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the legality of the judgment of the High Court setting aside an order dated 11.03.1999 passed by the State Bank of India dismissing the charged officer (respondent) from service in exercise of powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.= in Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pt. Ram Sarup; AIR 1957 SC 82 held where a workman intentionally refuses to participate in the inquiry, cannot complain that the dismissal is against the principles of natural justice. Once the inquiry proceed ex parte, it is not necessary for the Inquiring Authority to again ask the charged officer to state his defence orally or in writing. We cannot appreciate the conduct of the charged officer in this case, who did not appear before the Inquiring Authority and offered any explanation to the charges levelled against him but approached the High Court stating that the principles of natural justice had been violated. 26. We are also conscious of the fact that even if the Inquiring Authority set the charged officer ex parte that would not absolve him from deciding that the charges levelled against him were proved or not. In other words, no punishment could be imposed without an inquiry. We notice in this case the Inquiring Authority had elaborately considered the charges levelled against the charged officer and also the materials produced by the bank because some evidence is necessary to establish the charges. In some cases, proof may only be documentary and in some cases oral. The requirement of proof depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Appellant – Bank in this case has succeeded in establishing the charges levelled against the delinquent officer and was rightly dismissed from service which called for no interference by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 27. In view of the above-mentioned reasons, we find it difficult to support the judgment of the High Court. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside with no order as to costs.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 263 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 34118 of 2011] State Bank of India and Ors. .. Appellant(s) Versus Narendra Kumar Pandey .. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T K. S. Radhakrishnan, J. Leave granted. 2. … Continue reading
claim of the assessee for depreciation under Section 32 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short “the Act”).The assessee is a public limited company, classified by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) as a non-banking finance company. It is engaged in the business of hire purchase, leasing and real estate etc. The vehicles, on which depreciation was claimed, are stated to have been purchased by the assessee against direct payment to the manufacturers. The assessee, as a part of its business, leased out these vehicles to its customers and thereafter, had no physical affiliation with the vehicles. In fact, lessees were registered as the owners of the vehicles, in the certificate of registration issued under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the MV Act”). = where the business of the assessee consists of hiring out machinery and/ or where the income derived by the assessee from the hiring of such machinery is business income, the assessee must be considered as having used the machinery for the purpose of business. 40. In the present case, the business of the assessee consists of hiring out machinery and trucks where the income derived by the assessee from hiring of such machinery is business income. Therefore, the assessee- appellant viz. ICDS should be considered as having used the trucks for the purpose of business. 41. It was further brought to our notice that the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in its judgment in ITRC No. 789 of 1998 for the asst. year 1986- 87 in the case of the assessee- appellant itself (viz. ICDS) has already decided the issue in question in favour of the assessee, confirming the decision of the CIT (A) and the ITAT holding that the assessee company is entitled to the investment allowance and additional depreciation. In this judgment of the Karnataka High Court the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 231 ITR 308 was relied upon. Therefore we have no hesitation to hold that the appellant- company is entitled to a higher rate of depreciation at 50% on the trucks leased out by it. We therefore, reverse the orders of the CIT (Appeals) on this issue.” 32. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, the High Court erred in law in reversing the decision of the Tribunal. Consequently, the appeals are allowed; the impugned judgments are set aside and the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court, extracted in para 6 (supra), are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
REPORTABLE |IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | |CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION | |CIVIL APPEAL NO.3282 OF 2008 | | | |M/S I.C.D.S. LTD. |— |APPELLANT | |VERSUS | |COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, MYSORE |— |RESPONDENTS | |& ANR. | | | WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.3286 OF 2008, CIVIL APPEAL NO.3287 OF 2008, CIVIL APPEAL NO.3288 … Continue reading
