advocatemmmohan
just another law knowledge bank
Union Territory
the Protection of Rights of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and the Commission for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005, – Directions of Apex court not implemented by the state and central administrative bodies – Apex court gave further directions =Re. Exploitation of Children in Orphanages in the State of Tamil Nadu …Petitioner(s) Versus Union of India & Ors. …Respondent(s) = published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41092
the Protection of Rights of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and the Commission for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005, – Directions of Apex court not implemented by the state and central administrative bodies – Apex court gave further directions = this court on 3rd … Continue reading
RED LIGHT ON VEHICLES – only dignitaries as specified by central and state as per proviso (iii) to Rule 108(1) of the 1989 Rules and as prescribed in clauses ‘c’ and ‘d’ of Notifications dated 11.1.2002 and 28.7.2005 issued by the Central Government. – ambulance services, fire services, emergency maintenance etc, and police vehicles used as escorts or pilots or for law and order duties shall not be entitled to have red lights but lights of other colours, e.g., blue, white, multicoloured etc. – Clause 51 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Bill, 2012 contains a provision for imposition of enhanced penalty. – misuse of the provisions of the 1989 Act and the 1989 Rules generally and the provisions of Rules 108 and 119 in particular. = Abhay Singh ….PETITIONER versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others …RESPONDENTS = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41060
RED LIGHT ON VEHICLES – only dignitaries as specified by central and state as per proviso (iii) to Rule 108(1) of the 1989 Rules and as prescribed in clauses ‘c’ and ‘d’ of Notifications dated 11.1.2002 and 28.7.2005 issued by the Central Government. – ambulance services, fire services, emergency maintenance etc, and police vehicles used as escorts or pilots or … Continue reading
RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT – In order to promote transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority Stop giving Oral instructions or directions by the administrative superiors, political executive etc.& directions to the Union State Governments and Union Territories to issue appropriate directions to secure providing of minimum tenure of service to various civil servants, within a period of three months. = T.S.R. Subramanian & Ors. … Petitioners Versus Union of India & Ors. … Respondents = http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40943
RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT – In order to promote transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority Stop giving Oral instructions or directions by the administrative superiors, political executive etc. & directions to the Union State Governments and Union Territories to issue appropriate directions to secure providing of minimum tenure of service to various civil servants, … Continue reading
Applicability of the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1956, vis-à-vis, Article 2262 of the French Code Civil, said to be the governing law of limitation in the Union Territory of Pondicherry, erstwhile French Establishment.= whether, by virtue of the Limitation Act, 1963, the French Law of Limitation which had been in force till 1.1.1964, was in any manner repealed or modified by the Limitation Act, 1963. We can draw considerable sustenance from the ratio laid down by this Court in Syndicate Bank (supra), wherein, we have already indicated, this Court considered the interaction between the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 vis-à-vis Article 535 of the Portuguese Civil Code. In that case, this Court held as follows: “20. ……………….. In any event, as noticed above, the Portuguese Civil Code, in our view, could not be read to be providing a distinct and separate period of limitation for a cause of action arising under the Indian Contract Act or under the Negotiable Instruments Act since the Civil Code ought to be read as one instrument and cause of action arising therefrom ought only to be governed thereunder and not otherwise. The entire Civil Code ought to be treated as a local law or special law including the provisions pertaining to the question of limitation for enforcement of the right arising under that particular Civil Code and not dehors the same and in this respect the observations of the High Court in Cadar Constructions that the Portuguese Civil Code could not provide for a period of limitation for a cause of action which arose outside the provisions of that Code, stands approved. A contra approach to the issue will not only yield to an absurdity but render the law of the land wholly inappropriate. There would also be repugnancy insofar as application of the Limitation Act in various States of the country is concerned: Whereas in Goa, Daman and Diu, the period of limitation will be for a much larger period than the State of Maharashtra — the situation even conceptually