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The Honourable
Since the Special Land Acquisition Officer did not take steps in furtherance of the directions contained in the aforesaid order, respondent No.1 issued purchase notice dated 25.7.2007 under Section 127 of the 1966 Act, which was duly served upon the Corporation. After one year, respondent No.1 submitted plan dated 28.7.2008 for construction of a library building on the land owned by it. The same was rejected by the Competent – Authority vide order dated 29.9.2008 on the ground that the land was reserved for the college and the acquisition proceedings had already been initiated.= if any private land is shown as reserved in the Development plan, the same can be acquired within 10 years either by agreement or by following the procedure prescribed under the 1894 Act and if proceedings for the acquisition of the land are not commenced within that period and a further period of six months from the date of service of notice under Section 127 of the 1966 Act, reservation will be deemed to have lapsed and the land will be available for development by the owner. By applying the ratio of the above-noted judgments to the facts of this case, we hold that the High Court did not commit any error by declaring that reservation of the land owned by respondent No.1 had lapsed and the rejection of its application for construction of library building was legally unsustainable. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.
Page 1 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.2906 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 19003 of 2009) State of Maharashtra …Appellant versus Bhakti Vedanta Book Trust and others …Respondents J U D G M E N T G. S. Singhvi, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Respondent No.1 is … Continue reading
Whether the Catholic Society or tenant -members who should be given the redevelopmental rights,= The instant controversy relates to a dispute between the Catholic Society on the one hand; and the tenant-members on the other hand. The first dispute between the rival parties arose when the Catholic Society resolved to re-develop the land measuring 5.5 acres known as Willingdon East. The decision to re-develop the land in question was taken on account of the fact, that the 25 cottages constructed thereon, were scattered all over the land. = Based on the factual position noticed by three of the petitioners/appellants in I.A. nos. 17-19 of 2012, the finding recorded by the High Court in respect of the offer of Rs.75 crores can be stated to have been made at the behest of a rival builder Mr. B.Y. Chavan. Mr. B.Y. Chavan has even paid for the litigation expenses of the tenant-members. The tenant-members readily accepted the offer made by Mr. B.Y. Chavan, when he proposed before the High Court that he would act in the same manner as M/s. Sumer Associates. It is therefore natural to infer, that the tenant-members are agreeable to the redevelopment of 5.5 acres land comprising of Willingdon East in the manner contemplated by the resolution of the Catholic Society dated 6.12.2009 (and the consequential conveyance deed dated 7.12.2009), which is impugned in the suits filed by the tenant-members. This also prima facie shows that the action of the tenant-members prima facie seems to lack bona fides. We therefore affirm the determination rendered by the High Court in the impugned order, that it was for the Catholic Society to decide who should be given the redevelopmental rights, and not the tenant-members who are a small minority of 15 persons (the number having now diminished to 5) who have initiated the litigation out of which the present proceedings have arisen. As of now, therefore, it is possible to prima facie infer, that the petitioners’/appellants’ claim before the High Court does not seem to be bona fide. They also do not prima facie seem to have genuinely initiated the instant litigation. In the above view of the matter, the opinion recorded by the High Court, that all arguments of the plaintiff based on law and equity vanished, upon the offer made by Mr. B.Y. Chavan, cannot be stated to be unjustified. 37. For all the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit in the instant Civil Appeals. The same are accordingly hereby dismissed.
