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M.V. ACT – WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT= whether the appellant/insurance company was liable to pay the entire amount of compensation awarded to the claimants or its liability was restricted to that which was prescribed under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. = the liability to pay compensation in respect of death or bodily injury to an employee should not be restricted to that under the Workmen’s Compensation Act but should be more or unlimited. However, the determination would depend whether a policy has been taken by the vehicle owner by making payment of extra premium and whether the policy also contains a clause to that effect.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8725 OF 2012   RAMCHANDRA ..Appellant Versus REGIONAL MANAGER UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. ..Respondent   J U D G M E N T GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J. The judgment and order dated 17.4.2007 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at … Continue reading

M.V. Act -accident claim = Whether the High Court is justified in reducing the compensation from Rs.10,62,000/- to Rs.8,00,000/- with 6% interest per annum?= The same has been interfered with by the High Court in the Appeal filed by the Insurance Company though it has no right to challenge the quantum of compensation as it has got limited defence as provided under Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act in the absence of permission from the Tribunal to avail the defence on behalf of the insurer as required under Section 170(b) of the Act. It is relevant to note that Parliament, while enacting sub-section (2) of Section 149 only specified some of the defences which are based on conditions of the policy and, therefore, any other breach of conditions of the policy by the insured which does not find place in sub-section (2) of Section 149 cannot be taken as a defence by the insurer. If we permit the insurer to take any other defence other than those specified in sub- section (2) of Section 149, it would mean we are adding more defences to the insurer in the statute which is neither found in the Act nor was intended to be included.= In our considered view the Tribunal and the High Court have erred in not following the principles laid down in Sarla Verma’ case (supra) in fixing the monthly income at Rs.12,000/- in the absence of documentary evidence having regard to the fact that the deceased was employed as Lecturer in Odisha College of Homeopathy and Research, Sambalpur and she also had private practice. The Tribunal in exercise of its original jurisdiction has taken Rs.12,000/- as her monthly income and has deducted 1/3rd out of the monthly salary towards her personal expenses and computed the compensation both on the loss of dependency as well as the conventional heads and has awarded Rs.10,62,000/-. The same should not have been interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Hence, the impugned judgment, award and order passed in the Misc. Case no. 385/2011 in M.A.C.A No. 579/2007 is required to be interfered with. So also the order dated 10.3.2011 in Misc. Case No.385 of 2011 modifying the earlier direction issued by the High Court to deposit 60% of the awarded amount in any of the Nationalized Bank, is required to be interfered with. Accordingly, both the impugned judgment, award and orders dated 24.2.2011 and 10.03.2011 are hereby set aside by allowing the civil appeals. Having regard to the facts, circumstances and the finding recorded by the Tribunal in its judgment, we restore the same in awarding compensation in favour of the appellants at Rs.10,62,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40622 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.5373-5375 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 7407-7409 of 2012) REKHA JAIN & ANR. … APPELLANTS VS. NATIONAL INSURANCE CO.LTD. … RESPONDENT         J U D G M E N T   V. Gopala Gowda, J. … Continue reading

M.V. ACT = whether compensation in a motor vehicle accident case is payable to a claimant for both heads, viz., loss of earning/earning capacity as well as permanent disability. = The Tribunal, after holding that the accident was caused due to the negligence of the driver of the bus belonging to the Transport Corporation, by order dated 30.11.2000, awarded a sum of Rs. 9,42,822/- as total compensation by adopting the multiplier of 13 in terms of the second schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). (c) Dis-satisfied with the award of the Tribunal, the appellant preferred an appeal being CMA No. 150 of 2001 before the High Court praying for higher compensation, on the other hand, the Transport Corporation also preferred an appeal being CMA No. 82 of 2001 for reduction of the compensation. (d) The High Court, by impugned common judgment dated 29.01.2007, reduced the compensation from Rs. 9,42,822/- to Rs. 6,72,822/-. Aggrieved by the reduction in the compensation amount, the appellant has preferred the present appeals by way of special leave for enhancement of the compensation. = In the light of the above discussion, the appellant is entitled to the following additional amount: a) Towards 85% permanent disability … Rs. 1,00,000/- b) Towards loss of earning/earning capacity by applying the multiplier 13 … Rs. 80,000/- (in addition to the amount of Rs. 3,20,000/- fixed by the High Court) Accordingly, in addition to the amount awarded by the High Court, the claimant/the appellant herein is entitled to an additional amount of Rs. 1,80,000/-. Further, we make it clear that altogether the appellant is entitled to a total compensation of Rs. 8,52,822/- with interest at the rate of 9% from the date of claim petition till the date of deposit. 19) The appeals filed by the claimant/appellant are allowed in part to the extent mentioned above with no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40482 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4816-4817 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 15531-15532 of 2007) S. Manickam …. Appellant (s) Versus Metropolitan Transport Corp. Ltd. …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P. Sathasivam, J. 1) Leave granted. 2) … Continue reading

