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Union of India

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no court should give directions against the law for consideration of promotion=We, therefore, find that although the respondent no.1 was eligible for consideration for promotion to the post of

Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3692 OF 2006 Union of India & Ors. … Appellants Versus B.S. Darjee & Anr. … Respondents J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. This is an appeal against the order dated 26.08.2004 of the Division Bench … Continue reading

Arbitration = 30 days limitation for filing objections for award, is from the date of notice and not from the date of knowledge of filing of the award in the court =The Division Bench of the High Court has taken a view in the impugned order that as the Executive Engineer was looking after the arbitration proceedings, he was the one who could have filed the objections to the award on behalf of the Union of India and thus notice of the filing of the award on the Executive Engineer was mandatory and the starting point of

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1734 OF 2006 Union of India & Anr. … Appellants Versus M/s Deepak Electric & Trading Company & Anr. … Respondents J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. This is an appeal against the order dated 03.01.2003 … Continue reading

Income Tax Act, 1961 . Sections 269-UD (I), 269-UE (I), 269-UG(1) and 269- UH (I). Income Tax-Immovable property-Compulsory purchase of- Payment of consideration-Hy cheque-Misdescription of name of payee in cheque-Failure to correct same within prescribed statutory time-limit- Effect of-Held: Misdescription of name amounted to description of another legal entity- Hence, order of purchase stood abrogated and property got revested in transferors-Income Tax Rules, 1962, R.48-L and Form 37. Income Tax-Immovable property-Compulsory purchase of- Payment of consideration-By cheque-Statutory time-limit-Computation of-Payee neither indicated mode of payment nor appeared personally to receive cheque-Hence cheque dispatched to payee by post on last date of statutory time-limit- Payee received cheque on some later date-Held: It was reasonable to assume that payment of a large amount would be made by cheque and sent by post- Post office was agent of payee for purpose of receiving payment-Hence, though the cheque was received by payee on some later date it amounted Jo payment within prescribed period of statutory time-limit. Income Tax-Immovable property-Compulsory purchase of- payment of consideration- Made by cheque-Short-fall in payment to transferee-Though entire consideration was made collectively to persons entitled to receive payment-Held: Adjustment of exact amount due to each persons was an internal arrangement–Hence, such short-fall in payment by itself would not vitiate order of purchase. An agreement for sale of the right, title and interest of the respondents- transferors in respect of a property was made in favour of the appellant- transferee. The appellant-transferee was described as “Prima Ready, Partnership Firm”. A statement in statutory form No. 37-1 as required by Section 269-UG(l) and (3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 48L of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 duly signed by all the parties to the agreement was filed with the appropriate authority giving details of the persons ” interested in consideration”. As required by the proviso to Section 269- UD(l) of the Act the purchase order had to be made within a period of 3 months from the date of filing of the agreement. After a show cause notice under Section 269-UD(l-A) of the Act to the persons concerned, the order of purchase was passed under Section 269-UD(l) of the Act acquiring the property and determining the apparent consideration payable by the Central Government. The purchase order correctly recorded the date on which the payment was required to be made by the Central Government under the Act The cheque in favour of appellant-transferee was drawn in the name of “Prime Realty Ltd.” instead of Prima Realty, Partnership Firm”. This cheque was sent by speed post on the required date of payment and was delivered to the appellant-transferee only on the next day. However, there was a short-fall in the amount tendered to the appellant-transferee. Subsequently, the appellant-transferee returned the cheque with a covering letter to the appropriate authority contending that the purchase order stood abrogated on account of non-compliance with Section 269-UG(l) of the Act. The appellant- transferee then filed a writ petition before the High Court for quashing the compulsory purchase order, and it was dismissed. Being aggrieved the appellant-transferee preferred the present appeal. On behalf of the appellant-transferee it was contended that the tender of the