Page 1 “REPORTABLE” IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2683-2685 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 30847-30849 OF 2012) Margaret Almeida & Ors. etc. … Appellants Versus Bombay Catholic Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors. … Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2688-2688 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP … Continue reading
severe strictures It is settled legal position that no adverse remark can be made against any judicial officer without giving an opportunity to explain the conduct.- “This conduct of the Chief Judicial Magistrate is deplorable and wholly mala fide and illegal.” “Vexatiously illegal.” “… and has done unpardonable injustice to the injured and the informant. His lack of sensitivity and utter callous attitude has left the accused of murderous assault to go scot-free to this day”. Our legal system acknowledges the fallibility of the Judges, hence it provides appeals and revisions. lower judicial officers mostly work under a charged atmosphere and are constantly under psychological pressure and they do not have the facilities which are available in the higher courts, we are of the view that the remarks/observations and strictures are to be avoided particularly if the officer has no occasion to put-forth his reasonings. We, once again, reiterate that harsh or disparaging remarks are not to be made against judicial officers and authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law unless it is really for the decision of the case as an integral part thereof. Under these circumstances, the adverse remarks passed in the impugned judgment and the final orders dated 01.03.2012 and 23.04.2012 insofar as the appellant is concerned are set aside. Since these appeals are confined only for expunging the strictures, the same are allowed as pointed above. No costs.
Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1340-1341 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 18859-18860 of 2012) Awani Kumar Upadhyay …. Appellant(s) Versus The Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and Ors. …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P. Sathasivam, J. … Continue reading
registration of the car stood in the name of Anil Kumar and petitioner after purchasing vehicle got it insured in his own name without transfer of registration certificate in his name. – not entitled to claim insurance = Section 50 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 provides as under: ”50(1)(b) The transferee shall, within thirty days of the transfer, report the transfer to the registering authority within whose jurisdiction he has the residence or place of business where the vehicle is normally kept, as the case may be, and shall forward the certificate of registration to that registering authority together with the prescribed fee and a copy of the report received by him from the transferor in order that particulars of the transfer of ownership may be entered in the certificate of registration”. 7. As per this provision, the petitioner was bound to get the registration certificate transferred in his name and intimate to the insurance company but as the petitioner failed to get it transferred in his name within specified period, petitioner was not entitled to get any compensation only on the ground that policy existed in his name. At the time of taking policy, petitioner had no insurable interest in the vehicle and respondent/OP has not committed any error in repudiating claim. Learned State Commission has not committed any error in allowing appeal and dismissing complaint filed by the petitioner. We find no infirmity, material irregularity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order and revision petition is liable to be dismissed at admission stage. 8. Consequently, revision petition filed by the petitioner is dismissed at admission stage with no order as to cost.
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI REVISION PETITION NO. 64 OF 2013 (From the order dated 10.10.2012 in Appeal No.876/2012 of the Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Panchkula) D.P. Srivastava S/o Late Sh. Keshava Prasad Srivastava C1/102, Mayfair Tower Charmwood Village, Suraj Kund Road, Faridabad – 121 009, Haryana … Petitioner/Complainant Versus M/s. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. Plot No.60, Okhla Industrial Estate Phase II Opp. SBI Bank, New Delhi … Continue reading
The visa card carried a personal accident cover, with risk coverage of Rs.4 lakhs.= even though the visa card was issued, however till declaration of assignment was not filled in, the deceased cannot be regarded as their customer. Therefore the question of payment of any amount does not arise. ? = it is clearly stated that the card issued only with personal accident benefit and he is entitled to the amount for an accident on road or in air travel. Therefore on reading the instruction under “Insurance benefit on you card” it cannot be said that the benefit commences only after filling of declaration of assignment. The evidence put before us do not show that such a condition was put forth by the opponent that the benefit under the card will not be available unless declaration cum undertaking was filled in.”
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI REVISION PETITION NO. 1902 OF 2011 (Against the order dated 16.09.2010 in Appeal No.1297/2006 of the State Commission, Gujarat) Standard Chartered Bank 5th Floor, Sakar -3, Income Tax, Ashram Road Ahmedabad ……….Petitioner Versus Mr. Naran Bhai ShamjiBhai Bhandari R/o Tarwade, TA Distt. Amreli, Ahmedabad, Gujarat …..Respondent BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE J. M. MALIK, PRESIDING MEMBER HON’BLE MR. VINAY KUMAR, MEMBER … Continue reading
for issuing a passport , it is not necessary to mention always the name of the biological parents in the application form, adoptive parents name can be mentioned.
