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Writ

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Or. 40, rule 1 CPC – Appointment of interim receiver is not maintainable as the petitioner received the amount from the respondent to put a stop to the litigation and on the other hand the respondent is in possession of property = during the pendency of these proceedings, the second respondent sold the property in favour of respondent nos. 4 and 5 by sale deed dated 11.07.2006. It appears that the Sub-Registrar on inspection of the disputed plot found that there were two constructed duplex and two more near completion as on the date of inspection i.e. on 13.03.2007 of which one was occupied by respondent no.4.= It must be remembered that the instant proceedings arise out of the interlocutory proceedings seeking appointment of the receiver at the instance of the petitioner herein. Having regard to the fact that respondent no.4 was in possession of the property in dispute at least since 13.03.2007 admittedly and also having regard to the fact that the petitioner received an amount of Rs.6,50,000/- we do not see any justification for the appointment of the receiver. We see no reason to interfere with the judgment under appeal. We accordingly dismiss the special leave petition.

PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40573   NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(C) NO. 13255 OF 2012 Satya Pal Anand …Petitioner Versus Punjabi Housing Co-operative Society & Others …Respondents J U D G M E N T Chelameswar, J. 1. This petition arises out of the final judgment and order dated 03.08.2011 … Continue reading

Non- official as co – accused can be prosecuted along with other official accused by Special court = Admittedly, 2G Scam case is triable by the Special Judge against the persons accused of offences punishable under the PC Act in view of sub­Section (1) of Section 4. The Special Judge alone can take the cognizance of the offence specified in sub­ Section (1) of Section 3 and conspiracy in relation to them. While trying any case, the Special Judge may also try an offence other than the offence specified in sub­Section (1) of Section 3, in view of sub­Section (3) of Section 4. A magistrate cannot take cognizance of offence as specified in Section 3(1) of the PC Act. In this background, as the petitioners have been shown as co­accused in second­ supplementary chargesheet filed in 2G Scam case, it is open to the Special Judge to take cognizance of the offence under Section 120­B and Section 420 IPC.- the Special Judge while trying the co­ accused of an offence punishable under the provisions of the Act as also an offence punishable under Section 120­B read with Section 420 IPC has the jurisdiction to try the appellant also for the offence punishable under Section 120­B read with Section 420 IPC applying the principles incorporated in Section 223 of the Code.; In the present case there is nothing on the record to suggest that the petitioners will not get fair trial and may face miscarriage of justice. In absence of any such threat & miscarriage of justice, no interference is called for against the impugned order taking cognizance of the offence against the petitioners. On 11th April, 2001, when the 2G Scam Case was taken up by this Court, this Court, inter alia, observed as follows: “Acting on such basis, this Court has given directions for establishing a separate Special Court to try this case and pursuant to such direction, a Special Court has been constituted after following the due procedure. We also make it clear that any objection about appointment of Special Public Prosecutor or his assistant advocates or any prayer for staying or impeding the progress of the Trial can be made only before this Court and no other court shall entertain the same. The trial must proceed on a day­to­ day basis. All these directions are given by this Court in exercise of its power under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution and in the interest of holding a fair prosecution of the case.” From the aforesaid order it is clear that this Court passed the order under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution, in the interest of holding a fair prosecution of the case. – In Rupa Asbhok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra and another, (2002) 4 SCC 388, this Court held that a final judgment or order passed by this Court cannot be assailed in an application under Article 32 of the Constitution by an aggrieved person, whether he was a party to the case or not. For the said reason also, it is not open to the petitioner to indirectly assail the order passed by this Court in 2G Scam case. 30. We find no merit in these writ petitions, they are accordingly dismissed. The Special Court is expected to proceed with the trial on day­to­day basis to ensure early disposal of the trial. There shall be no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40469 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (C) No. 57 OF 2012 ESSAR TELEHOLDINGS LTD. … PETITIONER Versus REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT  & ORS.  … RESPONDENTS With WRIT PETITION (C) No. 59 OF 2012 LOOP TELECOM LTD.  … PETITIONER Versus REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT  & ORS.      … RESPONDENTS With WRIT PETITION (C) No. 96 OF 2012 VIKASH SARAF … PETITIONER Versus REGISTRAR GENERAL, DELHI HIGH COURT  & ORS.  … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Feeling   aggrieved   by   the   order   dated   21st December, 2011 passed by the Special Judge, Central 1Page 2 Bureau of Investigation, New Delhi taking cognizance against   the   petitioners,   they   … Continue reading

