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Interpretation of clause in the agreement of sale – Excise duty notice calling upon erst while owner is quashed =Excise dues are not the statutory liabilities which arise out of the land and building or the plant and machinery. = “all these statutory liabilities arising out of the land shall be borne by purchaser in the sale deed” and “all these statutory liabilities arising out of the said properties shall be borne by the vendee and vendor shall not be held responsible in the Agreement of Sale.” As per the High Court, these statutory liabilities would include excise dues. We find that the High Court has missed the true intent and purport of this clause. The expressions in the Sale Deed as well as in the Agreement for purchase of plant and machinery talks of statutory liabilities “arising out of the land” or statutory liabilities “arising out of the said properties” (i.e. the machinery). Thus, it is only that statutory liability which arises out of the land and building or out of plant and machinery which is to be discharged by the purchaser. Excise dues are not the statutory liabilities which arise out of the land and building or the plant and machinery. Statutory liabilities arising out of the land and building could be in the form of the property tax or other types of cess relating to property etc. Likewise, statutory liability arising out of the plant and machinery could be the sales tax etc. payable on the said machinery. As far as dues of the Central Excise are concerned, they were not related to the said plant and machinery or the land and building and thus did not arise out of those properties. Dues of the Excise Department became payable on the manufacturing of excisable items by the erstwhile owner, therefore, these statutory dues are in respect of those items produced and not the plant and machinery which was used for the purposes of manufacture. This fine distinction is not taken note at all by the High Court.= We thus conclude that the judgment of the High Court is unsustainable in law. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. As a consequence the notice of the Excise Department calling upon the appellant to pay the dues of the erstwhile owner of the unit in question also stands quashed. The appellant shall also be entitled to cost of this appeal.

published in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40655   [REPORTABLE]   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.6802/2013 (arising out of SLP(civil) No. 15278 of 2012)   M/s. Rana Girders Ltd. …..Appellant   Vs. Union of India & Ors. ….Respondents   J U D G M E N T A.K.SIKRI,J. 1. Leave granted. 2. One … Continue reading

Service matter = revised merit list drawn after the selective re-evaluation of the answer scripts of all the candidates who had appeared in the Main Examination for the posts of Subedars, Platoon Commanders and Sub-Inspectors in the respondent-State of Chhattisgarh.- the High Court has dismissed the Writ Petitions filed by the appellants herein and confirmed the revised merit list drawn after the selective re-evaluation of the answer scripts of all the candidates who had appeared in the Main Examination for the posts of Subedars, Platoon Commanders and Sub-Inspectors in the respondent-State of Chhattisgarh.= Admittedly, in the instant case the error committed by the respondent-Board in the matter of evaluation of the answer scripts could not be attributed to the appellants as they have neither been found to have committed any fraud or misrepresentation in being appointed qua the first merit list nor has the preparation of the erroneous model answer key or the specious result contributed to them. Had the contrary been the case, it would have justified their ouster upon re-evaluation and deprived them of any sympathy from this Court irrespective of their length of service. In our considered view, the appellants have successfully undergone training and are efficiently serving the respondent-State for more than three years and undoubtedly their termination would not only impinge upon the economic security of the appellants and their dependants but also adversely affect their careers. This would be highly unjust and grossly unfair to the appellants who are innocent appointees of an erroneous evaluation of the answer scripts. However, their continuation in service should neither give any unfair advantage to the appellants nor cause undue prejudice to the candidates selected qua the revised merit list. 27. Accordingly, we direct the respondent-State to appoint the appellants in the revised merit list placing them at the bottom of the said list. The candidates who have crossed the minimum statutory age for appointment shall be accommodated with suitable age relaxation. 28. We clarify that their appointment shall for all intents and purpose be fresh appointment which would not entitle the appellants to any back wages, seniority or any other benefit based on their earlier appointment. 29. The order passed by the High Court shall stand modified to the above extent. Appeals disposed of.

  published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40543 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.5318-5319 OF 2013 (@ S.L.P.(C) Nos.26341-26342 of 2011) |Vikas Pratap Singh and Ors. | Appellants | Versus |State of Chhattisgarh and Ors. | Respondents | WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5320 OF 2013 (@ S.L.P.(C) No. 26349 OF 2011) Rajendra Singh … Continue reading

