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Sec.271 of INCOME TAX ACT = The AO has to initiate penalty proceedings when he found difference between the reported and assessed income – No separate reasons not necessary to record whether to intiate proceedings or not – but the burden lies on the assessee to give suffcient reasons for show cause notice and the burden shift on the Ao then he has to given reasons for imposing penalty = MAK Data P. Ltd. … Appellant Versus Commissioner of Income Tax-II … Respondent = http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40925

Sec.271 of INCOME TAX ACT = The AO has to initiate penalty proceedings when he found     difference between the reported and assessed income – No separate reasons not necessary to record whether to intiate proceedings or not – but the burden lies on the assessee to give suffcient reasons for show cause notice and the burden … Continue reading

Civil court has no jurisdiction against the properties covered under Securitisation Act. = Jagdish Singh …….. Appellant Versus Heeralal and others ……. Respondents – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40924

Civil court  has no jurisdiction against the properties covered under Securitisation Act.=          Section 13, as already indicated, deals with the  enforcement  of  the   security interest without the intervention of the court or tribunal  but  in   accordance with the provisions of the Securitisation Act.       22.   Statutory interest … Continue reading

Rule 34 of CDA and Payment of Gratuity Act – Departmental enquiry – holding of Gratuity of a retired person – Since there is a conflict in opinion of three Bench judgment of this Court which is later in point of time. State Bank of India vs. Ram lal Bhaskar and Anr. 2011(10)SCC249. and the judgement of Jaswant Singh Gill vs. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors. (2007) 1 SCC 663. matter referred to larger bench – Referred to larger Bench = = Ch. cum Man. Director Mahanadi Coalfield Ltd. ………..Appellant Versus Rabindranath Choubey ……..Respondent = http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40916

Rule 34 of CDA  and Payment of Gratuity Act – Departmental enquiry – holding of Gratuity of a retired person – Since there is a conflict in opinion of three Bench judgment of this  Court  which  is  later  in point of time.  State Bank of India  vs.  Ram  lal Bhaskar and Anr. 2011(10)SCC249.  and the judgement of Jaswant  Singh  Gill  vs. … Continue reading

Sec.125 (3) of Cr.P.C. – When first petition not satisfied even after arrest of husband, another petition for arrears of maintenance from the date of order to till the day of new petition can not be considered as Time Barred as it is in continuation of old petition and for subsequent defaults = As the respondent-husband had not complied with the order of payment, in a miscellaneous petition, i.e., C.M.P. No. 566/1998 filed by the appellant, the trial court by its order dated 21.07.1998 had sentenced the respondent to imprisonment. The default in payment of maintenance was for the period 4.2.1993 to 4.2.1998. On 5.2.2002 another miscellaneous application (Crl.M.P. No.394/2002) was filed by the appellants claiming maintenance for the period 4.2.1993 to 5.2.2002. – As the aforesaid order of the High Court had curtailed the entitlement of the appellants to maintenance to a period of one year prior to the date of filing of the Crl. M.P. No. 394/2002, the appellants have filed this appeal.= The application dated 05.02.2002 filed by the appellants under Section 125(3) was in continuation of the earlier applications and for subsequent periods of default on the part of the Respondent. The first proviso to Section 125(3), therefore did not extinguish or limit the entitlement of the appellants to the maintenance granted by the learned trial court, as has been held by the High Court.= The order dated 21.04.2004 of the High Court is set aside and we now issue directions to the respondent to pay the entire arrears of maintenance due to the appellants commencing from the date of filing of the Maintenance Petition (M.C.No.1/1993) i.e. 4.2.1993 within a period of six months and current maintenance commencing from the month of September, 2013 payable on or before 7th of October, 2013 and thereafter continue to pay the monthly maintenance on or before the 7th of each successive month. If the above order of this Court is not complied with by the Respondent, the learned Trial Court is directed to issue a warrant for the arrest of the respondent and ensure that the same is executed and the respondent taken into custody to suffer imprisonment as provided by Section 125(3) CrPC. The appeal is allowed.

 published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40838     REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1542 OF 2013 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 4654 OF 2005)   Poongodi & Anr. … Appellant(s) Versus Thangavel … Respondent(s)   J U D G M E N T   RANJAN GOGOI, J.   … Continue reading

