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Srinagar Hydro Electric Project (SHEP) located in Tehri / Pauri Garhwal district of Uttar Pradesh was a project envisaged by the then Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board (UPSEB) on river Alaknanda, which was basically run-of-the-river scheme.= In the Executive Summary of Chaturvedi Report, on the question of ‘Environmental Impact of Projects’, reads as follows: 17. Development of new hydropower projects has impact on environment, ecology, biodiversity, both terrestrial & aquatic and economic and social life. 69 hydropower projects with a capacity of 9,020.30 MW are proposed in Bhagirathi and Alaknanda basins. This includes 17 projects which are operational with a capacity of 2,295.2 MW. In addition, 26 projects with a capacity of 3,261.3 MW (including 600 MW Lohari Nagpala hydropower project, work on which has been suspended by Government decision) which were under construction, 11 projects with a capacity of 2,350 MW CEA/TEC clearances and 16 projects with a capacity of 1,673.8 MW under development. 4.18 The implementation of the above 69 hydropower projects has extensive implications for other needs of this society and the river itself. It is noticed that the implementation of all the above projects will lead to 81% of River Bhagirathi and 65% of River Alaknanda getting affected. Also there are a large number of projects which have very small distances between them leaving little space for river to regenerate and revive. We are also deeply concerned with the recent tragedy, which has affected the Char Dham area of Uttarakhand. Wadia Institute of Himalayan Geology (WIG) recorded 350mm of rain on June 15-16, 2013. Snowfall ahead of the cloudburst also has contributed to the floods resulting in the burst on the banks of Chorabari lake near Kedarnath, leading to large scale calamity leading to loss of human lives and property. The adverse effect of the existing projects, projects under construction and proposed, on the environment and ecology calls for a detailed scientific study. Proper Disaster Management Plan, it is seen, is also not in place, resulting in loss of lives and property. In view of the above mentioned circumstances, we are inclined to give following directions: 1) We direct the MoEF as well as State of Uttarakhand not to grant any further environmental clearance or forest clearance for any hydroelectric power project in the State of Uttarakhand, until further orders. 2) MoEF is directed to constitute an Expert Body consisting of representatives of the State Government, WII, Central Electricity Authority, Central Water Commission and other expert bodies to make a detailed study as to whether Hydroelectric Power Projects existing and under construction have contributed to the environmental degradation, if so, to what extent and also whether it has contributed to the present tragedy occurred at Uttarakhand in the month of June 2013. 3) MoEF is directed to examine, as noticed by WII in its report, as to whether the proposed 24 projects are causing significant impact on the biodiversity of Alaknanda and Bhagirath River basins. 4) The Disaster Management Authority, Uttarakhand would submit a Report to this Court as to whether they had any Disaster Management Plan is in place in the State of Uttarakhand and how effective that plan was for combating the present unprecedented tragedy at Uttarakhand. 52. Reports would be submitted within a period of three months. Communicate the order to the Central and State Disaster Management Authority, Uttarakhand. 53. In view of above, civil appeals and transferred cases are disposed of.

PUBLISHED IN   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40641  REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6736 OF 2013@ (SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO.362 OF 2012) ALAKNANDA HYDRO POWER CO. LTD. ……APPELLANT Versus ANUJ JOSHI & ORS. …….RESPONDENTS WITH Civil Appeal Nos.6746-6747 of 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.5849-5850 of 2012) and T.C. (C) No.55 … Continue reading

