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state of haryana

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Land Acquisition Actappellant- sec.4 notification, sec.6 and award can be challenged before taking possession with in reasonable time – Notice at locality is mandatory – no company and it’s site can be acquired for industrial purpose = Company itself is running an industry on the date of the notification, we are of the view that there is no justification in acquiring a running industrial unit for industrialization of the area.- In view of the above, it is clear that in spite of knowing the specific ground raised by the appellant about the non- publication of the substance of the notification as prescribed under the Act in the locality concerned, neither the State nor the Land Acquisition Collector availed the opportunity of filing reply refuting the same. In such circumstances, we have no other option except to hold that there was no publication of the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in the locality which is held to be mandatory. It is also relevant to point out that by effecting such publication in the locality, it would be possible for the person in possession, namely, either the owner or lessee to make their representation/objection in the enquiry under Section 5A. In addition to the same, such person “owner or occupier” is entitled to file their objections within 30 days from the date of publication in the locality and by non-publication of the same in the locality as provided under the Act, the owner or occupier loses his valuable right. For these reasons also, the acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed.= Under these circumstances, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 08.07.2008 and quash the land acquisition proceedings insofar as the appellant-Company is concerned.

 published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40657       REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 2 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6792 OF 2013 3 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 19869 of 2008)   M/s V.K.M. Kattha Industries Pvt. Ltd. …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Haryana & Ors. …. Respondent(s)     J U … Continue reading

LAND ACQUISITION – FIXATION OF COMPENSATION FOR DIFFERENT LANDS UNDER ONE NOTIFICATION = the High Court almost on a uniform basis awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.235/- per sq. yard notwithstanding the type of land involved. Although a distinction had been made between “chahi” lands, “pahar gair mumkin” lands and “gair mumkin” lands while assessing compensation, ultimately, a uniform rate was awarded in respect of the different types of lands which had been acquired. Different reasons have been given by the High Court in arriving at the uniform figure of Rs.235/- per sq. yard, but what is important is that ultimately by applying different methods, the compensation worked out to be same. In the said cases, the High Court had assessed the compensation payable for the acquired lands at the rate of Rs.805/- per sq. yard along with the statutory sums available under Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act and solatium on the market value under Section 23(2) thereof. It was also indicated that the land owners would also be entitled to interest as provided under Section 28 of the Act. ; The general cut imposed is at a flat rate of 40%, which, in our view, is not warranted on account of the fact that the lands in question have lost their character and potentiality as agricultural lands and have more or less been converted into lands which were ready for use for the purpose of construction. Taking Ms. Agarwal’s submissions regarding the factors which determine deduction towards development cost, such as location and potentiality, into account, we are of the view that a deduction of 331/3 per cent would be reasonable on account of the passage of time and the all round development in the area which has made it impossible for the lands to retain their original character. 47. Accordingly, we direct that except where we have provided otherwise, wherever a deduction of 40% had been made, the same should be altered to 331/3 per cent and the compensation awarded is to be modified accordingly.; the Collector had awarded compensation at a uniform rate of Rs. 1,81,200/- per acre along with statutory benefits. The Reference Court determined the compensation at the uniform rate of Rs. 206/- per sq. yard. The High Court modified the said award and awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 260/- per sq. yard for the land acquired up to the depth of 100 meters abutting National Highway No. 10. The value of the rest of the acquired land was maintained at Rs. 206/- per sq. yard. The area in question being already developed to some extent, a cut of 50% on the value is, in our view, excessive. We agree with Mr. Swarup that resorting to the belting system by the High Court was improper and that at best a standard cut of 1/3rd would have been sufficient to balance the smallness of the exhibits produced. It has been pointed out by Mr. Swarup that on a comparative basis, the price of lands in the area in 1991 was on an average of about Rs. 420/- per sq. yard. Given the sharp rise in land prices, the value, according to Mr. Swarup, would have doubled to about Rs. 800/- per sq. yard by 1993. Even if we have to apply the formula of 12% increase, the valuation of the lands in question in 1993 would be approximately Rs. 527/- per sq. yard. Imposing a deduction of 1/3rd, valuation comes to about Rs. 350/- per sq. yard, which, in our view, would be the proper compensation for the lands covered in the case of Mukesh (supra) and other connected matters.

Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3279-3287 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP(C)Nos.24704-24712 of 2007] Ashrafi and Ors. …Appellants Vs. State of Haryana and Ors. …Respondents WITH C.A.Nos.3288-3299/2013@SLP(C)Nos.13415-13426/2008, C.A.Nos.3300-3319/2013@SLP(C)Nos.12263-12282/2008, C.A.No.3320/2013@SLP(C)No.15648/2008, C.A.Nos.3321-3323/2013@SLP(C)Nos.5392-5394/2008, C.A.Nos.3324-3325/2013@SLP(C)Nos.15485-15486/2009, C.A.Nos.3326-3330/2013@SLP(C)Nos.8592-8596/2009, C.A.Nos.3331-3333/2013@SLP(C)Nos.34118-34120/2010, C.A.Nos.3334-3337/2013@SLP(C)Nos.4176-4179/2010, C.A.Nos.3338-3340/2013@SLP(C)Nos.11156-11158/2009, C.A.No.3341/2013@SLP(C)No.28895/2008, C.A.Nos.3342-3344/2013@SLP(C)Nos.14409-14411/2013 (CC 863-865/2011), C.A.No.3345/2013@SLP(C)No.33257/2010, C.A.Nos.3346-3347/2013@SLP(C)Nos.11171-11172/2009, C.A.Nos.3348-3349/2013@SLP(C)Nos.3125-3126/2011, C.A.Nos.3350-3351/2013@SLP(C)Nos.29721-29722/2009, C.A.No.3352/2013@SLP(C)No.31281/2009, C.A. No.8719 … Continue reading

service matter Whether the Haryana Staff Selection Commission (for short, ‘the Commission’) could destroy the answer sheets/papers of the written examination in violation of the policy decision taken vide resolution dated 1.10.1994 and whether the High Court committed an error by dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant questioning the selection made by the Commission for recruitment of Lecturers in Hindi (Education Department) are the questions which arise for consideration in this appeal filed against judgment dated 29.6.2010 of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court.The question which remains to be considered is as to what relief, if any, can be given to the appellant. Since the record of selection has been destroyed, it is not possible for this Court to consider and decide the appellant’s plea that the assessment of her performance in the written examination was vitiated due to arbitrariness and lack of objectivity. In this scenario, the only possible course could be to direct the Commission to conduct fresh written test and interview. However, it will not be fair to confine the fresh selection to the appellant alone. The other unsuccessful candidates, who could not approach the High Court or this Court on account of ignorance or financial constraints cannot be deprived of their legitimate right to be again considered along with the appellant and any direction by the Court to consider the case of the appellant alone would result in the violation of the doctrine of equality. 20. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment as also the order passed by the learned Single Judge are set aside. The Commission is directed to hold fresh written test and interview for considering the candidature of the appellant and other unsuccessful candidates after giving them due intimation about the date, time and place of the examination and interview. This exercise should be completed within a period of four months from the date of receipt/production of this order. The candidates who are selected on the basis of the exercise undertaken pursuant to this direction shall become entitled to be appointed against the vacancies which may be available on the date of finalisation of the selection. The parties are left to bear their own costs.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4128 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 31804 of 2010). Poonam Rani @ Poonam … Appellant Versus State of Haryana and another … Respondents J U D G M E N T G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Whether the … Continue reading

apex court set aside the high court order and confirmed the conviction of lower courts under cow slaughter’s actThe accused persons were convicted under Section 8 of the Act and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year by the Court of Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ferozepur vide judgment dated 14.09.1998 in Crl. Case No.23/96. On Appeal, this order of conviction and sentence was confirmed and upheld by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon vide order dated 01.06.2000 in Criminal Appeal No.20/98.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2203 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.372/2011) State of Haryana ….Appellant(s) – Versus – Rajmal & another ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T GANGULY, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This Criminal Appeal is directed against the judgment … Continue reading