The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, etc.) Act, 1995 = a teacher with mental illness failed to attend her duties and as such she was removed from service due to lack of reply from her. after 3 she filed a complaint before commissioner for reinstatement as she was dismissed when she was under mental distress = For about three years, no action was taken by appellant. In the year 2007 she filed an application before the Commissioner under Section 62 of the Act. The said application was registered as Case No. 253/2007. In the said application, the appellant took plea that the order of dismissal passed by the authorities while she was suffering from mental illness was in violation of Section 47(1) of the Act. The appellant requested for her reinstatement with full back­wages.= whether the Commissioner under Section 62 of the Act can look into the legality of the order of dismissal from service of a disabled person, if it comes to his notice that the said person with disabilities has been deprived of his rights. whether the appellant was entitled for benefits under Section 47(1) of the Act. 13. The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act was enacted in 1995 pursuant to meet the following object and reasons: (i) to spell out the responsibility of the State towards the prevention of disabilities, protection of rights, provision of medical care, education, training, employment and rehabilitation of persons with disabilities; (ii) to create barrier free environment for persons with disabilities; (iii)to remove any discrimination against persons with disabilities in the sharing of development benefits, vis­à­vis non­ disabled persons; (iv)to counteract any situation of the abuse and the exploitation of persons with disabilities; (v)to lay down a strategy for comprehensive development of programmes and services and equalization of opportunities for persons with disabilities; and (vi)to make special provision of the integration of persons with disabilities into the social mainstream. “47 ­ Non ­discrimination in Government employments ­ (1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service: Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits: Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. (2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability: Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.”= Learned Single Judge by interim order dated 11th January, 2008 directed the respondent to reinstate the appellant and to pay her regular salary w.e.f 1.2.2008 on the following terms: “8. RULE (a)By interim order, there shall be stay against the impugned order of the Commissioner to the extent that the petitioner shall not be required to pay any backwages to the respondent, but the petitioner shall reinstate the respondent in service by paying regular salary to her from 1.2.2008. (b)It is further observed that directed that the petitioner shall get respondent examined through a Government Doctor of their choice and if it is so opined by the doctor, such duty may be assigned to the respondent at a place or a nearby place, where she can comfortably and conveniently, in a safe atmosphere, discharge duty.”- Inspite of the same, the respondent authority have neither reinstated the appellant nor paid salary w.e.f. 1.2.2008. So, they cannot take advantage of their own wrong and, thereby, cannot deny the benefit of wages to which the appellant was entitled pursuant to the order passed by the High Court on 11th January, 2008. -There is nothing on the record to suggest that the respondent authority got the appellant examined by a Government Doctor to determine the duty to be assigned to her. In view of her reinstatement, now the respondent authority may get opinion of the doctor for assigning her duty. In case the appellant is not in a position to perform the normal duty because of her mental condition, the competent authority will apply Proviso to Section 47(1) of the said Act. Having regard to the fact that we have upheld the order passed by the Commissioner, we direct the authorities to reinstate the appellant in service immediately and to pay her regular salary every month. The appellant shall be entitled to arrears of salary w.e.f. 1.2.2008 which the respondent shall pay within three months, else the appellant shall become entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum with effect from 1.2.2008 till the actual payment. The appeal is allowed in the manner indicated above and the orders passed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court are set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40492 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9324 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP(C)No.7647 of 2011) GEETABEN  RATILAL PATEL          … APPELLANT VERSUS DISTRICT PRIMARY EDUCATION OFFICER          … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. This appeal is directed against the order dated 4th November, 2009 passed by the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in L.P.A.No. 1988 of 2009 whereby the Division Bench dismissed the said Letters Patent Appeal   preferred   by  the  appellant  and  affirmed   the order   dated   10th  December,   2008   passed   by   learned Single   Judge   in   Writ   Petition­Special   … Continue reading

