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adverse possession can be used as a shield/defence but not as a weapon = Even if the plaintiff is found to be in adverse possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into ownership. Only if proceedings filed against the appellant and appellant is arrayed as defendant that it can use this adverse possession as a shield/defence.- As the appellant is in possession of the suit property since 13.4.1952 and has been granted the decree of injunction, it obviously means that the possession of the appellant cannot be disturbed except by due process of law. We make it clear that though the suit of the appellant seeking relief of declaration has been dismissed, in case respondents file suit for possession and/or ejectment of the appellant, it would be open to the appellant to plead in defence that the appellant had become the owner of property by adverse possession. Needless to mention at this stage, the appellant shall also be at liberty to plead that findings of issue No.1 to the effect that the appellant is in possession of adverse possession since 13.4.1952 operates as res- judicata. Subject to this clarification, the appeal is dismissed.

  published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40774  NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8244/2013 (arising out of S.L.P.(Civil) No. 23728 of 2012) Gurudwara Sahib …Appellant   Vs. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala & Anr. …Respondents   J U D G M E N T   A.K.SIKRI,J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The appellant herein … Continue reading

Industrial dispute = The Industrial Tribunal/ Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act is a creature of that statute. It acquires jurisdiction on the basis of reference made to it. The Tribunal has to confine itself within the scope of the subject matter of reference and cannot travel beyond the same. This is the view taken by this Court in number of cases including in the case of National Engineering Industries Limited v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. 2000 (1) SCC 371. 19. It is for this reason that it becomes the bounden duty of the appropriate Government to make the reference appropriately which is reflective of the real/ exact nature of “dispute” between the parties. In the instant case, the bone of contention is as to whether the respondent workmen were simply transferred by the appellant to M/s. Lafarge or their services were taken over by M/s. Lafarge and they became the employees of the M/s. Lafarge. Second incidental question which would follow therefrom would be as to whether they have right to join back the services with the appellant in case their service conditions including salary etc. which they were enjoying with the appellant are not given or protected by M/s. Lafarge? If it is proved that their service conditions are violated, another question would be as to whether they can claim the service benefits/ protection from M/s. Lafarge or they have the right to go back to the appellant?= It follows from the above that the reference in the present form is clearly defective as it does not take care of the correct and precise nature of the dispute between the parties. On the contrary, the manner in which the reference is worded shows that it has already been decided that the respondent workmen continue to be the employees of the appellant and further that their services were simply transferred to M/s. Lafarge. This shall preclude the appellant to put forth and prove its case as it would deter the labour court to go into those issues. It also implies that by presuming so, the appropriate Government has itself decided those contentious issues and assumed the role of an adjudicator which is, otherwise, reserved for the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal. 21. As a consequence, this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. Sequitur to that would be to quash the references made in the present form. However, at the same time, direction is given to the appropriate Government to make fresh reference, incorporating real essence of the dispute as discussed in this judgment, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40776 [REPORTABLE] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8246 OF 2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 20494 of 2011) M/s. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. …….Appellant(s) Versus State of Jharkhand & Ors. ……Respondent(s) WITH C.A. No. 8247/2013 (@ SLP(C) No. 21086 of 2011)   … Continue reading

Workmen compensation Act – whether the employee’s ischemic heart condition developed as a consequence of any stress or strain of his employment with the Appellant-company. – remanded = The Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation (1st Court), West Bengal held on 24.6.2010 that the Applicant/Respondent had met with an accident on 27.12.1999 while in the employment of the Appellant and that considering his age, wages and injury he was entitled to compensation computed at Rs.12,00,000/- (Rupees Twelve Lac) which is the maximum awardable, together with simple interest at the rate of twelve per cent per annum till the date of realization. = His argument is that this health malady has not arisen as a consequence of the Respondent’s services with the Appellant, and hence no compensation was payable under Section 3 of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 which comes into operation only in the event of an employee suffering personal injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.= whether the employee’s ischemic heart condition developed as a consequence of any stress or strain of his employment with the Appellant-company. There can be no gainsaying that the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 is a beneficial legislation requiring some play at the joints so far as considering a disabled employee’s claim is concerned. In these circumstances, parties shall appear before the Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation (1st Court) West Bengal or its successor Court, as the case may be, on 11.11.2013. 4. The Appeal stands allowed accordingly.= A perusal of the impugned order makes it palpably clear that the Appellant-company’s Appeal was dismissed following the decision in FMAT No.1327 of 2010 (Dredging Corporation of India Ltd. v. P.K. Bhattacherjee). In these circumstances, this matter also requires to be remanded to the High Court of Calcutta for a fresh hearing in F.M.A. No.869 of 2010. Parties to appear before the High Court on 18.11.2013. 6. The Appeal stands allowed accordingly.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40779     NON-REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8278 OF 2013 [Arising out of S.L.P.(C)No.26414 of 2011]       Dredging Corporation of India Ltd. …..Appellant   Versus   P.K. Bhattacherjee …..Respondent   W I T H CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8279 OF 2013 … Continue reading