land acquisition notification challenged = As noted by the National Commission on Farmers, the acquisition of agricultural land in the name of planned development or industrial growth would seriously affect the availability of food in future. After independence, the administrative apparatus of the State has not spent enough investment in the rural areas and those who have been doing agriculture have not been educated and empowered to adopt alternative sources of livelihood. If land of such persons is acquired, not only the current but the future generations are ruined and this is one of the reasons why the farmers who are deprived of their holdings commit suicide. It also appears that the concerned authorities are totally unmindful of the plight of those sections of the society, who are deprived of their only asset like small house, small industrial unit etc. They do not realise that having one’s own house is a lifetime dream of majority of population of this country. Economically affluent class of society can easily afford to have one or more houses at any place or locality in the country but other sections of the society find it extremely difficult to purchase land and construct house. Majority of people spend their lifetime savings for building a

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 10080-10081 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 12042-12043 of 2011) Raghbir Singh Sehrawat ..Appellant(s) Versus State of Haryana and others ..Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. Delay condoned. 2. Leave granted. 3. More … Continue reading

Penal Code, 1860 – s.304B: Offence of Dowry death – Ingredients required to be proved by the prosecution – Stated. Dowry – Meaning of – Held: For purposes of s.304B IPC, `dowry’ has the same meaning as in s.2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act – Mere demand for `dowry’ before marriage, at the time of marriage or any time after the marriage is an offence – The term `dowry’ is defined comprehensively to include properties of all sorts as it takes within its fold `any property or valuable security’ given or agreed to be given in connection with marriage either directly or indirectly – If a demand for property or valuable security, directly or indirectly, has a nexus with marriage, such demand would constitute `demand for dowry’; the cause or reason for such demand being immaterial – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – s.2 Dowry death – Wife of appellant no.2 died within 3 months of her marriage – She was found dead by hanging from a ceiling fan in the appellants’ house – Allegation that deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment by appellant no.1 (mother-in-law) and appellant no.2 in connection with demand of motorcycle – Conviction of the appellants u/s.304-B IPC – Challenge to – Held: That the deceased was subjected to harassment and ill-treatment by the appellants after PW-8 (father of the deceased) refused to accede to their demand for purchase of motorcycle is established by the evidence of PW-8 and PW-9 – Then there is evidence of PW-10 that PW-8 had called him and DW-1 to his house where appellant no.1 had made demand of motorcycle – PW-10 stated that he sought to reason to appellant no.1 about inability of PW-8 to give motorcycle at which appellant no.1 got angry and warned that the deceased would not be allowed to stay in her matrimonial home – It was established that unlawful demand of motorcycle was made by the appellants from PW-8 and the deceased was harassed on account of his failure to provide the motorcycle and that led the deceased to commit suicide by hanging – The demand of motorcycle by appellant no.1 from PW-8 was for the appellant no.2 and when PW-8 showed his inability to meet that demand, the appellant no.2 started harassing and ill-treating the deceased – In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that there was no demand by the appellant no.2 – No merit in the contention of the appellants that the demand of motorcycle does not qualify as a `demand for dowry’ – All the essential ingredients to bring home the guilt under s.304B IPC were established against the appellants by the prosecution evidence -Presumption under s.113B of the Evidence Act was fully attracted – The appellants failed to rebut such presumption – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.113B. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – Enactment of – Purpose stated. The wife of appellant no.2/(A-2) died within 3 months of her marriage. She was found dead by hanging from a ceiling fan in the appellants’ house. PW-8, the father of the deceased, is a Rikshawpuller. The trial court held that the prosecution was able to establish that the death was within seven years of her marriage and otherwise than under normal circumstances; that before her death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment by appellant no.1/(A-1) (mother-in-law) and appellant no.2 in connection with the demand of motorcycle and that the appellants were guilty of causing dowry death. The appellants were convicted by the trial court under Section 304-B IPC and sentenced to suffer seven years’ rigorous imprisonment. The High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. In the instant appeal, the appellants submitted that it was highly improbable that a demand for a motorcycle would be made from PW-8 knowing well that it could not be fulfilled by him as he was a Rikshawpuller earning Rs. 20/- per day. The appellants contended that the evidence let in by the prosecution was not trustworthy at all and the demand for dowry is not established. They submitted that the only independent witness of demand was DW-1 but he was not examined by the prosecution, though, DW-1 was examined in defence and he has denied that any demand was made by appellant no.1 in his presence. The appellants argued that