Urban Land Ceiling Act

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Whether the compromise decree dated 16.08.1976 is fraud and collusive and was intended/designed to overcome the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act in so far the suit property is concerned. = The basis of the suit (O.S. No.397/1976) filed by the defendant Nos.1 & 2 is the division of property made in the year 1962 and the will dated 18.05.1976. Though some amount of haste may be disclosed by the facts surrounding the passing of the compromise decree dated 16.08.1976, as already noted, the said decree had been acknowledged by the father in Exhibit D-1 i.e. sale deed by which a part of the Schedule ‘C’ property was sold by him. The father of the parties died in the year 1991 and for a period of 15 years after the compromise decree and the execution of the sale deed he had not raised any question with regard to the authenticity or genuineness of what is stated in the will and the compromise decree. In these circumstances, the compromise decree dated 16.08.1976 must pass the test of acceptability. there were four buildings standing on the land in question which fact alone would throw considerable doubt with regard to the applicability of the Urban Land Ceiling Act to the suit land.=2014- OCt. Part – CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6197 OF 2010 LALITHA THERESA SEQUERIA (SINCE DIED) BY L.RS. … APPELLANT (S) VERSUS DOLFY A PIAS @ ADOLPHYS JOSEPH PAIS & ANR. … RESPONDENT (S)


specific relief Act = It is a settled legal proposition that the power of attorney holder cannot depose in place of the principal. Provisions of Order III, Rules 1 and 2 CPC empower the holder of the power of attorney to “act” on behalf of the principal. The word “acts” employed therein is confined only to “acts” done by the power-of-attorney holder, in exercise of the power granted to him by virtue of the instrument. The term “acts”, would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. In other words, if the power-of-attorney holder has preferred any “acts” in pursuance of the power of attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for acts done by the principal, and not by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in respect of a matter, as regards which, only the principal can have personal knowledge and in respect of which, the principal is entitled to be cross-examined.; In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the appellant has not yet acquired any title over the land, he has no right to receive compensation to the tune of Rs. 29,47,112/-. However, he withdrew the said amount by giving an undertaking to return the said amount to Res. No. 1 in case any such order was passed by the court in this regard. In view of the above, the appeals are allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the High Court is set aside, and the same passed by the trial court is restored. As a consequence, the appellant is entitled to get the sale deed executed and registered, with respect to all the suit land available now (minus the land acquired and the land purchased by the respondent no.6). 17. The appellant is directed to refund the amount of compensation received by him to Res. No. 1 within a period of three months, alongwith 9% interest from the date of receipt till the date of payment. Civil Appeal Nos. 2888 and 4459 of 2005 In view of the judgment and order in Civil Appeal Nos. 2885- 2887 of 2005, these appeals are dismissed.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2885-2887 of 2005 S. Kesari Hanuman Goud … Appellant Versus Anjum Jehan & Ors. … Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2888 & 4459 of 2005 J U D G M E N T Dr.B.S.Chauhan, J. Civil Appeal Nos. 2885-2887 of 2005 … Continue reading

A total of 215 bighas (approximately) of land was allotted to the appellant – Company in Samvat 1998 (corresponding to English Calender year 1941) on the basis of 6 pattas issued by Zamindar in whom the land had come to be vested. The pattas specified that the land was meant for setting up of the sugar factory and any kind of agricultural operations therein was prohibited. The pattas also specified that the same would be valid till the existence of the factory.surplus land has been transferred contrary to the terms of the patta in connivance and collusion with the officials of the State Government.land measuring about 178 bighas stood recorded in the name of the appellant – Company in the revenue record of Samvat 2013. In the said records the name of the appellant was recorded as a “pucca tenant” under Section 54 (vii) of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tenancy Act’). Thereafter with the coming into force of the MP Land Revenue Code in the year 1959 the name of the appellant – Company was recorded as a ‘bhumiswami’ in respect of the aforesaid land.The rights of a bhumiswami are clearly enumerated by Section 165 of the MP Land Revenue Code which encompasses a right to transfer. The bar imposed on the right to transfer does not apply to non-agricultural lands and, hence, would not be relevant to the present case. If the right of transfer has been conferred on the appellant by the provisions of a statute and the bar contemplated does not apply to the appellant, we do not see how a clause or a condition in the original patta granted by the Zamindar in samvat 1978-79 (corresponding to English Calender year 1940-41) can restrict such a right. In any case, there is no specific clause or condition in any of the original pattas prohibiting or even restricting the right of the appellant to transfer any part of the land allotted to it that may be lying vacant. Neither any material has been placed before us to enable us to take the view that under terms of the lease granted under Section 101 of Tenancy Act and Section 39 of Abolition of Zamindari Act any restriction or bar had been imposed on the appellant – Company from making such a transfer. 14. In view of the aforesaid conclusions the issue with regard to applicability of the Urban Land Ceiling Act and the Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, need not detains us, save and except to hold that the provisions of either of the aforesaid Acts, ex-facie, do not apply to the case of the appellant – Company. We would further like to observe on the view taken by us it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the decree affirmed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in S.A. No.482 of 2002 binds the State or whether the same is in respect of the entire land holding of the appellant – Company or only a part thereof. 15. In view of the foregoing discussions and conclusions reached we allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order dated 01.12.2007 of the High Court as well as the directions contained in the said order.

|REPORTABLE | IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 7760 of 2012 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 1861 of 2008) Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. & Anr. … Appellant(s) Versus Anil Gupta and Ors. … Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T RANJAN GOGOI, J. Leave granted. 2. … Continue reading

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