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Stamp Act, 1899 – ss. 33 and 35 and Article 23 of Schedule 1A (as substituted by M.P. Act No. 19 of 1989) — Execution of sale deed – Execution whereof statutorily barred – Suit by the vendee for recovery of consideration amount – Reliance on the conveyance deed which was not registered – Document impounded, being not duly stamped – Held: Provision of ss. 33 and 35 are applicable, even if the unregistered document sought to be admitted in evidence is for collateral purpose – The purpose for which reliance is placed on the document is not relevant for applicability of the provisions – s. 35 rules out applicability of s. 49 of Registration Act – On facts, the document rightly impounded – Registration Act, 1908 – s. 49. Respondent-a member of Scheduled Tribe sold his immovable property to appellant. Appellant paid the consideration amount for the same, and respondent gave the possession of the property to the appellant. However, the permission for such transfer was not granted. Appellant filed a suit for recovery of the consideration amount. He relied on the agreement which was sought to be registered as a sale deed. As the document was not duly stamped, the court impounded the same. The challenge against the order was not entertained by High Court. In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that since the unregistered sale deed was sought to be put in evidence only for the purpose of recovery of the consideration amount i.e. for collateral purpose, the provisions of ss. 33 and 35 of Stamp Act, shall not be attracted. . =Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD:1.1. The Parliament has, in Section 35 of Stamp Act, used the words “for any purpose whatsoever”. Thus, the purpose for which a document is sought to be admitted in evidence or the extent thereof would not be a relevant factor for not invoking the provision. The land, in the instant case, is situated in a Scheduled Area. Execution of a deed of conveyance in respect of the land situated in the scheduled area is statutorily barred. All transactions can be effected only upon obtaining the permission of the Collector in terms of the provisions of Section 165 (6) of the C.G. Land Revenue Code, 1959. An instrument was executed. By reason of such an instrument not only the entire amount of consideration was paid but possession of the property had also been transferred. [Paras 12, 13 and 14] [953-C-F] 1.2. By reason of the explanation appended to Article 23 of Schedule IA of the Stamp Act as inserted by M.P. Act 19 of 1989 a legal fiction has been created. Although ordinarily an agreement to sell would not be subject to payment of stamp duty which is payable on a sale deed, but having regard to the purpose and object it seeks to achieve the legislature thought it necessary to levy stamp duty on an instrument whereby possession has been transferred. [Para 15] [954-C-D] 1.3. The possession of the property had been delivered in favour of the appellant. He has, thus, been exercising some right in or over the land in question. Although the agreement was not registered, but registration of the document has nothing to do with the validity thereof as provided for under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908. In the instant case, by reason of the statutory interdict, no transfer at all is permissible. Even transfer of possession is also not permissible. [Paras 16 and 19] [954-E-F] Pandey Oraon v. Ram Chander Sahu 1992 Supp (2) SCC 77 and Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati and Ors. 2004 (10) SCC 65, referred to. 1.4. Section 33 of Stamp Act casts a statutory obligation on all the authorities to impound a document. The court being an authority to receive a document in evidence is bound to give effect thereto. The unregistered deed of sale was an instrument which required payment of the stamp duty applicable to a deed of conveyance. Adequate stamp duty admittedly was not paid. The court, therefore, was empowered to pass an order in terms of Section 35 of Stamp Act. [Paras 17 and 18] [954-F-H] 1.5. It is not correct to say that the document was admissible for collateral purpose. The Registration Act, 1908 provides for such a contingency in terms of the proviso appended to Section 49 thereof. Section 35 of Stamp Act, however, rules out applicability of such provision as it is categorically provided therein that a document of this nature shall not be admitted for any purpose whatsoever. If all purposes for which the document is sought to be brought in evidence are excluded, the document would not be admissible for collateral purposes. [Paras 19, 20 and 21] [955-A-G-D-E] Ram Rattan v. Parmananad AIR 1946 PC 51, relied on. Bondar Singh v. Nihal Singh 2003 (4) SCC 161, distinguished. Bhaskarabhotla Padmanabhaiah and Ors. v. B. Lakshminarayana and Ors. AIR 1962 A.P. 132; Sanjeeva Reddi v. Johanputra Reddi AIR 1972 A.P. 373; T. Bhaskar Rao v. T. Gabriel and Ors. AIR 1981 A.P. 175; Firm Chuni Lal Tukki Mal v. Firm Mukat Lal Ram Chanda and Ors. AIR 1965 All. 164 and Chandra Sekhar Misra v. Gobinda Chandra Das AIR 1966 Ori. 18, referred to. Case Law Reference: 2003 (4) SCC 161 Distinguished. Para 19 1992 Supp (2) SCC 77 Referred to. Para 19 2004 (10) SCC 65 Referred to. Para 19 AIR 1946 PC 51 Relied on. Para 22 AIR 1962 A.P. 132 Referred to. Para 22 AIR 1972 A.P. 373 Referred to. Para 22 AIR 1981 A.P. 175 Referred to. Para 22 AIR 1965 All. 164 Referred to. Para 22 AIR 1966 Ors. 18 Referred to. Para 22 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7350 of 2008. From the Judgment and final Order dated 27.02.2007 of the High Court of Chattisgarh in at Bilaspur in W.P. No. 251/2007. A.K. Bajpai, M.F. Khan, Goodwill Indeevar for the Appellant. Suhail Dutt, Ram Gupta, Jagit Singh Chhavra and Ravin Rao for the Respondent =, , , 2009(1 )SCALE80 ,