LPA.No.357/2012 Page 1 of 16 *IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Date of decision: 11 th May, 2012 + LPA No.357/2012 MS. TEESTA CHATTORAJ THROUGH HER MOTHER/NATURAL GUARDIAN SMT. RAJESHWARI CHATTORAJ ….. Appellant Through: Mr. M. Dutta, Advocate Versus UNION OF INDIA ….. Respondent Through: Mr. Ruchir Mishra, Advocate. CORAM :- … Continue reading
“Sorry Teacher”= whereby the Hon’ble Single Judge restrained respondent No.4/the appellant herein and official respondents from releasing the film titled as “Sorry Teacher” pursuant to the Certification made in UA/DIL/2/13/2012/HYD, dated 16.7.2012, pending further orders.= since the film is not yet released, the contentions of the writ petitioners are based upon hear say evidence and are purely speculative, based on inferences drawn in the print and electronic media. Further the Revising Committee, which has examined the film has issued the Certificate for restricted viewing in conformity with the guidelines issued by the Government of India, by judging the film in its entirety for its over all impact. The guidelines prescribed have been adhered to as is evident from the reasons given in support of the Certification. Thus, the Certification made by a High powered Board of Film Certification, which is a specialised composition gives an un-rebuttable presumption in favour of the said statutory Certificate, which cannot be rebutted merely by allegations of the writ petitioners. Within the broad parameters of the guidelines, the film is required to be judged based upon a criteria as to whether an average person applying contemporary community standards would find that the subject matter taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest and the said test as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision fourth cited supra has been followed. Hence, we are of the opinion that the Central Board of Film Certification after thoroughly considering the recommendations of the Revising Committee and after considering all the aspects referred to above, has granted certification to the film in question. We, therefore, do not find that there is any reason to interfere with the said order of the Revising Committee. Accordingly, we allow the writ appeals and vacate the interim orders dated 3.9.2012 passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge in W.P.M.P. Nos. 32956 of 2012 and 33929 of 2012 in Writ Petition No. 25856 of 2012 and 26622 of 2012. In view of the orders passed in the writ appeals allowing the said appeals, no further orders are necessary in the writ petitions. Writ Petition Nos. 25856 of 2012 and 26622 of 2012 are accordingly disposed of. No costs.
THE HON’BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICESRI PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR Writ Appeal Nos.1128 & 1129 of 2012 And Writ Petition Nos. 25856 of 2012 & 26622 of 2012 24-09-2012 M/s. Suryalok Film Factory, Mumbai R. Malleshwari and others Counsel for Appellant : Mr. K. Durga Prasad Counsel for Respondent … Continue reading
the respondent has to be held guilty of medical negligence/deficiency in service at least on four counts. The respondent did not pay any attention to the patient’s persistent complaints of pain (as he himself admitted in his referral note for ERCP) till she presented with visible signs of jaundice and thus unduly delayed the diagnostic tests that were taken only on 02.10.2000. Secondly, having conducted an “exploratory” laparotomy on 04.10.2000, he failed to even attempt locating the cause of the bile leakage suffered by the patient though all standard literature (including that cited by the respondent) pointed to cystic duct stump leak as one of the most frequent causes of such leakage – such a situation was particularly likely in this case because the cholecystectomy was proceeded with by the respondent despite his inability to clearly separate the cystic duct and the cystic artery before their dissection and ligature. Further, after conducting the laparotomy, he delayed referring the patient for ERCP for no rhyme or reason though all standard literature (and hence