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“Freedom Fighters Pension Scheme= the petitioners claimed that they took part in the freedom movement and were, therefore, entitled to the benefits which the Government has announced with the proclamation of the “Freedom Fighters Pension Scheme”. = In the present case, it is stated at the cost of the repetition that apart from the affidavits of other freedom fighters, no other document is produced. 24. We, thus, allow these appeals and set aside the orders of the High Court and dismiss the Writ Petitions filed by the respondents. No costs.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40741 [REPORTABLE] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 7899-7901/2013 (arising out of S.L.P.(Civil) Nos.26441-26443 of 2012) State of Maharashtra & Ors. ……….Appellants Vs. Namdeo etc.etc. ………Respondents J U D G M E N T A.K.SIKRI,J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The three respondents herein were the … Continue reading
Appointment of Special police officers from ex-service men = whether this court can compel the State of Punjab to create posts and absorb the appellants into the services of the State on a permanent basis consistent with the Constitution Bench decision of this court in Umadevi’s case. = The appellants herein assert that all the appellants are ex- servicemen and registered with the employment exchange. They were recruited as Special Police Officers.[2] = i) That it will not be possible to provide police guard to banks unless the Banks were willing to pay for the same and additional force could be arranged on that basis, it was decided that police guards should be requisitioned by the Banks for their biggest branches located at the Distt. and Sub Divisional towns. They should place the requisition with the Distt. SSPs endorsing a copy of IG CID. In the requisition, they should clearly state that the costs of guard would be met by them. It will then be for the police department to get additional force sanctioned. This task should be done on a top priority. In the meantime depending upon the urgency of the need of any particular branch, police Deptt. may provide from police strength for its protection. ii) For all other branches guards will be provided by Distt. SSP after selecting suitable ex-servicemen or other able bodied persons who will be appointed as Special Police Officer in terms of Section 17 of the Police Act. Preference may be given to persons who may already be in possession of licence weapons. All persons appointed as SPO for this purpose will be given a brief training for about 7 days in the Police Lines in the handling of weapons taking suitable position for protection of branches. These SPOs will work under the discipline and control and as per Police Act, they will have the same powers, privileges and protection and shall be amenable to same penalty as an ordinary police personnel.”= The other factor which the State is required to keep in mind while creating or abolishing posts is the financial implications involved in such a decision. The creation of posts necessarily means additional financial burden on the exchequer of the State. Depending upon the priorities of the State, the allocation of the finances is no doubt exclusively within the domain of the Legislature. However in the instant case creation of new posts would not create any additional financial burden to the State as the various banks at whose disposal the services of each of the appellants is made available have agreed to bear the burden. If absorbing the appellants into the services of the State and providing benefits at par with the police officers of similar rank employed by the State results in further financial commitment it is always open for the State to demand the banks to meet such additional burden. Apparently no such demand has ever been made by the State. The result is – the various banks which avail the services of these appellants enjoy the supply of cheap labour over a period of decades. It is also pertinent to notice that these banks are public sector banks. We are of the opinion that neither the Government of Punjab nor these public sector banks can continue such a practice consistent with their obligation to function in accordance with the Constitution. Umadevi’s judgment cannot become a licence for exploitation by the State and its instrumentalities. For all the abovementioned reasons, we are of the opinion that the appellants are entitled to be absorbed in the services of the State. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The judgments under appeal are set aside. We direct the State of Punjab to regularise the services of the appellants by creating necessary posts within a period of three months from today. Upon such regularisation, the appellants would be entitled to all the benefits of services attached to the post which are similar in nature already in the cadre of the police services of the State. We are of the opinion that the appellants are entitled to the costs throughout. In the circumstances, we quantify the costs to Rs.10,000/- to be paid to each of the appellants.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40625 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1059 OF 2005 Nihal Singh & Others …Appellants Versus State of Punjab & Others …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6315 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 12448 of 2009) Bhupinder Singh & Others …Appellants Versus … Continue reading