cannot be sustained having due regard to the rule of law and the jurisprudential aspect of the Limitation Act.” 12. This Court also held that it cannot but hold that in the wake of the factum of the Limitation Act coming into existence from 1.1.1964, Article 535 of the Portuguese Civil Code cannot but be termed to be impliedly repealed and it is on this score that the decision of this Court in Justiniano Augusto De. Piedade Barreto v. Antonio Vicente Da Fonseca (1979) 3 SCC 47, stood overruled. This Court also held that there is one general law of limitation for the entire country, being the Act of 1963, and the Portuguese Civil law cannot be termed to be a local law or a special law applicable to the State of Goa, Daman and Diu, prescribing a different period of limitation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and the question of saving of local law under the Limitation Act, 1963 does not and cannot arise.- Pondicherry (Extension of Laws) Act, 1968, as amended, has adopted several such legislations in the State of Pondicherry, but the Act which governs limitation is the general law of the land that is the Indian Limitation Act. Consequently, it is not Article 2262 of the French Code Civil that applies to the suit in question, but Section 54 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. Under such circumstances, as rightly held by the High Court, the suit filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Article 54 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is clearly barred. Since the suit itself is barred by the law of limitation, the other questions of law framed by the High Court were rightly not answered. The appeal, therefore, lacks in merits and accordingly dismissed.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40788 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICITON CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8308 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 4836 of 2012] Gothamchand Jain .. Appellant Versus Arumugam @ Tamilarasan .. Respondent J U D G M E N … Continue reading
Land Acquisition Act = whether the officers of the Union Territory of Chandigarh other than the Administrator could issue notifications under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the 1894 Act, = Notification dated 1.10.2002 cannot be saved at this belated stage and the Competent Authority cannot issue declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act after 11 years of the issue of notification under Section 4(1). – In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned order is set aside and Notifications dated 1.10.2002 and 29.9.2003 are quashed insofar as the same relate to the lands of the appellants. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
reported in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40587 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.5885 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 27221 of 2011) Gurbinder Kaur Brar and another …Appellants versus Union of India and others …Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL NO.5884 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 25387 … Continue reading
the respondent has to be held guilty of medical negligence/deficiency in service at least on four counts. The respondent did not pay any attention to the patient’s persistent complaints of pain (as he himself admitted in his referral note for ERCP) till she presented with visible signs of jaundice and thus unduly delayed the diagnostic tests that were taken only on 02.10.2000. Secondly, having conducted an “exploratory” laparotomy on 04.10.2000, he failed to even attempt locating the cause of the bile leakage suffered by the patient though all standard literature (including that cited by the respondent) pointed to cystic duct stump leak as one of the most frequent causes of such leakage – such a situation was particularly likely in this case because the cholecystectomy was proceeded with by the respondent despite his inability to clearly separate the cystic duct and the cystic artery before their dissection and ligature. Further, after conducting the laparotomy, he delayed referring the patient for ERCP for no rhyme or reason though all standard literature (and hence the corpus of knowledge and practice based thereon expected of an ordinary medical practitioner of the relevant specialty) mandated such an investigation at the earliest because that is the most widely recommended way of both diagnosing and, in some situations also treating, bile anatomy injury/obstruction evidenced by either stricture/obstruction in the biliary tree or fistular leakage of bile flow. The respondent himself knew of this, according to his repeated admissions. It is really strange that this failure could be pleaded as an error of judgment. A physician can commit an error of judgment in a case of more than one options of (or, approaches to) diagnosis and/or treatment of a patient’s condition and he honestly believing one of them to be more appropriate than the other/s for that patient, though in retrospect that may turn out to be not so appropriate or advantageous to the patient. Here, in this case, the respondnet knew full well that the patient