Service matter – whether once a charge-sheet has been issued for imposition of a major penalty under Regulation 7 of the Haryana State Electricity Board Employees (Punishment & Appeal) Regulations, 1990 [for short “the Regulations 1990”], is it obligatory on the part of the Disciplinary Authority to conduct a full fledged departmental inquiry even if, after considering the reply of the delinquent, the authority decides to impose a minor penalty, for which no departmental inquiry is provided under the Regulations.= Sub-regulation 8 of Regulation 7, which reads as follows: “7(8). Where an employee has been charge-sheeted under this regulation and the Competent Authority, on receipt of his reply to the charge sheet is of the opinion that no major punishment as laid down in Regulation-4 (vi to x) is called for, it may dispense with the holding of enquiry and inflict straight-away any of the minor penalties as laid down in Clause (i) to (v) of the ibid Regulation by a speaking order.” 12. Above referred regulations, especially Regulation 7(8) clearly indicates that the competent authority has got the power to dispense with the procedure for holding a departmental inquiry, even though it had contemplated major penalty proceedings, on being satisfied with the reply submitted by the delinquent officer. In such a case, it can always follow the procedure for imposing minor penalty. Minor penalty, as per the Regulation, can be inflicted without holding any departmental inquiry, by giving only a show-cause-notice and a reasonable opportunity to make a representation to the show-cause-notice. Personal hearing can also be afforded and also can be dispensed with by a speaking order.= The delinquent officer was given an opportunity to submit his reply to the show-cause-notice which was considered and the Board took a conscious decision to impose only a minor penalty, i.e. barring one increment without cumulative effect, for which no full-fledged departmental inquiry is contemplated. Learned District Judge as well as the High Court, in our view, has committed a grave error in interfering with the punishment imposed by the Board which, in our view, is perfectly legal, going by the regulations referred to herein before. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the learned District Judge as well as that of the High Court is set aside. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that, by virtue of the punishment imposed, he has not been given his due promotion. We are of the view that if imposition of a minor penalty is not a bar in granting promotion to the respondent, due promotion be granted to him in accordance with the Rules and Regulations applicable to him.

   published in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40611 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6150 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (C) No. 5230 of 2013] D.H.B.V.N.L. Vidyut Nagar, Hisar & Others .. Appellants Versus Yashvir Singh Gulia .. Respondent J U D G M E N T K. S. Radhakrishnan, … Continue reading