It is a settled legal proposition that, once the Court set asides an order of punishment on the ground, that the enquiry was not properly conducted, the Court should not severely preclude the employer from holding the inquiry in accordance with law. It must remit the concerned case to the disciplinary authority, to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated, and to conclude the same in accordance with law. However, resorting to such a course depends upon the gravity of delinquency involved. Thus, the court must examine the magnitude of misconduct alleged against the delinquent employee. It is in view of this, that courts/tribunals, are not competent to quash the charge-sheet and related disciplinary proceedings, before the same are concluded, on the aforementioned grounds. – In the facts and circumstances of the case, as the Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge have examined all the charges on merit and also found that the enquiry has not been conducted as per the Rules 1981, it was not the cause of the Management Committee which had been prejudiced, rather it had been the other way around. In such a fact-situation, it was not necessary for the Division Bench to permit the respondents to hold a fresh enquiry on the said charges and that too, after more than a decade of the retirement of the appellant. 30. In view of the above, appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is modified to the extent referred to hereinabove. The appellant shall be entitled to recover all his salary and retirement dues, if not paid already. No costs.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3935 of 2013 Shri Anant R. Kulkarni … Appellant Versus Y.P. Education Society & Ors. … Respondents J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment and order … Continue reading

Whether the employees of the appellant-Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation are eligible to claim pensionary benefits under the Pension Scheme in view of the non-compliance with the essential conditions stipulated in the Regulations which govern the said Pension Scheme?

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5274 OF 2008 Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & others …. Appellants Vs. Madu Giri (Dead) through Lrs. & Anr. …. Respondents AND CIVIL APPEAL NO. 952 OF 2009 Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Another …. Appellants Vs. Mohini Devi … Continue reading

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act- whether the deemed vesting of surplus land under Section 10(3) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 [for short ‘the Act’] would amount to taking de facto possession depriving the land holders of the benefit of the saving Clause under Section 3 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 [for short ‘the Repeal Act’]. = The mere vesting of the land under sub-section (3) of Section 10 would not confer any right on the State Government to have de facto possession of the vacant land unless there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land before 18.3.1999. State has to establish that there has been a voluntary surrender of vacant land or surrender and delivery of peaceful possession under subsection (5) of Section 10 or forceful dispossession under subsection (6) of Section 10. On failure to establish any of those situations, the land owner or holder can claim the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. The State Government in this appeal could not establish any of those situations and hence the High Court is right in holding that the respondent is entitled to get the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. We, therefore, find no infirmity in the judgment of the High Court and the appeal is, accordingly, dismissed so also the other appeals. No documents have been produced by the State to show that the respondents had been dispossessed before coming into force of the Repeal Act and hence, the respondents are entitled to get the benefit of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. However, there will be no order as to costs.

Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 2326 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) NO.12960 OF 2008] State of U.P. .. Appellant Versus Hari Ram .. Respondent WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2327 OF 2013 arising out of SLP(C)No.10625/2006 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2328 OF 2013 arising out … Continue reading

service matter – whether a minimum continuous service in an academic year is a prerequisite for raising a claim for re-appointment under Rule 51A of Chapter XIV A of the Kerala Education Rules, 1959 (for short ‘ thePage 66 KER’) in view of sub-rule (3) of Rule 7A of the same chapter of the KER. – We are, therefore, inclined to allow these appeals and set aside the judgment of the Division Bench with the following directions: (i) A teacher, who was relieved from service under Rules 49 and 53 of Chapter XIVA of the KER, is entitled to get preference for appointment under Rule 51A only if the teacher has a minimum prescribed continuous service in an academic year as on the date of relief. (ii) The Manager of an aided school can, however, appoint teachers in vacancies occurred due to death, retirement, promotion, resignation, long-term leave etc. provided they are established vacancies and the approval can be granted subject to the conditions under Rule 49 of Chapter XIV A of the KER.Page 24 24 (iii) Approval can also be granted to appointments made to the approved vacancies arising and continuing beyond 31 st March due to sanctioning of additional divisions. (iv) The Manager can make appointments in school even if the duration of which is less than one academic year but on daily wages basis and if the duration of vacancy exceeds one academic year that can be filled up on scale of pay basis. (v) The Manager is free to appoint teachers on a regular basis from the re-opening date itself against regular established vacancies and need not wait for the appointments till completion of the staff fixation as per the KER. (vi) Teachers who have been appointed in the midst of the academic year and not completed the requisite minimum continuous service before vacation will not be entitled to get vacation salary.Page 25 25 27. Appeals are accordingly allowed and disposed of as above setting aside the judgment of the High Court but there will be no order as to costs.