Price fixation Notifications dated 30th April, 2009 and 17th November, 2009 whereby the Government had fixed the prices of “Doxofylline formulations” in exercise of power conferred under paras 9 and 11 of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as ‘DPCO, 1995’ for short).= Bench affirmed the order dated 19th May, 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in W.P.(C)No.10277 with W.P. (C)No.12958 of 2009 and dismissed the appeals preferred by the appellants. Learned Single Judge set aside the Notifications aforesaid and held that ‘Doxofylline’ is not a bulk drug within the meaning ascribed to it under para 2(a) of the DPCO, 1995. The Technical Committee decided to seek the experts opinion of the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore (IISc for short) on whether ‘Doxofylline’ is a derivative of ‘scheduled bulk drug’ Theophylline. The IISc, Bangalore, vide their letter dated 23rd January, 2009, informed the appellants that ‘Doxofylline’, is in fact, a derivative of scheduled bulk drug – Theophylline. = In this view of the matter and having regard to the facts that we have held that Doxofylline is derivative of Theophylline, a bulk drug, and Doxofylline in any formulation comes within the definition of scheduled formulation, we hold that it is well within the jurisdiction of the Government to fix the ceiling price of Doxofylline formulation under para 9 or para 11 of DPCO, 1995. Therefore, interference with Notification (s) both dated 30th April, 2009 and 17th November, 2009 is uncalled for. Consequently, the appeals are allowed; the judgments and orders dated 19th May, 2010 and 15th March, 2011 passed respectively by the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court are set aside. The writ petitions preferred by the respondents in the High Court are dismissed. The parties shall bear their own cost.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40521 Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5117 OF 2013 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO.11107 OF 2012) UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER … APPELLANTS VERUS M/S. SWISS GARNIER LIFE SCIENCES & ORS. … RESPONDENTS WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5118 OF 2013 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) … Continue reading
Declaring sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 as ultra vires the Constitution.=The result of our aforesaid discussion is that the affirmative words used in Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e) confer power on Parliament to make one law laying down the same disqualifications for a person who is to be chosen as member of either House of Parliament or as a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State and for a person who is a sitting member of a House of Parliament or a House of the State Legislature and the words in Articles 101(3)(a) and 190(3)(a) of the Constitution put express limitations on such powers of the Parliament to defer the date on which the disqualifications would have effect. Accordingly, sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act which carves out a saving in the case of sitting members of Parliament or State Legislature from the disqualifications under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act or which defers the date on which the disqualification will take effect in the case of a sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature is beyond the powers conferred on Parliament by the Constitution. Looking at the affirmative terms of Articles 102(1)(e) and 191(1)(e) of the Constitution, we hold that Parliament has been vested with the powers to make law laying down the same disqualifications for person to be chosen as a member of Parliament or a State Legislature and for a sitting member of a House of Parliament or a House of a State Legislature. We also hold that the provisions of Article 101(3)(a) and 190(3)(a) of the Constitution expressly prohibit Parliament to defer the date from which the disqualification will come into effect in case of a sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature. Parliament, therefore, has exceeded its powers conferred by the Constitution in enacting sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act and accordingly subsection (4) of Section 8 of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution.;Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the conviction continues to operate. But where the conviction itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay. An order of stay, of course, does not render the conviction non-existent, but only nonoperative. Be that as it may. Insofar as the present case is concerned, an application was filed specifically seeking stay of the order of conviction specifying the consequences if conviction was not stayed, that is, the appellant would incur disqualification to contest the election. The High Court after considering the special reason, granted the order staying the conviction. As the conviction itself is stayed in contrast to a stay of execution of the sentence, it is not possible to accept the contention of the respondent that the disqualification arising out of conviction continues to operate even after stay of conviction. In the aforesaid case, a contention was raised by the respondents that the appellant was disqualified from contesting the election to the Legislative Assembly under sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Act as he had been convicted for an offence punishable under Sections 366 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code and it was held by the three-Judge Bench that as the High Court for special reasons had passed an order staying the conviction, the disqualification arising out of the conviction ceased to operate after the stay of conviction. Therefore, the disqualification under sub-section (1), (2) or (3) of Section 8 of the Act will not operate from the date of order of stay of conviction passed by the Appellate Court under Section 389 of the Code or the High Court under Section 482 of the Code.;whether our declaration in this judgment that sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act is ultra vires the Constitution should affect disqualifications already incurred under subsections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act by sitting members of Parliament and State Legislatures who have filed appeals or revisions against their conviction within a period of three months and their appeals and revisions are still pending before the concerned court. =However, if any sitting member of Parliament or a State Legislature is convicted of any of the offences mentioned in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act and by virtue of such conviction and/or sentence suffers the disqualifications mentioned in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of the Act after the pronouncement of this judgment, his membership of Parliament or the State Legislature, as the case may be, will not be saved by subsection (4) of Section 8 of the Act which we have by this judgment declared as ultra vires the Constitution notwithstanding that he files the appeal or revision against the conviction and /or sentence.; whether a person, who is confined in prison, whether under a sentence of imprisonment or transportation or otherwise, or is in the lawful custody of the police is not entitled to vote by virtue of sub-section (5) of Section 62 of the 1951 Act and accordingly is not an “elector” and is, therefore, not qualified to contest elections to the House of People or the Legislative Assembly of a State because of the provisions in Sections 4 and 5 of the 1951 Act. By the impugned common order, the Patna High Court accepted this contention in the writ petitions and held: “A right to vote is a statutory right, the Law gives it, the Law takes it away. Persons convicted of crime are kept away from elections to the Legislature, whether to State Legislature or Parliament, and all other public elections. The Court has no hesitation in interpreting the Constitution and the Laws framed under it, read together, that persons in the lawful custody of the Police also will not be voters, in which case, they will neither be electors. The Law temporarily takes away the power of such persons to go anywhere near the election scene. To vote is a statutory right. It is privilege to vote, which privilege may be taken away. In that case, the elector would not be qualified, even if his name is on the electoral rolls. The name is not struck off, but the qualification to be an elector and the privilege to vote when in the lawful custody of the police is taken away.” – a person who has no right to vote by virtue of the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 62 of the 1951 Act is not an elector and is therefore not qualified to contest the election to the House of the People or the Legislative Assembly of a State.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40545 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 490 OF 2005 Lily Thomas … Petitioner Versus Union of India & Ors. … Respondents WITH WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 231 OF 2005 Lok Prahari, through its General Secretary S.N. Shukla … Petitioner Versus Union of India & … Continue reading
Non- official as co – accused can be prosecuted along with other official accused by Special court = Admittedly, 2G Scam case is triable by the Special Judge against the persons accused of offences punishable under the PC Act in view of subSection (1) of Section 4. The Special Judge alone can take the cognizance of the offence specified in sub Section (1) of Section 3 and conspiracy in relation to them. While trying any case, the Special Judge may also try an offence other than the offence specified in subSection (1) of Section 3, in view of subSection (3) of Section 4. A magistrate cannot take cognizance of offence as specified in Section 3(1) of the PC Act. In this background, as the petitioners have been shown as coaccused in second supplementary chargesheet filed in 2G Scam case, it is open to the Special Judge to take cognizance of the offence under Section 120B and Section 420 IPC.- the Special Judge while trying the co accused of an offence punishable under the provisions of the Act as also an offence punishable under Section 120B read with Section 420 IPC has the jurisdiction to try the appellant also for the offence punishable under Section 120B read with Section 420 IPC applying the principles incorporated in Section 223 of the Code.; In the present case there is nothing on the record to suggest that the petitioners will not get fair trial and may face miscarriage of justice. In absence of any such threat & miscarriage of justice, no interference is called for against the impugned order taking cognizance of the offence against the petitioners. On 11th April, 2001, when the 2G Scam Case was taken up by this Court, this Court, inter alia, observed as follows: “Acting on such basis, this Court has given directions for establishing a separate Special Court to try this case and pursuant to such direction, a Special Court has been constituted after following the due procedure. We also make it clear that any objection about appointment of Special Public Prosecutor or his assistant advocates or any prayer for staying or impeding the progress of the Trial can be made only before this Court and no other court shall entertain the same. The trial must proceed on a dayto day basis. All these directions are given by this Court in exercise of its power