Damages to the standing crop +The question relating to the value of larger extent of agricultural land, if required to be determined with reference to price fixed for small residential plot, = “When the value of a large extent of agricultural land has to be determined with reference to the price fetched by sale of a small residential plot, it is necessary to make an appropriate deduction towards the development cost, to arrive at the value of the large tract of land. The deduction towards development cost may vary from 20% to 75% depending upon various factors. Even if the acquired lands have situational advantages, the minimum deduction from the market value of a small residential plot, to arrive at the market value of a larger agricultural land, in the usual course, will be in the range of 20% to 25%. In this case, the Collector has himself adopted a 25% deduction which has been affirmed by the Reference Court and the High Court. We, therefore, do not propose to alter it.” Therefore, it is clear that mere reliance made by a Court on sale deeds of smaller residential area for determination of market value of larger agricultural area, the same will not render the determination illegal until and unless it is shown that the determination was not proper. 20. In the instant case, the average value of the sale­deeds relied upon by the Reference Court (Ext.1 and Ext.1/b) was Rs. 401/­ at the time of acquisition. Therefore, as the sale­deeds were in relation to smaller plots, the deduction of 37% was made by the Reference Court and thereafter, by allowing appropriate 10% increase in the value of the land from the date of the sale deeds upto the date of Notification under Section 4 of the Act, the Reference Court arrived at a figure of Rs.250/­ per decimal. The High Court while arriving at figure of Rs. 100/­ per decimal considered only the fact that the sale deeds relied upon were in relation to smaller plots and those sale deeds(Ext.1 and Ext.1/b) were related to homestead land and hence fixed Rs. 10,000/­ per acre as compensation. It completely failed to consider the increase in price of land and the deduction made by the 9Page 10 High Court is nearly 75% which is not in accordance with law. we have no other alternative but to set aside the order passed by the High Court and restore the award passed by the Reference Court.-The respondents are directed to pay the appellant the compensation in terms of the award passed by the Reference Court after adjusting the amount already paid within three months. There shall be no separate order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40470 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.5311 OF 2012 (arising out of SLP(C)No.34284 of 2011) AHSANUL HODA  … APPELLANT Versus STATE OF BIHAR     … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. This   appeal   has   been   filed   by   the   claimant­ appellant against the judgment and order of the Patna High   Court   dated   10.2.2011   by   which   the   High   Court reduced   the   compensation   awarded … Continue reading

Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai- pull down the building numbers 13,14,15 and 16 which are in dilapidated condition. = petitioners have no legal right to continue to live in the existing buildings as this Court by its previous order, sought to be modified, has already passed an order for their eviction from the premises in question.= In view of the existing precarious nature and status of the buildings in question which is informed to be extremely grave, we cannot permit the petitioners to continue to live in the existing buildings for more than a fortnight which they have been ordered to vacate. Therefore, we permit them to exercise their option of shifting either to Mahul, Chembur or the Transit Camps Nos. 13A and 13B after a fortnight when the transit camps are made fit for habitation with essential and basic amenities. However, if some of the occupants of the building No. 13 and top floor of building No. 14 wish to continue in the existing buildings at their own risk even after a fortnight, they are at liberty to seek permission from the Bench which had passed the order sought to be modified as we have taken up this application for modification only in view of its urgency.- However, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances as also taking into account the humanitarian consideration for the occupants of the building No. 13 and top floor of building No. 14, we accede to the request of the occupants of the building No. 13 and top floor of building No. 14 communicated through their counsel that if they wish to continue to live in the existing buildings beyond of a period of fortnight until they move the Regular Bench, they may do so at their own risk and in case the buildings in question falls down in the meantime and the occupants suffer loss in any manner, the whole and sole responsibility shall be of the occupants of the those buildings and the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai shall not be liable in any manner for any consequence that might follow. 14. The Applicant/respondent No.1 however, shall make the Transit Camp Nos. 13A and 13B habitable with all basic amenities within a fortnight but not later than 30.6.2013. It was further stated by the learned Attorney General that the respondent No. 1 will offer all assistance and logistic support to the evacuees for shifting them from the existing building No. 13 and top floor of building No. 14 to Mahul, Chembur and continue to live there until they reshift to the Transit Camp Nos. 13A and 13B after a fortnight or till such time when the Transit Camps are complete to their satisfaction. 15. It is made clear that the Transit Camp Nos. 13A and 13B shall provide all basic amenities required for human habitation but the word “habitation” will not be construed so as to insist for fancy fittings in the Transit Camps. = published in http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp


‘Jugaad’= wherein the complete liability of providing compensation in a vehicular accident had been fixed upon the appellant-Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the ‘RSRTC’), while unfastening the liability of the driver and the owner of the vehicle, known as ‘Jugaad’, under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’).= whether a particular vehicle can be defined as motor vehicle in terms of Section 2(28) of the Act, is to be determined on the facts of each case taking into consideration the use of the vehicle and its suitability for being used upon the road. Once it is found to be suitable for being used on the road, it is immaterial whether it runs on the public road or private road, for the reason, that actual user for a particular purpose, is no criteria to decide the name- The word `only’ used in Section 2(28) of the Act clearly shows that the exemption is confined only to those kinds of vehicles which are exclusively being used in a factory or in any closed premises. Thus, a vehicle which is not adapted for use upon the road, is only to be excluded. = if the tractor which is exclusively used for agricultural purpose, does require registration and insurance and driver also require a driving license, why the same provisions would not apply in case of `Jugaad’. = In view of the above, as the `Jugaad’ is covered in the definition of the motor vehicle under Section 2(28) of the Act, the statutory authorities cannot escape from their duty to enforce the law and restrain the plying of `Jugaad’. The statutory authorities must ensure that `Jugaad’ can be plied only after meeting the requirements of the Act. The same has become a menace to public safety as they are causing a very large number of accidents. ‘Jugaads’ are not insured and the owners of the `Jugaad’ generally do not have the financial capacity to pay compensation to persons who suffer disablement and to dependents of those, who lose life. Thus, considering the gravity of the circumstances, the statutory authorities must give strict adherence to the circular referred to hereinabove by the Central Government. However, we clarify that it is open to the statutory authorities to make exemptions by issuing a notification/circular specifically if such a vehicle is exclusively used for agricultural purposes but for that sufficient specifications have to be provided so that it cannot be used for commercial purposes. The matter is closed now.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No.3265 of 2012 Chairman, Rajasthan State Road Transport …Petitioners Corporation & Ors. Versus Smt. Santosh & Ors. …Respondents O R D E R 1. Originally this petition had been filed challenging the judgment and order of the Rajasthan High Court … Continue reading