Page 1 1 REPORTBLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1643 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.22332 of 2009 State of Kerala and others …… Appellants Versus Sneha Cheriyan and another …..Respondents WITH C. A. NO. 1644 OF 2013 @ SLP(C) No.22260 of 2009 C. A. NO. 1645 OF … Continue reading

It is well settled principle of law that where a relief is claimed in respect of compensation for wrong to, immoveable property situated within jurisdiction of different Courts, the suit may be instituted in any court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situated.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI                          (1)                         REVISION PETITION NO. 3117 OF 2012 (From the order dated 28-05-2012 in Appeal No. 964 to 998/2011   of the State Commission, Haryana) Cosmos Infra Engineering India Ltd. (Previously known as Cosmos Builders & Promoters Ltd.)                                               … Petitioner (s)       Versus Sameer Saksena                                                     … Respondent (s)   (2)                    REVISION PETITION NO. 3247 OF 2012 … Continue reading

The respondent/complainant had purchased 195 Kgs. of Lobia seeds from the petitioners/OPs in 2001 for total price of Rs.11,000/-. The seeds were sown in 24 acres of land. In the next three months, the crop had attained vigorous vegetative growth, but there was no pod formation. On a complaint by the respondent/complainant, the crop was inspected by officers of the State Agriculture Department as well as representative of Haryana, State Agriculture University, Hissar. The report of the latter shows that the entire crop was of fodder variety and not the (seed) vegetable variety of cowpea. Hence there was no pod formation.

Image via Wikipedia NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI   REVISION PETITION NO. 3180 OF 2011 (Against the order dated 12.05.2011 in First Appeal No.2499 of 2003 of the State Commission, Haryana ) Bharat Seed Company Through its Proprietor Near Anand Cinema, Post Office Box No.104 & 52, Jodhpur– 342 001                                                                                                                                        ……….Petitioner Versus 1. Charanjit Singh S/o Shri Balwant Singh Residing at Dera Sacha Sauda, Begu Road, Sirsa 2. Vikas Traders, … Continue reading

The perusal of the inspection report dated 25.9.2001 reveals that the meter was got installed by the complainant inside the hospital whereas as per rules it was to be installed at the front portion of the hospital. In other words the complainant was getting benefit of the hole in the meter by getting the meter installed inside so that theft of energy could be easily made. It is well settled principle of law that a consumer in whose custody the meter is provided by the Nigam is under a legal obligation to keep it intact and any tempering with it directly or indirectly shall be termed theft of energy under the circumstances of the case. In the present case admittedly the checking was conducted by the Vigilance staff in the company of other officials of the Nigam and their report cannot be disbelieved without any cogent, convincing and corroborating evidence contrary to it. The complainant in the present case has miserably failed to disclose as to what was the reason for developing a hole inside the meter. Checking report dated 25.9.2001 which is signed by the complainant as well as the members of the checking party, is sufficient to prove it a case of theft of energy. The observations of the District Consumer Forum, Sirsa that the seals were found intact and therefore, there was no question of committing theft of electric energy but this observation of the District Forum is not sustainable for the reason that it is a novel way of committing theft of energy because consumer inserts some hard object through the hole of the meter to stop the movement of the disc in order to abstract energy dishonestly without tempering of the seal. It is further observed that by drilling a hole it is the complaint who is to be benefited with respect to committing of theft of energy by inserting some hard object in the hole of the meter to stop the movement of the disc. It is not the case of the complainant that at the time of installation of the meter the said hole was there. It is also not the case of the complainant that the hole has developed due to any climatic change or with passage of time. The appellants-opposite parties have produced the meter in question which has a drilling hole in it. Admittedly the drilling process is the outcome of the nefarious and illegal designs of complainant to commit theft of energy through the hole. No person would drill a hole in the meter unless he gets any benefit from it. Hence this case is distinguishable from the observation made in Gautam Plastic and Ram Nath case (supra).

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION   NEW DELHI REVISION PETITION No. 2390 OF 2010 (From the Order dated 11.05.2010 in Appeal No. 2994/2002 of the Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Panchkula) Dr. Laxman Dass Bansal                                                                           Petitioner C/o Bansal Hospital Old Bus Stand, Rania Tahsil Rania Rania District Sirsa Versus 1. Executive Engineer                                                                                Respondents (OP) Division Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. Sirsa Distt. Sirsa   2. SDO (OP) Sub-Division Ph-1, Sas Nagar Branch … Continue reading

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