(1) If an Insurance Company can prove that it does not have any liability to pay any amount in law to the claimants under the Motor Vehicles Act or any other enactment, can the Court yet compel it to pay the amount in question giving it liberty to later on recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. (2) Can such a direction be given under Article 142 of the Constitution, and what is the scope of Article 142? Does Article 142 permit the Court to create a liability where there is none?” = The pendency of consideration of the above questions by a larger Bench does not mean that the course that was followed in Baljit Kaur5 and Challa Bharathamma6 should not be followed, more so in a peculiar fact situation of this case. In the present case, the accident occurred in 1993. At that time, claimant was 28 years’ old. He is now about 48 years. The claimant was a driver on heavy vehicle and due to the accident he has been rendered permanently disabled. He has not been able to get compensation so far due to stay order passed by this Court. He cannot be compelled to struggle further for recovery of the amount. The insurance company has already deposited the entire awarded amount pursuant to the order of this Court passed on 01.08.2011 and the said amount has been invested in a fixed deposit account. Having regard to these peculiar facts of the case in hand, we are satisfied that the claimant (Respondent No. 1) may be allowed to withdraw the amount deposited by the insurance company before this Court along-with accrued interest. The insurance company (appellant) thereafter may recover the amount so paid from the owner (Respondent No. 2 herein). The recovery of the amount by the insurance company from the owner shall be made by following the procedure as laid down by this Court in the case of Challa Bharathamma6 . 26. Appeal is allowed and disposed of as above with no order as to costs.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 20127 of 2011) Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. …… Appellant Vs. Saju P. Paul and Another ……Respondents JUDGMENT R.M. LODHA, J. Leave granted. 2. The appellant, insurance company, is in appeal by special leave … Continue reading
The visa card carried a personal accident cover, with risk coverage of Rs.4 lakhs.= even though the visa card was issued, however till declaration of assignment was not filled in, the deceased cannot be regarded as their customer. Therefore the question of payment of any amount does not arise. ? = it is clearly stated that the card issued only with personal accident benefit and he is entitled to the amount for an accident on road or in air travel. Therefore on reading the instruction under “Insurance benefit on you card” it cannot be said that the benefit commences only after filling of declaration of assignment. The evidence put before us do not show that such a condition was put forth by the opponent that the benefit under the card will not be available unless declaration cum undertaking was filled in.”
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI REVISION PETITION NO. 1902 OF 2011 (Against the order dated 16.09.2010 in Appeal No.1297/2006 of the State Commission, Gujarat) Standard Chartered Bank 5th Floor, Sakar -3, Income Tax, Ashram Road Ahmedabad ……….Petitioner Versus Mr. Naran Bhai ShamjiBhai Bhandari R/o Tarwade, TA Distt. Amreli, Ahmedabad, Gujarat …..Respondent BEFORE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE J. M. MALIK, PRESIDING MEMBER HON’BLE MR. VINAY KUMAR, MEMBER … Continue reading
Whether the ‘business hours’ did not include the lunch break?. an incident of theft, which took place in the shop premises of the Complainant/respondent on 8.5.2003 during the lunch hours. Gold ornaments allegedly worth over Rs.21 lakhs and some cash were stolen. Acting on the FIR lodged in this behalf, the Police recovered ornaments worth Rs.12,47,300/-. Therefore, as observed by the State Commission, there is no dispute about the fact of theft.— “Perused the record and documents tendered by the parties. There is no dispute regarding theft of jewelry occurred during the lunch hours. The Police were able to recover only Rs.12,47,000/-. However, total loss due to theft was valued to Rs.22,93,500/-. The Respondent/ Complainant subscribed to the insurance policy providing insurance cover to the ornaments in the shop. The policy document covers display window of the jewelry [included in the total section 1 Sum Insured] and also provided insurance cover for the jewelry kept elsewhere. Total sum Insured under the policy is Rs.21,51,000/-. The survey report mentioned that AC unit had fallen on the floor and on top of it chair has been kept to entire into the shop with intention to burglary. A big ply had also been placed behind the AC grill and AC grill had been cut opened so as to get access for burglary. The survey report is an important piece of document and cannot be ignored. Therefore, intent of burglary of the jewelry by breaking open the shop is clearly established form the record. Theft of jewelry is undisputed fact.” 3. Yet, the claim of the Complainant for the remaining value of Rs.10,46,500/- was rejected by the OP/revision petitioner.