Section 47 of the BSF Act- the case squarely falls within 1st exception to the general provisions of Section 47 of the BSF Act, for which option is available to the applicant either to try them at BSF Court or let the Criminal Court of Ordinary jurisdiction to go ahead with their trial. In the instant case applicant has chosen to try them at BSF Court. Therefore, this court has no option but to hand-over the accused together with the charge-sheet and other material collected by Investigating agency to the applicant for trying them at the BSF Court, Application is therefore accepted and accused are ordered to be handed over under custody so the applicant together with charge-sheet and the supporting material as well as all the seized articles. The Officer concerned shall try the accused expeditiously and convey the final out-come of the case to this court as soon as it is completed” In the facts and circumstances of the case, we give liberty to the Director General of the Force, if so advised, to re-visit the entire issue within eight weeks bearing in mind the observation aforesaid in accordance with law and if he comes to the conclusion that the trial deserves to be conducted by the Security Force Court, nothing will prevent him to make an appropriate application afresh before the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Needless to state that in case the Director General of the Force takes recourse to the aforesaid liberty and files application for the trial by the Security Force Court, the Chief Judicial Magistrate shall consider the same in accordance with law. It is made clear that observations made in these appeals are for the purpose of their disposal and shall have no bearing on trial. In the result, both the appeals are allowed, the impugned judgment and order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate dated 25th of November, 2010 and that of the High Court dated 21st October, 2011 are set aside. The Security Force Court shall forthwith transmit the record sent to it, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, who in turn shall proceed in the matter in accordance with law bearing in mind the observation aforesaid.


filing of the second FIR and fresh charge sheet is violative of fundamental rights under Article 14, 20 and 21 of the Constitution since the same relate to alleged offence in respect of which an FIR had already been filed and the court has taken cognizance. This Court categorically accepted the CBI’s plea that killing of Tulsiram Prajapati is a part of the same series of cognizable offence forming part of the first FIR and in spite of the fact that this Court directed the CBI to “take over” the investigation and did not grant the relief as prayed, namely, registration of fresh FIR, the present action of CBI filing fresh FIR is contrary to various judicial pronouncements which is demonstrated in the earlier part of our judgment. – In view of the above discussion and conclusion, the second FIR dated 29.04.2011 being RC No. 3(S)/2011/Mumbai filed by the CBI is contrary to the directions issued in judgment and order dated 08.04.2011 by this Court in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 115 of 2009 and accordingly the same is quashed. As a consequence, the charge sheet filed on 04.09.2012, in pursuance of the second FIR, be treated as a supplementary charge sheet in the first FIR. It is made clear that we have not gone into the merits of the claim of both the parties and it is for the trial Court to decide the same in accordance with law. Consequently, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 149 of 2012 is allowed. Since the said relief is applicable to all the persons arrayed as accused in the second FIR, no further direction is required in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 5 of 2013.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 149 OF 2012 Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah …. Petitioner(s) Versus The Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. …. Respondent(s) WITH WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 5 OF 2013 J U D G M E N T P. Sathasivam, J. 1) Amitbhai Anilchandra … Continue reading

under Sections 279 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”), Sections 184, 177 and 192 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short “M.V. Act”), Sections 5, 6, 8 and 10 of the Gujarat Animal Preservation Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as “the Principal Act”) and Section 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960.- ‘buffalo calf’ has not been mentioned as prohibited animal. Sub- section 1A of Section 5 stipulates the schedule of animals which are as under: (a) a cow; (b) the calf of a cow, whether male or female and if male, whether castrated or not; (c) a bull; (d) a bullock. It is clear from the above description of animals that the buffalo calf does not fall under the list of prohibited animals. It is true that Section 5(1) prohibits slaughtering of any animal without a certificate in writing from the Competent Authority that the animal is fit for slaughter. In other words, without a certificate from competent authority, no animal could be slaughtered. Sub-section (1A) to Section 5 mandates that no certificate under sub-section (1) shall be granted in respect of the above mentioned animals. In the said section, admittedly, ‘buffalo calf’ has not been mentioned as prohibited animal. In such circumstance, the prohibition relating to release of vehicle before a period of six months as mentioned in Section 6B(3) of the Amendment Act is not applicable since the appellant was transporting 28 buffalo calves only. In view of the same, it is not advisable to keep the seized vehicle in the police station in open condition which is prone to natural decay on account of weather conditions. In addition to the above interpretation, whatever be the situation, it is of no use to keep the seized vehicle in the police station for a long period. 13) In the light of the above conclusion, order dated 24.08.2012, passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Gandhinagar in Criminal Misc. Application No. 9 of 2012, order dated 01.09.2012, passed by the District and Sessions Judge, Gandhinagar in Criminal Revision Application No. 73 of 2012 and order dated 25.09.2012, passed by the High Court in Special Criminal Application No. 2755 of 2012 are set aside and the respondents are directed to release the vehicle – Eicher Truck bearing Regn. No. GJ-9-Z-3801 forthwith. 14) The appeal is allowed.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 219 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 8971 of 2012) Multani Hanifbhai Kalubhai …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Gujarat & Anr. …. Respondent(s) 2 J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam,J. 1) Leave granted. 2) This appeal … Continue reading