there was no evidence of demand of motorcycle by the appellant no.2 and further that in any case the demand of motorcycle for the purposes of the business does not qualify as a `demand for dowry’ and, therefore, no offence under Section 304-B IPC can be said to have been made out against the appellants. =Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD:1.1. Section 304B was inserted in IPC with effect from November 19, 1986 by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986. Thereby substantive offence relating to `dowry death’ was introduced in the IPC. For making out an offence of `dowry death’ under Section 304B, the following ingredients have to be proved by the prosecution: (a) death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or her death must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; (b) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (c) soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and (d) such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with the demand for dowry. Pertinently, for the purposes of Section 304B IPC, `dowry’ has the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. [Paras 11, 12, 13 and 14] [635-E-F; 636-B-F] 1.2. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was enacted to prohibit the giving or taking of `dowry’ and for the protection of married woman against cruelty and violence in the matrimonial home by the husband and in-laws. The mere demand for `dowry’ before marriage, at the time of marriage or any time after the marriage is an offence. The definition of `dowry’ show that the term is defined comprehensively to include properties of all sorts as it takes within its fold `any property or valuable security’ given or agreed to be given in connection with marriage either directly or indirectly. If a demand for property or valuable security, directly or indirectly, has a nexus with marriage, such demand would constitute `demand for dowry’; the cause or reason for such demand being immaterial. [Paras 15, 17] [637-D-F; 640-C-D] Appasaheb & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra. (2007) 9 SCC 721; S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1996) 4 SCC 596; Panjiyar @ Kamlesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar (2005) 2 SCC 388 – referred to. 2. In the facts of the case, it is clearly established that the deceased died otherwise than under normal circumstances. There is no dispute of fact that death occurred within seven years of her marriage. That the deceased was subjected to harassment and ill-treatment by the appellants after PW-8 refused to accede to their demand for purchase of motorcycle is established by the evidence of PW-8 and PW-9. Then there is evidence of PW-10 that PW-8 had called him and DW-1 to his house where A-1 had made demand of motorcycle. PW-10 stated that he sought to reason to A-1 about inability of PW-8 to give motorcycle at which A-1 got angry and warned that the deceased would not be allowed to stay in her matrimonial home. It is true that the appellants produced DW-1 in defence and he did state in his examination-in- chief that he did not meet A-1 at the house of PW-8 but in cross- examination when he was confronted with his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. where it was recorded that he and PW-10 had gone to the house of PW-8 and both of them (PW-10 and DW-1) counselled A-1 to desist from demanding motorcycle but she stuck to her demand, DW-1 had no explanation to offer. The evidence of DW-1 is, therefore, liable to be discarded. In light of the evidence let in by the prosecution, the trial court cannot be said to have erred in holding that it was established that unlawful demand of motorcycle was made by A-1 and A-2 from PW-8 and the decesded was harassed on account of his failure to provide the motorcycle and that led the deceased to commit suicide by hanging. Pertinently, the demand of motorcycle by A-1 from PW-8 was for A-2 and when PW-8 showed his inability to meet that demand, A-2 started harassing and ill-treating the deceased. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that there was no demand by A-2. [Para 18] [640-D-H; 641-A-C] 3. The High Court has also examined the matter thoroughly and reached the finding that A-1 and A-2 had raised a demand for purchase of motorcycle from PW-8; this demand was made within two months of the marriage and was a demand towards `dowry’ and when this demand was not met, the deceased was maltreated and harassed continuously which led her to take extreme step of finishing her life. The above view of the High Court is acceptable. There is no merit in the contention of the appellants that the demand of motorcycle does not qualify as a `demand for dowry’. All the essential ingredients to bring home the guilt under Section 304B IPC are established against the appellants by the prosecution evidence. As a matter of law, the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 is fully attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The appellants have failed to rebut the presumption under Section 113B. [Para 19] [641-D-F] Case Law Reference: (2007) 9 SCC 721 referred to Para 9 (1996) 4 SCC 596 referred to Para 15 (2005) 2 SCC 388 referred to Para 16 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 831 of 2006. From the Judgment & Order date 16.12.2004 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 113-S.B. of 1991. V. Madhukar, Paritosh Anil (for Hemantikar Wahi) for the Appellants. Kamal Mohan Gupta, Gaurav Teotia, Sanjeev Kumar for the Respondent.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 831 OF 2006 Bachni Devi & Anr. …Appellants Versus State of Haryana Through Secretary, Home Department …Respondent JUDGEMENT R.M. LODHA, J. The mother (A-1) and son (A-2) are in appeal as both of them have been convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge … Continue reading

