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Panchayats and Zila Parishads: Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994-Sections 175(1)(q) and 177(1)- Provisions disqualifying person having more than two children from contesting for, or holding elective office in Panchayats-Constitutional validity of-Held: Provisions intra vires the Constitution being salutary and in public interest-Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 14, 21 and 25. Constitution of India, 1950: Article 14-Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994-Sections 175(1)(q) and 177(1)- Provisions disqualifying person having more than two children from contesting for, or holding elective office in Panchayats-Whether arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory-Held: Persons having more than two living children and persons having not more than two living children constitute two different classes distinguishing one from another based on intelligible differentia having rational relation to the object of implementation of family planning programme-Uniform policy of controlling population having far reaching implication are capable of being implemented in phased manner either at grass root level or at the top-Panchayats are grass root level of local self-governance having wider base-Hence, the provisions neither arbitrary nor unreasonable nor discriminatory-Constitution of India, 1950- Article 243G- Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994-Section 21. Article 21-Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994-Sections 175(1)(q) and 177(1)- Provisions disqualifying person having more than two children from contesting for, or holding elective office in Panchayats-Whether violative of Article 21-Held: No, it is a measure to keep population explosion within reasonable bounds-Also to be read along with directive principles and fundamental duties “which dictate check on population explosion-Hence, the provisions not violative of right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21-Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 243C, 243F, 243G, 38, 46, 47 and 51-A. Article 25-Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994-Sections 175(1)(q) and 177(1)- Provisions disqualifying person having more than two children from contesting for, or holding elective office in Panchayats-Whether violative of Article 25-Held: No, the constitutional guarantee under Article 25 is subject to public order, morality and health-It, thus, permits legislation in the interest of social welfare and reform-The provisions being in that direction, not violative of Article 25. The provisions of Section 175(1)(q) and Section 177(1) of Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 disqualify from person having more than two children after one year on the date of commencement of Act from holding or contesting for specified offices of Panchayat. Writ petitioners and the appellants were disqualified from contesting for, or holding office of Panchas/Sarpanchas in view of their having incurred the disqualification as provided by Section 175(1)(q) and Section 177(1) of the Act. Writ petitioners and appellants have challenged the constitutional validity of Sections 175(1)(q) and 177(1) on the ground that it is arbitrary, hence violative of Article 14 of the Constitution; that the disqualification does not serve the purpose sought to be achieved by the legislation; that the provision is discriminatory; that the provision adversely affects the liberty of leading personal life in all its freedom and having as many children as one chooses to have, hence violative of Article 21 of the Constitution; and that the provision interferes with freedom of religion, hence violates Article 25 of the Constitution. Appellants and writ petitioners contended that the number of children which one has, whether two or three or more, does not affect the capacity, competence and quality of a person to serve on any office of a Panchayat and, therefore, the impugned disqualification has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act; that the provision of disqualification introduced by the State of Haryana is discriminatory since similar provision has not been enacted for disqualifying aspirants or holders of elective or public offices in other institutions of local self-governance, State Legislatures and Parliament and also in States other than Haryana; that the fundamental right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution should include all the varieties of rights which go to make up the personal liberty of man including the right to enjoy all the materialistic pleasures and to procreate as many children as one pleases; that the personal law of muslims permits performance of marriages with four women for the purpose of procreating children and any restriction thereon would be violative of right to freedom of religion under Article 25 of the Constitution; that in the rural population couples desirous of contesting an election but having more than two living children are compelled to give them in adoption; that the impugned disqualification would hit the women worst as they have no independence and they almost helplessly bear a third child if their husbands want them to do so; and that there may be cases where triplets or twins are born on the second pregnancy and consequently both the parents would incur