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The medical evidence also to a large extent confirmed that the deceased Radha Bai was raped prior to the suicide committed by her. = The appellant, who was initially charged under Section 306 and 376(2)(f) IPC, was convicted by the trial Court only for the offence under Section 376(1) IPC and was imposed with the punishment of 10 years rigorous imprisonment, along with the fine of Rs.500/- and in default of the payment of fine to undergo one more year’s rigorous imprisonment.= Having regard to our above conclusion, we do not find any merit in the appeal. The appeal fails and the same is dismissed.
reported in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40590 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2260 OF 2009 KAILASH …APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF M.P. …RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J. 1. This appeal by the sole accused is directed against the … Continue reading
failures of Appellate court = the Appellate Court was required to deal with each and every question raised on behalf of the appellants. Though the aforesaid questions were raised before the trial court as well as the High Court, we find that the High Court failed to discuss and decide the questions raised by the appellants -Apex court remanded for fresh disposal = the Division Bench held that the accused persons have failed to explain the circumstances under which they had come in possession of the motor cycle belonging to PW-1 which had been used by the deceased and, therefore, the presumption would arise against the accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act.= High court (i) The prosecution failed to prove the recovery of motor cycle from the possession of the appellant as the witnesses, who were the Panch had not stood to the test of cross-examination. (ii) PW-40 was examined to prove the alleged seizure of motor cycle (MO5). But the said witness deposed that he reached the place after the seizure. PW-40 could not state the date and time when seizure was made and he signed in Mahazar (Ex.P.23). According to PW.40 he had signed the Mahazar at the cross of Nelagadahalli Village but according to Seizure Mahazar (Ex.P.23), the place of seizure was NITF Cross. In the cross-examination he admitted that he did not remember MO5 vehicle was seized by the police. (iii) PW-2 in his deposition stated that the deceased had informed him that the motor cycle was seized for violation of Traffic Rules. This clearly shows that the motor cycle had already been seized by the Police. (iv) The prosecution also failed to prove the recovery of Wrist Watch (MO6) of the deceased. To prove the said aspect prosecution examined PW-8 and PW-9. The case of the prosecution was that Wrist Watch (MO6) was seized from PW-8, the brother of accused No.1. But PW-8 turned hostile and stated that nothing has been seized from him. Another witness was PW-9, who in his evidence stated that he had not seen any seizure and also turned hostile. In Ex.P.1, the complainant, PW-17 (mother of the deceased) has not stated anything regarding Wrist Watch of the deceased. Therefore, it is clear that the story of Wrist Watch was subsequently inserted to create evidence against the accused, but the prosecution failed to establish. (v) The prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the allegation that the exhumation of dead body was at the instance of the accused. The Investigation Officer (PW-45) in his cross-examination deposed that he knew the place of burial of dead body prior to the recording of the voluntary statement of the accused. Therefore, it can be said that the dead body has been recovered at the instance of the accused. (vi) The prosecution also failed to prove the last seen theory. The Poojari who performed the Pooja of motor cycle has categorically stated that he cannot identify the persons who visited the temple, as thousands of people used to visit the temple in a day. (vii) Once the prosecution has failed to prove the main offence under Section 302 of the IPC, offence under 201 IPC also does not survive for consideration. The evidence of PWs-2, 10, 11, 14 and 45, not at all stood the test of the cross-examination. the High Court being the Appellate Court was required to deal with each and every question raised on behalf of the appellants. Though the aforesaid questions were raised before the trial court as well as the High Court, we find that the High Court failed to discuss and decide the questions raised by the appellants. 8. In view of the finding recorded above, we are of the view that the case should be remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. The impugned judgment dated 19th January, 2010 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No.968 of 2006 is, accordingly, set aside. The case is remitted back to the High Court for fresh disposal of the appeal in accordance with law. It will be open to the appellants to raise all the questions and objections as raised in this appeal or as taken before the High Court. The respondents may also contest the case in support of the judgment passed by the trial court. The appeal stands disposed of with the aforesaid observation.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40539 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 887 OF 2013 (arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.1937 of 2013) P. NAGESH AND ANOTHER … APPELLANTS VERUS STATE OF KARNATAKA … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. This … Continue reading