What emerges from the above discussion can be summarized in the form of following directions: (i) The voter has the elementary right to know full particulars of a candidate who is to represent him in the Parliament/Assemblies and such right to get information is universally recognized. Thus, it is held that right to know about the candidate is a natural right flowing from the concept of democracy and is an integral part of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. (ii) The ultimate purpose of filing of affidavit along with the nomination paper is to effectuate the fundamental right of the citizens under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The citizens are supposed to have the necessary information at the time of filing of nomination paper and for that purpose, the Returning Officer can very well compel a candidate to furnish the relevant information. (iii) Filing of affidavit with blank particulars will render the affidavit nugatory. (iv) It is the duty of the Returning Officer to check whether the information required is fully furnished at the time of filing of affidavit with the nomination paper since such information is very vital for giving effect to the ‘right to know’ of the citizens. If a candidate fails to fill the blanks even after the reminder by the Returning Officer, the nomination paper is fit to be rejected. We do comprehend that the power of Returning Officer to reject the nomination paper must be exercised very sparingly but the bar should not be laid so high that the justice itself is prejudiced. (v) We clarify to the extent that Para 73 of People’s Union for Civil Liberties case (supra) will not come in the way of the Returning Officer to reject the nomination paper when affidavit is filed with blank particulars. (vi) The candidate must take the minimum effort to explicitly remark as ‘NIL’ or ‘Not Applicable’ or ‘Not known’ in the columns and not to leave the particulars blank. (vii) Filing of affidavit with blanks will be directly hit by Section 125A(i) of the RP Act However, as the nomination paper itself is rejected by the Returning Officer, we find no reason why the candidate must be again penalized for the same act by prosecuting him/her. 28) The Writ Petition is disposed of with the above directions.

published in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40768  REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 1 WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 121 OF 2008 Resurgence India …. Petitioner (s) Versus Election Commission of India & Anr. …. Respondent(s) 2 J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam, CJI. 1) This writ petition, under Article 32 of … Continue reading

Sections 138,142 of the NI Act = “Whether the complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act is within or beyond time as it was contended that it was not filed within one month from the date on which the cause of action arose under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act?”- “Whether for calculating the period of one month which is prescribed under Section 142(b), the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose?”= Section 138 of the N.I. Act reads as under: “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid. either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless- (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the Cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.” Section 142 of the N.I. Act reads as under: “142. Cognizance of offences: Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974 ),- (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque; (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138; [Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period.] (c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138.” Sections 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: “12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.- (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. (2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded.” Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads as under: “9. Commencement and termination of time.- (1) In any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from”, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “to”. (2) This section applies also to all [Central Acts] made after the third day of January, 1868, and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887.”= we are of the opinion that Saketh lays down the correct proposition of law. We hold that for the purpose of calculating the period of one month, which is prescribed under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose. We hold that SIL Import USA does not lay down the correct law. Needless to say that any decision of this Court which takes a view contrary to the view taken in Saketh by this Court, which is confirmed by us, do not lay down the correct law on the question involved in this reference. The reference is answered accordingly.

published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40692        REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1079 OF 2006 ECON ANTRI LTD. … APPELLANT VS. ROM INDUSTRIES LTD. & ANR. … RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. On 13/10/2006, while granting leave in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.211 of 2005, … Continue reading

This Revocation Application has been filed against the patent No.219504 “Combination of Brimonidine and Timolol” for topical Opthalmic use. The revocation is sought for on various grounds viz., that the Patent was obtained on a false suggestion or representation, that it is not an invention that it is obvious, that it does not sufficiently disclose and that Section 8 of the Patents Act, 1970 was violated.= As regards Section 3(e), according to the applicant it is merely an admixture and each drug provides the effect that any way individually it would do. We have already seen that the two drugs work in a different way in reducing IOP. The tests do not compare the composition with sequential combination as shown in Yuksel. The nearest prior art is the serial administration. A comparison with that would have shown if the improvement is only additive or more. That evidence is not before us. In view of our holding against the respondent on obviousness and S.8.Compliance it is not necessary for us to decide the 3(e) issue. 104. We have found the claimed invention as obvious. The BID administration was known and % / w of the drugs was also knownWe are not inclined to accept the amendments at this stage. =For the above reasons ORA/21/2011/PT/KOL is allowed and patent No.219504 is revoked. M.P. No.2/2012 is closed. As regards M.P. Nos.59/2012, 128/2012 and 134/2012 no orders are necessary. M.P. Nos. 60, 61, 72, 73, 127, 135/2012, 12/2013 and 15/2013 are allowed.