Electricity: Non-payment of electricity bill by previous owner/occupier of the premises in regard to the supply of electricity to the premises – Liability of subsequent purchaser of the premises to pay such arrears – Held: Electricity arrears do not constitute a charge over the property – Therefore, a transferee of a premises cannot be made liable for the dues of the previous owner/occupier – However, the electricity supplier can demand arrears from subsequent purchaser if the statutory rules or the terms and conditions of supply which are statutory in character, authorize it to make such demand. Res judicata: First suit filed for permanent injunction for restraining the electricity Board from enforcing the demand notice, dismissed – Second suit filed for declaration that the demand and the disconnection were invalid – Held: The second suit was not barred by the principle of res judicata since the matter that was directly and substantially in issue in the second suit was completely different from the matter that was directly and substantially in issue in the first suit and the reliefs claimed were also different – Doctrine/Principle. The first respondent purchased a rice mill in an auction. When the mill was purchased, the electricity supplied to it was already disconnected due to non-payment of electricity bill. After taking the possession of the mill, the first respondent applied for and obtained the electricity connection in its own name in the year 1991. Four years later, the appellant-Electricity Board served upon the first respondent a demand notice dated 16.1.1995 towards electricity arrears due from the previous owner. The first respondent filed a suit for permanent injunction for restraining the appellant-Board from enforcing the demand notice. The suit was dismissed. The appellate court upheld the order of dismissal. Thereafter, the appellant served a notice dated 2.3.1998 informing the first respondent that the electricity supply would be disconnected if the arrears due from the previous owner were not paid. Thereafter the electricity supplied was disconnected on 9.3.1998. The first respondent filed a suit challenging the demand and disconnection of electricity supplied. The said suit was dismissed by the trial court holding that the claim of the appellant was barred by limitation. Both the first respondent and the appellant filed appeals. The first appellate court while dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant and allowing the appeal filed by the first respondent held that the first respondent could not be made liable for the dues of the previous owner, as there was no provision in the terms and conditions of sale that the electricity dues of the previous owner should be paid by the first respondent as auction purchaser. The appellant filed an appeal before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal holding that in view of the decision in Isha Marbles case, the liability of a consumer to pay charges for consumption of electricity cannot be fastened on a subsequent auction purchaser of the property. In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that the dismissal of the first suit filed by the first respondent for permanent injunction having attained finality, the second suit filed by the first respondent for a declaration that demand and disconnection were invalid, was barred by the principles of res judicata, and that the decision in *Isha Marbles relied on by the High Court was inapplicable to the facts of the case. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The first suit by the first respondent was for a permanent injunction to restrain the appellant Board from enforcing the demand notice dated 16.1.1995 in respect of the electricity consumption charges incurred by the previous owner. By the second suit, the first respondent sought a declaration that the notice dated 9.3.1998 threatening disconnection of electricity supply for non-payment of the arrears of the previous owner and the consequential disconnection dated 2.3.1998, were invalid and for consequential relief. The matter that was directly and substantially in issue in the second suit was completely different from the matter that was directly and substantially in issue in the first suit. The reliefs claimed were also different, as the first suit was for a permanent injunction and the second suit was for a declaration and consequential relief. Therefore the second suit was not barred by res judicata. [Para 5] [223-A-D] 2. Electricity arrears do not constitute a charge over the property. Therefore, in general law, a transferee of a premises cannot be made liable for the dues of the previous owner/occupier. Where the statutory rules or the terms and conditions of supply which are statutory in character, authorize the supplier of electricity, to demand from the purchaser of a property claiming re-connection or fresh connection of electricity, the arrears due by the previous owner/occupier in regard to supply of electricity to such premises, the supplier can recover the arrears from a purchaser. The appellant did not plead in its defence that any statutory rule or terms and conditions of supply, authorized it to demand the dues of previous owner, from the first respondent. The decision in **Paramount Polymers shows that such an enabling term was introduced in the terms and conditions of electricity supply in Haryana, only in the year 2001. The appellant did not demand the alleged arrears, when the first respondent approached the appellant for electricity connection in its own name for the same premises and obtained it in the year 1991. More than three years thereafter, a demand was made by the appellant for the first time on 16.1.1995 alleging that there were electricity dues by the previous owner. In these circumstances, the claim relating to the previous owner could not be enforced against the first respondent. On facts, the decision of the High Court does not call for interference. [Paras 9 10, 11] [227-F-H; 228- A-E] Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. DVS Steels & Alloys Pvt.Ltd. 2009 (1) SCC 210 – relied on. *Isha Marbles v. Bihar State Electricity Board (1995) 2 SCC 648; **Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Paramount Polymers (P) Ltd. (2006) 13 SCC 101; Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Excel Buildcon Pvt.Ltd. 2008 (10) SCC 720 – referred to. Case Law Reference: (1995) 2 SCC 648 referred to Para 3 (2006) 13 SCC 101 referred to Para 4 2008 (10) SCC 720 referred to Para 7 2009 (1) SCC 210 relied on Para 8 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6817 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 08.08.2005 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No. 412 of 2004. Pardeep Dahiya, T.V. George for the Appellant. Amarjit Singh Bedi, Gurbir Singh R. for the Respondents.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6817 OF 2010 [Arising out of SLP (C) No.16396/2006] Haryana State Electricity Board … Appellant Vs. M/s Hanuman Rice Mills & Ors. … Respondents JUDGMENT R. V. RAVEENDRAN, J. Leave granted. Heard. 2. The second respondent – Haryana Financial Corporation auctioned the rice … Continue reading

5. We have carefully considered the submissions and perused the documents produced on record. It is obvious from its very title that the Janta Personal Accident Insurance Policy was limited to deaths, permanent disablement, etc., of the covered employees of the HPSEB, arising out of their “personal accident”. In other words, natural death of a daily-wage employee at his home was outside the coverage of the insurance scheme. What the State Commission has done is to read the word “Death” in isolation of the rest of the letter dated 20.02.1996 of the Secretary, HPSEB conveying the details of the scheme. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Sharma, the complainant herself has stated that the death of her husband was from natural causes, at this home and thereafter, she had been employed as a daily-wage worker by the Board in one of its offices. In other words, the Board has discharged its duties as a compassionate employer. However, even if it had not done so, the petitioner Board could not, by any reckoning, be held responsible for payment of the insurance amount to the complainant because her husband’s death was due to natural causes. Likewise, the death being “natural”, the insurance company was also not liable to pay the amount insured even if the delay in reporting the death/making the claim were to be overlooked/condoned.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI   REVISION PETITION No. 512 of 2007 (From the order dated 08.11.2006 of the Himachal Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Shimla in Appeal no. 18 of 2006) 1.  Executive Engineer, Transmission Division H. P. State Electricity Board, Bilaspur, H.P. 2.  Executive Engineer, Maintenance Division H.P. State Electricity Board Shimla – 171 004, … Continue reading

Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Ss. 3(a) and (b), 11 and 16: Acquisition of land by State Government-Easementary right on the ground of necessity-Availability of-High Court rightly drew a distinction between an easement of an ordinary nature for which compensation could be claimed and an easement of necessity in respect of which right of passage could not be extinguished by reason of acquisition, hence justified in granting right of passage to the claimant both on principle and precedent-Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Section 100-Constitution of India, 1950-Article 136. espondent Nos. 1 to 3 had purchased certain portion of land belonging to `R’. The sale deed specifically mentioned that respondent-vendees would have access to their land through a passage from the remaining part of the land of the vendor, which was later acquired by the Government of Himachal Pradesh. The State Government blocked off the passage by a barbed wire fencing, thereby preventing respondents’ access to their land. Aggrieved, respondents filed a suit for issuing injunction against the appellants. Suit was dismissed by the Trial Court. Appellate Court decreed the suit holding that there existed a passage from the land acquired by the State Government to the land of the respondents and they had no other passage to their land. Appeal against this order was dismissed by the High Court. Hence the present appeal. It was contended by the appellants that once an award has been made under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act and possession of the acquired land was taken, the land would vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. =Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. Both the Additional District Judge and the High Court have concurrently held that the only approach available to respondent Nos. 1 to 3, is through the land of the appellant and as such they had a right to approach their land as claimed by them and the appellant had no right to obstruct the approach by putting up a barbed wire fencing. [212-E] 1.2. The High Court drew a distinction between an easement of an ordinary nature in respect of which compensation could have been claimed in the land acquisition proceedings and an easement of necessity, a right of passage, and held that right of passage by way of necessity, as enjoyed by the respondents over the land of original landlord and presently acquired by the appellant, was not extinguished by reason of acquisition. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the distinction drawn by the High Court about non-extinguishment of the right of easement arising out of necessity appears to be justified both on principle and precedent. The present case is not a fit case to be interfered with in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. [213-B; 214-A-B-C] Collector of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri and Ors., AIR (1955) SC 298, relied on. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Tarsem Singh and Ors., [2001] 8 SCC 104, distinguished. Rakesh Dwivedi and Naresh K. Sharma for the Appellants. A.V. Palli and Mrs. Rekha Palli for the Respondent Nos. 1-3. J.S. Attri for the Respondent No. 4. =2005 AIR 954 , 2005(1 )SCR209 , 2005(2 )SCC164 , 2005(1 )SCALE150 , 2005(1 )JT169

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 1022 of 2000 PETITIONER: H.P. State Electricity Board & Ors. RESPONDENT: Shiv K. Sharma & Ors. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/01/2005 BENCH: Shivaraj V. Patil & B.N. Srikrishna JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T Srikrishna, J. The Himachal Prades State Electricity Board, Shimla, challenges by this appeal the judgment … Continue reading

apex court reassessed the entire evidence on bank guarantee and set aside the High court judgement and restore the lower court judgment as correct= This is a letter written by defendant 1 to the plaintiff-bank in response to the demand notice dated 23/6/1984 issued to defendant 1. DW-1 in his evidence has admitted that the said letter (Ex-A6) was written by defendant 1.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4446 OF 2006   PUNJAB & SIND BANK … APPELLANT Vs. M/S. C.S. COMPANY & ORS. … RESPONDENTS   JUDGMENT   (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.   1. The appellant – Punjab & Sind Bank (for short, “the plaintiff-bank”) has challenged in this … Continue reading