Insurance claim for the patient is medically described as in a “vegitiative state” and patient is called as “spastic quadric paresys = the appellants had in fact proved that they had spent Rs.3,49,128/- towards medical expenses for treating their son. They had to purchase certain instruments worth Rs.58,642/- for making life of their son comfortable and Rs.31,000/- had been spent towards nursing and Rs.1,37,000/- had to be spent for Physiotherapist. Looking at the fact that Rajanala Ravi Krishna will have to remain dependant for his whole life on someone and looking at the observations made by the Tribunal, which have been reproduced hereinabove, in our opinion, his life is very miserable and there would be substantial financial burden on the appellants for the entire life of their injured son. At times it is not possible to award compensation strictly in accordance with the law laid down as in a particular case it may not be just also. We are hesitant to say that it is a reality of life that at times life of an injured or sick person becomes more miserable for the person and for the family members than the death. Here is one such case where the appellants, even during their retired life will have to take care of their son like a child especially when they would have expected the son to take their care. 13. Though, the High Court has rightly followed the principle laid down in the case of Sarla Verma (supra), in our opinion, the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is more just.

NON-REPORTABLE     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8083 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.26872 of 2011)   R. Venkata Ramana & Anr. …..Appellants Versus   The United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. …..Respondents   J U D G M E N T   … Continue reading

cut off date for starting the professional courses can not be extended = it is not possible to accede to the request of the petitioner to change the time-schedule when the last date for admitting the students, which was July 15, 2013, expired long ago. If the Central Government forwards the application to the DCI at this juncture, DCI shall hardly have any time to look into the feasibility of the scheme as per the requirements contained in Regulation 21. We have to keep in mind that in the schedule annexed to the Regulations 2006, six to eight months time is given to the DCI for this purpose. We are, thus, of the view that the High Court did not commit any error in holding that in the given circumstances mandamus could not be issued to the Central Government to exercise its discretionary powers in a particular manner to modify the time-schedule. Sanctity to the time-schedule has to be attached. It is too late in the day, in so far as present academic session is concerned, to give any direction.- This Court has highlighted the importance of cut off date for starting the professional courses, particularly medical courses, and repeatedly impressed upon that such deadline should be tinkered with. (See: Priya Gupta vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2012) 7 SCC 433 and Maa Vaishno Devi Mahila Mahavidyalaya vs. State of U.P. (2013) 2 SCC 617. 10. We, thus, do not find any error in the impugned judgment of the High Court. This petition is bereft of any merit and is accordingly dismissed.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40787   [REPORTABLE]     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (Civil) No. 22910 OF 2013   Educare Charitable Trust ……Petitioner   Vs.   Union of India & Anr. ….Respondents       J U D G M E N T       A.K.SIKRI,J.   … Continue reading

DEATH CONFIRMED = Herein, A1 and A2 have committed a cold blooded murder in a pre-ordained fashion without any provocation whatsoever. The motive behind the gruesome act was to avenge the act of informant in approaching the machinery of law enforcement inspite of threats by the appellants. The victims were five innocent children and wife of the informant who were sleeping unalarmed when the appellants came and locked them inside their house while it was set ablaze. Further, wrath of A1 and A2 is reflected in their act of first gagging the informant, thereafter attempting to burn him alive and later, when he tried to escape, firing at him thereby leaving no stone unturned in translating their threats into reality. As a result of the aforesaid incident, having witnessed the threats of burning given by the A1 to the informant tuned into reality, none but the family of the deceased-informant came forth to depose against the appellant-accused persons during the trial. The crime, enormous in proportion having wiped off the whole family, is committed so brutally that it pricks and shocks not only the judicial conscience but even the collective conscience of the society. It demands just punishment from the Court and the Court is bound to respond within legal parameters. The demand for justice and the award of punishment have to be in consonance with the legislative command and the discretion vested in the Courts. “…the punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of wrong doing; and, in order to maintain respect for the law, it is essential that the punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the objects of punishments as being a deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else… The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong doer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not.” 90. In light of the aforesaid, having regard to the gravity of the offence committed, we are of the considered opinion that with regard to A1 and A2 this case falls into the category of rarest of the rare cases and is not a case where imprisonment for life is an adequate sentence and thus, constrained to reach the inescapable conclusion that death sentence imposed on A1 and A2 be confirmed. 91. Therefore, the sentence of death imposed on A1 and A2 is confirmed and the sentence awarded to A3 is commuted to life imprisonment till the rest of his life. 92. The order of stay on the execution of the capital punishment of A1 and A2 is vacated.