must undergo ERCP (or, an equivalent diagnostic or diagnostic-cum-therapeutic procedure), which he was not professionally competent to conduct. Why he delayed this reference to a qualified gastro-enterologist/endoscopist, or, in this case to the PGI, when he had not even been able to identify the patient’s biliary anatomy injury, leave alone repair it, may be a ‘judgment’ of sorts of this particualr surgeon but certainly not an error of judgment that an average informed and careful surgeon would make. Finally, there is incontrovertible evidence in the form of the signed consent documents that the respondent did not discharge the duty of disclosure in case of either surgery (cholecystectomy or laparotomy) as required of him under the law governing consent. We cannot also overlook the fact that this respondent’s recording of important treatment records could be interpreted to suggest an attempt at “improving” his case but perhaps that was not deliberate. It is unfortunate that the medical board did not go into these questions with the seriousness expected of an independent body of experts. However, there is no evidence at all that the acts of the respondent /OP were the proximate cause of Reeta’s eventual death and the respondent/OP cannot be held to account for that. 20. That brings us to the question of quantum of compensation. The complainant asked for Rs. 8.25 lakh (consisting of Rs. 5 lakh towards compensation for loss/damage due to medical negligence, Rs. 1.25 lakh for reimbursement of medical expenses and Rs. 2 lakh towards mental agony), with interest thereon @ 24% from the date of dispute till payment and costs of Rs. 5,000/-. In the case of “Lata Wadhwa & Others v State of Bihar & Others [(2001) 8 SCC 197], the Apex Court had taken the value of earnings of a simple housewife at Rs. 36,000/- p.m. while going into the question of compensation on account of deaths of several people that occurred in an accident in 1989. Smt. Reeta Dogra was also a simple housewife who died in 2000. Considering only the inflation since 1989, it would be reasonable to accept the sum of Rs. 10,000/- p.m. as the equivalent earning in December 2000. Applying the deduction of 1/3rd towards personal maintenance expenses, the contribution would work out to Rs. 80,000/- approx. per annum. Reeta was 46 at the time of her death and hence a multiplier of even 10 would lead to a compensation amount of Rs.8 lakh, which would have been payable in 2001 on which interest @ 9% per annum since 2001 would not be unreasonable. However, since we cannot attribute Reeta’s death solely to the acts of negligence on the part of the respondent/OP, the interest of equity would be met if his liability for compensation were restricted to Rs.7 lakh. 21. As a result, the appeal is partly allowed and the order of the State Commission is set aside. The respondent is directed to pay to the appellant/complainant the sum of Rs.7 lakh as consolidated compensation, including cost, within four weeks from the date of this order, failing which the sum would be liable to be paid with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of this order till realisation.
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI FIRST APPEAL No. 248 OF 2002 (From the order dated 27.03.2002 of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Union Territory, Chandigarh in Complaint Case no. 6 of 2001) Rajinder Singh Dogra 3152, Sector 28 D Appellant Chandigarh versus Dr. P.N. Gupta P. N. Urology and Surgical Centre House no. 1359, … Continue reading
majority of the States have not fully implemented the scheme regulating issuance and fixation of High Security Registration Plates (HSRP). From the affidavits filed on behalf of the respective
1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IA NOS. 10, 16, 17 AND 18 IN WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.510 OF 2005 Maninderjit Singh Bitta … Petitioner Versus Union of India & Ors. … Respondents O R D E R 1. This order is in continuation of the orders dated 30th August, 2011 … Continue reading
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – s. 2(1)(d), (g), (o) and s. 12 – Chandigarh Allotment of Land to Co-operative House Building Societies Scheme, 1991 – Envisaging allotment of land by Chandigarh Administration to Co-operative House Building Societies through Chandigarh Housing Board – Construction of multistoried structures/dwellings for members of Societies – Non-allotment of land to Societies – Complaint by members u/s. 12, for refund of 10% earnest money forfeited by the Board and 18% interest paid by them – Maintainability of – Held: Complaint is maintainable – Members of the Societies were the real and ultimate beneficiaries – Provisions in the Scheme regulated the relationship of the Societies with their members and also made them jointly and severally responsible for payment of the earnest money etc. – By making applications for allotment of land, Societies would be deemed to have hired or availed services of Chandigarh Administration and the Board in relation to housing construction, thus, members covered by definition of `consumer’ u/s. 2(d)(ii) and had right to file such complaint – Even though Finance Secretary decided to refund the earnest