability of Rs.1,12,24,792.99 was sought to be created on the appellant in a proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2A, the High Court did not even bother to refer to the facts and merits, and chose to sum-marily dispose of the appeal thereby allowing perpetration of a patent abuse of process of court by the respondent. The travails of the appellant could have been avoided if the trial court and the High Court had been diligent to ensure that its process were not misused and abused by the respondent. [Paras 25, 26] [1127-G-H; 1128-A-E] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.380 of 2007 From the Judgement and Order dated 06.03.2006 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in FAFO No. 343 of 2005. P.P. Malhotra, Ajit Pudussery, K. Vijayan, with him, for the Appellant. S.R. Yadav, Braj Kishore Mishra, Vikram, Tanushree Sinha, Aparna Jha, with him for the Respondent.

1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.380 OF 2007 Food Corporation of India … Appellant Vs. Sukh Deo Prasad … Respondent JUDGMENT R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J. The Food Corporation of India (`FCI’ for short) challenges the order dated 6.3.2006 of the Allahabad High Court, rejecting its appeal against the order … Continue reading

Banking Laws (Amendment) Act, 1984-Customary bonus abolished-Provisions added to various Acts-State Bank of India Act, 1955-Section 43-A-State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Acts, 1959-Section 50-A-Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970-Section 12-A-Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1980-Section 12-A-Amendment Act enacted during pendency of a writ petition filed against award of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, previously confirming payment of customary bonus-Writ petition dismissed and award attained finality-Appellant filed writ petition challenging the Amendment Act-Dismissed by High Court-On appeal Held, there is distinction between encroachment on the judicial power and nullification of the effect of a judicial decision by changing law retrospectively, the former is outside the competence of legislature but the latter is permissible-Bank possessed power to change and determine the terms and conditions of services of its employees-Award under the Industrial Disputes Act cannot have the effect of preventing the Parliament for all times to come from amending the law on the foundation of which the award was made-Amended provision operates notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, including the Industrial Disputes Act or anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Payment of Bonus Act, 1965-Constitution of India, 1950-Part III. Interpretation of Statutes-Operation of Amending Act-Objects and Reasons of a statute to be looked into as an extrinsic aid to find out legislative intent only when meaning by its ordinary language is obscure or ambiguous-Every sovereign legislature possesses right to make retrospective legislation-Public interest at large is one of the relevant considerations in determining constitutional validity of a retrospective legislation-Curative statutes are by their very nature intended to operate upon and affect past transactions. Words and Phrases-“Retroactive” and “Retrospective”-Meaning of. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal held that employees of the State Bank of India were entitled to payment of bonus at the rate of one month’s substantive pay, every half year. The management of the bank challenged the said award by filing a writ petition. During the pendency of the same the State Bank of India Act, 1955, the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959, the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 and the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1980 were amended by the Banking Laws (Amendment) Act, 1984 by adding provisions that denied the appellants of customary bonus as per the award. The writ petition of the management was dismissed and the award attained finality. Thereafter, the appellant challenged the said Amendment Act by filing a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed. Hence this appeal. Appellant contended that the Amendment Act was unconstitutional as it nullified a judicial decision; that an award passed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was entitled to greater recognition over the State Bank of India Act; that Parliament was not vested with the power to reduce wages, therefore, the legislation was ultra vires; that bonus being a customary bonus was peculiar to the employees of the bank and a mere fact that other public sector banks were not paying such bonus was of no consequence; that bonus was nothing but deferred wage; that customary bonus was one which was paid de hors the bonus paid under the payment of Bonus Act, 1965; that customary bonus was not profit linked; and that even if the amendment was accepted to be valid it could only have prospective effect. Respondents contended that payment of customary bonus was creating different yardsticks for different public sector banks; that even if a custom acquires a force of law, it could be changed as there was no fundamental right involved in any custom; that bonus cannot be called deferred wages; that the payments were related to profits and they were not uniform and so in that sense it was not really a condition of service or a deferred wage; that the Amendment Act brought in a curative provision, and no retrospective effect has been given to the Amendment Act; that the Industrial Disputes Act had no application as the Parliament had the power to legislate on that aspect; and that the legislature did not override a judicial decision but rendered the same ineffective by enacting a valid law within the legislative field of the legislature.

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 3396 of 2001 PETITIONER: State Bank’s Staff Union Madras RESPONDENT: Union of India & Ors. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/09/2005 BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & H. K. SEMA JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in this Appeal is to judgment of a Division Bench of Madras … Continue reading

cheque bounce case should be tried and heard by the same magistrate and not by his successor= From the language of Section 326(3) of the Code, it is plain that the provisions of Section 326(1) and 326(2) of the new Code are not applicable to summary trial. Therefore, except in regard to those cases which fall within the ambit of Section 326 of the Code, the Magistrate cannot proceed with the trial placing reliance on the evidence recorded by his predecessor. He has got to try the case de novo.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1703 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 723 of 2011) Nitinbhai Saevatilal Shah & Another … Appellant Versus Manubhai Manjibhai Panchal & Another … Respondents J U D G M E N T J.M. PANCHAL, J. Leave Granted. 2. This … Continue reading

The letter of credit established by the issuing bank, inter alia, made the following stipulations: ” . . . . . . . . THIS DOCUMENTARY CREDIT WHICH IS AVAILABLE BY NEGOTIATION OF 2

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1709 OF 2007 State Bank of India & Anr. …. Appellants Versus M/s. Emmsons International Ltd. & Anr. ….Respondents JUDGMENT R.M. Lodha, J. This civil appeal, by special leave, is from the judgment and decree of the Madhya Pradesh High Court whereby … Continue reading

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