punishable in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40794          REPORTABLE     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.249-250 OF 2011       DEEPAK RAI Appellant(s)   VERSUS   STATE OF BIHAR Respondent(s)   WITH   CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1747-1748 OF 2011       JAGAT RAI AND ANR. Appellant(s) … Continue reading

“438. -anticipatory bail = whether the condition of depositing an amount of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- in fixed deposit for anticipatory bail is sustainable in law and whether such condition is outside the purview of Section 438 of the Code?= “438. Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest:- (1) Where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a non- bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail; and that Court may, after taking into consideration, inter alia, the following factors, namely:- i) the nature and gravity of the accusation; ii) the antecedents of the applicant including the fact as to whether he has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a Court in respect of any cognizable offence; iii) the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice; and iv) where the accusation has been made with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by having him so arrested, either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail: Provided that, where the High Court or, as the case may be, the Court of Session, has not passed any interim order under this sub-section or has rejected the application for grant of anticipatory bail, it shall be open to an officer in-charge of a police station to arrest, without warrant the applicant on the basis of the accusation apprehended in such application. (1A) Where the Court grants an interim order under sub-section (1), it shall forthwith cause a notice being not less than seven days notice, together with a copy of such order to be served on the Public Prosecutor and the Superintendent of Police, with a view to give the Public Prosecutor a reasonable opportunity of being heard when the application shall be finally heard by the Court. (1B) The presence of the applicant seeking anticipatory bail shall be obligatory at the time of final hearing of the application and passing of final order by the Court, if on an application made to it by the Public Prosecutor, the Court considers such presence necessary in the interest of justice. (2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under sub-section (1), it may include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may thinks fit, including- (i) a condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required; (ii) a condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer; (iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the Court; (iv) such other condition as may be imposed under sub- section (3) of section 437, as if the bail were granted under that section. (3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station on such accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail, he shall be released on bail; and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant should issue in the first instance against that person, he shall issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of the Court under sub- section (1).” = However, the appellant-accused has to fulfill the following conditions: i) The appellant shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer as and when required; ii) The appellant shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer; iii) The appellant shall furnish his address to the Investigating Officer who shall verify it and submit it to the trial Court under his signature. In case of change of address, it must be communicated to the Investigating Officer who shall verify it and intimate the same to the court concerned under his signature; and iv) The appellant shall not leave India without the previous permission of the trial Court. 18) The appeal is disposed of with the above directions.

published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40770    REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1436 OF 2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2 of 2013)   Sumit Mehta …..Appellant(s) Versus State of N.C.T. of Delhi …. Respondent(s) 2 J U D G M E N T   P.Sathasivam,CJI. 1) … Continue reading

“Freedom Fighters Pension Scheme= the petitioners claimed that they took part in the freedom movement and were, therefore, entitled to the benefits which the Government has announced with the proclamation of the “Freedom Fighters Pension Scheme”. = In the present case, it is stated at the cost of the repetition that apart from the affidavits of other freedom fighters, no other document is produced. 24. We, thus, allow these appeals and set aside the orders of the High Court and dismiss the Writ Petitions filed by the respondents. No costs.

published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40741  [REPORTABLE] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 7899-7901/2013 (arising out of S.L.P.(Civil) Nos.26441-26443 of 2012) State of Maharashtra & Ors. ……….Appellants Vs. Namdeo etc.etc. ………Respondents   J U D G M E N T A.K.SIKRI,J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The three respondents herein were the … Continue reading