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7350 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8651 of 2007) Avinash Kumar Chauhan …. Appellant Versus Vijay Krishna Mishra …. Respondent JUDGMENT S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Interpretation of Sections 33 and 35 of the Indian Stamp Act … Continue reading

Registration Act, 1908: SS. 17(1)(b) & 49: Partition- Document containing list of properties allotted to parties- Recital of past events-Registration whether necessary- Whether admissible in evidence to prove factum of partition. % = The parties are decendants of a common ancestor, who had two sons. These two branches of the family had joint properties, both agricultural and residential. The agricultural land was partitioned in 1955 and the names of the respective parties were duly mutated in the revenue records. This was followed by a partition of their residential properties including the house, ghers, ghetwars etc. The factum of partition was embodied in the memorandum of partition Exh. B-12 dated August 3, 1955 and bears the thumb impressions and signatures of the heads of the families, and later confirmed in the settlement dated January 31, 1971, Exh. P-1 written in the presence of a number of villagers. A dispute arose between the parties in February, 1971 when the respondents were sought to be prevented by the appellants from raising a boundary wall to a plot of land that had fallen to their share. In proceedings under s. 145 Cr. P.C., 1898, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate held that the father of the appellants was in actual possession of the disputed piece of land. In revision the Sessions Judge agreed with the conclusion arrived at by the Magistrate. On further revision the High Court affirmed the findings reached by the courts below. In a suit for declaration brought by respondents a Single Judge of the High Court came to the conclusion that the disputed plot belonged to them and it had fallen to their share in the partition of 1955 and later confirmed in the settlement dated 31st January, 1971. He construed the document Exh. p-12 to be a memorandum of family arrangement and not an instrument of partition requiring registration and therefore admissible in evidence under the proviso to s. 49 of the Act for a collateral purpose of showing nature of possession. In a Letters Patent appeal a Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the reasoning and 1107 conclusion arrived at by the Single Judge. In the appeal by special leave, it was contended for the appellants that the document Exh. P-12 does not contain any recital of a prior, completed partition but on its terms embodies a decision which is to be the sole repository of the right and title of the parties i.e. according to which partition by metes and bounds had to be effected. It, therefore, required registration under s. 17 of the Registration Act. Dismissing the appeal, ^ HELD: 1. Partition, unlike the sale or transfer which consists in its essence of a single act, is a continuing state of facts. It does not require any formality, and therefore if parties actually divide their estate and agree to hold in severalty, there is an end of the matter. [1115B- C] 2. If the arrangement of compromise is one under which a person having an absolute title to the property transfers his title in some of the items thereof to the others, the formalities prescribed by law have to be complied with, since the transferees derive their respective title through the transferor. If, on the other hand, the parties set up competing titles and the differences are resolved by the compromise, there is no question of one deriving title from the other, and therefore the arrangement does not fall within the mischief of s. 17 read with s. 49 of the Registration Act as no interest in property is created or declared by the document for the first time. it is assumed that the title had always resided in him or her so far as the property falling to his or her share is concerned and therefore no conveyance is necessary. [1116C-E] Sahu Madho Das & Ors. v. Pandit Mukand Ram & Anr., [1955] 2 SCR 22; Khunni Lal v. Gobind Krishna Narain & Anr., LR (1911) 38 IA 87 and Lalla Oudh Behari Lall v. Mewa Koonwar, [1868] 3 Agra HC 82 at p. 84 refereed to. In the instant case, admittedly there was a partition by metes and bounds of the agricultural lands effected in the year 1955 and the shares allotted to the two branches were separately mutated in the revenue records. There was thus a disruption of joint status. All that remained was the partition of the ancestral residential house called rihaishi, the smaller house called baithak and ghers/ghetwars. The document Exh. P-12 does not effect a partition but merely records the nature of the arrangement arrived at as regards the division of the remaining property. The parties set out competing claims to the properties and there 1108 was an adjustment of the rights of the parties. The compromise was on the footing that there was an antecedent title of the parties to the properties and the settlement acknowledged and defined title of each of the parties. The opening words of the document are: ‘Today after discussion it has been mutually agreed and decided that …’ what follows is a list of properties allotted to the respective parties. From these words it is quite obvious that the document contains the recital of the past events and does not itself embody the expression of will necessary to effect the change in the legal relation contemplated. It cannot, therefore, be construed to be an instrument of partition. [1116F-G; 1114C-D] Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act lays down that a document for which registration is compulsory should, by its own force, operate or purport to operate to create or declare some rights in immovable property. Therefore, a mere recital of what has already taken place could not be held to declare any right and there would be no necessity of registering such a document. [1113H; 1114A] Rajangam Ayyar v. Rajangam Ayyar, LR (1923) 69 IA 123 and Nani Bai v. Gita Bai, AIR (1958) SC 706 referred to. 3. A document though unregistered can, however, be looked into under the proviso to s. 49 of the Act which allows documents which would otherwise be excluded, to be used as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument, for the limited purpose of establishing a severance in status, though that severance would ultimately affect the nature of the possession held by the members of the separated family as co-tenants. The document Exh. P-12 can be used for the limited and collateral purpose of showing that the subsequent division of the properties allotted was in pursuance of the original intention to divide. [1116G-H; 1117A] Varada Pillai v. Jeevarathnammal, LR (1919) 46 IA 285 referred to. 4. In any view, the document Exh. P-12 is a mere list of properties allotted to the shares of the parties. It merely contains the recital of past events. It is, therefore, admissible in evidence. [1117B] Narayan Sakharam Patil v. Cooperative Central Bank, Malkapur & Ors., ILR (1938) Nag. 604; Bageshwari Charan Singh v. Jagarnath Kuari, LR (1932) 59 IA 130; Subramanian v. Lutchman, LR (1923) 15 IA 77; Ganpat Gangaji Patil v. Namdeo Bhagwanji Patil & Ors., ILR 1109 (1942) Nag. 73 and Mulla’s Registration Act, 8th Edn. pp. 54-57 referred to. =1988 AIR 881, 1988( 2 )SCR1106, , 1988( 1 )SCALE391 ,