disqualification for reasons beyond their control or just by freak of divinity. Dismissing the writ petitions and appeals, the Court HELD: 1. Sections 175(l)(q) and 177 (1) of the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 casting disqualification on contesting for, or holding an elective office on having more than two children is intra vires the Constitution of India. The provisions seek to achieve a laudable purpose – socio-economic welfare and health care of the masses; are consistent with the National Population Policy; and are salutary and in public interest; hence, not violative of Articles 14, 21 and 25 of the Constitution. [963-B] 2. Persons having more than two living children are clearly distinguishable from persons having not more than two living children. The two constitute two different classes and the classification is founded on an intelligible differentia clearly distinguishing one from the other. It is well-defined and well perceptible. The object sought to be achieved by the legislation is popularizing the family welfare/family planning programme which the disqualification enacted by the provision seeks to achieve by creating a disincentive. Hence, the classification does not suffer from any arbitrariness. The number of children viz., two is based on legislative wisdom. It could have been more or less. The number is a matter of policy decision which is not open to judicial scrutiny. [959-B-C] Budhan Choudhry and Ors. v. The State of Bihar, [1955] 1 SCR 1045, referred to. 3. Section 21 of the 1994 Act enumerates the functions and duties of Cram Panchayat which include Public Health and Family Welfare-Implementation of Family Welfare programme. This is consistent with the National Population Policy, thus family welfare would include family planning as well. To carry out the purpose of the Act as well as the mandate of the Constitution the Legislature has made a provision for making a person ineligible to either contest for the post of Panch or Sarpanch having more than two living children. Such a provision would serve the purpose of the Act as mandated by the Constitution. Therefore, the impugned disqualification does have a nexus with the purpose sought to be achieved by the Act, hence valid. [960- A-D] 4.1. A legislation by one of the States cannot be held to be discriminatory or suffering from the vice of hostile discrimination as against its citizens simply because the Parliament or the Legislatures of other States have not chosen to enact similar laws. If it is held so it would be violative of the autonomy given to the Centre and the States within their respective fields under the constitutional scheme. Furthermore, it is not permissible to compare a piece of legislation enacted by a State in exercise of its own legislative power with the provisions of another law, though it may be part materia, but enacted by Parliament or by another State legislature within its own power to legislate. The sources of power are different and those who exercise the power also differ. Similarly, legislations referable to different organs of local self-government, that is, Panchayats, Municipalities and so on are different Many a time they are referable to different entries of Lists I, II and III of the Seventh Schedule. All such laws need not necessarily be identical. Same is the case with the laws governing legislators and parliamentarians. [960-G-H; 961-A] The State of Madhya Pradesh v. G.C. Mandawar, [1955] 2 SCR 225; The Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh v. The State of U.P. and Anr., [1973] 1 SCC 261; State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. v. Ananthi Ammal and Ors., [1995] 1 SCC 519 and Prabhakaran Nair and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., [1987] 4 SCC 238, referred to. 4.2. A uniform policy may be devised by the Centre or by a State. However, there is no constitutional requirement that any such policy must be implemented in one-go. Policies are capable of being implemented in a phased manner. More so, when the policies have far-reaching implications and are dynamic in nature, their implementation in a phased manner is welcome for it receives gradual willing acceptance and invites lesser resistance. Further the implementation in a phased manner is suggestive neither of arbitrariness nor of discrimination. [961-F-H] Lalit Narayan Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change, Patna, etc. v. State of Bihar and Ors., [1988] 2 SCC 433 and Pannalal Bansilal Pitti and Ors. v. State of A.P. and Anr., [1996] 2 SCC 498, referred to. 4.3. To make a beginning, the reforms may be introduced at the grass-root level so as to spiral up or may be introduced at the top so as to percolate down. Panchayats are grass-root level institutions of local self- governance. They have a wider base. There is nothing wrong in the State of Haryana having chosen to subscribe to the national movement of population control by enacting a legislation which would go a long way in ameliorating health, social and economic conditions of rural population, and thereby contribute to the development of the nation which in its turn would benefit the entire citizenry. Thus, no fault can be found with the State of Haryana having enacted the legislation. It is for others to emulate. [962-D-E; 963-A] 5. Right to contest an election is neither a fundamental right nor a common law right. In view of