amount of consideration was not as required by Section 269-UH(l) of the Act and, therefore, there was revesting of the property in the transferors in accordance with Section 269-UD(l); that the cheque was not a valid tender since the description of the payee in the cheque was of a different legal entity, i.e., a limited company other than the partnership firm which was the correct description of the appellant; that the cheque was sent by post and since the post office could not be deemed to be the agent of the addressee and mere posting of the cheque on the last date for payment of consideration under Section 269-UG(l) of the Act would not operate as the delivery of cheque to the addressee and, therefore, the tender of the consideration was not a valid one; and that the purchase order made under Section 269-UD(l) must be quashed. -Allowing the appeal, this Court HELD :”1.1. The appellant-transferee is a partnership firm with the name “Prima Realty” but the cheque described the payee as “Prime Realty Ltd,” which referred to a different legal entity, a limited company instead of a firm. The tender of the cheque could not, therefore, be treated as tender to the appellant-transferee. It was reasonable to assume that (he cheque would not be honoured by the banker to credit the amount of that cheque to the account of the appellant since it could relate to another legal entity, a limited company. In such a situation the appellants were justified in taking the view that the cheque was not meant for them, and they could not lawfully require the bank to deposit the amount of the cheque in their account. There was, thus, clear non-compliance of the requirement of Section 269-UG(I) of the Act, The consequence envisaged by Section 269-UH of the Act ensued. [674-E-G] 1.2. Although the Central Government sent a corrected cheque in the name of “Prima Realty”, the same was admittedly of no consequence. [671-B| 1.3. Accordingly, the order made under Section 269-UD(l) of the Act by the appropriate authority stood abrogated and the property was revested in the transferors in terms of Section 269-UH(l) of the Act with the other consequential results including those specified in Section 269-UH(2) and Section 269-UD(3) of the Act. In view of the fact that the cheque for the amount has not been encashed, the remaining amount has become refundable to the Central Government, which would be refunded by the appellants with interests @12% per annum from the date due till the date of payment. |674- H, 675-AB| Davies v. Elsby Brothers Ltd., (1960) 3 All, E.R. 672, referred to. 2. According to the ordinary course of business usage the only reasonable and proper inference is that the payment of a large amount would be made by cheque issued by the Central Government and unless the payee went to collect the cheque personally, the cheque had to be sent by post to the payee. According to this implied term, it must be assumed that unless the cheque was collected personally by the payee it would be sent by post thereby constituting the post office as the agent of the payee for the purpose of receiving the payment. In the present case the payee did not indicate the mode of payment to them inspite of a letter received by them to indicate the mode of payment. The appellant did not even choose to reply’ to that letter. In these circumstances it was reasonable for the concerned authority to have waited for the cheque to be collected personally by the payee till the last date and to have dispatched it by post on that day when no one came to collect the cheque personally from the authority. In such a situation, payment by cheque dispatched by post amounted to tender of the payment to the payee on that date itself when the cheque was put in the course of transmission through post so as to be beyond the control of the sender from the time of its dispatch by post. [672-EH, 673-A] CIT. Bihar v. M/s. Pamey & Co., [1959] Supp. 2 SCR 868 and Shri Jagdish Mills Ltd v. CIT, |1960| 1 SCR 236, relied on. 3. The payment of the entire consideration due under the purchase order was made collectively to the persons entitled to receive the payment even though there was some difference in the amount tendered to the appellant- transferee. The adjustment of the exact amount due to each, between the several persons who had to share the total amount of consideration was an internal arrangement between them, and this by itself would not vitiate the tender of the amount of consideration and order of purchase as required by Section 269-UG(l) of the Act. [673-CD| CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :Civil Appeal No.l4554of 1996. From the Judgment and Order dated 15.12.95 of the Bombay High Court in W.P. No. 1106 of 1995. F.S. Nariman, Subhas Sharma, P.H. Parekh, Jay Munim and Ms. Sunita Sharma for the Appellant. Dr. R.R. Mishra, Ranbir Chandra, B.K. Prasad, S.N. Terdol and Mukul Mudgal for the Respondents.