PETITIONER: ROSHAN SINGH & ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: ZILE SINGH & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT24/02/1988 BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) RAY, B.C. (J) CITATION: 1988 AIR 881 1988 SCR (2)1106 1988 SCALE (1)391 ACT: Registration Act, 1908: SS. 17(1)(b) & 49: Partition- Document containing list of properties allotted to parties- Recital of past … Continue reading

Indian Registration Act, 1908, s. 17-Mortgage by deposit of title deeds-Document evidencing mortgage when must be registered-Document which itself does not create contract but is only memorandum of contract already entered into need not be registered-Further evidence to prove terms of agreement not barred by ss. 91 & 92 Evidence Act, 1872. =The respondent Bank gave a loan to Godavari Sugars Refiners Ltd., of which defendants 1 to 3, as partners, were managing agents. Subsequently the bank filed a suit for the recovery of the loan. The appellant, a brother of defendant No. 1, was impleaded as defendant No. 4 and Godavari Sugars as defendant No. 5. The suit was decreed and the decree was upheld by the High Court. Only Defendant No.4 appealed tothis Court. The decree against the appellant was passed on the basis of Exh. 1-6, a document which was signed by Defendants 1 & 4 and in which it was recorded that the title deeds Exhs. A-7 and Exh. A-8 had been deposited with the respondent bank as security for money due. According to the appellant the said title deeds had been deposited by him as security for a loan given to him by the bank in his individual capacity, and that the signature of defendant no. I had been appended to Exh. A-6 only because he bad an interest in one of the properties covered by Exhs. A-7 and A-8. HELD.- If the parties intend to reduce their bargain: regarding the deposit of title deeds to the form of a document the document requires registration. If on the other hand its proper construction and the surrounding circumstances lead to the. conclusion that the parties did not intend to do so, then, there being no express. bargain the contract to create a mortgage arises by implication of the law from the deposit itself with the requisite intention, and the document being merely evidential does not require registration. [220 H-221A] Rachpal Maharaj v. Bhagwandas Daruka & Ors., [1950] S.C.R, 548 Pranjivandas Mehta v. Chan Ma Phee, L.R. 43 I.A. 123, Shaw v. Foster: (1872) L.R. 5 H. L. 321,341 and Subramonian =1971 AIR 1613, 1971Suppl.SCR 209, , ,