Maharashtra Slum areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971: ss. 4 and 2(e)(v) – `Slum area’ – `Occupier’ – `Trespasser’ – HELD: `Occupier’ as defined in Clause (v) of s.2(e) includes any person who is liable to pay to the owner damages for use and occupation of any land or building and would take within its fold and sweep a trespasser since such person is not only liable for damages for an act of trespass, but also liable to pay damages for use and occupation of land or building trespassed by him – It is immaterial whether damages for use and occupation are, in fact, claimed or not. ss. 4, 2(e)(v) and 22(1)(a) – `Slum area’ – `Occupier’ – Suit for eviction of trespasser – Prior permission of competent authority – HELD: Before initiation of any suit or proceedings for eviction of a trespasser who is `occupier’ within the meaning of s.2(e)(v), the written permission of the Competent Authority u/s 22(1)(a) is mandatorily required – In the instant case, though the `occupier’ is a trespasser, but the suit for her eviction was not maintainable for want of written permission of the competent Authority and was rightly dismissed by the trial court. Words and Phrases: `Trespass’ – `Trespasser’ – Connotation of. Plaintiff-respondent no. 1 filed a suit against the defendant-appellant and respondent no. 2, the Executive Engineer of the State Electricity Board, for declaration, possession and permanent injunction in respect of a room admeasuring 8′ x 10′ (the subject room) situate in the city of Pune. Her case was that she constructed the subject room in 1987, got electricity connection in her name, was paying taxes to the Municipal Corporation and had the photopass in her name; that she permitted her friend, the appellant, to stay temporarily in the subject room and when she was asked to vacate it, she refused denying the right of the plaintiff. It was stated that the defendant was neither a tenant nor a licensee but a trespasser and had no right to remain in possession of the subject room. The defendant- appellant contested the suit stating that she had the photopass for the subject room. She denied the room to have been constructed in 1987 and her status of a trespasser. She claimed that the subject room was situate in the slum area declared under the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 and the suit was not maintainable without the written permission of the Competent Authority in view of the prohibition contained in s. 22(1)(a) of the Act. The trial court accepted the title of the plaintiff over the subject room, but dismissed the suit holding that the suit without permission of the Competent Authority was not maintainable. On plaintiff’s appeal, the first appellate court decreed the suit holding that as the defendant was a trespasser, the permission of the Competent Authority was not necessary. The second appeal of the defendant having been dismissed by the High Court in limine, she filed the appeal. The question for consideration before the Court was: “is a trespasser covered by the definition of `occupier’ in s. 2(e) (v) of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971” and if yes, “whether for his eviction from the land or building in a declared slum area, the written permission of the Competent Authority u/s 22(1) (a) of the 1971 Act is mandatorily required.” =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 A `trespass’ is an unlawful interference with one’s person, property or rights. With reference to property, it is a wrongful invasion of another’s possession. [para 10] [194-F-G] Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition (West Publishing Company), pages 108 and 115; Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), 1990, page 1504; Halsbury’s Laws of England; Volume 45 (Fourth Edition), page 631 – referred to. 1.2 The definition of `occupier’ in s. 2(e) of the Maharashtra Slum areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 is not exhaustive but inclusive. Clause (v) that reads, `occupier’, includes `any person who is liable to pay to the owner damages for the use and occupation of any land or building’ would surely take within its fold and sweep a trespasser since such person is not only liable for damages for an act of trespass but also liable to pay to the owner damages for the use and occupation of any land or building trespassed by him. It is immaterial whether damages for the use and occupation are in fact claimed or not by the owner in an action against the trespasser. Clause (v), includes a person who enters the land or building in possession of another with permission or consent but remains upon such land or building after such permission or consent has been revoked since after revocation of permission or consent, he is liable to pay damages for unauthorised use of land or building. The first appellate court relied upon Shanker Dagadu Bakade’s case which has already been overruled in Taj Mohamed Yakub and distinguished the latter on superficial reasoning without properly appreciating the statement of law exposited therein. The High Court failed to notice such grave error in the judgment of the first appellate court. [para 15] [198-B-G; 199-A-B] Taj Mohamed Yakub vs. Abdul Gani Bhikan (1991) Mh L J 263 – approved. Shankar Dagadu Bakade and Ors. vs. Bajirao Balaji Darwatkar 1990(2) Bom CR 38 – stood overruled. 2.1 Once it is held that a trespasser is included in the definition of `occupier’ in s. 2(e)(v) of the 1971 Act, what necessarily follows is that before initiation of any suit or proceeding for eviction of such trespasser, the previous written permission of the Competent Authority is required as mandated by s. 22(1). Section 22(1) starts with non obstante clause and it is clear from the provision contained in clause (a) thereof that no person shall institute any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for eviction of the occupier from any building or land in a slum area or for recovery of any arrears of rent or compensation from any such occupier or for both without the previous written permission of the Competent Authority. The use of words `no’ and `shall’ in sub-s. (1) of s. 22 makes it abundantly clear that prior written permission of the Competent Authority for an action under clause (a) thereof is mandatorily required and is a must. The role of the Competent Authority under the 1971 Act is extremely important as the legislature has conferred power on him to carry out execution of works in improvement of the slum. These provisions contained in s. 22 are salutary in light of the scheme of 1971 Act and have to be followed. [para 16] [199-B-H] 2.2 In the instant case, respondent no.1 set up the case in the plaint that the appellant was a trespasser in the subject room. The first appellate court has also recorded a categorical finding, which has not been disturbed by the High Court, that the appellant was occupying the subject room as trespasser. In the circumstances, the suit was clearly not maintainable for want of written permission from the Competent Authority and was rightly dismissed by the trial court. [para 17] [200-C] 2.3 The judgment of the High Court affirming the judgment of the first appellate court is set aside. The suit filed by respondent no.1 stands dismissed. However, this will not preclude respondent no.1 from instituting fresh suit or proceeding for eviction against the appellant after obtaining necessary written permission from the Competent Authority. [para 18] [200- D-E] Case Law Reference: (1991) Mh L J 263 approved para 15 1990(2) Bom CR 38 stood overruled para 15 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2789 of 2005. From the Judgment & Order dated 20.09.2004 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Second Appeal No. 1125 of 2004. Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure for the Appellant. Punam Kumari for the Respondents.

REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2789 OF 2005   Laxmi Ram Pawar …… Appellant Vs. Sitabai Balu Dhotre & Anr. …… Respondents   JUDGMENT   R.M. LODHA, J. The decision in this appeal, in our opinion, turns upon the answer to the following question : is … Continue reading

the appellant was not liable to reimburse supervision charges stipulated under the Electricity Supply Code, 2002, does not lie in the appellant’s mouth. This is so, because the appellant has unilaterally accepted to pay supervision charges under the Electricity Supply Code, 2005. The aforesaid Electricity Supply Code, 2005 became enforceable w.e.f. 18.2.2005. All the pleas raised by the appellant, to avoid payment of supervision charges under the Electricity Supply Code, 2002, are also available to the appellant to avoid payment of such charges under the Electricity Supply Code, 2005. If the appellant has accepted the 20 enforceability of the Electricity Supply Code, 2005 over and above the office memorandum dated 17.1.1984, it is not possible for us to understand why the appellant has failed to accede to abide by supervision charges levied under the Electricity Supply Code, 2002. For exactly the same reasons, for which the appellant has accepted the Electricity Supply Code, 2005, it is liable to accept the levy of supervision charges under the Electricity Supply Code, 2002.

1 “REPORTABLE” IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4209 OF 2007 U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad …. Appellant Versus U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd. …. Respondent J U D G M E N T JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J. 1. The appellant herein, the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (hereinafter … Continue reading