Whether the amendment made in the Master Plan of Delhi vide Notification dated 20.9.1995 permitting utilization of the sites earmarked for Nursery Schools for other purposes is ultra vires the provisions of the Delhi Development Authority Act, 1957 (for short, ‘the Act’) or is otherwise arbitrary and whether allotment of 1000 sq. yards (in some paragraphs of the special leave petition and the documents annexed with it the size of the plot has also been mentioned as 1200 sq. yards) of land earmarked in Gulmohar Park for Nursery School to respondent No.4 – Kala Ashram, School of Dance and Drama, New Delhi is violative of the provisions of the Constitution and/or the Act are the questions which arise for consideration in this appeal filed against judgment dated 24.10.2008 of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.= “All executive actions of the Government of India and the Government of a State are required to be taken in the name of the President or the Governor of the State concerned, as the case may be [Articles 77(1) and 166(1)]. Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the President or the Governor of a State, as the case may be, are required to be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the President or the Governor, as the case may be [Articles 77(2) and 166(2)]. Article 77(3) lays down that: “77. (3) The President shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of India, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business.” Likewise, Article 166(3) lays down that: 166. (3) The Governor shall make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State, and for the allocation among Ministers of the said business insofar as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is by or under this Constitution required to act in his discretion.” This means that unless an order is expressed in the name of the President or the Governor and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the rules, the same cannot be treated as an order on behalf of the Government. A noting recorded in the file is merely a noting simpliciter and nothing more. It merely represents expression of opinion by the particular individual. By no stretch of imagination, such noting can be treated as a decision of the Government. Even if the competent authority records its opinion in the file on the merits of the matter under consideration, the same cannot be termed as a decision of the Government unless it is sanctified and acted upon by issuing an order in accordance with Articles 77(1) and (2) or Articles 166(1) and (2). The noting in the file or even a decision gets culminated into an order affecting right of the parties only when it is expressed in the name of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, and authenticated in the manner provided in Article 77(2) or Article 166(2). A noting or even a decision recorded in the file can always be reviewed/reversed/overruled or overturned and the court cannot take cognizance of the earlier noting or decision for exercise of the power of judicial review.” (emphasis supplied) 18. By applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgment to the facts of this case, we hold that note dated 2.12.1999 recorded by the Minister, Urban Development cannot be made basis for quashing the allotment made in favour of respondent No.4. 19. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.

published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40737   NON- REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7384 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.24415 of 2009)   Delhi Union of Journalist Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. and others …Appellants   versus Union of India and others …Respondents         … Continue reading

Allowance in lieu of kilometerage (ALK). = whether the respondent, a medically decategorised Driver of the Indian Railways, working as a Crew Controller with stationary duties, is entitled to allowance in lieu of kilometerage (ALK). = only a specific category of employees in the Railways like Drivers, Motormen, Firemen, Guards, Assistant Guards etc. who constitute the running staff and such staff who are directly connected with the movement of trains perform running duties. Running Allowance under the Rules is required to be paid only to the running staff who are engaged in the performance of duties directly connected with the movement of trains and such allowance includes kilometerage allowance or allowance in lieu of kilometerage (ALK). While kilometerage allowance is to be paid for performance of actual running duties, the allowance in lieu of kilometerage (ALK) is to be paid to such members of the running staff who are temporarily required to perform stationary duties. The rules also make it clear that 30% of the basic pay of the running staff is required to be treated as representing the pay element in the Running Allowance. Those members of the running staff who are employed on non-running duties are paid the aforesaid 30% of the basic pay if such non-running duties are performed at the headquarters whereas in case such non-running duties are performed by the running staff at outstations they are required to be paid ALK at the rates prescribed by Rule 907(b). It is thus clear that no Running Allowance i.e. either kilometerage allowance or allowance in lieu of kilometerage is contemplated for any staff, including erstwhile members of the running staff, permanently engaged in performance of stationary duties. Running Allowance of either description is required to be paid only to members of the running staff who are directly engaged in actual movement of trains or such staff who are temporarily assigned stationary duties but who are likely to go back and perform running duties. The respondent does not fall in either of the above two categories.- We, therefore, hold that the High Court was not justified in issuing the impugned directions for grant of ALK to the respondent. The order of the High Court dated 20.06.2011 is therefore set aside and the appeal is allowed.

 published in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40728        REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7298 OF 2013 (Arising Out of SLP (C) No.3446 of 2012) Union of India & Ors. … Appellant(s) Versus B. Banerjee … Respondent(s)   J U D G M E N T RANJAN GOGOI, J. … Continue reading

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