Uttarakhand High Court

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Whether she cannot take benefit of reservation in the State of Uttarakhand because she is a Scheduled Caste (Valmiki of Punjab). =She was provisionally selected but her candidature was cancelled by the Commission vide Office Memorandum dated 4.10.2005 on the ground that she cannot take benefit of reservation in the State of Uttarakhand because she is a Scheduled Caste (Valmiki of Punjab).- The Division Bench held that after migration from Punjab, the appellant cannot be treated as a member of Scheduled Caste in the State of Uttarakhand and she is not entitled to be appointed against the post reserved for Scheduled Caste.= Whether Presidential Order issued under Article 341(1) or Article 342(1) of the Constitution has any bearing on the State’s action in making provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State? – whether a person like the appellant, who is a Scheduled Caste in the State where she was born will not be entitled to the benefit of reservation after marriage in the State where her husband is living despite the fact that the husband also belongs to Scheduled Caste and the particular Caste falls in the same reserved category in the State of migration and that she is a permanent resident of that State. 16. Since the other related matter has been referred to a larger Bench, we think that it would be just and proper to refer this matter also to the larger Bench. Ordered accordingly. 17. The Registry is directed to place the papers before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for consideration and appropriate order.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40822 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No.8225 of 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.33724 of 2011) Ranjana Kumari … Appellant Versus State of Uttaranchal and others …Respondents J U D G M E N T G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The appellant has questioned correctness of … Continue reading

Stamp duty and penalty = Whether the sale deed executed by Aditya Mills Ltd. in favour of respondent No.1 could be treated as lease deed for the purpose of stamp duty is the question = unable to do so because neither party has placed on record copy of deed dated 29.9.1978 and without examining that document, it is not possible for us to record a firm finding about the nature and character of deed dated 3.5.1995. In this scenario, the only appropriate course is to remit the case to the Collector for fresh determination of the issue relating to valuation of the building and the land purchased by respondent No.1. Ordered accordingly.= The appeal is disposed of with a direction that the Collector shall call upon respondent No.1 to produce deed dated 29.9.1978, to which reference has been made in the deed executed in its favour by Aditya Mills Ltd. and then decide whether it is a lease deed simpliciter or a sale deed for the purpose of stamp duty. While disposing of the appeal, we consider it necessary to make it clear that if the Collector comes to the conclusion that the deed executed by Aditya Mills Ltd. in favour of respondent No.1 is a lease deed then the latter shall have to surrender the land to the Government of India on 9.3.2021, i.e., the date on which term of the lease would expire.

     published in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40595  NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.6086 OF 2013. (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 3749 of 2012) State of U.P. now Uttarakhand and another …Appellants Versus Vinit Traders and Investment Ltd. and another …Respondents O R D E R Leave granted. Whether the … Continue reading

Upgrade to Municipal corporation = Section 8-AA(1) of the Act -under Section 3(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1959 (for short ‘the Act’) as applicable in Uttarakhand read with Article 243Q(2) of the Constitution = Principal Secretary Urban Development Department, Government of Uttarakhand has provided an opportunity of hearing to the objectors on their respective objections on 16.07.2011 from 11.00 a.m. to 3.00 p.m. at Kumbh Fair Controlling House, Haridwar and amongst the objectors there were several Municipal Councilors of Haridwar Municipality, namely Dinesh Joshi, Rakesh Prajapati, Yashoda Devi, Leela Devi, Ashok Sharma, Jagdhir Singh, Nikhil Mehta, Idris Ansari, Satya Narayan, Karuna Sharma, Sanjay Sharma, Radhey Krishna, Prabha Ghai and Ram Ahuja. Hence, the appellant, who was the Chairman of the Municipal Council, Haridwar could have also participated in the hearing in support of his objections. We cannot, therefore, find any infirmity in the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court that an opportunity of hearing was actually given to all persons likely to be affected by the two notifications dated 21.07.2011. 13. At the time of hearing of this appeal, we were inclined to consider the other contention of Mr. Hansaria that the State Government must form an opinion that until the due constitution of the Municipal Corporation for an area, “it is expedient” to dissolve the Municipal Council from a specified date and to direct that all powers, functions and duties of the Corporation shall as from the specified date, be vested in and be exercised, performed and discharged by the Administrator appointed by the State Government in view of the language of sub-section (1) of Section 8-AA of the Act. But we find that this ground was not raised in the Writ Petition before the High Court nor raised in the special leave petition before this Court. We further find that pursuant to the two notifications dated 21.07.2011, the elections to the Municipal Corporation have been notified to be held and completed by 30.04.2013. Hence, even if the appellant succeeds on this point, we cannot direct restoration of the Haridwar Municipality after the constitution of the Municipal Corporation, Haridwar. For these reasons, we refrain from considering this question in this appeal and leave this question open to be decided in some other appropriate case.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40467 Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 4835 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 1889 of 2012) Kamal Jora … Appellant Versus State of Uttarakhand & Anr. … Respondents J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. Leave granted. 2. … Continue reading

Quash of an offence under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 447, 448 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short “the IPC”).Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of court.The pending civil suit will take care of all those issues. The allegation that forged and fabricated documents are used by the appellant can also be dealt with in the said suit. Respondent 2’s attempt to file similar complaint against the appellant having failed, he has filed the present complaint. The appellant has been acquitted in another case filed by respondent 2 against him alleging offence under Section 406 of the IPC. Possession of the shop in question has also been handed over by the appellant to respondent 2. In such a situation, in our opinion, continuation of the pending criminal proceedings would be abuse of the process of law. = the impugned order dated 29/9/2011 passed by the Uttarakhand High Court is set aside. The entire proceedings of Criminal Case No. 723/2005 (charge-sheet No. 32/2005), and the order of cognizance dated 22/3/2005 passed thereon by the Judicial Magistrate, Khatima, District Udham Singh Nagar against the appellant, respondents 3 and 4 and against accused Rajpal for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 447, 448 read with Section 34 of the IPC are quashed and set aside. This order will however have no effect on the pending civil suit between the parties. Needless to say that the court, seized of the said suit, shall decide it independently and in accordance with law.


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