under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution and in the interest of holding a fair prosecution of the case.” From the aforesaid order it is clear that this Court passed the order under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution, in the interest of holding a fair prosecution of the case. – In Rupa Asbhok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and another, (2002) 4 SCC 388, this Court held that a final judgment or order passed by this Court cannot be assailed in an application under Article 32 of the Constitution by an aggrieved person, whether he was a party to the case or not. For the said reason also, it is not open to the petitioner to indirectly assail the order passed by this Court in 2G Scam case. 30. We find no merit in these writ petitions, they are accordingly dismissed. The Special Court is expected to proceed with the trial on daytoday basis to ensure early disposal of the trial. There shall be no order as to costs.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40469 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (C) No. 57 OF 2012 ESSAR TELEHOLDINGS LTD. … PETITIONER Versus REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT & ORS. … RESPONDENTS With WRIT PETITION (C) No. 59 OF 2012 LOOP TELECOM LTD. … PETITIONER Versus REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT & ORS. … RESPONDENTS With WRIT PETITION (C) No. 96 OF 2012 VIKASH SARAF … PETITIONER Versus REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT & ORS. … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 21st December, 2011 passed by the Special Judge, Central 1Page 2 Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi taking cognizance against the petitioners, they … Continue reading
PROLOGUE : “Child Sexual Abuse happens because the system of silence around the act perpetuates it.” “Child Sexual Abuse represses children; the repression of children is unlikely to create a flourishing society, economically, emotionally, equally or spiritually”. [‘Bitter Chocolate’ – Child Sexual Abuse in India by Pinki Virani – Penguin Books – 2000] 2.Indian Scenario : 2.1.In order to examine the incidence of sexual abuse among child respondents, the questionnaire was administered to 12,447 children belonging to the five different categories including children in family environment, children in schools, children in institutions, children at work and street children. The study looked into four severe forms and five other forms of sexual abuse. Out of the total child respondents, 53.22% reported having faced one or more forms of sexual abuse that included severe and other forms. Among them 52.94% were boys and 47.06% girls. The age wise distribution of children reporting sexual abuse in one or more forms showed that though the abuse started at the age of 5 years, it gained momentum 10 years onward, peaking at 12 to 15 years and then starting to decline. This means that children in the teenage years are most vulnerable. [Sexual Abuse of Children : (para 6.2)] 2.2.Out of the total child respondents, 20.90% were subjected to severe forms of sexual abuse that included sexual assault, making the child fondle private parts, making the child exhibit private body parts and being photographed in the nude. Out of these 57.30% were boys and 42.70% were girls. Over one fifth of these children faced more than three forms of sexual abuse. Amongst these sexually abused children, 39.58% were in the age group of 5-12 years, 35.59% in the age group of 15-18 years and 24.83% in the age group of 13- 14 years. [Severe forms of sexual abuse :(para 6.2.1)] 2.3.From the data available, an analysis of severe forms of sexual abuse arranged age-wise revealed that sexual abuse crossed the 5% mark from the age of 10 years, peaked at 15 years and by the time the child reached 18 years, went below the 5% mark. 73% of the total incidence of child sexual abuse was reported among children between 11 and 18 years of age. Therefore the pre-adolescent to the adolescent child seems to be most at risk. It is also disturbing to note that children between 6 and 10 years also face severe forms of sexual abuse. [Study on Child Abuse : India 2007 : Ministry of Women and Child Development, Government of India : Pages 74, 75 and 76]
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED: 07/03/2012 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.CHANDRU W.P.(MD)No.8355 of 2011 and W.P.(MD)No.12572 of 2011 and M.P.(MD)No.1 of 2011 M.Veersamy .. Petitioner in both writ petitions Vs. 1.State of Tamilnadu, represented by Home Secretary, Secretariat, Fort St. George, Chennai. 2.District Collector, Madurai District, Collectorate, Madurai. 3.Superintendent … Continue reading
Petitioners are facing trial in the said case. Their statements under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been recorded and the trial is at the stage of argument. At this stage, petitioners have filed these writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and their prayer is to quash the prosecution primarily on the ground of violation of their fundamental right of speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. “(1) The dictum in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 is correct and still holds the field. (2) The propositions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 adequately take care of right to speedy trial. We uphold and reaffirm the said propositions.” Hence, in my opinion, the trial cannot be terminated merely on the ground of delay without considering the reasons thereof. My learned and noble brother has gone into the reasons for delay and I agree with him that the facts of the present case do not justify quashing of the prosecution.