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI REVISION PETITION NO. 2833 OF 2012 (Against the order dated 14.03.2012 in First Appeal No. A/06/2448 of the State Commission, Maharashtra) The New India Assurance Co. Ltd., Having office at 87, M.G. Road, Fort, Mumbai, Maharashtra Having its Regional office at Delhi Regional Office-II, Level-V, … Continue reading
the High Court has granted the Writ of Mandamus directing the Indian Oil Company to allot the dealership of the site located at Thane Belapur Road, Village Mahape, Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra to Shri Ashok Shankarlal Gwalani (hereinafter referred to as the “respondent”) we have no other option but to set aside the order of the High Court. Accordingly, the order and judgment dated 29.9.2010 passed by the High Court of Bombay is set aside with a liberty to the Competent Authority to re-advertise the petrol/diesel retail outlets in question and to make a fresh selection in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed with aforesaid observation and directions. There shall be no order as to costs.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9101 2012. (Arising out of SLP(C) No.31932 of 2010) SR. DIVISIONAL RETAIL SALES MANAGER, INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LTD. THROUGH POA HOLDER & ORS. . . APPELLANT(S) VERSUS ASHOK SHANKARLAL GWALANI . .RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N … Continue reading
whether the death of the deceased was due to natural causes and that there was no CAUSAL CONNECTION between the death of the deceased and that of his employment.The Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner determined the compensation payable to the appellant herein in a sum of Rs.2,20,280/- along with another sum of Rs.2500/- as funeral charges under Section 4(4) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. A separate show-cause-notice was issued for payment of interest and penalty. The respondent herein preferred the abovesaid appeal in FAO No.184/2005 in which the High Court passed the impugned order setting aside the order passed by the Commissioner. the deceased was actually driving the truck and that in the course of such driving activity as he felt uncomfortable he safely parked the vehicle on the side of the road near a hotel soon whereafter he breathed his last. In such circumstances, we are convinced that the conclusion of the Commissioner of Workmen’s Compensation that the death of the deceased was in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the second respondent was perfectly justified and the conclusion to the contrary reached by the learned Judge of the High Court in the order impugned in this appeal deserves to be set aside. The appeal stands allowed. The order impugned is set aside. The order of the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation shall stand restored and there shall be no order as to costs.
Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9084 OF 2012 (@ SLP (C) NO. 16063 OF 2007) Mst. Param Pal Singh Through Father ….Appellant VERSUS M/s National Insurance Co. & Anr. .…Respondents J U D G M E N T Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. … Continue reading
The matter pertains to a car which was stolen on 24.10.2007. The OP/New India Assurance Company had repudiated the claim on the ground that the Complainant had no insurable interest on the date of loss, as he had already sold vehicle to one Shri Dilprit Singh on 24.7.2007
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI REVISION PETITION NO. 1227 OF 2012 (Against the order dated 28.11.2011 in First Appeal No.931/2009 of the State Commission, Haryana) Dharambir, S/o Sh. Jhangi Ram R/o H No.89, Ram Nagar, Karnal Haryana ……….Petitioner Versus New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Divisional Office Gagan Building G T Road, Karnal Haryana … Continue reading
Section 52 opposition: amendment to Notice of Opposition considered and allowed – ss 58, 44 and 60 considered – Applicant’s claim to ownership not displaced – Trade Mark not deceptively similar to Opponent’s trade mark – reputation of Opponent’s trade mark not shown – opposition not established. Costs awarded against the Opponent. = The Applicant has “[s]ince around March 2007…been a rice importer and trader in Australia”. He says that he “created” the Trade Mark in around February 2008 and that in around May that year he “began using [it] in partnership with Liberty Impex [Pty Ltd]”, a company that he and a Mr Mohammed Moten had incorporated on 20 May 2008, “in connection with rice and the supply of rice in Australia”. He says he had a verbal agreement with Mr Moten at the time to license the company to use the Trade Mark and that, “It was always understood by [the company and Mr Moten] that I was the sole owner of the Trade Mark and that neither [the company nor Mr Moten] had any rights in [it] other than those under licence from me”. – Section 60 of the Act is reproduced below: Trade mark similar to trade mark that has acquired a reputation in Australia 60. The registration of a trade mark in respect of particular goods or services may be opposed on the ground that: (a) another trade mark had, before the priority date for the registration of the first-mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or services, acquired a reputation in Australia; and (b) because of the reputation of that other trade mark, the use of the first-mentioned trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS Re: Opposition by Taj Food Sales Pty Ltd to registration of trade mark application 1313229 (30, 35) – GRAND TIGER Label – in the name of Gerson Rangel DELEGATE: Michael Kirov REPRESENTATION: Opponent: Carmen Champion of Counsel, instructed by Matthews Folbigg Lawyers Applicant: Matthew Hall, Legal Practitioner, … Continue reading