Part IX of the Constitution, a right to contest election for an office in Panchayat may be said to be a constitutional right – a right originating in Constitution and given shape by statute, thus, right conferred by a Statute. But even so it cannot be equated with a fundamental right. Further, there is nothing wrong in the same Statute which confers the right to contest an election also to provide for the necessary qualifications without which a person cannot offer his candidature for an elective office and also to provide for disqualifications which would disable a person from contesting for, or holding, an elective statutory office. The disqualification on the right to contest an election by having more than two living children does not contravene any fundamental right nor does it cross the limits of reasonability. It is a disqualification conceptually devised in national interest. [963-D-F; 964-H; 965-A] Jyoti Basu and Ors. v. Debt Ghosal and Ors., [1982] 1 SCC 691; Jamuna Prasad Mukhariva and Ors. v. Lachhi Ram and Ors., [1955] 1 SCR 608 and Sakhawat Ali v. The State of Orissa, [1955] 1 SCR 1004, referred to. 6.1. The test of reasonableness is not a wholly subjective test and its contours are fairly indicated by the Constitution. The requirement of reasonableness runs like a golden thread through the entire fabric of fundamental rights. The lofty ideals of social and economic justice, the advancement of the nation as a whole and the philosophy of distributive justice – economic, social and political – cannot be given a go-by in the name of undue stress on fundamental rights and individual liberty. Reasonableness and rationality, legally as well as philosophically, provide colour to the meaning of fundamental rights. [965-E-F] Mrs. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr., [1978] 1 SCC 248 and M/s. Kasturu Lal Lakshmi Reddy and Ors. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Anr., [1980] 4 SCC 1, referred to. 6.2. Article 243C makes provision for the Legislature of State to enact laws with respect to constitution of Panchayats. The Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 enacted by the State of Haryana is within the permitted field of State subjects. Under Article 243F person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of Panchayat if he is disqualified by or under any law made by the Legislature of State and Article 243G casts one of the responsibilities of Panchayats as preparation of plans and implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice in relation to health and sanitation, family welfare and women and child development and social welfare. Family planning is essentially a scheme referable to health, family welfare, women and child development and social welfare. Thus, the Constitution contemplates Panchayat as a potent instrument of family welfare and social welfare schemes coming true for the betterment of people’s health especially women’s health and family welfare coupled with social welfare. Under Section 21 of the Act, the functions and duties entrusted to Gram Panchayats include `Public Health and Family Welfare’, `Women and Child Development’ and `Social Welfare’, Family planning falls therein. It is the leaders of Panchayat who can themselves better enable the discharge of functions and duties and such constitutional goals. [968-F-H; 969-A-B] 6.3. Fundamental rights have to be read along with the Chapter on Directive Principles of State Policy and the Fundamental Duties enshrined in Article 51A and not in isolation. Articles 38, 46, 47 and others deal with economic development and social welfare, public health as among its primary duties. These lofty ideals cannot be achieved without controlling the population inasmuch as our materialistic resources are limited and the claimants are many. The concept of sustainable development which emerges as a fundamental duty from the several clauses of Article 51A too dictates the expansion of population being kept within reasonable bounds. The problem of population explosion is a national and global issue and provide justification for priority in policy-oriented legislations wherever needed. Thus, the impugned legislation does not violate right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21 in any of the meanings howsoever expanded the meanings may be. [969-C E; 970-A] Air India v. Nergesh Meerza and Ors., [1981] 4 SCC 335, referred to. Census of India, 2001, Series I, India – Paper I of 2001, p.29; Paper on Population Stabilization by Usha Tandon, Reader, Faculty of Law, Delhi University – Delhi Law Review, VoLXXIII 2001, pp.125-131; Population Policy and the Law, Paper by B.K. Raina, 1992, edited by B.P. Singh Sehgal, p.52; Population Challenge, Article by Arcot Easwaran, The Hindu, dated 8.7.2003, referred to. 7.1. Under Article 25 of the Constitution the freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion is subject to public order, morality and health. Therefore, the Article itself permits a legislation in the interest of social welfare and reform which are obviously part and parcel of public order, national morality and the collective health of the nation’s people. [970-B-C, G] 7.2. It may be permissible for Muslims to enter into four marriages with four women and for anyone whether a Muslim or belonging to any other community or religion to procreate as many children as he likes but no religion in India