MERE ABSENCE OF EXTERNAL INJURIES ON BODY OF VICTIM – IT CAN NOT BE SAID AS CONSENT PARTY TO SEX = In the absence of pleading in defence , no court can presume the same wrongly = We are of the considered opinion that as the appellant had not taken any defence of consent of PW-5, the trial court was not correct in recording the finding that there was consent of PW-5 to the sexual intercourse committed by the appellant ;When benifit of doubt arose = The settled position of law is that the prosecution is required to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt by adducing evidence. Hence, if the prosecution in a given case adduces evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court cannot acquit the accused on the ground that there are some defects in the investigation, but if the defects in the investigation are such as to cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case, then of course the accused is entitled to acquittal because of such doubt. In the present case, as we have seen, the evidence of PW-5 as corroborated by the evidence of PW-2 and the FIR establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant has committed rape on PW-5 and thus the appellant is not entitled to acquittal. 16. In the result, we are not inclined to interfere with the finding of the guilt recorded by the High Court against the appellant as well as the minimum sentence of 7 years imprisonment for the offence under Section 376 IPC imposed by the High Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40522 Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1118 of 2004 Ganga Singh …… Appellant Versus State of Madhya Pradesh ….. Respondent J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. This is an appeal by way of special leave under Article 136 of … Continue reading
Section 498A and Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.= where some part of evidence is not believable, it does not mean that entire case is false, court can take aid of sec.106 of Indian Evidence Act to do justice = “The maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. This maxim has not received general acceptance nor has it come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called “a mandatory rule of evidence”. The doctrine is a dangerous one, especially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because a witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the court considers the same to be insufficient for replacing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be sifted with care. Falsity of a particular material witness or a material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence 2 (2003) 7 SCC 643 does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment.” – while dealing with Section 106 of the Evidence Act, this Court observed as under: “A fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as to the most probable position. The above position is strengthened in view of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the courts shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in addition to the facts of the case. In these circumstances, the principles embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act can also be utilized. Section 106 however is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but it would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, has offered an explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference.” – PW-5 Dr. Rajabalan has stated that if poison had been consumed prior to the head injury, it would have reached the liver and kidney. He has added that if poison is administered to a person when he is in an unconscious state there is a possibility that it would reach the stomach and intestine. = A1-Babu first caused the head injury to the deceased and when she became unconscious in order to create evidence to suggest that the deceased committed suicide, he administered poison to her. It reached her stomach and intestine but before it could reach the kidney and liver she died. When she succumbed to the head injury, the poison did not pass on to the liver and kidney. The High Court has rightly observed that this is the reason why there is no evidence of any resistance being offered by the deceased and no bruises were found on her lips. The trial court has convicted A1-Babu for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and not for offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC on the ground that the deceased had suffered only one head injury. The High Court has concurred with the trial court. We see no reason to interfere with the impugned order. In the circumstances, we confirm the conviction of A1- Babu and A2-Pappathi for offence punishable under Section 498A of the IPC. We confirm the sentence imposed on A1- Babu for the offence under Section 498A of the IPC. We find from the letter dated 17/5/2013 sent by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Coimbatore that A2-Pappathi has already undergone one year and four months sentence. In the peculiar facts of the case we direct that the sentence already undergone by A2-Pappathi be treated as sentence for the offence under Section 498A of the IPC. We confirm the conviction and sentence of A1-Babu for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC. However, we quash and set aside the conviction and sentence of A2- Pappathi for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I read with Section 109 of the IPC. There is, therefore, no question of her surrendering to the Court. As per order passed by this Court on 8/10/2007, she is on bail. Her bail bond shall stand discharged. As per the order of this Court dated 8/10/2007, A1-Babu is also on bail. Since we have confirmed his conviction and sentence, we direct that he should surrender before the Principal Sessions Judge, Coimbatore to serve out the remaining sentence. His bail bond shall stand cancelled. Needless to say that A1-Babu’s sentence for offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304 Part I of the IPC shall run concurrently.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40478 Page 1 1 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1738 OF 2007 BABU @ BALASUBRAMANIAM AND ANR. …Appellants Versus THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU …Respondent J U D G M E N T (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. The appellants (A1-Babu and A2-Pappathi respectively, for convenience) … Continue reading
motive is not a very strong one= The motive may be considered as a circumstance which is relevant for assessing the evidence but if the evidence is clear and unambiguous and the circumstances prove the guilt of the accused, the same is not weakened even if the motive is not a very strong one. It is also settled law that the motive loses all its importance in a case where direct evidence of eyewitnesses is available, because even if there may be a very strong motive for the accused persons to commit a particular crime, they cannot be convicted if the evidence of eyewitnesses is not convincing. In the same way, even if there may not be an apparent motive but if the evidence of the eyewitnesses is clear and reliable, the absence or inadequacy of motive cannot stand in the way of conviction.”
PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40455 Page 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1130 of 2010 Birendra Das & Anr. … Appellants Versus State of Assam …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated … Continue reading
Police case under sec.498 A and 306 I.P.C. ended in acquittal .No appeal is filed. after two years on private complaint , case under sec.302 was taken in to cognizance , trial court convicted main accused and High court acquitted not believing the evidence of child witness and also basing on postmortem report = “I cannot definitely say whether it is a case of suicide or homicide.” DW-1, Professor and Head of the Department of Forensic Medicine and Police Surgeon, Medical College, Trichur, has also opined in his medico-legal opinion Ex. D-1 “Under the circumstances, as per the medical evidence, the most likely manner of causation of injuries in this case is self infliction except for the fact that there is always a chance of any mechanical injury to be sustainable by homicidal manner.” Thus, the aforesaid opinions of the two medical experts also do not lend assurance to the prosecution story that the death of the deceased was only homicidal. The opinion at page 387 of Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence & Toxicology, Twenty-Second Edition, to which reference was made by Mr. Deepak, learned counsel for the appellant-Hamza, does not materially conflict with the expert opinions of PW-4 and DW-1. On the evidence of PW-1 read with the opinions of PW-4 and DW-1, the High Court could not have held that the prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that A-1 killed the deceased by stabbing her on the neck with the help of A-2. In this case, the police itself had investigated and filed a charge-sheet under Sections 498-A and 306 of the IPC against four members of the in-laws of the family of the deceased and found that it is a case of suicide. Thus, this is not a case where the only conclusion that could be drawn considering the entire evidence is that the death was homicidal and not suicidal. – We, therefore, do not find that the view taken by the High Court that A-1 and A-2 were entitled to acquittal is perverse or unreasonable on the evidence on record so as to call for our interference under Article 136 of the Constitution and we accordingly dismiss the appeals.
‘ published in http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp ITEM NO.1B COURT NO.3 SECTION IIB [FOR JUDGMENT] S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 268 OF 2007 HAMZA Appellant (s) VERSUS MUHAMMADKUTTY @ MANI & ORS. Respondent(s) WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1378 of 2007 … Continue reading
Planted Witnesses =Unreliability of fact witnesses and unnaturality of their conduct is sufficient to discard prosecution case-appeal allowed.= We are conscious of the fact that in cases of an eye witness account motive relegates into the background but that does not mean that even a proved unreliable and a planted witness be believed without scanning intrinsic worth of his depositions on the touch stone of improbabilities. When the presence of a witness is challenged on the ground that the whole case is cooked up and witnesses are got up to settle private scores then motive for false implication do assumes a bit of importance to judge the veracity and credibility of that witness. Judging from all the above angles we find informant PW1 is wholly an unreliable and untrustworthy witness on whom no implicit reliance can be placed. -Further, it is of significance that first informant PW1 had not sustained any injury during the incident which could have established his presence at the spot. It is still more bizarre that informant escaped unhurt, albeit, according to his own depositions assailants were in his look out to do away with him and not the deceased and he used to shield himself from them. It was testified by him in para 40 of his deposition that “All the three accused were my blood thirsty and I used to live shielding myself”. Had such a claim by the informant been true there was no earthly reason for the assailants to spare him and murder the deceased as he (informant) was in their closet sight without any hindrance. It is recollected that some of the murderers even carried bombs with them and consequently there was no difficulty for them to fatally assault the informant that too from a slapping distance. Presence of PW1 at the spot is further diminished because of the fact that he had not spotted PW2 at the time of the incident although PW2 claims himself to be witness of the incident and from para 13 of his cross examination it is well proved that he is a close relative of the informant Before we part away with this appeal we note that findings and observations recorded by the learned trial Judge in the impugned judgment are contrary to the evidences on record and are lopsided and does not indicate dispassionate analysis of entire material on record to fathom out the truth. To