Indian contract act -By invoking the bank guarantee and/or enforcing the bid security, there is no statutory right, exercise of which was being fettered. There is no term in the contract which is contrary to the provisions of the Indian Contract Act. The Indian Contract Act merely provides that a person can withdraw his offer before its acceptance. But withdrawal of an offer, before it is accepted, is a completely different aspect from forfeiture of earnest/security money which has been given for a particular purpose. A person may have a right to withdraw his offer but if he has made his offer on a condition that some earnest money will be forfeited for not entering into contract or if some act is not performed, then even though he may have a right to withdraw his offer, he has no right to claim that the earnest/security be returned to him. Forfeiture of such earnest/security, in no way, affects any statutory right under the Indian Contract Act. Such earnest/security is given and taken to ensure that a contract comes into existence. It would be an anomalous situation that a person who, by his own conduct, precludes the coming into existence of the contract is then given advantage or benefit of his own wrong by not allowing forfeiture. It must be remembered that, particularly in government contracts, such a term is always included in order to ensure that only a genuine party makes a bid. If such a term was not there even a person who does not have the capacity or a person who has no intention of entering into the contract will make a bid. The whole purpose of such a clause i.e. to see that only genuine bids are received would be lost if forfeiture was not permitted.”

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7033 OF 2011 [arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 24107 of 2009] State of Haryana & Ors. …. Appellants v. M/s. Malik Traders ….Respondent J U D G M E N T CYRIAC JOSEPH, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal is … Continue reading

If rounding off is given to the appellant as sought for by him there has to be similar rounding off for a person who has missed 33% in one of the papers just by a whisker. To him and to such a person who could not get 50% in aggregate in the written test, if this rule of rounding off is offered then they would also get qualified. In that event, there would be no meaning of having a rule wherein it is provided that a person must at least have the minimum marks as provided for thereunder. Somewhere a line has to be drawn and that line has to be strictly observed which is like a Lakshman Rekha and no variation of the same is possible unless it is so provided under the Rules itself. Both the Selection Committee as also the appointing authority are bound to act within the parameters of the Rules which are statutory in nature and any violation or any relaxation thereof whether by way of giving grace marks or rounding off would be acting beyond the parameters prescribed which would be illegal.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6205 OF 2011 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 9147 of 2008] Bhanu Pratap ….Appellant VERSUS State of Haryana & Ors. …. Respondent(s) JUDGMENT Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. In this appeal we are called upon to decide an issue … Continue reading

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