dictates or mandates as an obligation to enter into bigamy or polygamy or to have children more than one. What is permitted or not prohibited by a religion does not become a religious practice or a positive tenet of a religion. A practice does not acquire the sanction of religion simply because it is permitted. Assuming the practice of having more wives than one or procreating more children than one is a practice followed by any community or group of people the same can be regulated or prohibited by legislation in the interest of public order, morality and health or by any law providing for social welfare and reform. Thus, Sections 175(l)(q) and 177(1) casting disqualification on contesting for or holding an elective office on having more than two children is not violative of Article 25 of the Constitution. [975-B-C; 974-G] The State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali, AIR [1952] Bombay 84; Badruddin v. Aisha Begam, [1957] ALJ 300; Smt. R.A. Pathan v. Director of Technical Education and Ors., [1981] 22 GLR 289 and Ram Prasad Seth v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., AIR [1961] Allahabad 334, approved. Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [1994] 6 SCC 360; Sarla Mudgal (Smt.), President, Kalyani and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [1995] 3 SCC 635; Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and Ors., [1985] 2 SCC 556 and Mohd. Hanif Quareshi and Ors. v. The State of Bihar, [1959] SCR 629, referred to. 8. The disqualification is attracted no sooner a third child is born and is living after two living children. Merely because the couple has parted with one child by giving the child away in adoption, the disqualification does not come to an end. While interpreting the scope of disqualification the evil sought to be cured and purpose sought to be achieved by the enactment must be kept in view. [975-F-G] 9. If the legislature chooses to carve out an exception in favour of females it is free to do so but merely because women are not excepted from the operation of the disqualification it does not render it unconstitutional. [976-B] 10. Hypothetical examples where triplets are born or twins are born on second pregnancy are not normal cases and the validity of the law cannot be tested by applying it to abnormal situations. Exceptions do not make the rule nor render the rule irrelevant. [976-C] CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (C) No. 302 of 2001. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.) WITH C.A. Nos. 5355-5372, 5380, 5381, 5382, 5385, 5386, 5397-5450/2003, W.P. (C) Nos. 269, 316, 315, 329, 362, 363, 258, 403, 395, 420, 438, 475, 507, 508, 495, 567, 560/2001, 559, 561, 538, 539, 579/2001, 19, 30, 32, 1, 49, 50, 79, 94, 130, 93, 127, 144, 169, 168, 128, 177, 112, 71, 91, 178, 184, 2003 AIR 3057, 2003(1 )Suppl.SCR947 , 2003(8 )SCC369 , 2003(5 )SCALE602 , 2003(6 )JT283

  CASE NO.:   Writ Petition (civil) 302 of 2001 PETITIONER:Javed & Ors. RESPONDENT:Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/07/2003 BENCH:R.C. LAHOTI, ASHOK BHAN & ARUN KUMAR. JUDGMENT:   J U D G M E N T     (With C.A. Nos._5355-5372, 5380-5381, 5382, 5385, 5386, 5397-5450/2003 @ SLP(C) Nos. 7527-7528/2001, WP(C) … Continue reading

Building Labour problems – contempt of court =most of the states have not complied with the directions issued by this Court. They had failed to discharge their statutory duties under the provisions of the Building & Other Construction Worker (Regulations of Employment & Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 (for short, `the Act’) and the Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1996 (for short `the Cess Act’), thus, they should be punished for violating the orders of this Court. = audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) has not been conducted of the funds placed at the disposal of the concerned authority. We may also notice that large funds are lying with the said Welfare Boards/authorities, but have not been disbursed. The possibility of these amounts being diverted by the state authority for other heads of expenditure in the respective states/union territories cannot be ruled out. Resultantly, while reiterating our earlier orders, we also issue the following directions for their immediate compliance: a) All the State Welfare Boards shall be subjected to audit by the CAG within two months from today. All the States, Union Territories and the State Boards to initiate the process and ensure its completion under the provisions of Section 27 of the Act. [8]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.6 IN WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.318 OF 2006 National Campaign Committee for Central Legislation on Construction Labour … Petitioner Versus Union of India & Ors. … Respondents WITH Contempt Petition (C) Nos.41/2011 in WP (C) No.318/2006 Contempt Petition (C) Nos.42/2011 in WP (C) No.318/2006 … Continue reading