PETITIONER: VEERAMACHINENI GANGADHARA RAO Vs. RESPONDENT: ANDHRA BANK LTD. ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT25/03/1971 BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. GROVER, A.N. CITATION: 1971 AIR 1613 1971 SCR 209 ACT: Indian Registration Act, 1908, s. 17-Mortgage by deposit of title deeds-Document evidencing mortgage when must be registered-Document which itself does not create contract but is only … Continue reading

Indian Registration Act (16 of 1908),s. 17 (1) (b)-Partition of Property in specific shares-Deed not registered- Admissibility. Pleadings-Plea of acquiescence-Not raised in pleadings- Cannot be allowed to be set up subsequently. Hindu Law–Agharia caste-Custom of Jethansi allowing larger share of family property to eldest son–Outmoded custom loses legal force. Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872), s. 91-Bar on oral evidence. =D died in 1940 leaving certain agricultural land as well as house property. He had two children by his first wife the elder of whom was respondent no.. 1. By his second wife, appellant no. 2, he had a son, appellant no’. 1. The family belonged to the Agharia caste and was governed by the Benares School of Hindu Law. In 1956 Appellants 1 and 2 filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge Raigarh (now in Madhya Pradesh) claiming that they were entitled to 1/4 th share each in D’s estate and that there should be a partition by metes and bounds of joint family property. According to their pleadings Ex.D-4 dated December 27, 1943 by which appellant no. 2 accepted a lesser share of the properties than was due to her and her son was executed as a result of coercion by respondent no. 1. The latter along with other respondents contested the suit, relying on Ex.D- 4. The trial court, the first appellate court, as well as the High Court decided against the appellants who by special leave came to this Court. The questions that fell for consideration were : (i) whether Ex.D-4 was admissible in evidence without having been registered; (ii) whether Appellant No. 2 was precluded from demanding her share because her signing of Ex. D-4 showed acquiescence on her part; (iii) whether a higher share for respondent no. 1 was justified because of the custom of Jethansi in the Agharia caste according to which the eldest son was entitled to a larger -share than others; (iv) whether it was open to the respondents to give oral evidence of actual partition subse- quent to the execution of Ex.D-4. HELD: (i) The recitals in Ex.D-4 showed that there was allotment of specific properties to individual co-parceners and the document therefore fell within the mischief of s. 17(1) (b) of the Registration Act. It followed that Ex.D-4 was not admissible in evidence to prove the title of any of the coparceners to any particular property or to prove that any particular property had ceased to be joint -property. The document was only admissible to prove an intention on the part of the co-parceners to become divided in status. [643 F-H] Nanni Bai v. Gita Bai, [1959] S.C.R. 479, relied on. (ii) There was no pleading on behalf of the respondents and no issue framed to the effect that by signing Ex.D-4 appellant no. 2 had acquiesced in the division of properties among her sons without claiming the share to which she was entitled under the Mitakshara Law of the Benares 640 School. The respondents therefore could not be allowed to set up the plea of acquiescence by appellant no. 2 [L644 E] (iii) The doctrine of “Jethansi” or “Jeshtbhagam” is now obsolete and unenforceable. The principle of Hindu Law is equality of division and the exceptions to that rule, have almost, if not altogether disappeared. As between brothers or other relations absolute equality is now the invariable rule in all the States, unless, perhaps, where some special family Custom to the contrary is made out. The respondents had failed to prove that such a custom was prevalent in the caste of Agharias to which the parties belonged. [644 F-G; 645 F-G; 646 A-F] M. Y. A. A. Nachiappa Chettiar v. M. Y. A. A. Muthu Karuppan Chettiar, A.I.R. 1946 Mad. 398 and Hur- Purshad v. Sheo Dyal, 3 I.A. 259 at p. 285, referred to. (iv) The evidence showed that document Ex.D-4 was intended by the parties to be the sole evidence of partition and since it had been held that Ex.D.4 was not admissible in evidence on account of non-registration to establish when the property was so partitioned, it was manifest that no oral evidence was admissible to prove any subsequent partition having regard to the provisions of s. 91 of the Evidence Act. [L 646 G-647 A] =1968 AIR 1299, 1968( 3 )SCR 639, , ,