The policy of allocation of natural resources for public good can be defined by the legislature, as has been discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. Likewise, policy for allocation of natural resources may also be determined by the executive. The parameters for determining the legality and constitutionality of the two are exactly the same. In the aforesaid view of the matter, there can be no doubt about the conclusion recorded in the “main opinion” that auction which is just one of the several price recovery mechanisms, cannot be held to be the only constitutionally recognized method for alienation of natural resources. That should not be understood to mean, that it can never be a valid method for disposal of natural resources (refer to paragraphs 10 to 12 of my instant opinion). I would therefore conclude by stating that no part of the natural resource can be dissipated as a matter of largess, charity, donation or endowment, for private exploitation. Each bit of natural resource expended must bring back a reciprocal consideration. The consideration may be in the nature of earning revenue or may be to “best subserve the common good”. It may well be the amalgam of the two. There cannot be a dissipation of material resources free of cost or at a consideration lower than their actual worth. One set of citizens cannot prosper at the cost of another set of citizens, for that would not be fair or reasonable.NOW THEREFORE, in exercise of powers conferred upon me by clause (1) of Article 143 of the Constitution of India, I, Pratibha Devisingh Patil, President of India, hereby refer the following questions to the Supreme Court of India for consideration and report thereon, namely: Q.1 Whether the only permissible method for disposal of all natural resources across all sectors and in all circumstances is by the conduct of auctions? Q.2 Whether a broad proposition of law that only the route of auctions can be resorted to for disposal of natural resources does not run contrary to several judgments of the Supreme Court including those of Larger Benches? Q.3 Whether the enunciation of a broad principle, even though expressed as a matter of constitutional law, does not really amount to formulation of a policy and has the effect of unsettling policy decisions formulated and approaches taken by various successive governments over the years for valid considerations, including lack of public resources and the need to resort to innovative and different approaches for the development of various sectors of the economy? Q.4 What is the permissible scope for interference by courts with policy making by the Government including methods for disposal of natural resources? Q.5 Whether, if the court holds, within the permissible scope of judicial review, that a policy is flawed, is the court not obliged to take into account investments made under the said policy including investments made by foreign investors under multilateral/bilateral agreements? Q.6 If the answers to the aforesaid questions lead to an affirmation of the judgment dated 02.02.2012 then the following questions may arise, viz. (i) whether the judgment is required to be given retrospective effect so as to unsettle all licences issued and 2G spectrum (800, 900, and 1800 MHz bands) allocated in and after 1994 and prior to 10.01.2008? (ii) whether the allocation of 2G spectrum in all circumstances and in all specific cases for different policy considerations would nevertheless have to be undone? And specifically iii) Whether the telecom licences granted in 1994 would be affected? iv) Whether the Telecom licences granted by way of basic licences in 2001 and licences granted between the period 2003-2007 would be affected? v) Whether it is open to the Government of India to take any action to alter the terms of any licence to ensure a level playing field among all existing licensees? vi) Whether dual technology licences granted in 2007 and 2008 would be affected? vii) Whether it is necessary or obligatory for the Government of India to withdraw the Spectrum allocated to all existing licensees or to charge for the same with retrospective effect and if so on what basis and from what date? Q.7 Whether, while taking action for conduct of auction in accordance with the orders of the Supreme Court, it would remain permissible for the Government to: (i) Make provision for allotment of Spectrum from time to time at the auction discovered price and in accordance with laid down criteria during the period of validity of the auction determined price? (ii) Impose a ceiling on the acquisition of Spectrum with the aim of avoiding the emergence of dominance in the market by any licensee/applicant duly taking into consideration TRAI recommendations in this regard? iii) Make provision for allocation of Spectrum at auction related prices in accordance with laid down criteria in bands where there may be inadequate or no competition (for e.g. there is expected to be a low level of competition for CDMA in 800 MHz band and TRAI has recommended an equivalence ratio of 1.5 or 1.3X1.5 for 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands depending upon the quantum of spectrum held by the licensee that can be applied to auction price in 1800 MHz band in the absence of a specific price for these bands)? Q.8 What is the effect of the judgment on 3G Spectrum acquired by entities by auction whose licences have been quashed by the said judgment? NEW DELHI; DATED: 12 April 2012 PRESIDENT OF INDIA”
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ADVISORY JURISDICTION RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE NO.1 OF 2012 [Under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India] O P I N I O N D.K. JAIN, J. [FOR S.H. KAPADIA, CJ, HIMSELF, DIPAK MISRA & RANJAN GOGOI, JJ.] In exercise of powers conferred under Article 143(1) … Continue reading
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