Muslim Law : Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986: Constitution validity-Act excluded Muslim divorced woman from the provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C.-Further, under S.3 Muslim divorced woman was entitled to reasonable and fair provision and maintenance within the period of iddat by her former husband-Held: The Act is constitutionally valid-Reasonable and fair provision extending beyond the iddat period must be made by the husband within the iddat period-Liability of Muslim husband to pay maintenance to his divorced wife is not confined to iddat period-A divorced Muslim woman, who has not remarried, may proceed against her relatives for her maintenance-If relatives unable to pay maintenance State Wakf Board to pay such maintenance-The Act does not offend Arts. 14, 15 and 21-Constitution of India, 1950 Arts. 14, 15 and 21-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, S.I25. Interpretation of Statutes: Rule of construction-Provisions of a Statute-Possibility of two constructions-Preference of-Held: That construction, if permissible, which makes the Statute effective and operative has to be preferred-Whereas that construction which renders the Statute ultra vires or unconstitutional has to be rejected. Words & Phrases : “Divorce woman”: and “iddat period”-Meaning of-In the context of S.2(a) of the Muslim Woman (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. “Maintenance:, “provision” and “mahr”-Meaning of-In the context of S.3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The Petitioners filed a writ petition before this Court challenging the constitutional validity of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. On behalf of the petitioners it was contended that the Act was un-Islamic, unconstitutional and it undermined the secular character which was the basic feature of the Constitution; that there was no rhyme or reason to deprive the Muslim women from the applicability of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and consequently the Act must be held to be discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance for the divorced Muslim woman had been provided under Section 3 of the Act; that personal law was a legitimate basis for discrimination; that the Act was good enough to take care of the vagrancy of Muslim divorced woman; that the interpretation of the Act should be in consonance with the Muslim Personal Law; that the social ethos of the Muslims should be borne in mind while interpreting the Act; that the Act resolved all issues and, therefore, the Act was not invalid or unconstitutional. =Dismissing the petition, the Court HELD : 1. In interpreting the provisions where matrimonial relationship is involved, one has to consider the social conditions prevalent in the Indian society. In Indian society, whether one belongs to the majority or the minority group, what is apparent is that there exists a great disparity in the matter of economic resourcefulness between a man and a woman. Indian society is male dominated both economically and socially and women are assigned, invariably, a dependent role, irrespective of the class of society to which she belongs. A woman on her marriage very often, though highly educated, gives up her all other avocations and entirely devotes herself to the welfare of the family, in particular she shares with her husband, her emotions, sentiments, mind and body , and her investment in the marriage is her entire life – a sacramental sacrifice of her individual self and is far too enormous to be measured in terms of money. When a relationship of this nature breaks up, in what manner one could compensate her so far as emotional fracture or loss of investment is concerned, there can be no answer,. It is a small solace to say that such a woman should be compensated in terms of money towards her livehood and such a relief which partakes basic human rights to secure gender and social justice is universally recognised by persons belonging to all religions and it is difficult to perceive that Muslim law intends to provide a different kind of responsibility by passing on the same to those unconnected with the matrimonial life such as the heirs who were likely to inherit the property from her or the Wakf Boards. Such an approach appears to be a kind of distortion of the social facts. Solutions to such societal problems of universal magnitude pertaining to horizons of basic human rights, culture, dignity and decency of life and dictates of necessity in the pursuit of social justice should be invariably left to be decided on considerations other than religion or religious faith or beliefs or national, sectarian, racial or communal constraints. Bearing this aspect in mind, one has to interpret the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 in question. [435-B-G] 2. The provisions of the Act would indicate that a divorced woman is entitled to a reasonable and fair provisions for maintenance. The word `provision’ indicates that something is provided in advance for meeting some needs. In other words, at the time of divorce the Muslim husband is required to contemplate the future needs and make preparatory arrangements in advance for meeting those needs. Reasonable and fair provision may include provision for her residence, her food, her cloths and other articles. The Act would mean that on or before the expiration of the iddat period, the husband is bound to make and pay maintenance to the wife and if he fails do so then the wife is entitled to recover it by filing an application before the Magistrate as provided in Section 3(3); but nowhere the Parliament has provided that reasonable and fair maintenance is limited only for the iddat period and not beyond it. It would extend to the whole life of the divorced wife unless she gets married for a second time. [439- A-D] 