In the Supreme Court of India Criminal WRIT Jurisdiction Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 200 OF 2011 Ranjan Dwivedi …Petitioner(s) Versus C.B.I., Through the Director General …Respondent(s) With Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 205 OF 2011 Ac. Sudevananda Avadhuta …Petitioner(s) Versus C.B.I., Through the Director General …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T H. L. … Continue reading
MP AMENDMENT TO THE STAMP ACT RESTRICTING THE EXECTUION OF POWER OF ATTIRNEY TO THIRD PARTIES TO AVOID STAMP DUTY WHEN CHALLANGED IN HIGH COURT IT DECLARES AS VOID, THE APEX COURT SET ASIDE THE HIGH COURT ORDER AND UPHELD THAT THE AMENDMENT IS VALID= While dealing with constitutional validity of a taxation law enacted by Parliament or State Legislature, the court must have regard to the following principles: (i), there is always presumption in favour of constitutionality of a law made by Parliament or a State Legislature (ii), no enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable or irrational but some constitutional infirmity has to be found (iii), the court is not concerned with the wisdom or unwisdom, the justice or injustice of the law as the Parliament and State Legislatures are supposed to be alive to the needs of the people whom they represent and they are the best judge of the community by whose suffrage they come into existence (iv), hardship is not relevant in pronouncing on the constitutional validity of a fiscal statute or economic law and (v), in the field of taxation, the Legislature enjoys greater latitude for classification. 30. Had the High Court kept in view the above well-known and important principles in law, it would not have declared Clause (d), Article 45 of Schedule 1-A as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution being arbitrary, unreasonable and irrational while holding that the provision may pass test of classification. By creating two categories, namely, an agent who is a blood relation, i.e. father, mother, wife or husband, son or daughter, brother or sister and an agent other than the kith and kin, without consideration, the Legislature has sought to curb inappropriate mode of transfer of immovable properties. Ordinarily, where executant himself is unable, for any reason, to execute the document, he would appoint his kith and kin as his power of attorney to complete the transaction on his behalf. If one does not have any kith or kin who he can appoint as power of attorney, he may execute the conveyance himself. The legislative idea behind Clause (d), Article 45 of Schedule 1-A is to curb tendency of transferring immovable properties through power of attorney and inappropriate documentation. By making a provision like this, the State Government has sought to collect stamp duty on such indirect and inappropriate mode of transfer by providing that power of attorney given to a person other than kith or kin, without consideration, authorizing such person to sell immovable property situated in Madhya Pradesh will attract stamp duty at two per cent on the market value of the property which is subject matter of power of attorney. In effect, by bringing in this law, the Madhya Pradesh State Legislature has sought to levy stamp duty on such ostensible document, the real intention of which is the transfer of immovable property. The classification, thus, cannot be said to be without any rationale. It has a direct nexus to the object of the 1899 Act. The conclusion of the High Court, therefore, that the impugned provision is arbitrary, unreasonable and irrational is unsustainable. 31. Consequently, these appeals are allowed and the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court passed on September 15, 2003 is set aside. Writ petitions filed by the present respondents before the High Court stand dismissed. No order as to costs.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 684 OF 2004 State of M.P. …. Appellant Versus Rakesh Kohli & Anr. ….Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1270 OF 2004 JUDGMENT R.M. Lodha, J. The only point for consideration here is, whether or not the Division Bench … Continue reading
The Department of Medical and Family Welfare, Government of Chhattisgarh, vide its letter dated 10th September, 2010 cancelled the admission granted to Akansha Adile and Priya Gupta in the MBBS course for the academic year 2006-07 in the Government NMDC Medical College, Jagdalpur (for short, the Jagdalpur College) with immediate effect.Accordingly, we order as follows: – 1. Though, we find no merit in the appeal preferred by the appellants and the judgment of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity, still, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we permit the appellants to complete their MBBS course as general candidates in the Government Medical College, Jagdalpur, subject to their paying a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs each, within one week from today. 