Divorced Muslim wife petition for maintenance under sec.125 Cr.P.C. is directed to be converted suo-moto by Magistrate and directed to decided the same under MWP ACT = i. That divorced muslim wife would be entitled to maintenance from her husband under section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code subject to provisions of MWP Act. ii. That law laid down by the Apex Court in Saha Bano’s case (Supra) [Mohammad Ahamad Khan Vs. Saha Bano Begam AIR1985 SC 945: (1985)2 SCC 556] has been analyzed and codified the same in Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986. iii. In Dainial Latifi’s case (Supra) The validity of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 has been upheld. iv. In view of provisions contained in section of 5 of MWP Act if the parties have exercised their option, the parties to be governed by provisions of Section 125 to 128 of Criminal Procedure Code, and not in accordance with the provisions contained in MWP Act. The application so given under MWP Act shall be disposed of in view of the provisions contained in Section 125-128 Cr.P.C. v. In section 125 the word ‘ Divorced women’ include muslim women, who has been married accord to Muslim Law and has been divorced by or has obtained divorce from her husband in accordance with Muslim Law. vi. That MWP Act will not apply to a muslim women whose marriage has been solemnized either under the Indian Special Marriage Act 1954 or a Muslim women whose marriage was dissolved either under Indian Divorce Act, 1969 or Indian Special Marriage Act, 1954. vii. When a petition is filed by divorced muslim women for her maintenance before a family court, section 7 of the Family Court Act, 1987 would be applied. In view of of section 20 of Family Courts Act 1984, the provisions of Family Courts Act shall have overriding effect over all other law for the time being in force including the provisions of MWP Act . Any suit or proceeding for maintenance filed before family Court by any women including muslim women be governed by provisions of Section 125 Cr.P.C, which is a common law applicable to all the women and thus Family Courts are competent to decide the application of muslim divorced women under section 125 Cr.P.C. viii. The court proceeding under section 125 Cr.P.C. if is of the opinion that the matter relates to reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to divorced muslim women it would be open to him to treat the application under MWP Act instead of rejecting the same because the proceeding under section 125 Cr.P.C. and claim made under MWP Act could be tried by one and the same court.

reported/published in http://elegalix.allahabadhighcourt.in/elegalix/WebShowJudgment.do HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH  Reserved AFR High Court of judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow District- Lucknow Writ Petition No. – 4909 (M/S) of 2008 Rafiquddin son of Raisul Zama, resident of Village and post Vaishpur, P.S.-Mandhata, District Pratapgarh. ………………… Petitioner Vs. 1. Kishwar Jehan, daughter of Sri Habibur … Continue reading

SERVICE MATTER = where the respondent allegedly worked in the College as part- time Lecturer without any appointment letter and without any selection process. Since the Society never issued any letter of appointment a letter of termination was also not served upon the respondent. 25. As stated above, in the absence of any appointment letter, issued in favour of the respondent as he was temporary/part-time lecturer in the College, there cannot be any legitimate expectation for his continuing in the service.. This was the reason that when in the years 1995 and 1996, two persons were appointed one after the other on the post of Lecturer in History, the respondent did not challenge the said appointments. Even assuming that the respondent was permitted to work in the College as part-time lecturer for some period, the action of the management of the college asking him to stop doing work cannot be held to be punitive. The termination simplicitor is not per se illegal and is not violative of principles of natural justice. 26. After giving our anxious consideration in the matter and analyzing the entire facts of the case, we are of the view that the impugned order passed by the Education Appellate Tribunal and the High Court cannot be sustained in law and are liable to be set aside. 27. For the reasons aforesaid, these appeals are allowed and the impugned orders are set aside.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2948 OF 2013 (Arising out of the Special Leave Petition (C) No.27031 of 2011) B.T. Krishnamurthy …. Appellant (s) Versus Sri Basaveswara Education Society & Ors. ….Respondent (s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2949 OF 2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition( … Continue reading