PETITIONER: SHIROMANI & ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: HEM KUMAR & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/04/1968 BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. SHAH, J.C. CITATION: 1968 AIR 1299 1968 SCR (3) 639 CITATOR INFO : RF 1981 SC 178 (106) ACT: Indian Registration Act (16 of 1908),s. 17 (1) (b)-Partition of Property in specific shares-Deed not registered- … Continue reading

Registration-Sale-When complete-If complete only on date of registration Preemption Indian Registration Act, 1908 (XVI of 1908), ss. 47 and 61. =P executed a sale deed on January 31, 1946, in respect of a house in favour of D and presented it for registration on the same day. On coming to know of the execution of the sale deed, the appellant who had a right of preemption, made the talab-i-mowasibat on February 2, 1946. The deed was copied out in the Registrar’s books on February 9, 1946, and thereupon the registration became complete as provided in s. 61 of the Registration Act. The appellant filed a suit for preemption. D resisted the suit on the ground that the sale was completed on February 9, 1946, and the talab had been made prematurely. The appellant contended that in view Of s. 47 Registration Act a registered document operated from the time it would have otherwise operated and the sale was completed on the date of its execution. Held (per Sinha, C. J., Sarkar and Mudholkar, jj.) that the sale was completed only on February 9, 1946, when the registration was complete, that the talab was made prematurely and that the suit must fail. Section 47 merely permitted a document when registered to operate from a date which may be earlier than the date on which it was registered, it did not say when the sale would be deemed to be complete. A sale which was required to be registered was not completed until the registration of the deed was completed. Tilakdhari Singh v. Gour Narain, A.I.R. (1921) Pat. 150, Nareshchandra Datta v. Gireeshchandra Das, (1935) I.L.R. 62 Cal. 979, and Gobardhan Bar v. Guna Dhar Bar, I.L.R. (1940) II Cal. 270, approved. Bindeshri v. Somnath Bhadry, A.I.R. (1916) All. 199 and Gopal Ram v. Lachmi Himir, A.I.R. (1926) All. 549, distin- guished. Per Das Gupta and Ayyangar, jj. –The sale was completed on the day of execution and the talab was made at the right time. Section 61 had nothing to do with the time when the sale evidenced by the registered deed became complete; it refers merely to the fact that the registering officer had completed his duty. Section 47 provided when a sale was deemed to be completed. There was no difference between the time when a sale 475 became effective and the time it could be held to be completed. Under s. 47 the crucial test for determining the time from which the registered document was to have effect or be deemed to be completed was the intention of the parties. The sale deed shows that the parties intended that the deed should be effective from the date of execution. =1961 AIR 1747, 1962( 2 )SCR 474, , ,

PETITIONER: RAM SARAN LALL AND OTHERS Vs. RESPONDENT: MST. DOMINI KUER AND OTHERS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/04/1961 BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) GUPTA, K.C. DAS AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA MUDHOLKAR, J.R. CITATION: 1961 AIR 1747 1962 SCR (2) 474 CITATOR INFO : R 1969 SC 244 (11) F 1972 SC2162 (4,5,7) ACT: … Continue reading