money, Board did not refund the forfeited portion of the earnest money to the members of the Societies, thus, amounted to deficiency in service – 1952 Act, 1973 Rules and 1991 Scheme does not provide for levy of 18% interest on the delayed payment of earnest money – Chandigarh Administration and Board had no right to refuse refund of 18% interest – Thus, National Commission and State Commission justified in directing refund of the amount of interest – Board directed to refund the amount due to complainant within the stipulated period – Chandigarh Allotment of Land to Co-operative House Building Societies Scheme, 1991 – Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 – Chandigarh Lease Hold of Sites and Buildings Rules, 1973. The Chandigarh Administration framed the `Chandigarh Allotment of Land to Co-operative House Building Societies Scheme, 1991′ through Chandigarh Housing Board for allotment of land to Co-operative House Building Societies. Fifty three Societies challenged the 1991 Scheme. The High Court dismissed the writ petition. In terms of the order of the High Court the members of the Societies paid the balance earnest money and 18% interest, however, the Board did not take effective steps for allotment of land to the Societies. Respondent No.1 and others-members, applied through their respective Societies for refund of the amount paid by them. The Secretary of the Board sent a letter to the Finance Secretary, Chandigarh Administration for its decision However, the Chief Accounts Officer of the Board suo motu remitted the amount of earnest money to the Societies after deducting 10% in accordance with the memo dated 9.6.1993 issued by the Finance Secretary, Meanwhile, the Finance Secretary issued a memo dated 9.3.2000 directing that full earnest money would be refunded to the societies/and its members, however, the interest on the earnest money would not to be refunded. The members of the Societies filed complaints under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 against the action of the Board to forfeit 10% earnest money and the direction given by the Finance Secretary not to refund 18% interest. The District Forum held that the forfeiture of 10% earnest money in terms of the memo dated 9.6.1993 and non-refund of 18% interest were contrary to the 1991 Scheme and the 1973 Rules and amounted to deficiency in service and unfair trade practice. The State Commission held that the Finance Secretary could not have used the power for giving directions in violation of the Rules and the Scheme; that the memo dated 9.6.1993 was contrary to clause 8 of the 1991 Scheme; that once the Finance Secretary had issued instructions vide memo dated 9.3.2000 that full refund of earnest money would be made to the Societies/and its members the Board should have refunded the remaining amount to the complainants and its failure to do so amounted to deficiency in service; that the instructions issued by the Finance Secretary not to refund 18% interest deposited by the members of the Society did not have any legal sanction. The State Commission directed the Board to refund the amount to the complainants along with interest @ 8% p.a. However, the State Commission set aside the direction given by the District Forum for payment of interest from the amount of earnest money. The National Commission upheld the order passed by the State Commission. Therefore, the appellants filed the instant appeals. The question which arose for consideration in these appeals were whether the members of the Societies, who would have been benefited by allotment of land under the 1991 Scheme were `consumer’ within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the Act; and whether the District Forum had the jurisdiction to entertain the complaints filed by the members of the Societies for refund of 10% earnest money forfeited by the Board and 18% interest paid by them. =Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1 Even though the Chandigarh Allotment of Land to Co-operative House Building Societies Scheme, 1991 was ostensibly framed for allotment of land to the Co-operative House Building Societies through the agency of the Chandigarh Housing Board for construction of multistoried structures (dwelling units/flats) for their members and the Chandigarh Administration and the Board had nothing to do with the members of the Societies, but a careful reading of various clauses of the Scheme and the directives given by the Finance Secretary from time to time leave little room for doubt that the members of the Societies were the real and ultimate beneficiaries. The provisions contained therein not only regulated the relationship of the Societies with their members, but also made them jointly and severally responsible for payment of the earnest money etc. The Finance Secretary and the Board issued directions from time to time for payment of the earnest money and interest by the members of the Societies. If the scheme had nothing to do with the members of the Societies, then it would not have contained provisions to regulate their eligibility and entitlement to get dwelling units to be constructed on the land allotted by the Board and made them jointly and severally responsible for payment