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 309 – Prayer for stay of criminal proceedings pending probate case – Criminal case alleging the Will to be forged – HELD: Primacy has to be given to criminal case over civil case – Orders of courts below declining to stay criminal proceedings need no interference, in view of the fact that criminal case was instituted much prior to initiation of probate proceedings and because of the conduct of the appellant and the stage in which the probate proceedings are pending – Practice and Procedure – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.41 – Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 136. Evidence Act, 1872: s. 41 – Pendency of probate case – Its effect on criminal case alleging the will to be forged – Held: Pendency of two proceedings, whether civil or criminal, by itself would not attract the provisions of s. 41 – A judgment has to be pronounced – The genuineness of the will must be gone into – s. 41 would become applicable only when a final judgment is rendered – On facts, courts below rightly declined to stay criminal proceedings – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.309. The appellant filed an application before the Sub-Registrar, Hazaribagh, Jharkhand for registration of a will dated 3.5.1998 stated to have been executed by one Mst. `SA’, and applied before the Delhi Development Authority for grant of mutation in respect of a property in Delhi on the basis of the alleged will. Mst. `SM’, the daughter of Mst. `SA’ also made an application to the DDA for grant of mutation in respect of the Delhi property in her favour. Mst. `SM’ filed a civil suit in Patna questioning the genuineness of the will dated 3.5.1998,and also filed a criminal complaint u/ss 420/468/444/34 IPC in Delhi against the appellant alleging the will dated 3.5.1998 as a forged one. The appellant filed an application for grant of probate in respect of the will dated 3.5.1998 before the Jharkhand High Court u/s 276 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The appellant first filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court seeking to quash the criminal proceedings and on its dismissal filed an application u/s 309 Cr.P.C. before the Metropolitan Magistrate seeking stay of the proceedings in the criminal case. The said application was dismissed. Appellant’s revision petition also having been dismissed by the High Court, he filed the instant appeal. Meanwhile Mst. `SM’ died after having executed a will in favour of respondent no.2, and the Delhi property was mutated in his name. He was impleaded as respondent no.2 in the appeal. It was contended for the appellant that a judgment in probate proceedings being a judgment in rem as envisaged u/s 41 of the Evidence Act, the criminal proceedings should have been directed to be stayed. =Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. Section 41 of the Evidence Act, 1872 would become applicable only when a final judgment is rendered. Rendition of a final judgment which would be binding on the whole world being conclusive in nature would take a long time. As and when a judgment is rendered in one proceeding subject to the admissibility thereof keeping in view s.43 of the Evidence Act may be produced in another proceeding. It is beyond any cavil that a judgment rendered by a probate court is a judgment in rem. It is binding on all courts and authorities. Being a judgment in rem it will have effect over other judgments. A judgment in rem indisputably is conclusive in a criminal as well as in a civil proceeding. [Para 12] [1034-D-G] Surinder Kumar & Ors. vs. Gian Chand & Ors. AIR 1957 SC 875; Sardool Singh & Anr. vs. Smt. Nasib Kaur 1987 (Supp.) SCC 146; Mt. Daropti vs. Mt. Santi 1929 Lahore 483 and Darbara Singh vs. Karminder Singh & Ors. AIR 1979 Punjab & Haryana 215 – referred to. Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai vs. Bhupen Champak Lal Dalal & Anr. (2001) 3 SCC 459, cited. 1.2. Pendency of two proceedings whether civil or criminal, however, by itself would not attract the provisions of s.41 of the Evidence Act. A judgment has to be pronounced. The genuineness of the Will must be gone into. Law envisages not only genuineness of the Will but also explanation to all the suspicious circumstances surrounding thereto besides proof thereof in terms of s.63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, and s.68 of the Evidence Act. [Para 13] [1038-C-D] Lalitaben Jayantilal Popat vs. Pragnaben Jamnadas Kataria & ors. 2009 (1) SCALE 328, relied on. 1.3. As noticed in several decisions of this Court, including two Constitution Bench decisions*, primacy has to be given to a criminal case over a civil case. If primacy is to be given to a criminal proceeding, indisputably, the civil suit must be determined on its own merit, keeping in view the evidences brought in it and not in terms of the evidence brought in the criminal proceedings. In the instant case, the FIR was lodged not only in regard to forgery by the Will but also on the cause of action of a trespass. Not only another civil suit is pending, but a lis in relation to mutation is also pending. [Para 10, 14 and 15] [1029-G; 1038-E; 1039-A] *M.S. Sheriff & anr. vs. State of Madras & Ors. AIR 1954 SC 397 and Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. vs. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 370, relied on. K.G. Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and Anr. (2002) 8 SCC 87 M/s Karam Chand Ganga Prasad & anr. etc. vs. Union of India & Ors. (1970) 3 SCC 694 and P. Swaroopa Rani vs. M. Hari Narayana @ Hari Babu AIR 2008 SC 1884, referred to. 1.4. Whereas the criminal case is pending before the Delhi court, the testamentary suit has been filed before the Jharkhand High Court. Since 2003 not much progress has been made therein. The Will has not been sent to the handwriting expert for his opinion, which is essential for determination of the question in regard to its genuineness. It is alleged that the Will was registered at Hazaribagh after the death of the testatrix. For the last seven years in view of the pendency of the matters before the High Courts in different proceedings initiated by the appellant, the criminal case has not proceeded, although charge-sheet has been filed and cognizance of the offence has been taken. Exercise of such a jurisdiction furthermore is discretionary. [Para 15] [1039-A-C] 1.5. In the facts and circumstance of the case, orders of the Metropolitan Magistrate and the High Court need not be interfered with. Firstly, because the criminal case was instituted much prior to the initiation of the probate proceeding and, secondly, because of the conduct of the appellant and the stage in which the probate proceedings are pending. Therefore, it is not a fit case where the Court should exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. [Para 15] [1039-D] Case Law Reference: AIR 1954 SC 397 relied on para 10 (2002) 8 SCC 87 referred to para 10 (1970) 3 SCC 694 referred to para 10 (2005) 4 SCC 370 relied on para 11 AIR 2008 SC 1884 referred to para 11 1987 (Supp.) SCC 146 referred to para 12 (2001) 3 SCC 459 cited para 12 AIR 1957 SC 875 referred to para 12 1929 Lahore 483 referred to para 13 AIR 1979 Punjab & Haryana 215 referred to para 13 2009 (1) SCALE 328 relied on para 13 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 416 of 2009. From the Judgment and Order dated 23.07.2008 of the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Revision No. 184 of 2005. Dinesh Dwivedi, S.K. Sinha, Manish Shanker and Prateek Dwivedi for the Appellant. A. Sharan, ASG, A.M. Singhvi, S.C. Maheshwari, Neera Gupta, Sadhna Sandhu, Anil Katiyar, Sandhya Goswami, H.C. Kharbanda and M.P.S. Tomar for the Respondent.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 416 OF 2009 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 5791 of 2005] SYED ASKARI HADI ALI AUGUSTINE IMAM & ANR. … APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE (DELHI ADMN.) & ANR. … RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Effect of … Continue reading