Transfer of Property Act, 1882: s.52 – Transfer of property by a defendant pending a partition suit – Partition suit found to be not collusive – Decree in partition suit – In terms of decree, the pendente lite transferor found to have only half share in the property and she was allotted only one fourth of the property purchased by the transferee – Suit by transferee for declaration of title and permanent injunction in regard to transferred property – Courts below dismissed the suit – Held: Suit ought not to have been dismissed in entirety even if the sale was hit by the Doctrine of lis pendens – Transferee’s title will be saved in respect of that part of the transferred property allotted to the transferor in the partition suit – Transfer in regard to the remaining portion of the transferred property to which the transferor is found not entitled, will be invalid and the transferee will not get any right, title or interest in that portion. Transfer of Property: Suggestion to Law makers – Absence of a mechanism for prospective purchasers to verify whether a property is subject to any pending suit or a decree or attachment cause lot of hardship, loss, anxiety and leads to unnecessary litigation – All these inconveniences, risks and misery could be avoided and the property litigations could be reduced to a considerable extent, if there is some satisfactory and reliable method by which a prospective purchaser can ascertain whether any suit is pending (or whether the property is subject to any decree or attachment) before he decides to purchase the property – Law Commission and the Parliament much consider such amendment or other suitable amendment to cover the existing void in title verification or due diligence procedures – Also, registration of agreements of sale should be made compulsory to reduce property litigation – Registration Act, 1908 – Legislation. Appeal: Appeal before Supreme Court – Concurrent findings of facts by the three courts below that the partition suit was not collusive – Interference with – Held: Not called for – Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 136. The appellant filed a suit for declaration of his right and title and permanent injunction in regard to the suit property. The case of the appellant was that he purchased the suit property from the second respondent under sale deed dated 11.4.1990 and he was a bona fide purchaser and was unaware of the partition suit between the second respondent and the first respondent who was the step daughter of the second respondent. On 17.3.1994, the said suit for partition was decreed by preliminary decree whereby the two respondents were held entitled to half share each in the properties including the suit property. In the final decree proceedings, the Commissioner divided the suit property in such a manner that nearly three-fourth portion of the suit property was allotted to the share of the first respondent and only about a one-fourth portion was allotted to the share of the second respondent. The first respondent resisted the suit contending that the appellant had purchased the suit property during the pendency of her suit for partition; and that being a purchaser pendente lite, the sale in his favour was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens and, therefore, he could not claim any right in the suit property; and she denied that there was any collusion between her and the second respondent. The second respondent did not contest the suit. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that the sale in favour of the appellant was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. The appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed by the first appellate court. The High Court dismissed the second appeal. Aggrieved, the appellant filed the instant appeal. =Partly allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The trial court, the first appellate court and the High Court on appreciating the evidence have held that the partition suit was not collusive and that there was a valid reason for a larger portion of the suit property being allotted to the first respondent, plaintiff in the partition suit as the portion allotted to the second respondent had a house therein and to equalize the value, a larger portion (vacant plot) was allotted to the first respondent. There is no reason to interfere on that score. [Para 8] [570-C-D] Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami AIR 1973 SC 569; Hardev Singh v. Gurmail Singh (2007) 2 SCC 404 – relied on. 2.1. The principle underlying Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is clear. During the pendency in a court of competent jurisdiction of any suit which is not collusive, in which any right of an immovable property is directly and specifically in question, such property cannot be transferred by any party to the suit so as to affect the rights of any other party to the suit under any decree that may be made in such suit. If ultimately the title of the pendente lite transferor is upheld in regard to the transferred property, the transferee’s title will not be affected. On the other hand, if the title of the pendente lite transferor is recognized or accepted only in regard to a part of the transferred property, then the transferee’s title will be saved only in regard to that extent and the transfer in regard to the remaining portion of the transferred property to which the transferor is found not entitled, will be invalid and the transferee will not get any right, title or interest in that portion. If the property transferred pendente lite, is allotted in entirety to some other party or parties or if the transferor is held to have no right or title in that property, the transferee will not have any title to the property. Where a co-owner alienates a property or a portion of a property representing to be the absolute owner, equities can no doubt be adjusted while making the division during the final decree proceedings, if feasible and practical (that is without causing loss or hardship or inconvenience to other parties) by allotting the property or portion of the property transferred pendente lite, to the share of the transferor, so that the bonafide transferee’s right and title are saved fully or partially. [Para 10] [571-C-H; 572-A] 2.2. In the instant case, a suit for partition filed by the first respondent against the second respondent in the year 1985 which included the suit property, was pending in a court of competent jurisdiction as on the date of sale (11.4.1990) by the second respondent in favour of the appellant. The partition suit was not collusive. Having regard to Section 52 of the Act, the sale by the second respondent in favour of the appellant did not in any way affect the right of the first respondent (plaintiff in the partition suit) or the decree made in her favour in the said partition suit. It is thus evident that the sale by the second respondent in favour of the appellant though not void, did not bind the first respondent. On the other hand, the sale in favour of appellant was subject to the right declared or recognized in favour of the first respondent-plaintiff under the decree passed in the pending partition suit. The sale pendente lite would, therefore, be subject to the decree in the partition suit. In the final decree passed in the partition suit, the major portion of the suit property was allotted to the share of the first respondent and to that extent, the sale in favour of the appellant would be ineffective. But in regard to the remaining portion of the suit property which stood allotted to the share of the second respondent in the final decree in the partition suit, the sale by the second respondent in favour of the appellant would be effective, valid and binding on the second respondent and to that extent, the appellant is entitled to a declaration of title and consequential injunction. The suit ought not to have been dismissed in entirety even if the sale by the second respondent in favour of appellant on 11.4.1990 was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. The second respondent cannot avoid the sale made by her on the ground that she was held to be not the exclusive owner, in the pending partition suit. Therefore, the courts below ought to have decreed the appellant’s suit in part, in regard to the portion of the suit property that fell to the share of second respondent instead of dismissing the suit. Therefore, the declaration of title with consequential permanent injunction as prayed is granted in regard to that portion of the suit property that was allotted to the second respondent in the partition suit. [Paras 11, 12, 16] [572-B-H; 573-A-B; 576-B] A related suggestion to the Law makers 3.1. Absence of a mechanism for prospective purchasers to verify whether a property is subject to any pending suit or a decree or attachment cause lot of hardship, loss, anxiety and unnecessary litigation. At present, a prospective purchaser can find out about any existing encumbrance over a property either by inspection of the Registration Registers or by securing a certificate relating to encumbrances (that is copies of entries in the Registration Registers) from the jurisdictional Sub-Registrar under Section 57 of the Registration Act, 1908. But a prospective purchaser has no way to ascertain whether there is any suit or proceeding pending in respect of the property, if the person offering the property for sale does not disclose it or deliberately suppresses the information. The inconveniences, risks, hardships and misery as a result of such transfers could be avoided and the property litigations could be reduced to a considerable extent, if there is some satisfactory and reliable method by which a prospective purchaser can ascertain whether any suit is pending (or whether the property is subject to any decree or attachment) before he decides to purchase the property. A solution has been found to this problem in the States of Maharashtra by an appropriate local amendment to section 52 of the Act, by Bombay Act 4 of 1939. The Law Commission and the Parliament must consider such amendment or other suitable amendment to cover the existing void in title verification or due diligence procedures. Provision can also be made for compulsory registration of such notices in respect of decrees and in regard to attachments of immoveable properties. [Paras 13, 14] [573-C-H; 574-A-C; 575-C] 3.2. At present in most of the States, agreements to sell are not compulsorily registrable as they do not involve transfer of any right, title or interest in an immoveable property. Registration of agreements of sale will reduce property litigation. It will go a long way to discourage generation and circulation of black money in real estate matters, as also undervaluation of documents for purposes of stamp duty. It will also discourage the growth of land mafia and muscleman who dominate the real estate scene in various parts of the country. [Para 15] [575-D-G] Case Law Reference: AIR 1973 SC 569 relied on Para 9 (2007) 2 SCC 404 relied on Para 9 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 10325 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 01.09.2009 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in S.A. No. 1141 of 2008. R. Balasubramaniam, B. Karunakaran, V. Balachandran for the Appellant. N. Shobha, Sriram J. Thalapathy, Adhi Venkataraman, S.P. Parthasarthy for the Respondents.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.10325 OF 2010 [Arising out of SLP [C] No. 163 of 2010] T.G. Ashok Kumar … Appellant Vs. Govindammal & Anr. … Respondents JUDGMENT R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J. Notice to respondents was issued limited to the question whether the High Court ought to have decreed … Continue reading