of the premium etc. and the Finance Secretary would not have issued directions vide memos dated 9.6.1993 and 9.3.2000 in the matter of refund of earnest money and interest. The Board too would not have entertained the request made by the members of the Societies for refund of the earnest money and remitted the amount to the Societies after deducting 10%. Thus, even though no formal contract had been entered into between the Chandigarh Administration and the Board on the one hand and the members of the Societies on the other hand, the former exercised sufficient degree of control over the latter. [Paras 27 and 28] [129-B-C; 131-A-F] 1.2 By making applications for allotment of land, the Societies would be deemed to have hired or availed services of Chandigarh Administration and the Board in relation to housing construction. If the scheme had been faithfully implemented and land had been allotted to the Societies, their members would have been the actual and real beneficiaries. Therefore, they were certainly covered by the definition of `consumer’ under Section 2(d) (ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, the second part of which includes any beneficiary of the services hired or availed for consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised. The members of the Societies had every right to complain against illegal, arbitrary and unjustified forfeiture of 10% earnest money and non-refund of 18% interest and the District Consumer Forum did not commit any jurisdictional error by entertaining the complaints. [Para 28] [131-F-H; 132-A-B] Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta (1994) 1 SCC 243; Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Balbir Singh (2004) 5 SCC 65, relied on. 1.3 The submission that the Board had deducted 10% earnest money and declined to refund 18% interest to the members of the Societies strictly in accordance with the directives given by the Finance Secretary and in the absence of challenge to memos dated 9.6.1993 and 9.3.2000, the complainants were not entitled to any relief, is meritless and cannot be accepted. In terms of clause 8 of the 1991 Scheme, a Society would have become entitled to refund of the earnest money without any deduction if it were to cancel the demand before allotment of land. This is also the spirit of Rule 8 of the Chandigarh Lease Hold of Sites and Building Rules, 1973 which were made applicable to the land allotted under the scheme. [Para 29] [132-B-D] 1.4 Rule 8 shows that an application for allotment of site or building by way of lease can be entertained only if it is accompanied by 10% of the premium as earnest money. The allottee is required to deposit 15% of the premium within 30 days of allotment. The balance amount is to be paid in accordance with Rule 12. An applicant who refuses to accept allotment within 30 days is entitled to refund of the amount paid by him. If the applicant neither refuses to accept the allotment nor deposits 15% of the premium, the Estate Officer can forfeit the whole or part of the earnest money. The provision relating to refund of the premium/earnest money or forfeiture of the whole or part thereof gets attracted only after the allotment is made and not before that. [Para 30] [133-E-G] 1.5 On examining para V(i) of memo dated 9.6.1993 issued by the Finance Secretary in the light of the plain language of Rule 8 of the 1973 Rules and clause 8 of the 1991 Scheme, it becomes clear that the concerned officer exceeded his brief when he directed that 10% of 25% of the premium/earnest money should be deducted if the members sought refund of the earnest money on any ground whatsoever. By giving the said directive, the concerned officer attempted to teach a lesson to the members of the Societies who had filed writ petition and succeeded in persuading the High Court to restrict payment of the earnest money to 10%. However, he must have realized the folly committed by issuing a direction in complete disregard of the spirit of Rule 8(5) of the 1973 Rules and clause 8 of the 1991 Scheme and this must have been the reason why he made amendments by incorporating clause 7 in memo dated 9.3.2000 for full refund of the earnest money without forfeiting 10%. Unfortunately, it proved to be a half hearted attempt by the Finance Secretary to redeem the wrong done earlier because while directing refund of the earnest money without any deduction, he used the expression `will henceforth’ in clause 7, which gave leverage to the Board to decline the request of the members of the Societies for full refund of the earnest money on the ground that 15% had already been remitted to the Societies for being paid to their members before the issue of memo dated 9.3.2000. Once the Finance Secretary took the corrective step, which was in consonance with the spirit of Rule 8(5) of the 1973 Rules and clause 8 of the 1991 Scheme, the Board should have refunded the balance 10% amount to all the members who had applied for refund on finding that land had not been allotted to the Societies and they might have to wait for indefinite period to get the flats. [Para 30] [133-G-H; 134-A-F] 1.6 On receipt of the applications made by the members of the Societies for refund of the earnest money and