SARFAESI Act,=avail the alternative remedy available under law, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs.= it is to be noticed that under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, any person aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in Section 13 (4) by the secured creditor or his authorized officer has to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within 45 days from the date on which such measures had been taken. Against the order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, a further appeal lies under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act to the Appellate Tribunal. In the light of such efficacious alternative remedy available under the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, the petitioner cannot straightaway invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Hence the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on the said ground alone.

THE HON’BLE Ms. JUSTICE G. ROHINI WRIT PETITION No.19260 OF 2011   Dated: 08.07.2011 Between: 1. Ch. Vijay Thomas and another.          …                          Petitioners AND The State Bank of Hyderabad, RACPC, rep. by Its Manager, Ramanthapur, Hyderabad., And another.          …          Respondents                                       … Continue reading

service matter = Unless the suspension period is regularized treating the same as on duty by the disciplinary authority, the question of payment of difference of pay does not arise.

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C. BHANU WRIT PETITION No.17159 OF 2011 Dated:22.06.2011 Between: Challa Srinivas Rao                                          ..  Petitioner And The Chairman and Managing Director, Andhra Bank, Head or Central Office, Saifabad, Hyderabad and others                      ..  Respondents                                           THE HON’BLE … Continue reading

SARFAECI Act,=This writ petition is misconceived. There is no cause of action for the petitioner. The 2nd respondent, who is the husband of the petitioner, is the borrower. However, since the petitioner and her children are living in the house of the petitioner, the 1st respondent bank issued notice under Section 13 (2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for brevity ‘SARFAECI Act’) demanding to vacate the house for recovery of the loan amount availed her husband. Challenging the same, the petitioner approached this Court and filed the present writ petition.

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE GHULAM MOHAMMED AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G.SHANKAR Writ Petition No.3358 OF 2011 01-03-2011 Between: Smt. B.Jayapradha Reddy ……….Petitioner And State Bank of Hyderabad, Alakapuri Branch, rep. by its Branch Manager, Hyderabad and another. ………Respondents THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE GHULAM MOHAMMED AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.G.SHANKAR Writ Petition No.3358 OF … Continue reading

supervision services for implementing the law over the govt.=the Court has been monitoring the implementation of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short `the Act’). The Court has already passed several orders for constitution of Juvenile Justice Boards under Section 4 of the Act and Child Welfare Committees under Section 29 of the Act in different States and Union Territories

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 473 OF 2005 Sampurna Behura …..Petitioner Versus Union of India and Others …..Respondents O R D E R In this Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, the Court has been monitoring the implementation of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection … Continue reading

extraordinary delay in submitting physical handicap certificate to claim the reservation quota=it is too well settled to need any further reiteration that all appointments to public office have to be made in conformity with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In other words, there must be no arbitrariness resulting from any undue favour being shown to any candidate. Therefore, the selection process has to be conducted strictly in accordance with the stipulated selection procedure. Consequently, when a particular schedule is mentioned in an advertisement, the same has to be scrupulously maintained. There can not be any relaxation in the terms and conditions of the advertisement unless such a power is – 23 –

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION I.A. No. 5-8 IN CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8343-8344 OF 2011 [Arising out of S.L.P (C) No.20152-20153 of 2010] Bedanga Talukdar … Appellant VERSUS Saifudaullah Khan & Ors. …Respondents O R D E R 1. Leave granted. 2. These appeals are directed against the impugned judgment … Continue reading

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