published in  http://www.ipab.tn.nic.in/173-2013.htm INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD Guna Complex Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443, Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai-600 018 ORA/21/2011/PT/KOL AND M.P. NOS.60/2011, 2/2012, 59-61/2012, 72/2012, 73/2012, 127/2012, 128/2012, 134/2012, 135/2012, 12/2013 AND 15/2013 IN ORA/21/2011/PT/KOL   THURSDAY, THIS THE  8TH DAY OF AUGUST , 2013   Hon’ble Smt. Justice Prabha Sridevan   … Chairman Hon’ble Mr. D.P.S.Parmar                      … Continue reading

the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, = whether certain regulations framed by the University Grants Commission had a binding effect on educational institutions being run by the different States and even under State enactments.= However, within this class of institutions there is a separate group where the State Governments themselves have taken a decision to adopt the scheme. In such cases, the consequences envisaged in the scheme itself would automatically follow. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court in all these matters in the light of the various submissions made on behalf of the respective parties. The several Appeals, Writ Petitions and the Transferred Case, which involve the same questions as considered in this batch of cases, are all dismissed. However, the Appeals filed by the State of Uttarakhand and Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 6724, 13747 and 14676 of 2012 are allowed. As far as the Transfer Petition Nos. 1062-1068 OF 2012 are concerned, the same are allowed and the Transferred Cases are dismissed. The Contempt Petitions are disposed of by virtue of this judgment. However, persons who have continued to work on the basis of the interim orders passed by this Court or any other Court, shall not be denied the benefit of service during the said period. The Appeals and Petitions having been dismissed, both the State Authorities and the Central Authorities will be at liberty to work out their remedies in accordance with law.

reported in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40584 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.5527-5543 OF 2013                      [@ SLP (C) Nos. 18766-18782/2010] 1 Jagdish Prasad Sharma etc. etc.    … Appellants Vs. 2 State … Continue reading

Acquittal of murder case = It is a well settled principle of law that when the genesis and the manner of the incident is doubtful, the accused cannot be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. Inasmuch as the prosecution failed to establish the circumstances in which the appellant was alleged to have fired at the deceased, the entire story has to be rejected. 19) In the light of the above discussion, though we are unable to accept the contention relating to the right of private defence as pleaded by learned counsel for the appellant, on going through the entire prosecution case, coupled with the reasoning of the High Court accepting the claim of the other accused, i.e., A-2 and A-3, the entire prosecution case is to be rejected as unbelievable. In such circumstances, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt, accordingly, we set aside his conviction and sentence.

published in          http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40570         REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 889 OF 2009   Arshad Hussain …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Rajasthan … Respondent(s) 2     J U D G M E N T   P.Sathasivam,J. 1) This appeal has … Continue reading

Company Owned Company Operated outlets (COCO) as a means to enable National Oil Companies to run and operate their own outlets which were to be run as model retail outlets.= Although, the Appeals have been filed on account of the denial to the land owners of the grant of dealership in respect of the lands demised by them to the Oil Companies, = the doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, as canvassed on behalf of the Appellants and the Petitioners, cannot be made applicable to these cases where the leases have been granted by the land owners on definite terms and conditions, without any indication that the same were being entered into on a mutual understanding between the parties that these would be temporary arrangements, till the earlier policy was restored and the claim of the land owners for grant of dealership could be considered afresh. On the other hand, although, the nominees of the lessors were almost in all cases appointed as the M&H Contractors, that in itself cannot, in our view, convert any claim of the land owner for grant of a permanent dealership. As has been indicated hereinbefore, even the M&H Contractor had to submit an affidavit to the effect that he did not have and would not have any claim to the dealership of the retail outlet and that he would not also obstruct the making over possession of the retail outlet to the Oil Company, as and when called upon to do so. – the entire focus has shifted to COCO outlets on account of the fresh lease agreements entered into by the Appellants with the Oil Companies which has had the effect of obliterating the claim of the land owners made separately under earlier lease agreements. The claims of the Appellants/Petitioners in the present batch of matters have to be treated on the basis of the agreements subsequently entered into by the Oil Companies, as submitted by the learned Attorney General.- The four Transfer Petitions, being T.P.(C) Nos. 971-973 of 2010 and T.P.(C) No. 1260 of 2011, which were heard along with these Appeals and Petitions, are allowed. These Appeals and Petitions must, therefore, fail and are dismissed.However, it will be open to the Appellants and the Petitioners to approach the proper forum in the event they have suffered any damages and loss, which they are entitled to recover in accordance with law.

 published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40540    REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.5228 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 5849 OF 2008) MOHD. JAMAL …APPELLANT Vs. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. …RESPONDENTS WITH C.A. No.5229/2013 @ S.L.P.(C) No.8658/2008 C.A. No.5230/2013 @ S.L.P.(C) No.27299/2008 W.P.(C) No.459/2009 W.P.(C) No.528/2008 C.A. No.5231/2013 … Continue reading

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