Dismissing the appeals of the Board and allowing those of the consumers, the Court HELD: 1.1. The significance of the question as to whether fixing the rate of fuel surcharge is a legislative function or a non-legislative function is that if the function is held to be legislative, in the absence of any provision in that regard the principles of natural justice would not be applicable and the scope of judicial review would also be limited to the plea of discrimination i.e. violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950. [Para 21] [311-C, D] Prag Ice and Oil Mills v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 1296; Rohtas Industries v. Bihar State Electricity Board AIR 1984 SC 657 and Kerala State Electricity Board v. M/s S.N. Govind Prabhu & Brothers AIR 1986 Supreme Court 1999, relied on. Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Limited v. Union of India AIR 1975 SC 460; Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. AIR 1987 SC 1802 and Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Ltd. v. Union of India 1990 (3) SCC 223, referred to. 1.2. In a sense, fixing rate of fuel surcharge under clause 16.10 of the Tariff notification is different from fixing the tariff u/s 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. Fuel surcharge is undoubtedly a part of tariff. But fixing rates of consumption charges or the guaranteed charges or the fixed charges or the delayed payment surcharge etc. and fixing rates of fuel surcharge do not stand on par. Though rates of consumption charges etc. are based on objective materials, there is enough scope for flexibility in fixing the rates. It also involves policy to fix different rates for different categories of consumers. Such is not the position with the fuel surcharge. [Para 26] [313-B, C] 1.3. Clause 16.10.1 specifies the categories coming in the net of the levy and clause 16.10.3 provides the formula. The formula envisages addition of units generated or purchased and increased average cost of fuel and average unit rate of purchase rates and division of the total by the quotient is the average fuel surcharge per unit (expressed in terms of paise) described by denominator S1 in the formula. The whole exercise, it would appear, involves arithmetical accounting. There is no scope for exercise of any discretion or flexibility. If fixing rate of fuel surcharge is just an arithmetical exercise, giving opportunity of hearing would hardly serve any useful purpose. [Para 26] [311-D, E] 1.4. Where the fixation of rate or determination of the amount is made individually, depending on the context in which this is to be done, there may be justification or necessity to give opportunity of hearing to the person(s) concerned. But where the rate is fixed for persons at large the only way by which such opportunity can be given is to notify the rates and then invite objections. There is no such provision. In the absence of any mechanism provided in the Tariff notification, it would not be feasible at all. [Para 27] [315-F, G] 2.1. The validity of the formula had been upheld earlier. High Court noted that though by the impugned circular dated 31.5.1999 the rates of fuel surcharge have been fixed for the years 1993-94 (July 1993 to March 1994) to 1997-98, the correctness of the rates fixed for the years 1993-94 (July 1994 to March 1994) to 1995-96 were not challenged and correctness of the rates for the subsequent years only was under challenge. [Para 29] [317-C, D] Bihar State Electricity Board and anr. v. Bihar 440 Volt Vidyut Upbhokta Sangh and Ors. 1997 (11) SCC 380 and Kerala State Electricity Board v. S.N. Govind Prabhu & Brothers AIR 1986 SC 1999, referred to. 2.2. The Electricity Board is entitled to levy fuel surcharge on the consumers receiving high tension supply leaving out the consumers coming in other categories. [Para 30] [317-F] Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Kalyan Borough Municipality AIR 1968 SC 991; M/s Rohtas Industries Limited v. Chairman, Bihar State Electricity Board AIR 1984 SC 657, relied on. 3.1. It is not in dispute that TVNL came into existence in 1996-97 whereas while calculating the electricity 1991-92 is to be treated as the base year. As a matter of fact, it was on that ground, namely, that a different base year i.e. 1992-93 was provided for computing the increase in the average unit rate of purchase of electricity from external sources, that the High Court directed the Board to consider amending clause 16.10.3 so as to provide for the same base year i.e. 1991-92 with respect to both the increase in the average cost of generation and increase in the rates of purchase, and accepting the verdict of the High Court the Board amended the last part of clause 16.10.3. Purchase of electricity from TVNL which admittedly came into existence in the year 1996-97, therefore, cannot be treated as component of H3 i.e. increase in the average unit rate of purchase of electricity from “any other source”. As a matter of fact, the case of writ petitioners was that the TVNL is nothing but a unit of the Board in disguise of a subsidiary company and, therefore, could not be treated as a component of H3. It may not be necessary to go behind the veil of the separate legal character of the TVNL. The fact that TVNL did not exist in the year 1991-92 and came into existence only in the year 1996-97 is sufficient to justify its deletion as component of H3. [Para 