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) l4554 of 1996 PETITIONER: PRIMA REALTY RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/11/1996 BENCH: J.S. VERMA & B.N. KIRPAL JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT 1996 Supp(8) SCR 665 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by J.S. VERMA, J.: This appeal by special leave is against the judgment dated December 15,1995 … Continue reading

Whether the metal scrap o waste generated whilst repairing of worn out machineries or parts of cement manufacturing plant amounts to manufacture, and thereby, is excisable to excise duty. ?=the metal scrap and waste arising out of the repair and maintenance work of the machinery used in manufacturing of cement, by no stretch of imagination, can be treated as a subsidiary product to the cement which is the main product. The metal scrap and waste arise only when the assessee undertakes repairing and maintenance work of the capital goods and, therefore, do not arise regularly and continuously in the course of a manufacturing business of cement.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7453 OF 2008 M/s. Grasim Industries Ltd. ………….. Appellant versus Union of India ………..Respondent J U D G M E N T H.L. Dattu, J. 1) This appeal is directed against the Judgment and Order dated 31.07.2008 of the High Court of … Continue reading

since all offences under the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the Customs Act, 1962, are non-cognizable, are such =Consequently, as in the case of offences under the Central Excise Act, 1944, it is held that offences under Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962, are bailable and if the person arrested offers bail, he shall be released on bail in accordance with the provisions of sub-Section (3) of Section 104 of the Customs Act, 1962, if not wanted in connection with any other offence.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO.66 OF 2011 Om Prakash & Anr. … Petitioners Vs. Union of India & Anr. … Respondents WITH WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO.85 OF 2010 AND WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NOS.74, 87, 101 & 102 OF 2011 AND WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO.74 OF 2010 … Continue reading

age relaxation for attending examination to the post =In the present case the advertisement of the Public Service Commission issued in the year 2002, required the persons concerned to be of less than thirty five years of age at the relevant time. That age limit applied to all the candidates. There was no age relaxation in favour of the candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, though there was a quantum of reservation provided for them. The earlier resolution of the Full Court of the High Court passed in February 1982, will therefore, have to be read as providing only 1 for the quantum and not for any age relaxation. If there is no age relaxation in the rules, the same cannot be brought in by any judicial interpretation. In the circumstances we do not find any error in the judgment of the Single Judge or that of the Division Bench. 16. Although, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the High Court on the judicial side, we do feel that the High Court on its administrative side should examine the issue as to whether age relaxation should be provided to the candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes appearing for the Judicial Service Examination at the Munsif level as is provided to the candidates appearing for the Higher Judicial Service Examination. We hope that this will be done without much delay

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8093 OF 2004 Jamaluddin …Appellant Versus State of Jammu & Kashmir and Ors. …Respondents J U D G E M E N T H.L. Gokhale J. This appeal seeks to challenge the order passed by a Division Bench of the High Court … Continue reading

The first respondent was deployed between 1.2.1984 and 3.10.1986 as the Commanding Officer of the 6 Armoured Regiment which was a new raising at the relevant time in the Indian Army. The unit was authorized for one signal special vehicle. In case such a vehicle was not held by the unit it was authorized to modify one vehicle with ad-hoc special finances for which it was authorized to claim 75% of Rs.950/- initially and claim the balance amount on completion of modification work.= “18………..The Code does not contain any precise and specific definition of the words “intent to defraud”. However, it has been settled by a catena of authorities that “intent to defraud” contains two elements viz. deceit and injury. A person is said to deceive another when by practising “suggestio falsi” or “suppressio veri” or both he intentionally induces another to believe a thing to be true, which he knows to be false or does not believe to be true. “Injury” has been defined in Section 44 of the Code as denoting “any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property”.” – “14. To summarize: the expression “defraud” involves two elements, namely, deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury is something other than economic loss that is, deprivation of property, whether movable or immovable, or of money, and it will include any harm whatever caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or such others In short, it is a non-economic or non- pecuniary loss……..”- The armed forces are known for their integrity and reputation. The senior officers of the Armed Forces are expected to be men of integrity and character. When any such charge is proved against a senior officer, the reputation of the Army also gets affected. Therefore, any officer indulging into such acts could no longer be retained in the services of the Army, and the order passed by the General Court Martial could not be faulted.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 7241 OF 2002 Union of India through its Secretary Ministry of Defence … Appellants Versus Rabinder Singh … Respondent J U D G E M E N T H.L. Gokhale J. This appeal by Union of India through the Secretary to Government, … Continue reading