3.1. The provisions of the Act depriving the divorced Muslim woman of a right to maintenance from her husband providing for her maintenance to be paid by the former husband only for the period of iddat and thereafter to make her run from pillar to post in search of her relatives one after the other and ultimately to knock at the doors of the Wakf Board does not appear to be reasonable and fair substitute of the provisions of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Such deprivation of the divorced Muslim women of their right to maintenance from their former husbands under the beneficial provisions of the Code which are otherwise available to all other women in India cannot be stated to have been effected by a reasonable, right, just and fair law and, if these provisions are less beneficial than the provisions of Chapter IX of the Code, a divorced Muslim woman has obviously been unreasonably discriminated against and has got out of the protection of the provisions of the general law as indicated under the Code which are available to Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian women or women belonging to any other community. The provisions prima facie, therefore, appear to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution mandating equality and equal protection of law to all persons otherwise similarly circumstanced and discrimination on the ground of religion as the act would obviously apply to Muslim divorced women only and solely on the ground of their belonging to the Muslim religion. [442-E- H] 3.2. It is well settled that on a rule of construction a given statute will become `ultra vires or `unconstitutional’ and, therefore, void, whereas on another rule of construction which is permissible, the statute remains effective and operative the court will prefer the latter on the ground that Legislature does not intend to enact unconstitutional laws. The latter interpretation should be accepted and, therefore, this interpretation results in upholding the validity of the Act. It is well settled that when by appropriate reading of an enactment the validity of the Act can be upheld, such interpretation is accepted by courts and not the other way. [443-A-B] 4. While upholding the validity of the Act, the conclusions are summed up as follows : (a) A Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of the divorced wife, which obviously includes her maintenance as well. Such a reasonable and fair provision extending beyond the iddat period must be made by the husband within the iddat period in terms of Section 3(1)(a) of the act. (b) Liability of Muslim husband to his divorced wife arising under Section 3(l)(a) of the Act to pay maintenance is not confined to iddat period. [444-G-H] (c) A divorced Muslim woman who has not remarried and who is not able to maintain herself after the iddat period can proceed as provided under Section 4 of the Act against her relatives who are liable to maintain her in proportion to the properties which they inherit on her death according to Muslim law from such divorced woman including her children and parents. If any of the relatives being unable to pay maintenance, the Magistrate may direct the State Wakf Board established under the Act to pay such maintenance. (d) The provisions of the Act do not offend Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India. [445-A-B] Mohd Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, [1985] 2 SCC 556; Bai Tahira v. ALi Hussain Fidaalli Chothia, [1979] 2 SCC 316; Fuzlunbi v. K. Khader Vali, [1980] 4 SCC 125; Aga Mahomed Jaffer Bindaneem v. Koulsom Bee Bee, 241A 196; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, [1985] 3 SCC 545 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 1 SCC 248, referred to. Arab Ahmadhia Abdulla v. Arab Bail Mohmuna Saiyadhbhai, AIR (1988) (Guj) 141; Ali v. Sufaira, [1988] 3 Crimes 147, K. Kunhashed Hazi v. Amma, (1995) Crl. L.J. 337; K. Zunaideen v. Ameena Begum, (1998) II DMC 468, Karim Abdul Shaik v. Shenaz, Karim Shaik, (2000) Crl. L.J. 3560, Jaitunbi Mubarak Shaikh v. Mubarak Fakruddhi Shaikh, (1999) M.L.J. 694 and Kaka v. Hassan Bano, II (1998) DMC 85 (Pun) (FB), approved. Umar Khan Bahamami v. Fathimnurisa, (1990) Cr. L.J. 1364; Abdul Rashid v. Sultana Begum, [1992] Cr.L.J. 76; Abdul Haq v. Yasima Talat, (1998) Cr. L.J. 3433 and Md. Marahim v. Raiza Begum, (1993) 1 DMC 60, overruled. CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (C) No. 868 of 1986. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. WITH W.P.(C) Nos. 996, 1001,1055, 1062, 1236, 1259, 1281/86, TC. (C) No. 22/87, 86, 68/88, T.P. (C) No. 276-77/87, Crl. A. No. 702/90, SLP (Crl.) Nos. 655/88, 596-97/92, W.P. (C) No. 12273/84 SLP (Crl.) No. 2513/94, Crl. A. Nos. 508, 843/95, 102-103/89, 292/90, SLP(Crl.) Nos. 2165/96, 3786, 2462/99. =2001 AIR 3958, 2001( 3 )Suppl.SCR 419, 2001( 7 )SCC 740, 2001( 6 )SCALE537 , 2001( 8 )JT 218

CASE NO.: Writ Petition (civil) 868 of 1986 PETITIONER: DANIAL LATIFI & ANR. RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/09/2001 BENCH: G.B.PATTANAIK & S.RAJENDRA BABU & D.P.MOHAPATRA & DORAISWAMY RAJU & S.V.PATIL JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT With [WP(C) Nos. 996/86, 1001/86, 1055/86, 1062/86, 1236/86, 1259/86, 1281/86, T.C. (C) 22/87, 86/88, 68/88, T.P. (C) No. 276-77/87, Crl. … Continue reading

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