Registration Act (16 of 1908), s. 17(1) (c)-Partnership assets consisting of immovable property-Relinquishment by one partner of his share-Deed of relinquishment if should be registered. =The members of two Joint Hindu families (Appellants and Respondents) entered into partnership for carrying on business. The members of one family filed a suit in 1949 for dissolution of the partnership and the taking of accounts. The members of the second family raised the defence that the partnership was dissolved even in 1936 and that accounts were then settled between the two families. In support of that plea they relied upon an unregistered document, which showed that the partnership had come to an end. It was contended by the appellants-plaintiffs, that since the partnership assets included immovable property and the document recorded the relinquishment by the members 6f the plaintifffamily of their interest in those assets, the document was compulsorily registerable under s. 17(1)(c) of the Registration Act, 1908; and that as it was not registered, it was inadmissible in evidence to prove the dissolution as well as the settlement of accounts. HELD : The document only records the fact that the partnership had come to an end. It cannot be said to convey any immovable property by a partner to another, expressly or by necessary implication, nor is there any express reference to any immovable property, except a recital of a fact which had taken place earlier. Therefore, the unregistered deed of release by one family of its share in the partnership was admissible in evidence, even though the partnership owned immovable property. [410 D. E] The interest of a partner in partnership assets comprising of movable as well as immovable property should be treated only as movable property. His right during the insistence of the partnership is to get his share of the profits from time to time, as may be agreed upon among the partners, and his right after the dissolution of the partnership, or with his retirement from, the partnership, is only to receive e the money value of his share in the net partnership assets as on the date of dissolution or retirement, after a deduction of Liabilities and prior charges. [406 E; 407 F-G) Case law reviewed. =1966 AIR 1300, 1966( 3 )SCR 400, , ,