2. In the event of default of payment or failure to file proof of payment in the Registry of this Court, not only will the present appeal stand dismissed on merits, but we also direct that the exam results of the defaulting appellant will not be declared, they will not be conferred with the degree of MBBS by the Jagdalpur College and the Medical Council of India shall not register their names on the rolls maintained by it or the State Council, as the case may be. 3. For the reasons afore-stated, if their admissions are cancelled, there being no claimants for these seats, the seats will go waste and the entire expenditure incurred by the State would also be wasted. After so many years, it would be an exercise in futility to cancel their admissions, which, but for the interim orders, could be avoided. An undue advantage from the interim orders has accrued in favour of the appellants. With all the humility at our command, we request the High Courts to ensure strict adherence to the prescribed time schedule, process of selection and to the rule of merit. We reiterate what has been stated by this Court earlier, that except in very exceptional cases, the High Court may consider it appropriate to decline interim orders and hear the main petitions finally, subject to convenience of the Court. We may refer the dictum of this Court in the case of Medical Council of India v. Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences [(2004) 6 SCC 76, para 14] in this regard. 4. We have categorically returned a finding that all the relevant stakeholders have failed to perform their duty/obligation in accordance with law. Where the time schedules have not been complied with, and rule of merit has been defeated, there nepotism and manipulation have prevailed. The stands of various authorities are at variance with each other and none admits to fault. Thus, it is imperative for this Court to ensure proper implementation of judgments of this Court and the regulations of the Medical Council of India as well as not to overlook the arbitrary and colourable exercise of power by the concerned authorities/colleges. 5. Therefore, we hereby direct initiation of proceedings against the following under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Let notice be issued to the following, to show cause why they be not punished in accordance with law. a. Additional Secretary, Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Union of India. b. Dr. S.L. Adile, Director, Medical Education. c. Dean of the Jagdalpur College. d. Dr. M.S. Banjan, Member of the Selection Committee. e. Dr. P.D. Agarwal, Member of the Selection Committee. f. Shri Padmakar Sasane, Member of the Selection Committee. g. Director General, Directorate of Health Services, Union of India. 5. Notice be issued returnable in two weeks, on which day the matter shall be listed before this Court. Registry shall maintain separate file for that purpose. 6. All concerned authorities are hereby directed to carry out the directions and orders contained in this judgment, particularly paragraphs 30 and 31 of the judgment forthwith. The directions shall be applicable for the academic year 2012-2013 itself. 54. A copy of this judgment shall be sent to all concerned authorities, forthwith, for strict compliance and adherence, without demur and default. 55. Both the appeals are disposed of with the above directions.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4318 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.27089 of 2011) Priya Gupta … Appellant Versus State of Chhatishgarh & Ors. … Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4319 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 29306 of 2011) J U D … Continue reading
There is a vast difference between Muslim Wakfs and Trusts created by Muslims. The basic difference is that Wakf properties are dedicated to God and the “Wakif” or dedicator, does not retain any title over the Wakf properties. As far as Trusts are concerned, the properties are not vested in God. Some of the objects of such Trusts are for running charitable organisations such as hospitals, shelter homes, orphanages and charitable dispensaries, which acts, though recognized as pious, do not divest the author of the Trust from the title of the properties in the Trust, unless he relinquishes such title in favour of the Trust or the Trustees. At times, the dividing line between Public Trusts and Wakfs may be thin, but the main factor always is that while Wakf properties vest in God Almighty, the Trust properties do not vest in God and the trustees in terms of Deed of Trust are entitled to deal with the same for the benefit of the Trust and its beneficiaries. 29. In the present case, the difference between Trusts and Wakfs appear to have been overlooked and the High Court has passed orders without taking into consideration the fact that the Charity Commissioner would not ordinarily have any jurisdiction to manage the Wakf properties. 30. In these circumstances, in our view, it would be in the interest of all concerned to maintain the status quo and to restrain all those in management of the Wakf properties from alienating and/or encumbering the Wakf properties during the pendency of the proceedings before this Court. The order of the High Court staying the operation of its judgment has led to the revival of interim orders which have rendered such stay otiose. The said order of stay cannot also be continued during the pendency of these proceedings in its present form. 31. Accordingly, at this stage, we direct that in relation to Wakf properties, as distinct from Trusts created by Muslims, all concerned, including the Charity Commissioner, Mumbai, shall not permit any of the persons in management of such Wakf properties to either encumber or alienate any of the properties under their management, till a decision is rendered in the pending Special Leave Petitions.
REPORTABLE | | IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) Nos.31288-31290 of 2011 Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs … Petitioner Vs. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla & Ors. … Respondents WITH SLP(C) Nos.32129-32131 of 2011, SLP(C) No.32636 of 2011, SLP(C) No.35196 of 2011 AND SLP(C) No.35198 … Continue reading
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