33] [319-F, G, H; 320-A, B, C] 3.2. The relevant clause of the formula, after amendment, reads, “the said increase to be calculated with respect to the year 1991-92” ( last para of clause 16.10.3). The amendment has been made in the light of the decision of the High Court which rightly held that it is not possible to allow the Board to include purchase of electricity as a component of H3 without suitably amending the formula in accordance with law. [Para 33] [320-F, G, H; 321-A] 3.3. As regard “deemed supply” by the Board to TISCO, the High Court noticed that under a tripartite agreement between the Board, the DVC and the TISCO, with the consent of the State Government, the electricity is being supplied directly by the DVC to the TISCO but such supply is treated as made by the Board to the TISCO. High Court held that the Board cannot treat the sale of electricity by the DVC to the TISCO as a separate class or category for the purpose of computing D3. The computation of D3 to this extent, was rightly held to be not correct. [Para 34] [321-A, B; 322-D] 4.1. The computation of the rates of fuel surcharge by the impugned circular for the years 1996-97 and onwards so far as it relates to the purchase of electricity from TVNL and “deemed supply” by the Board to TISCO thus does not appear to be in accordance with the formula. Fuel surcharge has to be calculated strictly within the framework of the formula. If any extraneous element has crept in, the computation to that extent must be held to be not in accordance with law and accordingly modified. [Para 35] [322-E, F] 4.2. The fact that the Board has had to pay large amounts as delayed payment surcharge (DPS) to the external agencies from which it has been purchasing electricity is more or less an admitted position. The case of the Board, however, is that the default in payment was mainly on account of defaults committed by the consumers themselves. High Court found substance in the stand of the Board. The fact that the consumers at large have not been paying the dues on time and many of them have been making only part payment on the strength of interim orders of Courts are facts which are not disputed. If the consumers do not pay the dues to the Board, they cannot be heard to make any complaint against payment of DPS by the Board to the external agencies. [Para 37] [323-E, F, G, H] 5. As regards the non-accounting of Rs.100 Crores paid by Coal Companies to the Board, the High Court observed that payment of the amount would be relevant consideration while calculating the rate of fuel surcharge for the year 1998-99 and not 1997-98. It is directed that adjustment of Rs.100 crores be worked out accordingly. [Para 45] [326-A, C, D] 6. Nothing material could be highlighted as to how the reasons of the High Court suffer from any infirmity. [Para 44] [325-G] Case Law Reference: 1997 (11) SCC 380 referred to para 2 AIR 1978 SC 1296 relied on para 21 AIR 1984 SC 657 relied on para 22 AIR 1986 Supreme Court 1999 relied on para 22 AIR 1975 SC 460 referred to para 23 AIR 1987 SC 1802 referred to para 24 1990 (3) SCC 223 referred to para 25 AIR 1968 SC 991 relied on para 30 AIR 1984 SC 657 relied on para 30 AIR 1986 SC 1999 referred to para 31 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7220-7239 of 2000. From the Judgment & Order dated 26.06.2000 of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in CWJC No. 5542, 2009, 2087, 1655, 1807, 1971, 1861, 5592, 5624, 5728, 5819, 5861, 5993, 6054, 6079, 6248, 6249, 6275, 6358 and 6490/1999. WITH C.A. Nos. 2560/2009, 2561/2009, 2555-2559/2009. V.R. Reddy, Mir Jha, Sunil Kumar, Harish N. Salve, D.A. Dave, Navin Prakash, Sumant Bhardwaj, Anita Kanungo, Mridula Ray Bharadwaj, L.K. Bajla, Praveen Kumar, Gopal Prasad, R.N. Karanjawala, Nandini Gore, Debmalya Banerjee, Bharat Singh, Manik Karanjawala, Jayant Mohan, Pragya Singh Baghel, Ajit Kumar Sinha, Shree Prakash Sinha, Sunita Sharma, Manjula Gupta, Gopal Prasad, S. Chandra Shekhar, Himanshu Shekhar, Gopal Singh, Vivek Singh for the appearing parties.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 7220-7239 OF 2000 Bihar State Electricity Board …Appellant Versus M/s Pulak Enterprises and Ors. …Respondents WITH Civil Appeal No. 7219 of 2000 Civil Appeal Nos. 2555-2559 of 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.456-460/2001) Civil Appeal 2560 of 2009 (Arising out of … Continue reading

Patna Electric Supply Company Limited (PESCO), was taken over by the appellant, Bihar State Electricity Board (BSEB), certain disputes arose regarding payment of compensation by BSEB to PESCO in respect of the assets of PESCO. This resulted in litigation and ultimately in C.A. No.2630 of 2 1982 this Court, while granting leave, directed that BSEB would pay to PESCO the purchase price on the basis of book-value in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. Since payments were not made by BSEB to PESCO in terms of the said directions, PESCO filed I.A. No.5 for appropriate directions to be given to BSEB in this regard.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION I.A. NO. 5 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2630 OF 1982 Bihar State Electricity Board … Appellant Vs. The Patna Electric Supply Co. Ltd. & Ors. Respondents O R D E R 1. After the respondent No.1, Patna Electric Supply Company Limited (PESCO), was taken over … Continue reading

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