This dispute between the State of Himachal Pradesh (Plaintiff), on the one hand, and the Union of India (defendant No.1), State of Punjab (defendant No.2), State of Haryana (defendant No.3), State of Rajasthan (defendant No.4) and Union Territory of Chandigarh (defendant No.5), on the other hand, under Article 131 of the Constitution of India relates to the power generated in the Bhakra-Nangal and Beas Projects.= Whether the State of Himachal Pradesh is entitled to an allocation of 7.19% in addition to 12% free power as claimed above, of the total power generated in Bhakra-Nangal & Beas Projects from the date of commissioning of the Projects or the appointed date (01.11.1966)? (Plaintiff) 10. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for a sum of Rs.2199.77 crores against the defendants jointly and severally, as compensation/reimbursement for their failure to supply to the plaintiff 12% and 7.19% shares (on account of distress caused/surrender of rights to generate power and on account of transfer of population to the plaintiff State respectively in the power generated in these projects upto the date of the filing of the present suit and such further sums as may be determined, as entitlement of the plaintiff for the period subsequent to the filing of the suit? (Plaintiff) 11. Whether the Plaintiff-State is entitled to the award of any interest on the amounts determined as its entitlement? (Plaintiff)” =It is hereby declared that the Plaintiff-State is entitled to 7.19% of the power of the composite State of Punjab from the Bhakra-Nangal Project with effect from 01.11.1966 and from Beas Project with effect from the dates of production in Unit I and Unit II. (iii) It is ordered that Defendant No.1 will work out the details of the claim of the Plaintiff-State on the basis of such entitlements of the Plaintiff, Defendant No.2 and Defendant No.3 in the tables in Paragraph 77 of this judgment as well as all other rights and liabilities of the Plaintiff-State, Defendant No.2 and Defendant No.3 in accordance with the provisions of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 and file a statement in this Court within six months from today stating the amounts due to the Plaintiff-State from Defendant Nos. 3 and 4. (iv) On the amount found to be due to the Plaintiff- State for the period from 01.11.1966 in the case of Bhakra-Nangal Project and the amount found due to the Plaintiff-State for the period from the dates of production in the case of Beas Project, the Plaintiff-State would be

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ORIGINAL SUIT NO. 2 OF 1996 State of Himachal Pradesh …… Plaintiff Versus Union of India & Ors. …… Respondents J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. This dispute between the State of Himachal Pradesh (Plaintiff), on the one hand, and … Continue reading

Swiss Bank accounts of Indians =Writ Petition (Civil) No.176 of 2009 was filed by Shri Ram Jethmalani and five others against the Union of India, the Reserve Bank of India, the Securities Exchange Board of India, the Director, Directorate of Enforcement and the Chairman, Central Board of Direct Taxes, Department of

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION I.A. NO.8 OF 2011 IN WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.176 OF 2009 Ram Jethmalani & Ors. … Petitioners Vs. Union of India & Ors. … Respondents O R D E R 1. Writ Petition (Civil) No.176 of 2009 was filed by Shri Ram Jethmalani and … Continue reading

inter state water disputes ?- The State of Punjab has filed Suit No. 1 of 2007 on July 11, 2007 in this Court under Article 131 of the Constitution read with Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 and claimed a decree of perpetual injunction restraining the State of Haryana from

Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO. 7 OF 2011 IN ORIGINAL SUIT NO. 1 OF 2007 State of Punjab … Plaintiff Versus State of Haryana and others … Defendants O R D E R J.M. Panchal, J. The State of Punjab has filed Suit No. 1 of 2007 … Continue reading

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