Customs Act,- “28. Notice for payment of duties, interest, etc. = whether duty on the supply and receipt of furnace oil and electricity respectively was required to be paid. The Development Commissioner, referring to a circular dated 12.10.1999 of the Ministry of Commerce, said as follows: – “They are procuring surplus power from their sister concern M/s. Uniworth Ltd. (Unit- 1, LOP dated 31.01.1989) under Permission No. 248(93) dated 01.11.1994 and the unit transferred 2590.30 KL of furnace oil to M/s. Uniworth Ltd. (Unit- 1) for their captive power consumption. No permission is required from this office for duty free import/ procurement of POL products for captive power consumption. It is further to clarify as per the Exim Policy provision, one EOU may sell/ transfer surplus power to another EOU duty free in terms of Ministry of Commerce Letter No. 1/1/98-EP dated 12.10.1999 (sic)” [Emphasis supplied] The relevant portion of the Ministry of Commerce Letter No.1/98-EP is extracted below: “2. No duty is required to paid (sic) on sale of surplus power from an EOU/EPZ unit to another EOU/EPZ unit. Development Commissioner of EPZ concerned would be informed in writing for such supply and proper account of consumption of raw material would be maintained by the supplying unit for calculation of NFEP.” = Yet, the appellant received a show cause notice from the Commissioner of Customs, Raipur, demanding duty for the period during which the appellant imported furnace oil on behalf of Uniworth Ltd. = in order to attract the proviso to Section 11- A(1) it must be alleged in the show-cause notice that the duty of excise had not been levied or paid by reason of fraud, collusion or willful misstatement or suppression of fact on the part of the assessee or by reason of contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or of the Rules made thereunder with intent to evade payment of duties by such person or his agent. There is no such averment to be found in the show cause notice. There is no averment that the duty of excise had been intentionally evaded or that fraud or collusion had been practiced or that the assessee was guilty of wilful misstatement or suppression of fact. In the absence of any such averments in the show-cause notice it is difficult to understand how the Revenue could sustain the notice under the proviso to Section 11- A(1) of the Act.’ = the show cause notice must put the assessee to notice which of the various omissions or commissions stated in the proviso is committed to extend the period from six months to five years. That unless the assessee is put to notice the assessee would have no opportunity to meet the case of the Department. It was held: …There is considerable force in this contention. If the department proposes to invoke the proviso to Section 11-A(1) , the show-cause notice must put the assessee to notice which of the various commissions or omissions stated in the proviso is committed to extend the period from six months to 5 years. Unless the assessee is put to notice, the assessee would have no opportunity to meet the case of the department. The defaults enumerated in the proviso to the said sub-section are more than one and if the Excise Department places reliance on the proviso it must be specifically stated in the show-cause notice which is the allegation against the assessee falling within the four corners of the said proviso….” = the burden of proof of proving mala fide conduct under the proviso to Section 28 of the Act lies with the Revenue; that in furtherance of the same, no specific averments find a mention in the show cause notice which is a mandatory requirement for commencement of action under the said proviso; and that nothing on record displays a willful default on the part of the appellant, we hold that the extended period of limitation under the said provision could not be invoked against the appellant. 27. In view of the afore-going discussion, the appeal is allowed and the decisions of the authorities below are set aside, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.


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