the corpus of knowledge and practice based thereon expected of an ordinary medical practitioner of the relevant specialty) mandated such an investigation at the earliest because that is the most widely recommended way of both diagnosing and, in some situations also treating, bile anatomy injury/obstruction evidenced by either stricture/obstruction in the biliary tree or fistular leakage of bile flow. The respondent himself knew of this, according to his repeated admissions. It is really strange that this failure could be pleaded as an error of judgment. A physician can commit an error of judgment in a case of more than one options of (or, approaches to) diagnosis and/or treatment of a patient’s condition and he honestly believing one of them to be more appropriate than the other/s for that patient, though in retrospect that may turn out to be not so appropriate or advantageous to the patient. Here, in this case, the respondnet knew full well that the patient must undergo ERCP (or, an equivalent diagnostic or diagnostic-cum-therapeutic procedure), which he was not professionally competent to conduct. Why he delayed this reference to a qualified gastro-enterologist/endoscopist, or, in this case to the PGI, when he had not even been able to identify the patient’s biliary anatomy injury, leave alone repair it, may be a ‘judgment’ of sorts of this particualr surgeon but certainly not an error of judgment that an average informed and careful surgeon would make. Finally, there is incontrovertible evidence in the form of the signed consent documents that the respondent did not discharge the duty of disclosure in case of either surgery (cholecystectomy or laparotomy) as required of him under the law governing consent. We cannot also overlook the fact that this respondent’s recording of important treatment records could be interpreted to suggest an attempt at “improving” his case but perhaps that was not deliberate. It is unfortunate that the medical board did not go into these questions with the seriousness expected of an independent body of experts. However, there is no evidence at all that the acts of the respondent /OP were the proximate cause of Reeta’s eventual death and the respondent/OP cannot be held to account for that. 20. That brings us to the question of quantum of compensation. The complainant asked for Rs. 8.25 lakh (consisting of Rs. 5 lakh towards compensation for loss/damage due to medical negligence, Rs. 1.25 lakh for reimbursement of medical expenses and Rs. 2 lakh towards mental agony), with interest thereon @ 24% from the date of dispute till payment and costs of Rs. 5,000/-. In the case of “Lata Wadhwa & Others v State of Bihar & Others [(2001) 8 SCC 197], the Apex Court had taken the value of earnings of a simple housewife at Rs. 36,000/- p.m. while going into the question of compensation on account of deaths of several people that occurred in an accident in 1989. Smt. Reeta Dogra was also a simple housewife who died in 2000. Considering only the inflation since 1989, it would be reasonable to accept the sum of Rs. 10,000/- p.m. as the equivalent earning in December 2000. Applying the deduction of 1/3rd towards personal maintenance expenses, the contribution would work out to Rs. 80,000/- approx. per annum. Reeta was 46 at the time of her death and hence a multiplier of even 10 would lead to a compensation amount of Rs.8 lakh, which would have been payable in 2001 on which interest @ 9% per annum since 2001 would not be unreasonable. However, since we cannot attribute Reeta’s death solely to the acts of negligence on the part of the respondent/OP, the interest of equity would be met if his liability for compensation were restricted to Rs.7 lakh. 21. As a result, the appeal is partly allowed and the order of the State Commission is set aside. The respondent is directed to pay to the appellant/complainant the sum of Rs.7 lakh as consolidated compensation, including cost, within four weeks from the date of this order, failing which the sum would be liable to be paid with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of this order till realisation.