note a few of them the mentioning of fact at page 3 of the impugned judgment that “Vinod and Harendra assaulted with bomb which did not hit” is contrary to the evidence on record. It is the conspicuous case of the prosecution that both the aforesaid accused exploded bombs on the opposite side on the road and they never attempted to hit the deceased. Likewise the mentioning of fact that incident occurred due to political rivalry is also against evidence on record as there is no reliable evidence in that respect but for a single line ipse dixit of the informant in his cross examination. Similarly the finding at page 4 of the impugned judgment that ” Witness clearly states that except the three present in court accused, he had not seen anybody else committing the murder” is also contrary to the evidences on record as according to the informant Chhotai @ Jai Nath and Dablu Mani @ Vijai Pratap Mani had also participated in the crime and had fired shots. Going by the analogy drawn and slated by the learned trial Judge, even (A-2) and (A-3) did not participate in the murder. A perusal of findings at pages 4/5 of the impugned judgment not only indicates that it were oxymoron but also shows them to be perverse. Further, the evidences, which according to the trial Judge are insignificant are so glaringly damaging, noticeable and important that they could not have been ignored or brushed aside. As has been pointed out here in above no prudent person would have arrived at such a conclusion as has been arrived at by the learned trial Judge if he would have examined, sift and weighed evidences to separate grain from the chaff, which he never endeavoured. At page 5 learned trial Judge has himself mentioned that the bombs were not hurled aiming at the deceased but that does not make any difference as their “crime falls within the ambit of section 302/149 I.P.C. and charge for the same has also been framed” is again a perverse finding as no charge for hurling of bombs was framed and when only participation of three accused surfaced no unlawful assembly exited. Furthermore findings at page 6 of the impugned judgment regarding FIR and arrival of police personnel and non-disclosure of the names of the assailants to them by the witnesses is also incomprehensible and perverse findings being contrary even according to the opinion of the apex court as well. Ignoring criminal background of the deceased and defence version of him being shot dead in loneliness is yet another defect of significance in the impugned judgment. Furnishing a wholly unacceptable explanation regarding inconsistency between medical and ocular version against too settled expert view is yet again an error committed by the learned trial Judge. Other findings are also discredited by evidence on record. The residue of our discussion is that the prosecution has failed to bring home the charges against the appellants by leading cogent and reliable evidences and all the accused are entitled to the benefit of doubt. reported / pub. in http://elegalix.allahabadhighcourt.in/elegalix/WebShowJudgment.do
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD RESERVED A.F.R. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3587 OF 2006 SUNIL PASI……………………………………………….APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF U.P…………………………………………RESPONDENT. CONNECTED WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.3573 OF 2006 VINOD AND ANOTHER………………………………APPELLANTS. VERSUS STATE OF U.P…………………………………………RESPONDENT. HON’BLE VINOD PRASAD J. HON’BLE SURENDRA SINGH J. (Delivered by Hon’ble Vinod Prasad J.) Three appellants herein Sunil Pasi (A-1), Vinod … Continue reading
Non- framing of charge cause no prejudice = In the case at hand, the basic ingredients of the offence under Section 306 IPC have been established by the prosecution inasmuch as the death has occurred within seven years in an abnormal circumstance and the deceased was meted out with mental cruelty. Thus, we convert the conviction from one under Section 304B IPC to that under Section 306 IPC. As the accused has spent almost five years in custody, we limit the period of sentence to the period already undergone.= It is a sad plight in the trial courts that witnesses who are called through summons or other processes stand at the doorstep from morning till evening only to be told at the end of the day that the case is adjourned to another day.- “We make it abundantly clear that if a witness is present in court he must be examined on that day. The court must know that most of the witnesses could attend the court only at heavy cost to them, after keeping aside their own avocation. Certainly they incur suffering and loss of income. The meagre amount of bhatta (allowance) which a witness may be paid by the court is generally a poor solace for the financial loss incurred by him. It is a sad plight in the trial courts that witnesses who are called through summons or other processes stand at the doorstep from morning till evening only to be told at the end of the day that the case is adjourned to another day. This primitive practice must be reformed by the presiding officers of the trial courts and it can be reformed by everyone provided the presiding officer concerned has a commitment towards duty.”