interest, the Secretary of the Board wrote letter dated 11.12.1998 to the Finance Secretary seeking his guidance in the matter. However, before the latter could take a decision, the Chief Accounts Officer of the Board remitted the amount of earnest money to the Societies after deducting 10% with a direction that the same be paid to their members. The Board did not explain why its officers did not wait for the decision of the Finance Secretary and why the Chief Accounts Officer exhibited undue haste in remitting the amount of earnest money to the Societies after deducting 10%. In any case, after the Finance Secretary decided that earnest money would be refunded to the Societies and their members without any deduction, the Board should have refunded forfeited portion of the earnest money to the members of the Societies and its failure to do so certainly amounted to deficiency in service. [Para 31] [134-G-H; 135-A-B] 1.7 The Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 and the Chandigarh Lease Hold of Sites and Buildings Rules, 1973 do not provide for levy of 18% interest on the delayed payment of earnest money or a portion thereof. The 1991 Scheme also did not provide for levy of such interest. Notwithstanding this, the members of the Societies had to pay 18% interest because while dismissing the writ petition, the High Court observed that the Societies who had deposited 10% of the sale consideration and found eligible for allotment or were allotted sites would be liable to pay the balance 15% with a further interest at the rate of 18% per annum. However, there was nothing either in the interim or the final order of the High Court from which it could be inferred that the Chandigarh Administration or for that reason the Board was authorised or empowered to refuse refund of 18% interest to the members who did not seek allotment of flat. If the final order passed by the High Court is read in conjunction with interim order dated 11.5.1992, it becomes clear that the Societies were to deposit the remaining amount with interest at the rate of 18% per annum only if they were to accept allotment of flats under the Scheme. Although, the writ petitions were filed by the Societies, the language of the interim order passed by the High Court shows that the judges were thinking of imposing liability of 18% interest only on those members who were to accept allotment of flats to be constructed by the Societies. The members of the Societies did not get an opportunity to accept the allotment because even after deposit of full earnest money and 18% interest, the Board did not allot land to the Societies on which they could construct dwelling units/flats. The Finance Secretary misinterpreted the orders of the High Court and issued wholly arbitrary and unjust directive to the Board not to refund 18% interest to the members of the Societies who had applied for refund before allotment of land by the Board. The Chandigarh Administration and the Board had no right to refuse refund of 18% interest and absence of direct challenge to clause 11 of memo dated 9.3.2000 was not sufficient to legitimize indirect forfeiture of that amount and the State Commission did not commit any error by directing refund of the amount of interest by treating it to be a case of deficiency in service and the National Commission rightly declined to interfere with the order of the State Commission. The Board is directed to refund the amount due to the complainants within the period stipulated. [Paras 32 and 33] [135-C-H; 136- A-E] Case Law Reference: (1994) 1 SCC 243 Relied on. Para 28 (2004) 5 SCC 65 Referred to. Para 28 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8203 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 12.7.2007 of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in R.P. No. 734 of 2004. WITH C.A. 8204, 8205, 8206, 8207, 8208, 8209, 8210, 8211, 8212, 8213, 8214, 8215, 8216, 8217, 8218, 8219, 8220, 8221, 8222, 8223, 8224, 8225, 8226 & 8227 of 2010. Rachana Joshi Issar, Nidhi Tiwari for the Appellant. Anil Nag, S.S. Khetarpal, H.K. Chaturvedi, Syed Ahmad Saud, M.M. Abbasi, Shakil Ahmed Syed for the Respondent.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 21740 of 2007) Chandigarh Housing Board … Appellant Versus Avtar Singh and others … Respondents WITH C.A. No. ________ of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.831/2008] C.A. No. ________ of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) … Continue reading
supervision services for implementing the law over the govt.=the Court has been monitoring the implementation of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short `the Act’). The Court has already passed several orders for constitution of Juvenile Justice Boards under Section 4 of the Act and Child Welfare Committees under Section 29 of the Act in different States and Union Territories
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 473 OF 2005 Sampurna Behura …..Petitioner Versus Union of India and Others …..Respondents O R D E R In this Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, the Court has been monitoring the implementation of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection … Continue reading
advocatemmmohan 