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI FIRST APPEAL No. 248 OF 2002 (From the order dated 27.03.2002 of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Union Territory, Chandigarh in Complaint Case no. 6 of 2001) Rajinder Singh Dogra 3152, Sector 28 D Appellant Chandigarh versus Dr. P.N. Gupta P. N. Urology and Surgical Centre House no. 1359, … Continue reading
whether the competing goods are different and whether the Registrar was right in refusing the appellant’s opposition. In deciding on this point the well settled law is to consider the nature of goods; its characteristic; its origin; the purpose; whether it is produced usually by one and the same manufacturer or distributed by the same wholesale houses; whether they are sold in the same shop over the same counter; during the same season and to the same class or classes of customers; whether they are regarded as belonging to the same trade etc. The Act uses the expression ”Similarity of goods or services” [S.11(a)]. The essential requirement is that there should be such similarity resulting in the likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. The question whether or not two sets of goods are of the same description is a question of fact and in deciding that question “one has to look at the trade” and must look at it from a practical business and commercial point of view. It is recognized that classification of goods and services is only an enabling tool for seeking registration and we can find many goods of same description in different classes as also goods of different description in the same class. In the instant case the competing marks are identical i.e. SONA. The rival goods are used by the common man. The perception of the mark in the mind of average consumer plays a decisive role. Here the appellant coined, adopted and started using SONA from 1975. The respondent was born some ten years later. Here it is layperson – illiterate, semi-literate, housewives, servants who will be buying both goods. Confusion as to the trade source is therefore inevitable. When the rival goods are used through the same trade channel and sold in the same shop over the same counter, many customers will wonder whether it might not be the case that the two products come from the same source. There is a real tangible danger if the impugned trade mark is put on the Register. The respondent started the use of the impugned trade mark in 1985 with an annual turnover of Rs.36,000/-. Upto 1995 their annual turnover was always less than one lakh rupees. On the other hand even before the respondent’s trade mark was born in 1985, the appellant annual turnover had reached Rs.36.0 lakhs. No wonder the appellant are greatly exercised. He is expanding and diversifying his business. The appellant have thus established by evidence filed before the Registrar and beyond any reasonable doubt, the civil standard of proof required to show that potential customers for the appellant’s goods will be misled into purchasing the respondent’s goods. In determining the likelihood of confusion because of similarity of goods, we are concerned with ordinary practical business probabilities having regard to all the circumstances. There is great affinity between the competing goods here. Since the practice of Registry is not to permit registration for a broad range of goods in a class, it then becomes its duty to ensure correct application of law in respect of subsequent identical mark for cognate class of goods. The Deputy Registrar had erred in applying the wrong test and permitted the registration of the impugned trade mark. His ruling that the rival goods are totally dim-similar is misconceived as the class of customers has been ignored. Similarity and confusion as to origin both largely are matters of fact and impression. The appellant have built a reasonable reputation for their trade mark SONA ten years before the respondent. In deciding such cases one has to think like a common man. That is the only correct test that can be sustained. The supreme test is the likely public confusion bench marking the level of education, class of customers at ground zero. 7. Accordingly, we set aside the order of the Deputy Registrar permitting registration of the impugned trade mark. OA/54/2005/TM/KOL is consequently allowed and the impugned trade mark “SONA” in class 30 is refused registration. There is no order as to costs.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD Guna Complex Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443 Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai-600018 (Circuit Bench Sitting at Kolkata) OA/54/2005/TM/KOL FRIDAY, THIS THE 8th DAY OF JUNE, 2012 HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE PRABHA SRIDEVAN … CHAIRMAN HON’BLE SHRI V. RAVI … TECHNICAL MEMBER M/s Sona Spices Pvt. Ltd., 746, Industrial Area, Phase-11, … Continue reading
whether the impugned trade mark can continue to remain on the register when already a mark was on the registerThe respondent herein filed a Civil Suit against the applicant for infringement of the trade mark “CLAVMOX”. The applicant is the prior registered proprietor of the trade mark. Person who is in any way interested in having removed the mark and is in any way affected or damaged if the mark continued to remain on the register then that person is said to be a person aggrieved. In case on hand the applicant is the registered proprietor of the trade mark as of 1998. An identical trade mark if allowed to be registered subsequently would definitely cause damage and therefore the applicant is a “person aggrieved”.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD Guna Complex Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443, Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai-600018 (CIRCUIT SITTING AT AHMEDABAD) M.P. No.105/2010 in ORA/95/2010/TM/AMD AND ORA/95/2010/TM/AMD MONDAY, THIS THE 25th DAY OF JUNE, 2012 Hon’ble Ms.S. Usha … Vice Chairman Hon’ble Shri V. Ravi … Technical Member M/s. Cipla Ltd., … Continue reading
advocatemmmohan 