= “Unnecessary adjournments give a scope for a grievance that the accused persons get a time to get over the witnesses. Whatever be the truth in this allegation, the fact remains that such adjournments lack the spirit of Section 309 of the Code. When a witness is available and his examination-in-chief is over, unless compelling reasons are there, the trial court should not adjourn the matter on the mere asking.”= Recently, in Akil @ Javed v. State of Delhi[17], the Court, after surveying the earlier pronouncements, has stressed on the compliance of the procedure and expressed its anguish that the trials are not strictly adhering to the procedure prescribed under the provisions contained in Section 231 along with Section 309 of the CrPC, and further emphasised that such adherence can ensure speedy trial of cases and also rule out the possibility of any maneuvering taking place by granting undue long adjournment for mere asking.- We have expressed our anguish, agony and concern about the manner in which the trial has been conducted. We hope and trust that the trial courts shall keep in mind the statutory provisions and the interpretation placed by this Court and not be guided by their own thinking or should not become mute spectators when a trial is being conducted by allowing the control to the counsel for the parties.- It needs no special emphasis to state that dispensation of criminal justice system is not only a concern of the Bench but has to be the concern of the Bar. – An advocate cannot afford to bring any kind of disrespect to fairness of trial by taking recourse to subterfuges for procrastinating the same. 35. Consequently, the appeal is partly allowed and the appellant be set at liberty if his detention is not required in connection with any other case. ‘
‘ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 744 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl. ) No. 6183 of 2012) Gurnaib Singh … Appellant Versus State of Punjab ..Respondent J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. Leave granted. 2. Respect of a bride in her … Continue reading
whereby the High Court disposed of the appeal preferred by the appellant-herein by confirming his conviction and altering the sentence of death to imprisonment for life passed by the Court of Ad-hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur at North Lakhimpur dated 18.03.2006 in Sessions Case No. learned senior counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 34 of 2009 dated 07.09.2009 wherein the order passed by the Governor of the State of Uttar Pradesh for release on remission of the petitioners therein was set aside by a Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad and the same was challenged before this Court by way of a writ petition. It was also pointed in the above said writ petition that a number of convicts who had undergone actual sentence of 14 years were directed to be released forthwith by this Court in SLP (Crl.) No. 553 of 2006 dated 09.05.2006. This Court, following the same, issued a similar order in the said writ petition for the release of the petitioners therein. As stated earlier, the case on hand relates to commuting the sentence of death into imprisonment for life and we have already preserved the right of the executive for ordering remission taking note of the gravity of the offence. Hence, the said decision is not helpful to the facts of this case and the contention of learned senior counsel is liable to be rejected. 20) In the light of the above discussion, we do not find any valid ground for interference, on the other hand, we are in entire agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the High Court, consequently, the appeal is dismissed.
Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 194 OF 2008 Bhaikon @ Bakul Borah …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Assam …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam,J. 1) This appeal is filed against the judgment and order dated 26.09.2006 passed by the Division Bench … Continue reading
Considering the totality of the evidence and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the High Court has rightly reversed the judgment of the trial court after finding the appellant guilty under Section 302 read with Section 148 of IPC for the murder of Amrita Dome and awarded the sentence of life imprisonment. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. The appeal lacks merit and the same is dismissed.
Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1268 OF 2007 GUIRAM MONDAL .. Appellant Versus STATE OF WEST BENGAL .. Respondent J U D G M E N T K. S. Radhakrishnan, J 1. The appellant, the 10th accused in Sessions Case No.20 of 1986, was charge-sheeted along … Continue reading
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