PETITIONER: ADDANKI NARAYANAPPA & ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: BHASKARA KRISHTAPPA AND 13 ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/01/1966 BENCH: MUDHOLKAR, J.R. BENCH: MUDHOLKAR, J.R. SARKAR, A.K. WANCHOO, K.N. CITATION: 1966 AIR 1300 1966 SCR (3) 400 CITATOR INFO : F 1967 SC 401 (9) RF 1968 SC 676 (6) D 1974 SC1066 (4,5) R 1977 SC 489 … Continue reading

Apex court upheld the cancellation of recognisation of B.Ed.College=There is no distinguishing feature between the cases mentioned above and the case at hand for us to strike a discordant note. The institution established by the appellant is not equipped with the infrastructure required under the NCTE Act and the Regulations. It is not in a position to impart quality education, no matter admissions for the session 2011-2012 were made pursuant to the interim directions issued by the High Court. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the prayer for permitting the students to continue in the unrecognised institution of the appellant or directing that they may be permitted to appear in the examination. We, however, make it clear that this order will not prevent the respondent-University from examining the feasibility of reallocating the students who were admitted through the University process of selection and counselling to other recognised colleges to prevent any prejudice to such students. Such re-allocation for the next session may not remedy the situation fully qua the students 16

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.11215 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.28473 of 2011) Shri Morvi Sarvajanik Kelavni Mandal Sanchalit MSKM B.Ed. College …Appellant Versus National Council for Teachers’ Education & Ors. …Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL NO.11216 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.28528 of … Continue reading

what are to be consider while framing charges ?=whether in a revision petition challenging an order framing charges against the accused, the latter could rely upon documents other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 of the Cr.P.C. and whether the High Court would be justified in quashing the charges under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. on the basis of such documents. =”The law is that at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material. No provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the “Code”) grants to the accused any right to file any material or document at the stage of framing of charge. That right is granted only at the stage of the trial. Satish Mehra case, (1996) 9 SCC 766 holding that the trial court has powers to consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage of Section 227 of the Code has not been correctly decided. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge the defence of the accused cannot be put forth. The acceptance of the contention of the accused would mean permitting the accused to 14 adduce his defence at the stage of framing of charge and for examination thereof at that stage which is against the criminal jurisprudence.” 13. In the result, we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the High Court in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The Special Leave Petitions are accordingly dismissed.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.4606 of 2011 Helios & Matheson Information Technology Ltd. & Ors. … Petitioners Versus Rajeev Sawhney & Anr. …Respondents With SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) No.4672 of 2011 Pawan Kumar …Petitioner Versus Rajeev Sawhney & Anr. …Respondents 1 J U D G … Continue reading

cancellation of the bail order by complainant gang – not allowed by apex court=gang wars =the bail order was passed as early as on 11th February, 2010 i.e. nearly two years back. It is not the case of the complainant that the respondent has during this period either tried to tamper with the evidence or committed any other act that may affect the fairness of the trial. Equally significant is the fact that there was no gunshot injury to either the complainant or the deceased or any other person involved in the incident.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) No.4010 of 2011 Jetha Bhaya Odedara …Petitioner Versus Ganga Maldebhai Odedara and Anr. … Respondents J U D G M E N T T.S. THAKUR, J. 1 1. The High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad has by its order dated 13th … Continue reading

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